LVI Defence Rejected; Costs Awarded Despite Small Claims Quantum Judgement

In my continued effort to document judicial treatment of the LVI Defence, I summarize reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, yet again addressing and rejecting submissions based on this defence.
In last week’s case (Johnson v. Keats) the Plaintiff was injured in a low-speed rear end crash in Burnaby, BC.  The collision resulted in little vehicle damage.  The Plaintiff sustained soft tissue injuries of a relatively minor nature and claimed damages.
At trial the Defendant argued that the injuries were not connected to this low velocity collision.  Madam Justice Wedge disagreed and found the Plaintiff proved his case and awarded $16,000 in non-pecuniary damages.  In dismissing the LVI Defence the Court provided the following reasons:

[24] The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not established causation between the accident and his alleged injuries. The gist of the defendant’s position on causation was that it did not follow that the plaintiff, a strapping young man in reasonable physical shape, could suffer the alleged soft tissue injuries from such a low velocity impact.

[25] The difficulty with this argument is that there is simply no evidence to support it. The defendant did not have the plaintiff examined by a physician or call any evidence to suggest that low velocity impacts could not cause the kind of soft tissue injuries that the plaintiff claimed to suffer as a result of the accident.

[26] Moreover, the defendant did not put that theory to Dr. Lim when she testified. It was not suggested in cross-examination of Dr. Lim that Mr. Johnson was malingering or exaggerating his injuries.

[27] The defendant attempted to attack the plaintiff’s credibility by pointing to what I can only describe as minuscule discrepancies in his evidence.

[28] The plaintiff was a credible and even a quite remarkably low-key witness. He did not attempt to exaggerate his symptoms. His evidence was straightforward and matter of fact. He readily acknowledged he was sufficiently recovered after three weeks to return to light duties and in slightly less than three months was fit to take on the more strenuous labouring tasks of a longshoreman.

[29] Dr. Lim, too, gave forthright and factual evidence. She did not attempt to advocate on her patient’s behalf.

[30] In summary, I am satisfied the accident of March 12, 2009, caused the soft tissue injuries described by the plaintiff and his physician Dr. Lim.

The global damages awarded were below $25,000.  Despite this the Court awarded the Plaintiff costs finding there was sufficient reason to bring the claim in Supreme Court.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

…I am cognizant that the amount of the award falls within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court. However, the case law establishes that if there is sufficient basis for the plaintiff’s proceeding in this Court, this Court has discretion to depart from the provisions of the Rules limiting costs.

[50] I have considered the issue of costs carefully given the range of non-pecuniary damages for injuries of the nature suffered by the plaintiff. It was reasonable for him to bring his claim in this Court. Accordingly, it is reasonable and fair that the plaintiff receive his costs pursuant to Rule 15-1.

The Other Side of the "Low Velocity Impact" Coin


I’ve written many times about the so-called “low velocity impact” defence where Defendants argue that a crash with little vehicle damage can create only minimal (or perhaps no) injuries and compensation should be accordingly modest.  These arguments have been soundly defeated many times in Court.
The other side of the equation, however, holds equally true.  Just because a collision results in severe vehicle damage does not mean that a severe injury occurred.  It is the severity of injury, not the severity of impact, that really matters.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court addressing this.
In this week’s case (Currie v. McKinnon) the Plaintiff was involved in a fairly significant collision.  He was injured in the crash.  In support of his submissions for damages the Plaintiff stressed that this was “a very serious accident” involving “high speed”.  The Court noted that these facts are of little consequence.  In addressing the ‘serious accident’ submissions Madam Justice Adair provided the following comments:

[67] There is no dispute that Mr. Currie suffered some injuries in the accident.  Mr. Currie’s position is that he continues as of trial to suffer the effects of those injuries.  The defendants’ position is that the injuries suffered in the accident were relatively minor and had resolved within a short period.  The defendants say that, to the extent Mr. Currie continues to experience symptoms – particularly neck and back pain – as of trial, those symptoms are unrelated to the accident and are not caused by injuries suffered in the accident.

[68] Mr. Dahlgren, on behalf of Mr. Currie, argues that I should conclude Mr. Currie was seriously injured because he was involved in a “very serious accident,” involving a “high speed” collision and that resulted in substantial property damage.  However, these facts are not necessarily connected in any logical way to the nature and extent of Mr. Currie’s injuries, as Thackray J. (as he then was) pointed out (in a slightly different context) in Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236, at para. 5:

Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slips and falls.  Conversely, accidents causing extensive property damage may leave those involved unscathed.  The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court.  Objectivity is thus preserved and the public does not have to concern itself with extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.

The Court went on to conclude that the Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries which “substantially recovered” in one year and awarded non-pecuniary damages of $22,000.

$10,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for 4 Month Soft Tissue Injury; Costs Denied Under Rule 14-1(10)


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries sustained in consecutive motor vehicle collisions.
In last week’s case (Liu v. Thaker) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions, the first in October of 2007 and the second a month later.  Both collisions caused relatively minor soft tissue injuries which largely recovered in 4 months.  In assessing Non-Pecuniary Damages at $10,000 Mr. Justice Schultes made the following findings:

[58] On the whole I would say that the plaintiff’s case offered persuasive evidence of relatively minor soft-tissue injuries, rather than the unpersuasive evidence of more serious injuries that is sometimes seen in motor vehicle injury cases.

[59] I find that Mr. Liu did suffer the injuries that he described and that they were caused by the two accidents for which the defendants have admitted responsibility. These were soft-tissue injuries to the neck and shoulder which had largely resolved by the end of February 2009, about four months after the first accident…

[65] In all the circumstances, balancing the various factors, and having due regard to the range, but not being straight jacketed by it, I consider an award of $10,000 for non-pecuniary damages to be appropriate in this case.

Paragraphs 75-82 of the reasons for judgment are also worth reviewing for the Court’s reasoning in denying the Plaintiff costs findng there was no ‘sufficient reason’ to sue in Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-1(10).
Lastly, paragraph 56 is worth reviewing for the Court’s comments addressing the Defendant’s ‘low velocity impact’ testimony.  Mr. Justice Schultes provided the following criticism:
[56] Except as to the bare contours of his involvement in the first accident, I did not find Mr. Thaker’s evidence credible. He sought to portray the impact as so slight as to be virtually negligible — a mere touching of the vehicles, in his view. But he also sought to absolve himself of the responsibility of having caused the accident, even though liability has been admitted on his behalf. This suggested somewhat of a self-serving perspective on his part, which is at odds with the reality of the situation. It also made no sense to me, if the impact had been as trivial as Mr. Thaker claimed, that he would have asked Mr. Liu if he was okay afterwards, as he described. On his version of a mere touching between the vehicles, such an inquiry would have been completely unnecessary.

$35,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment For SI Joint Injury With Flare-Ups; LVI Defence Rejected

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a sacroiliac joint injury caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Bartel v. Milliken) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  Fault was admitted by the Defendant.  Although the Defendant challenged the Plaintiff’s credibility arguing she “is exaggerating her injuries and their effect” the Court rejected this submission and found the Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries which continued to flare with activity.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $35,000 Madam Justice Gerow provided the following reasons:

[26] It is apparent from a review of the whole of the evidence that Ms. Bartel suffered injuries to her neck and back in the accident which had resolved for the most part by February 2009, although she was still experiencing intermittent pain in her sacroiliac joint areas. Since then she has had flare-ups, the October 2009 incident being the most significant. Although there is some evidence of ongoing shoulder problems, the evidence is that Ms. Bartel suffered from shoulder problems prior to the accident. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that her ongoing shoulder problems are as a result of the motor vehicle accident.

[27] Both Dr. Kelly and Dr. le Nobel are of the opinion that Ms. Bartel’s prospect for full recovery is guarded. However, Dr. le Nobel is of the opinion that Ms. Bartel may have significant improvement if not complete resolution of her symptoms with injections into her back and an exercise program.

[28] Based on the evidence, I have concluded that Ms. Bartel suffered a moderate soft tissue injury to her neck, back and sacroiliac joint which resolved for the most part within seven months with occasional flare-ups. The injuries Ms. Bartel suffered have restricted her ability to engage in gardening and walking in the manner she could prior to the motor vehicle accident. It is likely there will be ongoing restrictions on her gardening as a result of the injuries…

[35] Having considered the extent of the injuries, the fact that the symptoms were largely resolved within seven months with occasional flare-ups and the ongoing restrictions on Ms. Bartel’s gardening, as well as the authorities I was provided, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non pecuniary damages is $35,000.

Another noteworthy aspect of the judgement was the Court’s rejection of the so called LVI defence.  The Defendant argued that since there was modest vehicle damage the injury itself was modest.  In rejecting this submission the Court provided the following comments:

[23] Finally, the defendants point to the fact that the accident was not severe enough to cause the ongoing symptoms Ms. Bartel complains of. The defendants’ proposition that a low velocity accident cannot cause any significant injury to a plaintiff has not been accepted in a number of cases, including Gordon v. Palmer (1993), 78 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236 (S.C.); Lubick v. Mei, 2008 BCSC 555; and Jackman v. All Season Labour Supplies Ltd., 2006 BCSC 2053. As stated in Gordon at paras. 4 and 5:

I do not subscribe to the view that if there is no motor vehicle damage then there is no injury. This is a philosophy that the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may follow, but it has no application in court. it is not a legal principle of which I am aware and I have never heard it endorsed as a medical principle.

Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slip and falls. Conversely, accidents causing extensive property damage may leave those involved unscathed. The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court. Objectivity is thus preserved and the public does not have to concern itself with extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.

[24] Although the severity of the accident is a factor that should be taken into consideration when determining whether Ms. Bartel suffered injuries in the motor vehicle accident and the extent of those injuries, it is not determinative of either issue. Rather the whole of the evidence must be considered in determining those issues.

Its Important to Know The Low End of the Range


When valuing a case for non-pecuniary damages its easy to cherry pick a few cases with similar facts and focus on the high end of potential damage awards.  While it is useful to be familiar with such authorities it is equally important to know the low end of potential damages as injuries are sometimes valued accordingly.  Knowing both ends of the risk spectrum helps make a more informed decision when valuing an injury claim.
With this in mind, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages on a very modest basis following a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Lee v. Dueck) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 so-called ‘low velocity impact’.  The Plaintiff was injured and some of her injuries lingered to the time of trial.  Madam Justice Gray found that the Plaintiff was “a straighforward witness who did not exaggerate“.  Despite this positive finding the Court concluded that the injuries were minor and that their consequences were not particularly significant.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $5,000 Madam Justice Gray provided the following reasons:

[35] In summary, Ms. Lee suffered minor soft tissue injuries in the accident. It was a relatively low velocity accident, but in Dr. Le Nobel’s opinion, Ms. Lee was at increased risk for more severe musculoskeletal consequences from physical trauma because she had increased ligamentous laxity in her joints. I accept that she suffered the injuries she has described. While she did not know whether her continuing problems were the result of the accident, I accept Dr. Le Nobel’s opinion that the injuries were likely caused by the accident.

[36] Ms. Lee suffered pain in her left ankle which resolved after about 10 days. She suffered pain in her right wrist which gradually improved and was gone by about seven months after the accident, except for flares of pain. The injuries caused her to substantially modify her cooking and housework for less than a month after the accident. She was a homemaker and her substantial modification to her work in the home was similar to a person who would take a couple of weeks entirely off work, and then gradually increase work.

[37] Since the accident, Ms. Lee has modified her activities to avoid heavy lifting and repeated twisting. Ms. Lee was essentially pain-free for about a year from the summer of 2010 to the summer of 2011, and after that she has suffered minor, brief flare?ups of pain with heavy lifting or frequent use of her wrist. She does not have pain or limitation of function on a daily basis. She is at risk for future flares of pain…

[51] In this case, Ms. Lee was 37 at the time of the injuries. The ankle resolved after about 10 days, and the wrist substantially resolved after about seven months. Ms. Lee has been left with chronic intermittent short?lived pain, which is triggered by heavy lifting and repeated twisting, but which she is able to avoid by modifying her activities to avoid those actions. This has not significantly affected her ability to work as a homemaker or in work or other activities that she is likely to pursue.

[52] In all the circumstances, a fair award for Ms. Lee’s non?pecuniary damages is $5,000.

Court Finds "LVI" Evidence Relevant But Not a Significant Consideration

In keeping with the ongoing trend of judicial criticism of ICBC’s ‘low velocity impact‘ defence (you can click here to access dozens of my archived posts detailing this) reasons for judgement were released earlier this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, confirming that while defendants are free to put evidence of minimal vehicle damage before the court, it likely is not a significant consideration.
In this week’s case (Gron v. Brown) the Plaintiff was involved in two rear-end collisions, the first in 2003, the second in 2008.  ICBC admitted fault on behalf of the rear drivers.  Both collisions were low velocity impacts.  ICBC stressed this evidence at trial.  Mr. Justice Brown found that despite the low impact of the crashes the Plaintiff did suffer injury.  The Court awarded $24,000 in non-pecuniary damages and provided the following practical critique of low velocity impact evidence:

[10] The defendants called two ICBC estimators, Mr. J. Hansen and Mr. J. Gali. Following the May 31, 2008 accident, they examined damage to the plaintiff’s Toyota Yaris and Mr. Godwin’s Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera.

[11] Mr. Hansen, who examined the Yaris, noticed some minor damage on the Yaris’s bumper cover and slight sheet metal distortion on the Yaris’s trunk lid.

[12] Mr. Gali, who examined the Oldsmobile, found minor damage to the strip moulding on its bumper. Mr. Godwin did not want to have it repaired.

[13] Neither estimator looked under the bumpers for damage, which, they granted, possibly could have been present.

[14] Low velocity impacts are common. Defendants often question the relationship between minimal vehicular damage and physical injuries claimed after low velocity impacts. In the case at bar, neither of the estimators ventured an opinion on the inherent potential for injury from the minimal physical damage they found after examining the vehicles nor claimed the expertise to do so, but as noted by Vickers J. at para. 15 in Kirsebom v. Russell, [1995] B.C.J. No. 359 (S.C.), the defendants are “entitled to argue in this or any other case that, because there has not been motor vehicle damage, there can be no injury.”

[15] Barrow J. endorsed this view in Makara v. Weihmann, 2005 BCSC 1757, where he said at para. 7:

[7]        I share this view. It follows that the extent of the damages to motor vehicles involved in a collision may well be relevant notwithstanding an admission of liability where the remaining issues make it so. In this case, the issues include whether the plaintiff suffered the injuries complained of in the accident or elsewhere. They include an assessment of the extent of the injuries generally. The nature of the collision is a relevant consideration in resolving these matters. It may not be a significant consideration, but it remains a relevant one. …

"The Pain Remains Real to the Victim" Despite Low Velocity Impact

In the latest judicial demonstration that the so-called Low Velocity Impact Defence is not the law, reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding damages following a motor vehicle collision.
In yesterday’s case (Sun v. Sukhan) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 rear end collision.  Fault was admitted by the rear motorist.  The collision caused very little vehicle damage.  The Defendant stressed this during trial.  Madam Justice Maisonville provided the following reasons addressing the value of this evidence:

[22] The damage to the vehicle was described by the assessing adjuster, with respect to the bumper, as a plastic face all warped, and a gross total damage of $927.31 was found including all taxes. Total labour costs were estimated to be $607.20.

[23] From the pictures that were put in evidence on the summary trial, the vehicle appeared to have sustained only minor damage, but again that does not mean that the plaintiff did not suffer genuine injuries, nor is it the case that with soft tissue injuries there is always a physical presentation that can be seen or felt. The pain remains real to the victim of the accident, and his credibility is not an issue on this application.

The Court went on to find that the collision caused soft tissue injuries that largely resolved after 21 months but continued to occasionally flare.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $20,000 the Court provided the following reasons:

[55] In all of the circumstances, I find while the plaintiff’s injuries had largely resolved within one year and nine months, he has some ongoing complaints of pain, coupled with his inability to perform certain activities as a consequence of his fear of causing flare-ups to his lower back such as carrying heavy objects.

[56] Taking evidence as a whole, I find that the plaintiff has, on a balance of probability, proved he was injured from this accident for one year and nine months and that he presently has some minor complaints on occasion relating to his lower back and neck, but that these are not preventing the plaintiff from enjoying his pre-accident state of health and activity level.

[57] I award the following:  Non-pecuniary  damages: $20,000

For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts addressing ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact Policy.


Is the "Low Velocity Impact" Defence Unethical?


The Law Society of BC’s Winter Benchers’ Bulletin is now out and available here.  As always there are many good tips and reminders to help keep out of ethical hot water.
Among the various tips is a reminder to litigators that encouraging reasonable settlement is a must.  Specifically the Law Society published the following reminder:

Chapter 8, Rule 1(a) of the Handbook prohibits lawyers from instituting or prosecuting proceedings that, although legal in themselves, are clearly motivated by malice on the client’s part and are brought solely for the purpose of injuring another party. Rule 4.01(2)(a) is the counterpart to Rule 1(a) in the new BC Code. In addition, BC Code Rule 2.02(4) requires lawyers to encourage clients to compromise or settle a dispute on a reasonable basis.
Encouraging Compromise or Settlement
2.02(4) A lawyer must advise and encourage a client to compromise or settle a dispute whenever it is possible to do so on a reasonable basis and must discourage the client from commencing or continuing useless legal proceedings.
This led me to think about the Low Velocity Impact defence used in response to personal injury lawsuits.  I’ve discussed this many times.  In short the LVI Defence is an argument that a Plaintiff suffered no injury due to the minor nature of vehicle damage following collision.
This defence has been rejected numerous times in British Columbia with Courts stating that it has “no scientific justification“, a defence that does not follow “logic or legal principle” and is a “myth.  Given these findings is it fair to conclude the LVI Defence leads to a “useless legal proceeding“?  Is it unethical for counsel to run a trial based solely on the LVI defence?  As always, feedback and comments are welcome.

$20,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for "Minor Exacerbation of Pre-Existing Symptoms"

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for the aggravation of pre-existing injuries caused by a so-called Low Velocity Impact.
In today’s case (Pearlman v. Phelps Leasing Ltd.) the Plaintiff, a 77 year old retired lawyer, was involved in a 2007 collision.  He had pre-existing injuries from a 2004 collision and the Court found that these were exacerbated for a short while following the 2007 crash.  The Court expressed serious concern about the Plaintiff’s credibility with the following observation:
[3] The plaintiff’s credibility from the onset of the trial before me through to its conclusion dissipated like aspirin in a glass of water until all that remained was a murky, cloud-like substance. Amongst his many inconsistencies and exaggerations, the most shocking was that the testimony of his injuries in the trial before me was nearly identical to the testimony he gave at the 2008 trial, in which he blamed the 2004 Accident for all the problems he was experiencing in 2008.
Despite this the Court found that the Plaintiff did suffer injury in the 2007 crash.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $20,000 Madam Justice Kloegman provided the following comments:
[44] After having reviewed all of the exhibited medical records and reports, and after considering all of the viva voce testimony, it seems fair to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff experienced from the 2007 Accident an exacerbation of his pre-existing symptoms. However, it appears to have been minor and not long in duration. The plaintiff developed no new symptoms. He was back doing physical labour within a few days, and his complaints from that time to the present would likely have continued, regardless of the 2007 Accident. His pre-existing condition was well described by Dr. Baird and Dr. Keyes and there was no reliable, positive evidence to indicate that he developed some further injury of a permanent nature as a result of the 2007 Accident. It is telling, indeed, that the plaintiff’s statement of claim with respect to the 2004 Accident is almost identical to his statement of claim respecting the 2007 Accident…
[47] The case law indicates that a reasonable award of non-pecuniary damages for the plaintiff’s aggravated injury is in the range of $15,000 to $20,000 (Hough v. Wyatt, 2011 BCSC 910; and Dempsey v. Oh, 2011 BCSC 216). It is interesting to note that in both these other cases, the plaintiff was found to be lacking credibility and the Court was obliged to rely on the medical evidence to determine the cause of the plaintiff’s claims of injury. I find myself in a similar position, and on the evidence before me, I award the plaintiff $20,000 in total damages arising from the 2007 Accident.

Provincial Court BackLog Justifies Modest Injury Trials in BC Supreme Court


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff damages and costs for modest injuries following a motor vehicle collision.  Although the claim was straight-forward and damages were within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, the Plaintiff was awarded costs with Mr. Justice Burnyeat finding that the Supreme Court’s summary trial process is a reasonable alternative to the backlog litigants face in Small Claims Court.
In today’s case (Parmar v. Lahay) the Plaintiff sustained a modest whiplash injury as a result of motor vehicle collision.  ICBC ran the “Low Velocity Impact” defence arguing no compensation should be awarded.  The trial proceeded summarily and took less than one day.  The Plaintiff’s evidence was accepted and non-pecuniary damages of $12,000 were awarded.
The Court went on to award costs despite the modest quantum.  In doing so Mr. Justice Burnyeat provided the following reasons:

[9] I cannot reach the conclusion that the legal or factual complexity of the case, the need for discovery of documents and examination for discovery, and the need for a judgment enforceable outside of British Columbia are applicable reasons why this action was commenced in the Supreme Court of British Columbia rather than in Provincial Court.  However, I am satisfied that the summary trial procedure available in the Supreme Court and the availability of costs makes the Supreme Court a preferable and justified forum for this Action.

[10] I take judicial notice that this case reached the Court for decision much more quickly than if the Action had been commenced in the Provincial Court.  In this regard, I take judicial notice of the absence of a considerable number of judges at the Provincial Court level and the backlog in hearing matters that the failure to appoint more judges has produced.

[11] I also take into account the ability of the Plaintiff to have costs awarded in this Court but not in Small Claims Court.  In that that regard, I adopt the reasoning of Harvey J. in Zale v. Colwell, 2010 BCSC 1040, where he states:

In each of the above three decisions [Spencer v. Popham, supra; Faedo v. Dowell, 2007 BCSC 1985; and Kanani v. Misiurna, 2008 BCSC 1274] the primary reason for awarding the plaintiff costs, in circumstances not unlike these facing the plaintiff here, was the consideration that given the need to retain counsel to battle an institutional defendant, a reasonable consideration in determining the forum is the matter of indemnity for the costs of counsel.  (at para. 14)

[12] I also adopt the statement of Humphries J. in Kananisupra:

… in a situation where the defendant put the plaintiff to the proof of having suffered any injury at all, thus making her credibility a crucial issue at trial, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to require the assistance of counsel.  She was therefore justified in commencing the action in Supreme Court where she could hope to recover some of the costs it was necessary for her to expend in retaining counsel to recover the compensation to which she was found to be entitled. This reasoning has application here as well. (at para. 8).

[13] I take into account that it may well be economically unrealistic for counsel to be retained for up to three appearances in Small Claims Court where the damages sought are nominal.  This must be contrasted with the institutional defendant and its unlimited resources.  In an action in Supreme Court, counsel for a plaintiff is only required to appear once in Court if an application pursuant to Rule 9?7 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules is appropriate.  In the case at bar, the application has taken approximately one hour.

[14] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff should be entitled to his costs throughout on a Party and Party (Scale B) basis.

Contact

If you would like further information or require assistance, please get in touch.

ERIK
MAGRAKEN

Personal Injury Lawyer

When not writing the BC Injury Law Blog, Erik is the managing partner at MacIsaac & Company, based in Victoria, B.C. He is also involved with combative sports regulatory issues and authors the Combat Sports Law Blog.

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