Skip to main content

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Moderate Soft Tissue Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Adding to this site’s soft tissue injury damage archives, reasons for judgement were released earlier this year by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing damages for chronic moderate soft tissue injuries imposed on a pre-existing condition.
In the recent case (Graydon v. Harris) the 65 year old plaintiff was injured when his vehicle was struck by a large industrial garbage truck.  The Defendant was found fully at fault for the collision.  The Plaintiff suffered from pre-existing neck pain and headaches due to a degenerating spine.  The Collision resulted in soft tissue injuries which aggravated these issues.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $60,000 Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:
 
[67]         Based upon the evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff is a very stoic and hardworking man who has suffered a moderate soft tissue injury to his neck, lower back and shoulders as a result of the October 25, 2007 accident.  I also find that, at the time of the October 25, 2007 accident, the plaintiff was suffering from pre-existing neck pain, headaches and a degenerative condition of the cervical spine.  That is why Dr. Koelink was continuing to prescribe Tylenol 3 for him.  The soft tissue injuries suffered during the October 25, 2007 accident exacerbated his pre-existing condition.
[68]         Despite some inconsistencies in his evidence, I find that the plaintiff’s injuries have had and will have a lasting effect on his work life and, to a lesser degree, on his home and recreational life.  He continues to be able to work but not without pain and discomfort.  He continues to have headaches which flare up when he is welding. 
[69]         He is able to travel both for vacation and work without adverse effects with the exception of occasional numbness in his left leg after sitting for prolonged periods of time.  However, as Dr. Craig testified, that discomfort can be eased by changing position.
[70]         The plaintiff was suffering from pain, headaches and a degenerative condition of the cervical spine well before the October 25, 2007 accident.  In my view, there is at least a 25% chance that the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition would have interfered with his work and other activities had the October 25, 2007 accident not occurred.
[71]         After considering all of the plaintiff’s circumstances, the principles set out in Stapley and the cases provided by counsel, and after applying a 25% contingency in respect of the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition, I find that an award of $60,000 for non-pecuniary damages is appropriate.

$45,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For 4 Year Soft Tissue Injury With Good Prognosis

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases. 50 Comments on $45,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For 4 Year Soft Tissue Injury With Good Prognosis

Adding to this site’s archived soft tissue injury caselaw assessments, reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a chronic soft tissue injury with an ultimately good prognosis.
In the recent case (Chingcuangco v. Herback) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision for which she was not at fault.  She suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck and back which continued to pose problems at the time of trial.  Despite their long duration the prognosis for full symptom recovery was good with the Court finding they would resolve within a further 5 years.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $45,000 Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:
[197]     The plaintiff felt some immediate pain in her chest and right toe after the accident.  She had no loss of consciousness.  X-rays taken at the hospital shortly after the accident were negative.  As the days and weeks progressed, she developed debilitating pain in her neck and lower back, with resulting headaches.  She had bruising on her chest and abdomen.  She was unable to go to work at CRA for two weeks.
[198]     The bruises and the pain she suffered in her chest and right toe pain resolved completely within six weeks.  Although she thought her lower back pain had resolved by the end of 2009, she has since experienced severe flare-ups several times since then.
[199]     The plaintiff has tried various modalities of treatment.  They have provided temporary but not permanent relief.  The plaintiff continues to experience persistent pain and muscle spasms.  She will continue to have episodic flare-ups of pain in her lower back and cervical spine with associated headaches.  I am satisfied that such episodes have been and will continue to be the result of the injuries she suffered during the September 15, 2008 accident…
[201]     I find that the plaintiff suffered a Grade II whiplash injury as a result of the September 15, 2008 accident.  She also suffered contusion injuries to her chest and lower abdomen, chest wall strain and a chipped tooth.  Over four years have passed since the accident and she still suffers from intermittent neck and lower back pain and tension headaches as a result of the accident.
[202]     I find that it is reasonable to expect the plaintiff will be fully recovered within five years.  In part, I make this finding on the basis that the plaintiff is an achiever.  Dr. Mergens gave evidence that she might still suffer some muscle tension headaches for an indefinite period.  He did say these symptoms may dissipate with time and conditioning.  However, there is no reasonable prospect of permanent impact upon her capabilities.
[203]     After considering all of the evidence, the submissions of counsel and the case authorities, I find that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in this case is $45,000.

Defence Psychiatrist Rejected for Basing Opinion on "Facts That Are Wrong"

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

In my continued effort to highlight judicial scrutiny of expert witnesses, reason for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, rejecting an expert psychiatric opinion.
In last week’s case (Moritz v. Schmitz) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 collision.  She was 17 years old at the tine and “was a healthy teenager“.  The collision caused chronic soft tissue injuries along with a worsening of pre-existing psychological difficulties.  The Court awarded $80,000 for the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages.
In the course of trial the Defendant called a psychiatrist who provided an opinion that the collision was not the cause of the Plaintiff’s aggravated pscyhological difficulties.  In rejecting this opinion Madam Justice Gropper provided the following critical comments:
[70]         Dr. Solomons goes on to suggest that, in his opinion, it is “most likely that the course of her psychiatric difficulties after the accident was related to stressors unrelated to the accident”, referring to matters that occurred prior to the motor vehicle accident. He then concludes that the plaintiff would have experienced the same symptoms even if the accident had not occurred. Again, Dr. Solomons does not provide a foundation for his opinion that the problems Ms. Mortiz faced before the accident are of greater significance than those she faced because of the accident. He was aware that the plaintiff suffered from physical injuries but he does not turn his mind to whether those injuries may have affected her psychiatric functioning.
[71]         Dr. Solomons does not explain his emphasis on pre-accident events. This same observation in respect of Dr. Solomon’s emphasis on pre-accident events was made by Mr. Justice Willcock in Jokhadar v. Dehkhodaei, 2010 BCSC 1643 at para 135:
Further, there is no reason, in my view, to regard stressors other than the car accident as more compelling or predominant. Dr. Solomons, in reaching that conclusion, ignored clear evidence of the significance of the accident.
[72]         I also note that Dr. Solomons’ final paragraph under the “Opinion” section of his report is based on “facts” that are wrong. He says Ms. Moritz was “psychiatrically disabled before the accident and was not working at the time of the accident.” He fails to note that she was 17 years old and in grade 12 at the time of the accident. She was not psychiatrically disabled from working. He says that “[s]he had no psychiatric requirement for time off work as a result of the accident since she was already on long term psychiatric disability … .” Again, she was not off work because of her psychiatric disability before the accident; nor was she on long-term psychiatric disability. In all of the circumstances, I am unable to accept Dr. Solomons’ opinion.

Subjective Soft Tissue Injuries and Judicial Scrutiny

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Last year I criticized the often recited judicial passage stating that ““…the Court should be exceedingly careful when there is little or no objective evidence of continuing injury and when complaints of pain persist for long periods extending beyond the normal or usual recovery…”  and pointing out that these comments should no longer be used given Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons in FH v. McDougall.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court (Prince v. Quinn) addressing a Court’s role when dealing with subjective injuries.  Mr. Justice Williams provided the following comments which, in my view, would do well to substitute the above passage in the context of a chronic soft tissue injury case:
[25]         With respect, as regards this latter point, it seems to me that this is an approach that must be considered with care. Taken to its ultimate conclusion, it would, in many cases, quite unfairly put a plaintiff in a position where proving a claim would be exceedingly difficult and verging on impossible.
[26]         In my view, the point to be observed is this: where a plaintiff’s claim is founded quite substantially on self-reported evidence, it is necessary for the trier of fact to scrutinize the plaintiff’s evidence carefully and evaluate it in the light of other evidence, such as the circumstances of the collision, other relevant information concerning the plaintiff’s activities and statements made by the plaintiff on other occasions. However, where the evidence of physical injury is substantially based on subjective evidence – the testimony of the plaintiff – that should not constitute an effective barrier to proof of a claim.
[27]         In the final analysis, it is the court’s duty to examine the evidence carefully and critically. That is what I have done in this case.

$40,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for "Mild, Intermittent, Indefinite" Soft Tissue Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a long term soft tissue injury.
In the recent case (Sahota v. Ho) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2001 collision.  He was 9 years old at the time.  He suffered soft tissue injuries which continued to be symptomatic.  Although the Court rejected the Plaintiff’s characterization as to the severity of his symptoms the Court accepted they were on-going and would continue indefinitely   In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $40,000 Mr. Justice Cohen made the following findings:
[185]     Thus, I find as follows:
(1)      the plaintiff sustained injuries to his head, abdomen and neck as a result of the accident on September 29, 2001.  The plaintiff’s injury to his head and abdomen resolved shortly after the accident.  The plaintiff continued to experience occasional headaches, but this symptom has also since resolved.  The plaintiff’s neck pain is on-going and will likely continue indefinitely;
(2)      the plaintiff’s injury to his neck was a mild, soft tissue injury.  The evidence from the clinical records of Dr. Chua is that from both a subjective and objective point of view, he noted “mild” with respect to what the plaintiff reported to him and what he found upon examination.  He also conceded in cross-examination that he did not ever use the terms “moderate” or “severe” in his clinical records.  In my opinion, the plaintiff’s complaints regarding his neck pain were not as severe as described by the plaintiff and his father in their testimony.  I do not agree with the plaintiff’s position that the plaintiff’s neck is appropriately characterized as a “moderately severe cervical strain” as stated by Dr. Chua in his August 2007 report; and
(3)      the neck pain experienced by the plaintiff was intermittent, rather than every day or “constant” as the plaintiff and his father insisted.  If the plaintiff or his father had reported to Dr. Chua that the plaintiff experienced neck pain every day, or that the plaintiff’s neck pain was “constant”, then Dr. Chua would have written this description in his clinical records.  Instead, Dr. Chua recorded that the pain was “on and off” or “recurrent”, terms which are not synonymous with the word “constant”.   Furthermore, those terms were used elsewhere in Dr. Chua’s clinical records in reference to other symptoms that do not support such an interpretation.  I also prefer the testimony of Ms. Porter to that of the plaintiff’s father regarding whether the plaintiff experienced improvements in his condition over the period of time following the accident.  Her testimony is in keeping with the evidence of Dr. Chua who mentioned in his report of August 2002 that the plaintiff had improved from his injuries…
[202]     I am mindful that the plaintiff continues to be symptomatic and that his neck pain is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.  However, given my findings on the chronicity and severity of the plaintiff’s pain, in the context of the evidence regarding the extent of the suffering and inconvenience experienced by the plaintiff following the accident, I find that a fair award to him for general damages is $40,000.

Vague Evidence Leads to Significant Rejection of Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

In a demonstration that detailed evidence is important when advancing a personal injury claim for damages at trial, reasons for judgemet were published last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, largely rejecting a claim due to “vague” plaintiff evidence.
In last week’s case (Kartouchine v. Coons) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision.  He suffered soft tissue injuries and sought approximately $70,000 in damages at trial.  Madam Justice Griffin rejected much of the Plaintiff’s claim and assessed modest non-pecuniary damages of $2,000.  In addressing the lack of detailed evidence the Court provided the following feedback:
[16]         Also starkly absent is what happened between the accident and the date of his affidavit of October 5, 2011.  Has he always had these periodic episodes of pain?  How often are they?  How is his lifestyle impacted?  How active is he day-to-day?  How do we know something else in his life or job has not occurred to cause these episodes? 
[17]         In short, the evidence of the plaintiff is so vague that it does not permit me to draw any conclusions in respect of the duration or severity of ongoing injuries.  He has not supplied sufficient detail to enable me to assess the probability that what he asserts is true.  His affidavit is an outline only which is not coloured in. 
[18]         Plaintiff’s counsel submits at para. 127 of the written submission:
127.     The medical expert reports document the plaintiff’s injuries showing several years of pain and stiffness which is intermittent but at times quite severe.  The affidavit of the plaintiff documents a continuing struggle over six-and-a-half years and his efforts at mitigation. 
[19]         I must take these submissions as rhetorical hyperbole rather than evidence?based. 
[20]         The medical evidence such as it is, does not support the plaintiff’s submissions.  The plaintiff does attach clinical records to his affidavit but these are largely illegible.  Nowhere in his affidavit does he say that the records accurately record his visits to doctors or his complaints made to the doctors.  There is no evidence that the clinical records accurately record observations made by the physicians either.  Simply appending them to his affidavit does not establish the truth of their contents.  I find them to be completely useless to support his case. ..
[42]         In conclusion, I do not find there to be sufficient medical evidence to persuade me that the collision caused the plaintiff to suffer long-term injuries causing him continued pain and suffering and the loss of enjoyment of life. 
[43]         Considering the factors influencing an award of non-pecuniary damages, I find that the evidence only supports the conclusion that the plaintiff suffered some minor inconvenience and discomfort as of the date of the accident when he felt it necessary to see his medical doctor.  I therefore award him $2,000 in non-pecuniary damages. 

LVI Defence, Liability Denial and Language Barriers Create Sufficient Reason to Sue in Supreme Court

Written by admin on . Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 14, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

While the BC Supreme Court Rules generally deprive a Plaintiff of costs who bring an action to trial that could have been brought in small claims court the BC Court of Appeal clarified that having ‘sufficient reason’ to sue in the BC Supreme Court is not limited to quantum of damages alone.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering some such other factors.
In this week’s case (Bae v. Vasquez) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2010 rear-end collision.  The Plaintiff suffered relatively minor soft tissue injuries.  She sued in the BC Supreme Court and was awarded damages of just over $12,000.  ICBC argued she should not be awarded costs as the action could have been brought in small claims court.  Madam Justice Baker disagreed finding that ICBC’s initial denial of liability, LVI Defence and the Plaintiff’s language barriers were all reasons justifying bringing the action in the Supreme Court.  In awarding costs the Court provided the following reasons:
[69]         I am satisfied that this case had neither legal nor factual complexities that made the Supreme Court a necessary venue.  I have already referred to the fact that a jury trial was not an option in any case; and there will be no need to enforce the judgment outside of the province.
[70]         In some cases, the fact that the plaintiff had difficulty with the English language; and therefore would have difficulty pursuing the claim without the assistance of counsel, has been held to be sufficient reason to proceed in Supreme Court, where the possibility of recovering costs makes it easier for a plaintiff to find counsel willing to act.
[71]         Plaintiff’s counsel submits also that in this case, the defendant denied liability for the accident in the Response to Civil Claim.  Plaintiff’s counsel has advised the Court that prior to the action being commenced, the defendant’s insurer had indicated:
…that due to the “minimal nature of the impact forces involved in the collision”…the Plaintiff had not sustained any “compensable injury”.
[72]         The defendant did not admit liability until January 30, 2012 and even at that date, continued to maintain that the plaintiff had suffered no injury, loss, damage or expense as a result of the accident.
[73]         Plaintiff’s counsel submits that because the defendant was maintaining that the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole cause of the accident, an examination for discovery of the defendant was necessary and that procedure would not have been available to the plaintiff in Provincial Court.  Counsel pointed out that at the plaintiff’s examination for discovery in July 2011, she was asked questions pertaining to liability, including whether she had consumed alcohol or drugs prior to the accident; whether she was familiar with the location where the accident happened; whether her vehicle had been properly maintained and was in proper working order and whether she had a valid driver’s licence at the time.
[74]         It was not until August 18, 2011 – after both the plaintiff and defendant had been examined for discovery – that defendant’s counsel wrote to plaintiff’s counsel suggesting that the action should be heard in Provincial Court and seeking the plaintiff’s consent to transfer the action to that court.  Plaintiff’s counsel replied on September 21, 2011 indicating that if the trial could be heard in Provincial Court in the same time frame as the trial date set in Supreme Court – March 2012 – then the plaintiff would consider the request for a transfer.  Defendant’s counsel was asked to make inquiries to determine when the trial could be heard if transferred to Provincial Court.  No reply was received.
[75]         Ms. Bae testified at trial with the assistance of an interpreter.  She had been examined for discovery without an interpreter and at trial indicated she had misunderstood some of the questions asked of her.  Ms. Bae is not an assertive individual and I am satisfied she would have had considerable difficulty pursuing this action without the assistance of counsel.  Of course, parties may be and often are represented by counsel in Provincial Court, but the unavailability of costs makes it more difficult to find representation.  There was a denial of liability in circumstances where normally liability would be admitted and it was reasonable for the plaintiff to wish to examine the defendant for discovery on the issue of liability – a procedure unavailable in Provincial Court.
[76]         Taking all of these factors into account, I am of the view that there was sufficient reason for the plaintiff to bring her action in Supreme Court.  I award the plaintiff costs, the costs to be governed by Rule 15-1(15).

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic "Moderate" Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Adding to this site’s archives of soft tissue injury non-pecuniary awards, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, dealing with a chronic ‘moderate’ low back injury.
In last week’s case (Schafer v. Whitely) the plaintiff was involved in a 2010 collision.  Although liability was disputed the defendant was found fully at fault at trial.  The plaintiff suffered various injuries which improved by the time of trial with the exception of a low back injury of moderate severity which continued to pose problems.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 Mr. Justice Halfyard provided the following reasons:
[179]     There is no dispute about the nature of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the accident. She suffered minor injuries to her left knee and to her face, and experienced some headaches. These injuries, and the headaches, had resolved within a month or so after the accident.
[180]     I find that the plaintiff sustained injury to the soft tissues of the musculoskeletal structures of her neck and lower back. The injury to these structures has caused pain in the plaintiff’s neck and low back. By the time of trial, the plaintiff’s neck pain symptoms had resolved, but she continues to experience pain in her low back on an intermittent basis.
[181]     I find that the impact of the collision was violent and that the forces exerted on the plaintiff’s body were capable of causing, and did cause significant injury. Although the medical experts did not offer an opinion as to the severity of the injury, I find that the injury was at least moderate in severity…
[197]     In my opinion, having regard to the facts I have found, a fair and reasonable amount of damages for non-pecuniary loss would be $70,000, and I order that the plaintiff be awarded that amount under this head of loss.

Video Surveillance Erodes Personal Injury Claim; $4,000 Assessment for Modest Soft Tissue Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.


Although video surveillance is not always a useful tool in personal injury litigation, it sometimes is used effectively.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, illustrating such evidence assisting in challenging a personal injury claim.
In last week’s case (Berenian v. Primus) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision when he was travelling on foot and struck by the Defendant’s vehicle.  Although liability was disputed the defendant was ultimately found 100% at fault for the collision.
The Plaintiff sought damages for soft tissue injuries which he says took 18 months to clear.  He further advanced a claim that the injuries “have impacted his routine… because of them, he was not able to run in the usual fashion and it was in fact some time later that he was able to get back to his pre-accident routine“.
The Defendant “robustly disputed” this allegation and produced video evidence of the Plaintiff jogging in the month following the collision.  Mr. Justice Williams concluded that the injuries sustained in the collision were “fairly minor” and assessed non-pecuniary damages at $4,000.  In rejecting the claims of long-standing consequences from the injuries the Court provided the following comments:
50]         As part of its examination of the circumstances, the defence retained an investigator to observe the activities of the plaintiff. That resulted in video recordings being made; those were tendered in evidence at this trial. Those recordings show the plaintiff, on three separate occasions, leaving his downtown place of business and travelling on foot to the area of his residence in West Vancouver.
[51]         The first of those recordings was made on May 4. It shows the plaintiff as he slowly jogged from his place of business to his residence. On the way, he stopped and did some moderate physical exercise including push-ups. The elapsed time from his departure from his place of work to his arrival at his home was approximately 70 minutes.
[52]         Another recording was made the day following, May 5. Again, it shows similar activity; the elapsed time was 70 minutes.
[53]         The third observation was conducted on May 11. Again, the plaintiff is shown essentially jogging from his place of work to his home. The additional exercise was done along the way in the same fashion.
[54]         At trial, the plaintiff was confronted with this evidence, as well as testimony he had provided in the course of an examination for discovery, at a time when he was unaware of the recordings having been made. At the examination, he stated under oath that he had eased into his running gradually following the motor vehicle accident and had started running the entire distance from his place of work to his home approximately five to six months after the motor vehicle accident. He said that, post-accident, the trip would take him in the order of two hours, which he said was about 45-60 minutes longer than it had taken prior to the injury. His evidence at the examination for discovery was that his time to make the trip, prior to the motor vehicle accident, was in the order of 60-70 minutes.
[55]         At trial his testimony was different. He said that before the motor vehicle accident, he had been able to do the run and the en route workout in 40 minutes.
[56]         Quite predictably, the apparent discrepancy between these activities and the manner in which the plaintiff had represented his injuries and their effects was the basis of some real dispute at trial…
[68]         I am concerned with the veracity of the plaintiff’s claims regarding the extent, severity and effects of the injuries he suffered. The principal basis upon which the claim rests is his testimony, his description. There is not any notable objective evidence to support his assertions of the quite extensive nature of the consequences…
[70]         In the final analysis, I have very serious doubts as to the truth and reliability of the plaintiff’s description of the extent of the injuries and their impact upon him. My conclusion is that there was some soft tissue injury – bruising and discomfort – but it was fairly minor in that he was able to resume his running within a month. In view of that finding, while I accept there may have been some lingering residual discomfort, it would be of a fairly modest magnitude.
[71]         Similarly, as for his claims that his neck pain continued for 12 to 18 months, that the headaches persisted for six to eight months, and his complaint of low back pain, I find that he has not proven on a balance of probabilities that such injuries resulted in discomfort such as he describes. On the evidence, it was substantially less.

$60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Shoulder Soft Tissue Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases. 61 Comments on $60,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Shoulder Soft Tissue Injury

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, assessing damages for a chronic shoulder soft tissue injury.
In this week’s case (Jorgensen v. Coonce) the Plaintiff was injured in 2009 when the vehicle in which he was a passenger left the roadway and collided with some trees.  The defendant admitted fault.
The Plaintiff suffered a soft tissue injury to his shoulder which remained symptomatic at the time of trial and was expected to pose continued difficulties in the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $60,000 Mr. Justice Baird provided the following reasons:
[90]         In short, I conclude that the plaintiff suffers from chronic pain from a soft tissue injury in the area of his right shoulder sustained in the May 2009 accident. This injury is not related to the physical or functional deficits that the plaintiff continued to experience as a result of the April 2006 accident for which, as I have noted, the present defendant is not liable.
[91]         The May 2009 injury has impacted the quality of the plaintiff’s life in material measure. He has been unable to pursue his sporting and recreational activities. Worse still, his relationship with his children has suffered because of his physical limitations. He has also been affected, not only in his enjoyment of work, but in his capacity to perform his work adequately, and on all of the evidence I consider it possible that this reduced capacity played a role in his dismissal from long-term, secure, well-paying employment in the paving business…
[106]     Having due regard to the often cited factors articulated in Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34 at paragraph 46 and the observations of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Lindal v. Lindal, [1981] 2 SCR 629 at p. 637, and employing a discount in light of my findings respecting the plaintiffs pre-existing injury or condition for which the present defendant is not responsible, I have decided that an appropriate award for general damages in this case is $60,000