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$125,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for TBI – Adverse Inference Discussed

Update March 21, 2014 – the Liability findings in the below case were upheld today by the  BC Court of Appeal
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Adding to this site’s ICBC Case Summary Archives, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, assessing non-pecuniary damages for a traumatic brain injury sustained in a BC vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Meghji v. Lee) the Plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while walking in a marked cross-walk in 2003.  Both the Defendant driver and BC Ministry of Transportation and Highways were found at fault for the crash.  The former for failing to keep a proper lookout while driving, the latter for designing the intersection at question with inadequate overhead lighting.  The driver was found 90% at fault with the Ministry shouldering 10% of the blame.
The Plaintiff suffered a fracture near her left shoulder, left elbow, ankle, knee and a traumatic brain injury.   The consequences of these were expected to cause permanent dysfunction.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $125,000 Mr. Justice Johnston provided the following reasons:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[134]Mr. Lee struck Ms. Meghji on her left side. That caused a significant fracture to Ms. Meghji’s left upper arm, a less significant fracture just below and into her left knee and an injury to her left ankle, all of which required immediate medical intervention. There were also the soft tissue injuries that would reasonably be expected to accompany such trauma.

[135]Within a day of the accident, Ms. Meghji had surgery to her left upper arm that involved the insertion of a rod that was fixed by screws just below her shoulder and just above her left elbow. She also had a screw placed into her left ankle…

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[270]Based upon the evidence of Dr. Ali and Mr. Brozak of the substantial change noted in Ms. Meghji during this time, as supported by similar observations from Ms. Chauncey’s and Ms. Wyeth’s description of Ms. Meghji’s abilities in her math class and as a teaching assistant before the accident, I conclude that Ms. Meghji has more likely than not suffered a brain injury in the accident, and that the combination of the effects of the brain injury and the depression and chronic pain disorder, which I also find was caused by the accident or flows from injuries suffered in the accident, are so inextricably intertwined that they cannot possibly be disentangled.

[271]In all of the circumstances, the defendants are ordered to pay Ms. Meghji $125,000 for non-pecuniary damages for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s application of the ‘adverse inference’ principle.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff’s lawyers had her assessed by a neurologist.  The neurologist did not tender evidence at trial.  Mr. Justice Johnston used his discretion to draw an adverse inference in these circumstances finding that the privately hired doctor likely did not have helpful evidence to give in support of the Plaintiff’s claim.  The court provided the following reasons:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[240]In ordinary circumstances, I would agree that a claim of litigation privilege should be sufficient explanation for the failure to produce evidence from an expert who examined a party, and no inference adverse to that party should be drawn from the failure to produce the evidence.

[241]However, where, as here, counsel has assumed control of medical management of a plaintiff’s injuries, the circumstances are not ordinary.

[242]Dr. Grimwood would ordinarily have been expected to coordinate Ms. Meghji’s treatment, including referrals to specialists as he thought advisable. In this case, Dr. Grimwood appears to have largely ceded that responsibility to Ms. Meghji’s counsel, largely because counsel were able to arrange examinations by medical specialists much sooner than could Dr. Grimwood.

[243]Where counsel becomes actively involved in arranging treatment, or in treatment decisions, or in selection of treatment providers to the extent that it becomes difficult or impossible to determine whether any particular doctor is involved for treatment purposes, or to advise counsel, the protective cloak of litigation privilege becomes tattered.

[244]In such circumstances, counsel and the party who permit the line between treating physicians and physicians retained to advise counsel to become blurred must accept some risk that the protection ordinarily afforded by litigation privilege might be lost.

[245]Ms. Meghji testified that she saw Dr. Cameron for headaches. In the face of that evidence, I infer, from the refusal to produce evidence from Dr. Cameron, that any opinion generated as a result of his examination of Ms. Meghji was not helpful to the claims she makes in this trial. I also infer that, while examining for headache, had Dr. Cameron observed any signs that suggested to him that Ms. Meghji had suffered a traumatic brain injury in the accident, his observations or opinion would have been produced at trial.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

UMP Arbitration Caselaw Summary: Non-Pecuniary Damages for Tibial Plateau Fracture

As previously discussed, when catastrophic injuries are sustained through the fault of an under-insured motorist most British Columbians enjoy Underinsured Motorist Protection “UMP”.
Sections 148.1 – 148.4 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation deal with UMP Claims.  When disputes arise as to the availability or the amount of UMP coverage the matter needs to be resolved through private arbitration as opposed to a public lawsuit.   The law requires all UMP decisions from 2007 onward to be published on ICBC’s website.  These cases, unfortunately, are published in PDF Format and they are not search friendly.  To remedy this I’ve decided to include UMP case summaries on this blog.  With that in mind here is the first in a series of UMP cases summaries.
The first UMP judgement published was RAH v. ICBC.  In RAH the Claimant was injured in a 2002 motor vehicle collision.   Fault was admitted.  It was agreed that the value of the claim would exceed the Defendant’s insurance limits and the parties agreed to have the value of the claim adjudicated by way of UMP Arbitration.

The Claimant suffered a comminuted fracture of the left medial and tibial plateaus.  These required surgical correction.   Unfortunately, even with surgical correction, the injury was so severe that the Claimant was left with “a marked disruption of the articular surface which accounted for on-going pain and inability to regain full movement of the left knee“.   The prognosis was for gradual worsening with a likelihood of a total knee replacement.   It was accepted that this injury would seriously impede the Claimant’s ability to earn a living and total damages of $681,000 were awarded.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $95,000 the arbitrator (Donald Yule) provided the following reasons:
The Claimant sustained severely comminuted medial and lateral tibial plateau fractures of the left knee.  He has undergone two surgeries, one to reduce the fractures with two plates and 10 screws and a second procedure to remove the hardware.  He faces the prospect of further surgery for a total knee joint replacement with a possible further revision 15 years later.  He has permanent on-going pain which will inevitably worsen over time until the first knee joint replacement surgery is done.  He has permanent loss of flexion of the left knee and knee joint replacement surgery will likely increase the loss of flexion.   He cannot return to his former occupation as industrial nurse/medic.  He cannot walk or sit for prolonged periods of time without causing an increase in left knee pain.   He takes non-morphine analgesics on a daily basis and occasionally Percocet for break-through pain.   He continues to use a cane.  Prolonged standing, walking on uneven surfaces, and going up and down stairs all aggravate his symptoms and will hasten the time when knee joint replacement surgery is required.  The claimant was physically active outdoors, apart from his work, before the Accident, both in the Scouting and Fourth Ranger groups and for recreational hiking, hunting, fishing and camping.  These activities except in a most limited and superficial manner, are now foreclosed to him…
…I assess the non-pecuniary damages at $95,000.
I should point out that this case was decided in 2008 and adjusting for inflation the assessment would be approximately $100,000.

$28,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Assessment for Patellofemoral Pain


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for an accident related knee injury.
In this week’s case (Battagliola v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp.) the Plaintiff was shopping in Wal-Mart in 2005 when a metal shelf struck her right knee.  Wal-Mart accepted that they were liable for the incident leaving only quantum of damages (value of the claim) at issue.
The Plaintiff suffered pain and discomfort in her knee following the incident and was diagnosed with patellofemoral pain (knee joint pain).  The symptoms lasted up until the time of trial but were expected to “slowly resolve over time“.
The Court accepted the injury was caused by the incident although expressed concerns that “the negative impacts are not quite as debilitating as asserted” and further that the Plaintiff’s “current limitations are not as severe as her personal account suggests“.  Non-Pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) were assessed at $28,000.  In reaching this assessment Mr. Justice Masuhara provided the following reasons:
[19] Dr. Pisesky opined in his report that Ms. Battagliola suffers from patellofemoral syndrome of the right knee and that the pain associated was brought about directly by the contusion to her right knee on February 15, 2005….
[22] He opined that Ms. Battagliola “will likely have some degree of discomfort in [her right] leg and findings associated with this of patellofemoral irritation indefinitely.” …
[25] The report of Dr. White concluded that upon his examination, Ms. Battagliola “probably had a blow and bruise to the right patella area in the indeterminate past.”  Based on the information he had as of the date of his report, he stated that Ms. Battagliola’s knee injury “should slowly resolve over time but may take a while yet.”…
[33] In considering the circumstances of this case, the age of Ms. Battagliola; the period of time over which her condition has continued; the medical evidence of Dr. Pisesky that symptoms will continue on indefinitely but that they can be controlled to a certain extent by his recommendations and that there should be a noticeable benefit with orthotics; and my finding that her pain is not as debilitating as indicated in the plaintiff’s case, I assess non-pecuniary damages as $28,000.

$155,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Agreement for Serious Knee Injury


Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing compensation for a serious knee injury following a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Stevanovic v. Petrovic) the Plaintiff was struck by a vehicle driven by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff was standing in the middle of a residential road when the Defendant approached in his vehicle.  The Plaintiff was friends with the Defendant and was expecting the Defendant to pick him up.  The Defendant attempted to show off and drive his vehicle dangerously close to the Plaintiff.  He miscalculated and struck the Plaintiff causing injury.  The Defendant denied fault but Mr. Justice Sigurdson found him entirely liable for the collision.
The parties were able to agree on several heads of damages including the claim for non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).   The balance of the trial focused on the Plaintiff’s damages for cost of future care and diminished earning capacity.
The parties settled the value of the pain and suffering claim at $155,000.   Since the issue was privately settled this case is not a true ‘precedent‘.  Despite this I thought this case would be worth summarizing given the relatively few precedents dealing with unique and complex knee injuries.  The Court made the following findings with respect to the severity and extent of the Plaintiff’s physical injury:

[88]         The purpose of the review of the injuries that the plaintiff suffered is not to revisit the issue of non-pecuniary damages, which was agreed, but for the purpose of the assessment of his loss of earning capacity and cost of future care.

[89]         The injuries suffered by the plaintiff were summarized by Dr. Anton, a physiatrist, in his medical report of August 21, 2008:

1.         multiple injuries to the right knee including

(a)        a patellar dislocation with a residual osteocondral defect in the articular (joint) surface of the patella;

(b)        an impacted fracture of the lateral femoral condyle;

(c)        evulsion of the anterior cruciatr ligament from the tibial spine;

(d)        a lateral tibial-plateau fracture, and

(e)        a bucket handle tear in the anterior portion of the lateral meniscus;

2.         a closed head injury including a laceration, nasal fracture, and probable mild traumatic brain injury;

3.         a fracture of the proximal fibula of the right leg;

4.         an injury to the left shoulder involving the supraspinatis tendon of the rotator cuff and anterosuperior glenoid labrum; and

5.         multiple soft tissue injuries including a probable soft tissue injury to the cervical spine.

[91]         The plaintiff’s most serious physical injury was the damage to his right knee, which required surgery on four occasions by Dr. Pierre Guy, an orthopaedic surgeon.  The plaintiff also required shoulder surgery in 2008 by Dr. Gilbert, which surgery was successfully completed.  In more recent times, the plaintiff has developed and has complained of hip pain.

[92]         The knee injury was described by the doctors as serious and complex, and is significant for the loss of earning capacity claim, because it affects and continues to affect his ability to bend his knee, go up or down stairs, or crouch, squat, kneel, or run without pain.  As a result of his knee injury, notwithstanding the successful surgeries, it is now apparent, with his knee pain, and difficulty crouching and bending, that he would not be able to continue employment as a copier repair person, which was what he had done at RISO before the accident.

[93] I find that the plaintiff continues to suffer from pain to his knee and that further surgical options are limited until much later.  A total knee replacement at a much later age appears to be the only possible surgical solution to deal with ongoing pain and discomfort.

Wage Loss Claims for Stay-At-Home Parents Intending on Returning to the Workforce


Although stay-at-home parents are becoming less and less common many parents still take several years away from the workforce to raise their children in their infant and pre-school years.  Often times these parents intend to return to work after their children attend school on a full time basis.
When a parent in these circumstances becomes disabled from working due to the fault of another can they make a claim for loss of income in their tort action?  The answer is yes provided there is evidence establishing  a likelihood of returning to employment absent the accident related disability.   Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In last week’s case (Carr v. Simpson) the Plaintiff was seriously injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  The Defendant admitted fault and further admitted that the crash injured the plaintiff but took issue with the value of her claims for various damages including for income loss.
The Plaintiff, a 39 year old mother of three at the time of the collision, was out of the workforce for several years prior to the crash.  She spent these years working as a home-maker and raising her children.  She undertook some modest employment as a house cleaner shortly prior to the crash.  Following the crash she became disabled and did not return to any work from the time of the crash to the time of trial.
The Court accepted the Plaintiff sustained serious, permanent and partly disabling injuries due to the crash.  The Plaintiff sought damages of $84,000 for lost income from the time of the crash to the time of trial.  She argued that she had planned on returning to the work force once her children became school-aged (which was around the time of the crash) but was precluded in doing so as a result of her injuries.  The Defendant disagreed arguing that the Plaintiff suffered only a modest loss of income because of her “inconsistent work history (and) lack of incentive to work because of income from other sources.
Mr. Justice Bernard sided with the Plaintiff and awarded her most of what she sought for past income loss.  In doing so the Court provide the following useful reasons addressing the reality that parents that leave the workforce to raise young children can still succeed in an income loss claim:

[132]     I reject the notion that Ms. Carr’s unemployment history during her child-rearing years made her return to the workforce less realistic or less likely. Ms. Carr did not harbour fanciful ideas about her capabilities, her income-earning potential, or her opportunities for employment. When her youngest child reached school age, Ms. Carr was relatively young, energetic, able-bodied, willing to work hard, prepared to accept modest wages in exchange for her labours, and was fortunate to have a brother who could offer her steady, secure, and reasonably well-remunerated employment.

[133]     The evidence establishes that Ms. Carr, shortly before the collision, was motivated to earn some income (e.g., from housecleaning) until her youngest child was enrolled in school; thereafter, she planned to seek more fulsome employment. I do not accept the defence submission that Ms. Carr lacked the incentive and/or need to earn an income; to the contrary, since she has been unable to work because of her injuries she has, with some reluctance, turned to her mother for ongoing loans of relatively large sums of money, just to get by.

[134]     Ms. Carr became a single parent as of June 1, 2005. I find it highly likely that this new status would have impelled her to take the employment her brother offered, and to do so immediately. Her newly poor economic circumstances would have necessitated that Ms. Carr make child-care arrangements to bridge the time until her youngest child was in school in September 2005, and would have motivated her to work as many hours as she could manage as a single parent. Similarly, I am satisfied that she would have made any necessary arrangements for the care of her father.

[135]     I also find it is highly likely that Ms. Carr, as an employee of her brother, would have worked the hours and received the rates of pay assumed by Mr. Bush in his calculations. I find it is most unlikely that the seasonal aspect of the work would have reduced Ms. Carr’s overall income. Any shortage of work in the slow season would be offset by the demands of the busy season, and I am satisfied that Ms. Carr would have adjusted her life, accordingly.

[136]     While I am unable to agree with the plaintiff’s submission that in the determination of past wage loss there should be no reduction for negative contingencies, I am satisfied, for the relatively predictable period in question, the reduction must be minor.

[137]     Having regard for all the foregoing, I assess the plaintiff’s past wage loss at $75,000.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of non-pecuniary damages.  The Plaintiff sustained numerious injuries including soft tissue injuries to her neck and upper back, Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, headaches and dizziness, a right hand and wrist injury which required surgery, a meniscus tear that required surgery, low back pain and depression related to chrobic pain.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 Mr. Justice Bernard provided the following reasons:

125]     Ms. Carr has, at age 44, many years ahead of her. As a result of the defendant’s negligence, Ms. Carr has been permanently partially disabled and left with constant and chronic pain. Since the collision, Ms. Carr has undergone two surgeries and endured considerable pain and discomfort. Ms. Carr has developed TOS and surgery is not recommended. She suffers from clinical depression related to the negative effect her injuries has had upon her, her family, and her way of life. Ms. Carr’s mental acuity and concentration has slipped. Ms. Carr’s marriage ended six months after she sustained her injuries. Her husband was unsympathetic and frustrated by her lack of desire for sex due to her discomfort. Ms. Carr has been rendered unemployable for most jobs in a competitive market. She is now unable to enjoy most leisure activities and active social pursuits with her children. She has a special fondness for horses and gardening, but meaningful participation in activities related to these interests is no longer feasible. Ms. Carr has lost much of the satisfaction from gainful employment, and the purpose and dimension it gives to life. In short, the negligence of the defendant has had a profoundly negative and lasting impact upon Ms. Carr.

[126]     I agree with the plaintiff’s position that the Djukic case is most similar of the proffered cases on its facts. I also agree with the defendant’s submission that Ms. Djukic’s pain was more severe than that of Ms. Carr; otherwise, I am persuaded that Djukic a useful reference point for the upper end of a general damages award in this case; and that Cimino is instructive in determining the lower end.

[127]     Having regard to all the foregoing, I assess Ms. Carr’s general damages at $100,000.

$75,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Ruptured Posterior Cruciate Ligament


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Port Alberni Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $220,000 in total damages for injuries and loss sustained as a result of a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Haley v. Gust) the Plaintiff was operating her motorcycle when she was struck by a left-turning motorist.  The Defendant admitted full fault for the crash.  The trial focused on the extent of and value of the Plaintiff’s injuries.
The Plaintiff’s most serious injury was a tear to her posterior cruciate ligament in her left knee.  The injury was expected to lead to long term pain and limitations with the possibility of a total knee replacement in the years to come.  In awarding the Plaintiff $75,000 for her non-pecuniary damages Madam Justice Dardi made the following findings about the extent of the injury and it’s interference with the Plaintiff’s life:
[50] In summary, I find that the March 4, 2007 accident caused Ms. Haley permanent and significant injury to her left knee and the rupture of her PCL. I accept that surgical repair is not a viable option. I accept that she experiences pain on occasion and that the damage to the PCL may cause her knee to fail under stress or when she performs highly strenuous activity. I also accept that she faces a realistic prospect of developing osteoarthritis of the joint and of requiring a total knee replacement in the future…
[57] She is currently 38-years-old and has suffered a permanent injury to her knee. Her injuries, while not catastrophic, are very real. As a result of the accident she clearly has suffered pain and a loss of enjoyment of life, and she will no doubt continue to do so. As well, as referred to earlier, she faces the realistic prospect of osteoarthritis, and in Dr. Leete’s opinion, it is more likely than not that she will require a total knee replacement in 20 to 25 years….

60] While she attempts to remain as active as possible (she now participates in “quadding”), she remains limited when compared to her pre-accident activities. Since the accident, she has become very cautious about any activity that might injure her knee. She is no longer able to participate in mini-triathlons and dirt-biking with her family. She cannot ski or participate in water sports. It is likely she will continue to be restricted for the rest of her life to some degree in respect of the scope of the activities she would have enjoyed but for the accident.

[61] I have also considered as a factor in my assessment the adverse emotional impact of Ms. Haley’s inability to pursue a line of work which she clearly enjoyed…

[65] Having reviewed all of the authorities provided by both counsel, and in considering all of Ms. Haley’s particular circumstances, I conclude that a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages is $75,000.

$135,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded for Multiple Orthopaedic Injuries


(Illustrations provided courtesy of Artery Studios Ltd.)
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $426,000 in total compensation for injuries and losses as a result of a 2007 motor vehicle collision.
Fault for the collision was hotly contested in today’s case (Hildebrand v. Musseau) .   The Defendant was operating a pick-up truck.   The Plaintiff was operating a dirt bike.  The vehicles approached each other from opposite directions.  Both motorists gave evidence that the other was on the wrong side of the road as they approached.  Ultimately the Court concluded that the Defendant was in the Plaintiff’s lane of travel as the vehicles approached each other.  The Plaintiff took evasive measures but was unsuccessful and was struck by the Defendant’s truck.   The Defendant was found 90% at fault for the crash.
The Plaintiff suffered serious injuries including a fractured right ankle and right wrist.  Both of these required surgery.  The Plaintiff also fractured his left femur which required splinting along with various soft tissue injuries.  Some of the injuries, particularly the injury to the knee and ankle, were expected to pose long term problems for the Plaintiff.  In awarding $135,000 for the Plaintiff’ non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) Madam Justice Hyslop provided the following reasons:

[216]     The plaintiff is a young man who suffered three different broken bones in his body. He lost eight and a half months of work convalescing. He had surgery to repair his broken bones and eventually had further surgery in which to remove plates and screws. He was initially confined to a wheelchair, then walked with crutches and eventually a cane. Many of his recreational activities were curtailed, some of which have been curtailed permanently, particularly if they relate to high impact-type activities. He has lost some range of motion in his right ankle which is unlikely to improve. The prognosis for osteoarthritis in the right ankle in the long-term is moderate. His injuries have prevented him in part from pursuing some renovations he wished to do in his home. The plaintiff’s injuries, particularly his right ankle and right knee, affect his ability to carry heavy loads, climb stairs and ladders, squat or kneel for extended periods of time.

[217]     The plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was aged 21 and had recently been certified as a journeyman auto body repair technician, a trade to which he appears to be well-suited.

[218]     He has a permanent disability as it relates to his ankle which prevents him from pursuing activities that he pursued prior to the accident and he may have wished to pursue in the future.

[219]     I assess non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $135,000.00.

Pedestrian Struck in Cross Walk Found 75% At-Fault for Crossing Against "Don't Walk" Signal


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $10,000 for injuries and losses sustained in a cross-walk collision.
In today’s case (Furness v. Guest) the Plaintiff pedestrian was struck by the Defendant’s vehicle as he was trying to cross Nicol Street in Nanaimo, BC.  When the Plaintiff stepped off the curb to cross the street the “don’t walk” signal was flashing but he was not aware of this.  The Defendant was stopped in a tractor-trailer waiting for a green signal.  As the Plaintiff walked in front of the Defendant’s vehicle an advance green arrow illuminated permitting the Defendant to start driving.  The Defendant did not see the Plaintiff and struck him with his vehicle.
Both liability (fault) and quantum (value) were at issue in this trial.  Mr. Justice Halfyard held that the Defendant driver was careless for failing “to keep a proper lookout” and for failing to see the Plaintiff who was “there to be seen“.
The Plaintiff acknowledged that he was also partially at fault.  The Court was asked to determine how much each party was to blame.  Mr. Justice Halfyard found that the Plaintiff was more at fault and apportioned his blame at 75%.  In reaching this distribution of fault the Court reasoned as follows:

[58]         I find that the plaintiff’s degree of fault for the accident is considerably greater than the degree of fault of Mr. Guest. There is no legal formula for determining how fault for an accident should be divided. Counsel for the plaintiff referred me to a number of authorities in support of his submission that Mr. Guest should bear the far greater fault for the accident. Of course, the evidence and the findings of fact are different in all cases. As a consequence, previously-decided cases are of limited assistance at best. I found the cases of Funk v. Carter 2004 BCSC 866 (Williamson J.) and Morrison v. Pankratz 1991 CarswellBC 1765 (Shaw J.) to be of some assistance, particularly in the discussions of the general principles.

[59]         In my opinion, liability should be apportioned as to 25% against Mr. Guest, and 75% as against Mr. Furness, and I so order.

The Court then dealt with the value (quantum) of the Plaintiff’s claim.  The Plaintiff’s injuries and their course of recovery were summarized as follows:

[60]         Most of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff are not in dispute and I find them to be the following:

a)    undisplaced fracture of the posterior aspect of the medial femoral condyle of the right knee;

b)    tiny fracture of the very lateral aspect of the lateral tibial plateau, which was undisplaced;

c)     injury to the soft tissues in and around the right knee joint including a tear of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus;

d)    other minor contusions and abrasions.

[61]         The plaintiff complained of ongoing pain in his right ankle, which he attributes to the accident of February 13, 2007. ..

[81] I find that, by the time of trial, the plaintiff had substantially recovered from the injuries he sustained in the accident of February 13, 2007. There is no medical opinion evidence which causally connects the plaintiff’s present complaints to his injuries of February 13, 2007. Nor is there any evidence of objective medical findings that confirm the plaintiff’s ongoing complaints of pain in his knee. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the necessary causal connection between the accident and the plaintiff’s present complaints of physical pain has been proved. However, I do accept that the plaintiff is still experiencing some intermittent psychological effects from the accident, in the form of nightmares and fear of crossing the street. I find that these psychological effects are diminishing, and should not persist for much longer. The evidence does not establish a real and substantial possibility that these psychological symptoms will persist well into the future.

Mr. Justice Halfyard valued the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $40,000.  The Court then reduced this award by 75% to take into account the Plaintiff’s own blame for his injuries.

Gas Station Found Liable for Slip and Fall on Ice; $40,000 Non-Pecs for Dislocated Kneecap

Reasons for judgement were released this week dealing with fault and damages arising from a slip and fall incident at a North Vancouver gas station.
In this week’s case (Foley v. Imperial Oil Limited) the Plaintiff, an insurance adjuster for ICBC, slipped and fell on ice located near a car wash at an Esso Station in North Vancouver.   He suffered various injuries, the most serious being a dislocated knee.  He claimed the Defendants were liable for his injuries and sued for damages.  The Defendants disagreed arguing that they took reasonable care to keep the area clear of ice.
Mr. Justice MacKenzie agreed with the Plaintiff and found the Defendant responsible for the incident.  The evidence showed that when cars left the car wash water would drip down and sometimes freeze causing ice.  The Court found that the Defendant did not take adequate steps to warn of this known hazard.  In finding the gas station at fault the Court reasoned as follows:

[69] The defendants maintained no regular patrol for ice, but left the frequency of patrol for ice to the employees. Mr. Morrow testified that when he did patrol, he occasionally found ice, and then he would apply fresh salt. So the presence of ice would move him to reapply salt. This indicates either that he was not salting enough, or the defendants were not sufficiently addressing the problem. Both Mr. Morrow and Mr. Christian knew that dripping water from cars would wash the salt away.

[70] In short, the washing away of salt by the water dripping from cars leaving the car wash bay, and then freezing, constituted an unusual hazard of which the defendants were aware, but the plaintiff was not. Mr. Morrow knew the ice was hard to see, particularly if it was clear, and covered by water dripping from cars. He saw the ice on which the plaintiff slipped and it was covered by water. Therefore, it was hard to see.

[71] The defendants did nothing to warn users of the car wash about the risk of ice. They could easily have put out the orange warning cones that conventionally alert people to risk, or posted readily visible signs warning of the risk of ice. The expense would have been minimal. They could also have improved the drainage to avoid the washing away of the salt, or closed the car wash, as they had done on a couple of occasions before when it was cold enough for ice to form at the known area of risk. The patrol for ice, and salting could have been more frequent.

[72] In MacLeod v. Yong, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2108 (S.C.) at para. 8, Mr. Justice Burnyeat listed a series of factors that are relevant in considering whether an occupier has fulfilled the duty imposed by s. 3 of the Occupiers Liability Act. These factors include “whether an unusual danger was present, whether a warning had been provided to the plaintiff, the ease or difficulty and the expense with which the unusual danger could have been remedied, and any prior record of safe usage of the premises by others or by the plaintiff.”

[73] In considering whether the defendants have breached their duty to take reasonable care to ensure the plaintiff would be reasonably safe on the premises, I must consider all the circumstances of the case, including: the slip and fall was reasonably foreseeable and the defendants were clearly aware of it; the efforts made by the defendants depended on the judgment of employees who were prone to human error and who were occupied with other duties; and it would have been easy and inexpensive for the defendants to put up a warning sign, or orange cones at the location they knew was particularly hazardous.

The Court went on to award the Plaintiff $40,000 for his injuries which included a dislocated knee cap.  In reaching this award Mr. Justice MacKenzie provided the following reasons:

[126]     The plaintiff’s most serious injury in the slip and fall was his dislocated right patella (kneecap). He also had a minor scrape on his head and strained wrists and abrasions that were bandaged at the hospital. He took nine days off work as the combined result of his knee and wrist injuries.

[127]     The dislocated kneecap caused the plaintiff excruciating pain. There was profuse swelling and a very large bruise. It was swollen and red for a few weeks or a month or more after the fall.

[128]     The plaintiff initially required crutches because he could not bear his weight. He also used a brace afterward, and tapered off his use of both the crutches and brace. The evidence as to how long he used both varies somewhat, but is simply a matter of inaccurate recording or memory, and not the plaintiff’s dishonesty.

[129]     The wrist pain lasted a month or two, and he had a very stiff neck with pain for a week or two…

[135] The knee pain, while gradually abating, had essentially plateaued by the spring of 2007. It was getting stronger and better, but he still felt pain and instability in the right knee in the spring of 2007. He saw his doctor in the spring and summer of 2007 and the doctor recommended he see a specialist, Dr. Forsyth, at the McGavin Clinic at UBC…

[140] In the summer of 2008, the plaintiff’s symptoms improved again and he noticed fewer symptoms. The pain ranged from nothing to 20 out of 100, or quite modest discomfort. However, knee stamina for walking and standing had not improved. Sitting for prolonged periods made his knee ache. He also noticed increased joint sounds in his knee, especially when climbing stairs. The plaintiff was forthright in admitting that he had some such sounds in both knees before the slip and fall, but after it, he noticed increased joint sounds in his right knee which he still notices…

[168]     The damages awarded in each case are specific to the particular facts. In this case, the plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer chronic pain and loss of enjoyment of life. His condition is likely to remain stable, although there is a risk that he may develop post-traumatic arthritis in the future, which could have further negative impact on his daily activities.

[169]     Based on my findings and upon reviewing the cases, I find an award of non-pecuniary damages of $40,000 is appropriate.

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Assessment for Patellofemoral Knee Pain


Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court awarding $126,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and loss caused by a 2006 BC car crash,
In this week’s case (Poulton v. Inderbosch) the Plaintiff was injured when the Defendant ‘went through a red light‘ and T-boned the Plaintiff’s vehicle on her passenger side.  Fault was admitted by the Defendant focussing the trial on the value of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The Court heard competing evidence about whether the Plaintiff suffered a knee injury as a result of the crash.  Mr. Justice Sewell decided that the Plaintiff’s knee in fact was injured.  In awarding $70,000 for non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for the Plaintiff’s injuries the Court stated as follows:
[15] The plaintiff filed a medical/legal report of Dr. McKenzie, an orthopaedic surgeon.  He examined Ms. Poulton on September 14, 2009.  Dr. McKenzie is of the opinion that Ms. Poulton has ongoing left knee pain which is likely patellofemoral knee pain as well as ongoing pain in her neck and upper back.  In his opinion her symptoms are caused by the accident including a direct blow to her knee…
[21] I conclude that Ms. Poulton did injure her left knee in the motor vehicle accident on January 27, 2006…
[26] In this case, Ms. Poulton has suffered an injury which continues to trouble her more than four years after the accident.  Given the duration of Ms. Poulton’s symptoms and the inability of any of the treating physicians to isolate an organic cause for those symptoms, I agree with Dr. Mackenzie’s opinion that the prognosis for the resolution of Ms. Poulton’s pain is poor.  There is evidence that Ms. Poulton’s headaches have significantly improved since the date of the accident and there is therefore some reason to conclude that those headaches will continue to improve.  I am also mindful of the evidence that Ms. Poulton seems to be able to function with the assistance of medications.  On the other hand, Ms. Poulton has testified that the injuries have had a significant impact on the quality of her life, particularly with respect to her ability to pursue such recreational activities as hiking and aqua size. ..
[30] I conclude that an award of $70,000 is appropriate in this case to compensate Ms. Poulton for her pain, suffering and loss of amenities of life.  In assessing these damages I have taken into account that Ms. Poulton will likely seek symptomatic relief from medication for the reasons set out in paras. 50 and 51 of these reasons.
You can click here to read my archived posts of other recent BC Court Cases awarding damages for knee injuries.