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$65,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for Chronic Headaches and Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 1 Comment on $65,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for Chronic Headaches and Soft Tissue Injuries

Adding to this site’s archived posts of BC non-pecuniary damage assessments for chronic headaches, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this topic.
In last week’s case (Fell v. Morton) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 rear-end collision.  Fault was admitted by the rear motorist.  The Plaintiff suffered from pre-existing neck and upper back pain along with “headaches that were brought on by exertion“.  Following the crash she suffered soft tissue injuries to these regions along with a recurrence of frequent migraine headaches.   These aggravated symptoms continued to the time of trial and the prognosis for full recovery was poor.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $65,000 Madam Justice Fenlon provided the following reasons:

[23] Having considered all of the evidence, I find that Ms. Fell suffered soft tissue injuries to her upper neck and back as a result of the accident. I further find that those injuries triggered a recurrence of migraine headaches that had been almost entirely in remission since the birth of her first son.

[24] The migraines initially occurred twice per week, gradually decreasing to about once or twice each month by the time of trial. Ms. Fell’s headaches are debilitating, involving nausea and extreme sensitivity to light and sound. They sometimes last for two or three days, and all Ms. Fell can do is lie in a darkened room. She could not attend her wedding reception in Mexico in April 2010 because of a migraine headache…

[28] I find that prior to the accident Ms. Fell tended to suffer regularly from neck and upper back pain and headaches that were brought on by exertion. She sought regular massage therapy and chiropractic treatment in relation to those symptoms. She also had a proclivity to develop migraine headaches, and that condition meant she was susceptible to something else triggering her headaches in future.

[29] Ms. Fell should not be compensated for her pre?existing condition or the potential for it to reoccur quite apart from the injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident…

[38] Ms. Fell is a stoic individual whose attitude in the face of life’s difficulties is to get on with it, in her words, “to suck it up”. She should not receive a lower award of non-pecuniary damages because of that stoicism. Indeed, to the contrary, it is appropriate to include under this head the suffering she endured while she pushed herself to keep working after the accident, despite her injuries.

[39] In summary, the injuries from the accident have affected all areas of Ms. Fell’s life. While she has periods of time when she is unaffected by her injuries, in particular when she avoids exertion, she has curtailed her recreational activities, no longer camping, exercising at the same level, or taking her dogs for on-leash walks with her husband. She has found it difficult to pick up her children and cannot interact with them when she has a migraine. However, as I have earlier noted, I must also take into account her pre?existing condition and proclivity to develop migraine headaches.

[40] Taking all of these considerations into account, I set non-pecuniary damages at $65,000.

Liability Denial To the Cusp of Trial Brings Judicial Criticism

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

While an at-fault motorist is free to deny liability when sued for damages (even in obvious circumstances) doing so can create bad optics and be met with judicial criticism.  Such a result was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.
In last week’s case (Eng v. Titov) the Plaintiff was stopped waiting to yield to traffic when he was rear-ended by the Defendant’s vehicle.  The Defendant denied fault in the lawsuit and maintained this position until shortly prior to trial.  Madam Justice Allan found there was no good reason to deny fault for so long and provided the following criticism:
[31] Mr. Eng also experienced significant stress as a result of the defendant’s denial of liability.  To suggest that Mr. Eng could have been, in any way, responsible for the accident, is unsustainable. Nevertheless, although ICBC did not charge Mr. Eng any deductible for the repairs to his car, the defendant denied liability in its pleadings and maintained that position through its Trial Management Brief and up until January 19, 2012. Mr. Eng is a professional driver with a Class 2 licence and is understandably proud of his driving record and driving skills. As a professional driver, he is responsible for the safety of his passengers. He was upset and frustrated that he was blamed for an accident that he could not have avoided…
The Plaintiff suffered chronic soft tissue injuries and headaches following the collision.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $40,000 the Court made the following findings:

[26] Soon after the accident, Mr. Eng experienced severe pain in his shoulders and neck, restricted range of motion, and headaches.  Mr. Eng’s injuries have plateaued in the last year.  He still suffers from pain to his neck and shoulders and occasional headaches about once every month. The headaches still last several hours and he needs to sleep to clear the headache. Overall, his sleep is 90% improved.

[27] The plaintiff suffered severe episodes of lower back pain that lasted two or three days.  They have not occurred for the past year. His right knee problems resolved after about six months. His irritable mood and short temper have improved although his girlfriend and best friend still find him changed for the worse in that regard.

[28] While the acute phase lasted only a few months, his condition is chronic and unlikely to improve significantly.  His neck and shoulders become tighter when he is driving as he is constantly turning to look in mirrors. His level of pain and discomfort fluctuates but he is now used to a nagging pain which is always present and he has good days and bad days.  As Dr. Koo testified, a person with chronic pain has to adjust to “the new normal”.

[29] Mr. Eng is not disabled. He is able to do most of his day-to-day activities although the pain and discomfort fluctuates from day to day.  Mr. Eng is a stoic plaintiff and he should not be penalized for continuing to work hard at a stressful job that exacerbates his neck and shoulder difficulties.

[30] Dr. Koo agreed, in cross-examination, that Mr. Eng’s best possibility for an optimal outcome would be to quit his job and devote himself to therapy and exercise.  Such a plan is clearly impractical as he needs to work and take care of his son and his parents.  However, Mr. Eng agrees that his condition would likely improve somewhat if he returned to swimming and exercise and is prepared to devote some time to those activities…

[32] His continuing injuries prevent Mr. Eng from working overtime driving shifts for which he can bid from time to time.  Overtime is given to drivers on the basis of seniority.  However, Mr. Eng readily agreed that his responsibilities to his son and parents also restrict his ability to work overtime.

[33] Mr. Teed, counsel for the plaintiff, referred me to cases involving comparable injuries where the Court awarded $45,000 to $60,000.  On the other hand, Mr. Langille relied on cases that suggest the appropriate award would be $25,000 to $30,000.   Each case is unique. I would describe Mr. Eng’s injuries, which have not resolved almost three years after the accident, as moderate soft tissue injuries. They are chronic, ongoing – albeit fluctuating – and will probably continue indefinitely. On the basis of the evidence and awards in roughly comparable cases, I conclude that a fair and reasonable award is $40,000, taking into account the extent of Mr. Eng’s initial injuries and his continuing myofascial pain in his neck and shoulders. The fluctuating pain is exacerbated by his work activities and he is restricted in engaging in physical activities that he enjoyed before the accident.

$70,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded to "Stoic" Plaintiff

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.


Plaintiffs should not be punished with reduced damages in a personal injury claim simply because they are stoic in dealing with their injuries.  Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, discussing this in the context of a chronic soft tissue injury claim.
In yesterday’s case (Courtney v. Huthinson) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 rear-end collision.  The Defendant admitted fault for the crash.  The Plaintiff, a 48 year old logger, suffered a chronic soft tissue injury to his neck which produced symptoms of pain and headaches.  The symptoms continued on to the time of trial and were not expected to further recover.
Despite the chronic nature of the Plaintiff’s injuries he carried on with a stoic attitude minimizing his complaints.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 Madam Justice Power made the following findings with respect the Plaintiff’s injuries and his stoicism:

[16] Dr. MacKean’s opinion was that Mr. Courtney had suffered a Grade two whiplash associated disorder to the cervical spine and upper back with persistent daily neck pain greater on the right than left side, and headaches. She is of the opinion that the ongoing persistent neck pain and headaches is due to injuries sustained in the accident.

[17] Of significance Dr. MacKean noted that:

He has most likely reached the point of maximal medical improvement. It has been almost 3 years following the date of motor vehicle accident and he has not seen significant improvement over the past two years with regards to improvement in his neck pain symptoms.

[18] Dr. MacKean in her report and in her evidence noted that the disc degeneration seen in the MRI was less likely the cause of the ongoing pain he was experiencing since it was asymptomatic prior to the accident…

[23] Mr. Courtney came across in his evidence as a quiet man who was committed to his personal health and fitness and who was conscientious and proactive about pursuing his treatment options. He did not appear to exaggerate or overstate his evidence. When he made errors in his evidence for example with respect to his work history, he acknowledged them and any errors appear to be reasonable based on the passage of time, and Mr. Courtney’s knowledge. He is clearly a hardworking man who has worked through pain caused by the accident in order to provide for his family. The ongoing pain is primarily neck pain which is aggravated by activities which require neck extension and occasional headaches. I do not have any difficulty in accepting the evidence of Mr. Courtney. Based on the evidence I would characterize Mr. Courtney as a stoic individual…

[44] I have already found Mr. Courtney to be a stoic individual who does not complain and indeed his return to work post-collision is consistent with the behaviour of a hardworking, stoic individual. As noted, he should not be penalized as a result of his stoicism.

[45] In all of the circumstances, I conclude that an appropriate sum under this head is $70,000.

$85,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Post Traumatic Headaches

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Headache Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, assessing damages for chronic headaches and an aggravation of a low back injury caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Drodge v. Kozak) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 two-vehicle collision on Vancouver Island.  ICBC admitted the crash was the fault of the other motorist.  Following the collision the Plaintiff suffered various injuries including chronic post-traumatic headaches.  The Plaintiff argued that these were caused by a traumatic brain injury sustained in the crash.  Madam Justice Dardi rejected this argument finding that the Plaintiff did not suffer a brain injury.  The Court did, however, find that the headaches were causally linked to trauma sustained in the collision.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $85,000 the Court made the following findings:

[106] I have concluded that the constellation of symptoms that Dr. Smart bases his concussion diagnosis upon are not sufficiently specific to be diagnostic. I prefer Dr. Teal’s opinion that it is unlikely that Mr. Drodge sustained a mild traumatic brain injury. I find that the headache, cognitive, and other symptoms attributed by Dr. Smart to post-concussion syndrome are non-specific symptoms. I accept Dr. Teal’s evidence that there are “multiple reasons for dizziness, for headaches, for sleep disturbances, for mood disturbance … they are not necessarily post-concussional symptoms.” Further, the expert evidence establishes that cognitive difficulties including poor concentration and mood disturbances can develop as a consequence of severe headaches.

[107] In summary on this issue, I have concluded that on balance the preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Drodge suffered either a mild traumatic brain injury or concussion/post-concussion syndrome.

[108] Although I have concluded that the evidence falls short of establishing a diagnosis of concussion/post-concussion syndrome, I do accept that Mr. Drodge has suffered chronic headaches and associated cognitive symptoms for some four and a half years since the accident…

[120] In the end the question of Mr. Drodge’s prognosis is difficult. Taking into account all of the opinion evidence of the experts which conflicted on this point, I have concluded that Mr. Drodge is not likely to make a full recovery. While Mr. Drodge may be able to develop better coping strategies to manage his pain more effectively, and may experience some corresponding improvement in his headache symptoms as well as his back symptoms, there is only a small chance that he will improve to the degree that he will be employable…

[143] While the authorities are instructive I do not propose to review them in detail as they only provide general guidelines. I have reviewed all of the authorities provided by both counsel, and considering Mr. Drodge’s particular circumstances, and compensating him only for the increase in the exacerbation of his low back symptoms and not for the effects of his pre-existing back condition that he would have experienced in any case, I conclude a fair and reasonable reward for non-pecuniary damages is $85,000.

$125,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for TBI – Adverse Inference Discussed

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Ankle Injury Cases, ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Elbow Injury Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Knee Injury Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, Uncategorized.

Update March 21, 2014 – the Liability findings in the below case were upheld today by the  BC Court of Appeal
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Adding to this site’s ICBC Case Summary Archives, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, assessing non-pecuniary damages for a traumatic brain injury sustained in a BC vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Meghji v. Lee) the Plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while walking in a marked cross-walk in 2003.  Both the Defendant driver and BC Ministry of Transportation and Highways were found at fault for the crash.  The former for failing to keep a proper lookout while driving, the latter for designing the intersection at question with inadequate overhead lighting.  The driver was found 90% at fault with the Ministry shouldering 10% of the blame.
The Plaintiff suffered a fracture near her left shoulder, left elbow, ankle, knee and a traumatic brain injury.   The consequences of these were expected to cause permanent dysfunction.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $125,000 Mr. Justice Johnston provided the following reasons:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[134]Mr. Lee struck Ms. Meghji on her left side. That caused a significant fracture to Ms. Meghji’s left upper arm, a less significant fracture just below and into her left knee and an injury to her left ankle, all of which required immediate medical intervention. There were also the soft tissue injuries that would reasonably be expected to accompany such trauma.

[135]Within a day of the accident, Ms. Meghji had surgery to her left upper arm that involved the insertion of a rod that was fixed by screws just below her shoulder and just above her left elbow. She also had a screw placed into her left ankle…

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[270]Based upon the evidence of Dr. Ali and Mr. Brozak of the substantial change noted in Ms. Meghji during this time, as supported by similar observations from Ms. Chauncey’s and Ms. Wyeth’s description of Ms. Meghji’s abilities in her math class and as a teaching assistant before the accident, I conclude that Ms. Meghji has more likely than not suffered a brain injury in the accident, and that the combination of the effects of the brain injury and the depression and chronic pain disorder, which I also find was caused by the accident or flows from injuries suffered in the accident, are so inextricably intertwined that they cannot possibly be disentangled.

[271]In all of the circumstances, the defendants are ordered to pay Ms. Meghji $125,000 for non-pecuniary damages for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s application of the ‘adverse inference’ principle.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff’s lawyers had her assessed by a neurologist.  The neurologist did not tender evidence at trial.  Mr. Justice Johnston used his discretion to draw an adverse inference in these circumstances finding that the privately hired doctor likely did not have helpful evidence to give in support of the Plaintiff’s claim.  The court provided the following reasons:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[240]In ordinary circumstances, I would agree that a claim of litigation privilege should be sufficient explanation for the failure to produce evidence from an expert who examined a party, and no inference adverse to that party should be drawn from the failure to produce the evidence.

[241]However, where, as here, counsel has assumed control of medical management of a plaintiff’s injuries, the circumstances are not ordinary.

[242]Dr. Grimwood would ordinarily have been expected to coordinate Ms. Meghji’s treatment, including referrals to specialists as he thought advisable. In this case, Dr. Grimwood appears to have largely ceded that responsibility to Ms. Meghji’s counsel, largely because counsel were able to arrange examinations by medical specialists much sooner than could Dr. Grimwood.

[243]Where counsel becomes actively involved in arranging treatment, or in treatment decisions, or in selection of treatment providers to the extent that it becomes difficult or impossible to determine whether any particular doctor is involved for treatment purposes, or to advise counsel, the protective cloak of litigation privilege becomes tattered.

[244]In such circumstances, counsel and the party who permit the line between treating physicians and physicians retained to advise counsel to become blurred must accept some risk that the protection ordinarily afforded by litigation privilege might be lost.

[245]Ms. Meghji testified that she saw Dr. Cameron for headaches. In the face of that evidence, I infer, from the refusal to produce evidence from Dr. Cameron, that any opinion generated as a result of his examination of Ms. Meghji was not helpful to the claims she makes in this trial. I also infer that, while examining for headache, had Dr. Cameron observed any signs that suggested to him that Ms. Meghji had suffered a traumatic brain injury in the accident, his observations or opinion would have been produced at trial.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

$90,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for Headaches and PTSD

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC PTSD Cases, Uncategorized.


Reasons for judgement were released last month by the BC Supreme Court, Duncan Registry, assessing damages for PTSD and chronic headaches following a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 collision.  Fault for the crash was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the claim.   The Plaintiff suffered from some pre-existing difficulties including depression and anxiety.  The collision caused new injuries including pain, headaches and PTSD.  Mr. Justice Rogers assessed non-pecuniary damages of $90,000 and then made a modest reduction to take the pre-existing condition into account.  In assessing damages the Court provided the following reasons:
[32] Turning to the plaintiff’s injuries, the overall weight of the evidence paints a clear picture: before the traffic accident the plaintiff had some depression and she was sometimes anxious. The breakdown of her marriage and the emotional upheaval and fiscal uncertainty that flowed from that breakdown fuelled her depression and anxiety. Both conditions were sufficiently active as to prompt her to obtain medical attention. The plaintiff’s depression and anxiety were, therefore, present and active maladies before the accident. The plaintiff did not, however, suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder or from pain in her neck, jaw and face, and the plaintiff did not suffer from migraine or neuralgic headaches. The plaintiff was not fatigued and her ability to function in everyday life was not limited in any significant way. After the accident the plaintiff does now, and will in the future continue to, suffer from myofascial pain in her face and jaw. She does, and will continue to, suffer from periodic migraine and neuralgic headaches. Her neck will be sore after physical activity. She will be fatigued and socially withdrawn. These changes in her life have deepened her depression and made her more susceptible to anxiety…




[34] That said, the plaintiff’s pain, headaches and post-traumatic stress disorder were not features of her life before the accident and there was no measurable risk that, absent the accident, they would have become features of her life. Likewise, the plaintiff’s difficulties with memory and concentration were not a problem before the accident. Although the plaintiff argued that these latter problems stemmed from a minor traumatic brain injury, I find that that they are, in fact, a product of the effect on her mentation of pain, depression and anxiety.

[35] On an overall assessment of the whole body of the evidence at trial, I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s claim for non-pecuniary damages should be reduced by a relatively modest amount in order to accurately reflect her pre-existing emotional condition. I fix that reduction at 10 percent of the total.

[36] I find that were it not for her pre-existing condition, I would have fixed the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $90,000. I find that after subtracting the pre-existing condition, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for general damages of $81,000.





This judgement is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of principle of adverse inference.  The Plaintiff did not call her family physician in support of her claim.  ICBC argued that the Court should draw an adverse inference as a result.  Mr. Justice Rogers refused to do so and in dismissing ICBC’s argument the Court provided the following comments:
[31] I also accept the opinions of the plaintiff’s medical treaters. I am not worried about the lack of evidence from the plaintiff’s family physician. It was he who referred the plaintiff to specialists, and it was those specialists who diagnosed and treated the plaintiff’s accident-caused symptoms. The family physician’s evidence would, in my view, likely have consisted of little more than confirmation that the specialists were engaged and progress was made under their care. As such, I am confident that the family physician’s evidence would have added little new into the mix.

Wage Loss Claims for Stay-At-Home Parents Intending on Returning to the Workforce

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Hand Injury Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Knee Injury Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Thoracic Outlet Syndrome Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, ICBC Wrist Injury Cases, Uncategorized. 1 Comment on Wage Loss Claims for Stay-At-Home Parents Intending on Returning to the Workforce


Although stay-at-home parents are becoming less and less common many parents still take several years away from the workforce to raise their children in their infant and pre-school years.  Often times these parents intend to return to work after their children attend school on a full time basis.
When a parent in these circumstances becomes disabled from working due to the fault of another can they make a claim for loss of income in their tort action?  The answer is yes provided there is evidence establishing  a likelihood of returning to employment absent the accident related disability.   Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with this area of law.
In last week’s case (Carr v. Simpson) the Plaintiff was seriously injured in a 2005 motor vehicle collision.  The Defendant admitted fault and further admitted that the crash injured the plaintiff but took issue with the value of her claims for various damages including for income loss.
The Plaintiff, a 39 year old mother of three at the time of the collision, was out of the workforce for several years prior to the crash.  She spent these years working as a home-maker and raising her children.  She undertook some modest employment as a house cleaner shortly prior to the crash.  Following the crash she became disabled and did not return to any work from the time of the crash to the time of trial.
The Court accepted the Plaintiff sustained serious, permanent and partly disabling injuries due to the crash.  The Plaintiff sought damages of $84,000 for lost income from the time of the crash to the time of trial.  She argued that she had planned on returning to the work force once her children became school-aged (which was around the time of the crash) but was precluded in doing so as a result of her injuries.  The Defendant disagreed arguing that the Plaintiff suffered only a modest loss of income because of her “inconsistent work history (and) lack of incentive to work because of income from other sources.”
Mr. Justice Bernard sided with the Plaintiff and awarded her most of what she sought for past income loss.  In doing so the Court provide the following useful reasons addressing the reality that parents that leave the workforce to raise young children can still succeed in an income loss claim:

[132]     I reject the notion that Ms. Carr’s unemployment history during her child-rearing years made her return to the workforce less realistic or less likely. Ms. Carr did not harbour fanciful ideas about her capabilities, her income-earning potential, or her opportunities for employment. When her youngest child reached school age, Ms. Carr was relatively young, energetic, able-bodied, willing to work hard, prepared to accept modest wages in exchange for her labours, and was fortunate to have a brother who could offer her steady, secure, and reasonably well-remunerated employment.

[133]     The evidence establishes that Ms. Carr, shortly before the collision, was motivated to earn some income (e.g., from housecleaning) until her youngest child was enrolled in school; thereafter, she planned to seek more fulsome employment. I do not accept the defence submission that Ms. Carr lacked the incentive and/or need to earn an income; to the contrary, since she has been unable to work because of her injuries she has, with some reluctance, turned to her mother for ongoing loans of relatively large sums of money, just to get by.

[134]     Ms. Carr became a single parent as of June 1, 2005. I find it highly likely that this new status would have impelled her to take the employment her brother offered, and to do so immediately. Her newly poor economic circumstances would have necessitated that Ms. Carr make child-care arrangements to bridge the time until her youngest child was in school in September 2005, and would have motivated her to work as many hours as she could manage as a single parent. Similarly, I am satisfied that she would have made any necessary arrangements for the care of her father.

[135]     I also find it is highly likely that Ms. Carr, as an employee of her brother, would have worked the hours and received the rates of pay assumed by Mr. Bush in his calculations. I find it is most unlikely that the seasonal aspect of the work would have reduced Ms. Carr’s overall income. Any shortage of work in the slow season would be offset by the demands of the busy season, and I am satisfied that Ms. Carr would have adjusted her life, accordingly.

[136]     While I am unable to agree with the plaintiff’s submission that in the determination of past wage loss there should be no reduction for negative contingencies, I am satisfied, for the relatively predictable period in question, the reduction must be minor.

[137]     Having regard for all the foregoing, I assess the plaintiff’s past wage loss at $75,000.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of non-pecuniary damages.  The Plaintiff sustained numerious injuries including soft tissue injuries to her neck and upper back, Thoracic Outlet Syndrome, headaches and dizziness, a right hand and wrist injury which required surgery, a meniscus tear that required surgery, low back pain and depression related to chrobic pain.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 Mr. Justice Bernard provided the following reasons:

125]     Ms. Carr has, at age 44, many years ahead of her. As a result of the defendant’s negligence, Ms. Carr has been permanently partially disabled and left with constant and chronic pain. Since the collision, Ms. Carr has undergone two surgeries and endured considerable pain and discomfort. Ms. Carr has developed TOS and surgery is not recommended. She suffers from clinical depression related to the negative effect her injuries has had upon her, her family, and her way of life. Ms. Carr’s mental acuity and concentration has slipped. Ms. Carr’s marriage ended six months after she sustained her injuries. Her husband was unsympathetic and frustrated by her lack of desire for sex due to her discomfort. Ms. Carr has been rendered unemployable for most jobs in a competitive market. She is now unable to enjoy most leisure activities and active social pursuits with her children. She has a special fondness for horses and gardening, but meaningful participation in activities related to these interests is no longer feasible. Ms. Carr has lost much of the satisfaction from gainful employment, and the purpose and dimension it gives to life. In short, the negligence of the defendant has had a profoundly negative and lasting impact upon Ms. Carr.

[126]     I agree with the plaintiff’s position that the Djukic case is most similar of the proffered cases on its facts. I also agree with the defendant’s submission that Ms. Djukic’s pain was more severe than that of Ms. Carr; otherwise, I am persuaded that Djukic a useful reference point for the upper end of a general damages award in this case; and that Cimino is instructive in determining the lower end.

[127]     Having regard to all the foregoing, I assess Ms. Carr’s general damages at $100,000.

Pain and Suffering Damages Discussed for Severe Post Traumatic Migraine Headaches

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Headache Cases.


Reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff damages for post accident migraine headaches.
In today’s case (Ward v. Klaus) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end collision in Chilliwack, BC.  Fault was admitted by the rear-motorist focusing the trial on the value of the claim.
The Plaintiff suffered various injuries the most serious of which were post-traumatic migraine headaches.  These were so invasive that they required surgical intervention with the installation of a “neurostimulator” in the back of her head.  The Court provide the following summary of the Plaintiff’s surgeries:

[16]         In May 2008, the plaintiff consulted Dr. Kumar, a neurosurgeon in Regina, for an assessment on the suitability for neurostimulator implants.  She qualified and in September, at Regina Saskatchewan, a neurotransmitter was implanted in the back of her neck.  It had two leads and an external remote that connected the wires under her skin.  From September to mid-October 2008, she had two more operations in Regina and two more temporary implants were imbedded.  In December 2008, two permanent implants were installed in the back of her head in the same area as before.  To deal with the pain of the operation, she took more medication.

[17]         In January 2009, the plaintiff had permanent leads installed at the front of her head.

[18]         The implant battery has to be recharged, usually once a week.  She keeps it on at all times other than when she is driving.  She has a device that plugs into an electrical outlet.  It tells her if the battery needs to be recharged.  Sometimes it has to charge for up to four hours, but usually it takes an hour or an hour and a half.  When pain flares, she can increase the strength of the current from the stimulator.  Again, she does not see it as the answer.  It simply “takes the edge off”.

Mr. Justice Rice assessed the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $150,000.  In arriving at this figure the Court provided the following reasons:

[52]         In this case, counsel on both sides agree that this was a soft-tissue injury to the neck resulting in continuing neck pain, and continuing generalized moderate headaches with severe migraine headaches, occurring two or three times per week.  The pain during such migraine headaches is excruciating, and her pain and suffering as a whole have affected very negatively almost every aspect of her life.  According to doctors’ recommendations, she has taken medications that only partially help, and at one point led her to addiction to narcotics.  She has undergone surgeries to implant a neurostimulator which has only been moderately successful at best as a means of alleviating the pain.  The consensus of the medical experts has been that the plaintiff has reached the point of maximum medical improvement, and that the headaches and pain will continue indefinitely.

[53]         At the same time, observing her demeanour as she gave evidence, as well as seeing the videotape evidence shown in court, and considering her inability to answer many questions on the basis that she could not remember, I am afraid there is room for mild caution in accepting her testimony unreservedly.  Her frequent inability to recall answers to questions leads me to doubt the reliability of her memory when giving testimony.  By this, I do not mean to resile from the impression that she was generally honest and truthful in explaining the excruciating pain she had suffered.  It is only in respect of a few details, particularly her work capacity and motivation, that her evidence was not completely satisfactory…

[56]         The purpose of non-pecuniary damage awards is to compensate the plaintiff for “pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities”: Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023 at para. 134. While each award must be made with reference to the particular circumstances and facts of the case, other cases may serve as a guide to assist the court in arriving at an award that is just and fair to both parties: Kuskis v. Tin, 2008 BCSC 862 at para. 136.

[57]         Taking all of the foregoing into account, my view is that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary loss is $150,000.  In this amount I take account of all aspects of general pain and suffering, including a reasonable portion attributable to the effect of diminished capacity in her homemaking role.

Non-Pecuniary Damages Update – the Kelowna Road Edition

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Dental Injury Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, Uncategorized. 51 Comments on Non-Pecuniary Damages Update – the Kelowna Road Edition


I’m writing today’s non-pecuniary damages case update in Kelowna, BC where I’m finishing up some work on a handful of ICBC claims.
Reasons for judgement were released earlier this week by the BC Supreme Court awarding non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for headaches and chronic pain following soft tissue and TMJ injuries.
In this week’s case (Ho v. Dosanjh), the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 BC motor vehicle collision.   It was a rear-end crash and the Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained over $7,000 in damage.   The Plaintiff’s injuries continued to cause him problems by the time of trial (nearly 4 years after the collision).  Mr. Justice Silverman awarded the Plaintiff $75,000 for his non-pecuniary loss and in reaching this figure the Court noted the following about the extent and severity of the Plaintiff’s injuries:

[21]         As a result of the subject MVA, the plaintiff suffered pain in his neck, upper back, shoulder, jaw, numbness down the left arm, headaches, and insomnia.  He was on a variety of medications for a period of time and was unable to work.

[22]         The most serious and ongoing consequences of the MVA are the TMJ and the headaches, which leave him in constant pain.

[23]         Dr. Mehta confirmed that the plaintiff suffers from pain in his jaw, teeth, and  related areas, and that he suffers from headaches as a result of the MVA.

[24]         He testified that these areas of concern had not improved significantly in the four years since the MVA and further recovery was unlikely; that the plaintiff will suffer long-term symptoms that impact on all aspects of his functioning; and that he should avoid any activities that involve jumping or jarring.  Dr. Mehta recommended conservative care, including continuation of various treatments which were already ongoing, such as physiotherapy and massage.

[25]         Dr. le Nobel diagnosed the plaintiff with diffuse myofascial pain syndrome, TMJ, and chronic headaches.  He testified that the plaintiff’s capacity for recreational pursuits has been compromised and that this will continue for the foreseeable future.  He testified that, given the amount of time that has passed since the MVA, there is unlikely to be any further improvement.

[26]         Dr. Weiss confirmed that the plaintiff has chronic neck, back, and TMJ pain and that, in his opinion, “they will remain a long term issue.”  He noted that the plaintiff had a pre-existing degenerative condition, which made him more susceptible to injury from the MVA.

[27]         Dr. Gilbart provided an independent medical report and was called as a witness for the defence.  He confirmed that the MVA aggravated the plaintiff’s pre-existing degenerative condition in his neck.  He opined that the “prognosis for significant further improvement in his symptoms at this point is guarded.”  He noted that the plaintiff was asymptomatic prior to the MVA and was functioning at a very high level in all aspects of his life.  Dr. Gilbart also noted that, despite the post-MVA pain complained of by the plaintiff, he still appeared to be functioning at a very high level.  Finally, he opined that, given the pre-existing condition of the plaintiff as well as his prior history, he likely would have had flare-ups in the future even if the MVA had not occurred.

[28]          With respect to the jaw pain and headaches, Dr. Gilbart deferred to the expertise of Dr. Mehta.

[29]         Presently, the plaintiff has not returned to most of his pre-MVA athletic activities.  He no longer is involved in volleyball, softball, aggressive hiking, or skiing.  He does still rollerblade, although not as aggressively as before, and he has recently begun to swim with the encouragement of his girlfriend, who is a physiotherapist’s assistant.

[30]         Various friends testified that the plaintiff’s personality has changed.  He is moody, irritable, withdrawn, quiet, rarely socializes, and not as pleasant to spend time with as he used to be.  It was clear to me, when watching the plaintiff in the gallery of the courtroom that he was distressed when he heard this testimony.  He subsequently testified that he had not actually heard these witnesses say this before…

76]         I am satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered neck, back, jaw, and shoulder pain, and that he continues to suffer on a daily basis, particularly from TMJ and headaches.

[77]         I am satisfied that it has affected his recreational and athletic activities, which were an important part of his life.

[78]         I am satisfied that there is unlikely to be much further improvement.

[79]         I am also satisfied that, while he is suffering pain, he is nevertheless able to function in a reasonably normal way.  He certainly appeared to be reasonably comfortable when giving evidence.  He also continued to work full-time after a period of months during which he was unable to work, although I accept that work is much less physically comfortable for him than it used to be.

[80]         While I accept the evidence that he might have suffered another flare-up even in the absence of the MVA, I am satisfied that the MVA was, and is, the primary cause of his current difficulties.

[81]         With respect to ongoing treatments for the rest of his life, I am satisfied that, while these might provide him with some periodic temporary relief, they are not likely to result in any improvement.  Consequently, what the plaintiff might perceive as the “need” for such ongoing treatments, will be reflected as an aspect of the non-pecuniary award.

[82]         In all the circumstances, I award $75,000 for non-pecuniary damages.

$50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Neck/Low Back Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized. 53 Comments on $50,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic Neck/Low Back Soft Tissue Injuries

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the fair assessment of damages for chronic soft tissue injuries.
In today’s case (Baxter v. Jamal) the Plaintiff was involved in a ‘substantial‘ 2005 motor vehicle collision.  The Plaintiff was in her vehicle in an intersection waiting to turn left.  The Defendant “ran a red light and struck the driver’s side door of the plaintiff’s vehicle“.
Despite feeling no pain at the time of the accident the Plaintiff in fact was injured.  Her symptoms came on shortly after the crash and some of them persisted to the time of trial.   In awarding $50,000 for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) Madam Justice Boyd stated as follows:
[18] Dr. Witherspoon and Dr. Rosemary Nairne Stewart, a physiatrist who conducted an independent medical examination on behalf of the plaintiff in February 2009, both opine the plaintiff has suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck and back.  Since more than three years have passed since the injury, they expect she will continue to experience her current symptoms over the long term and that as a result, she will likely be unable to do physically demanding work.  ..

I am satisfied that pre-accident, the plaintiff was asymptomatic and that since the accident, she has unfortunately been plagued by ongoing neck and back pain which now remain unresolved over four years since the accident.  I accept Dr. Nairne Stewart’s opinion that her condition is either the reflection of the soft tissue injuries (suffered at the time of the accident) which remain unresolved or are the result of the trauma to her back (suffered at the time of the accident), which has rendered a previously asymptomatic condition symptomatic.

[34] I accept Dr. Nairne Stewart’s evidence concerning the plaintiff prognosis, namely that she is “likely to continue to experience all of her current symptoms and limitations over the long term.  She will be unable to do physically demanding work because of her injury.  In sedentary work, she will continue to need a good ergonomic setup in her workstation and the flexibility to change her work tasks and position periodically throughout her workday”.

[35] I accept that these injuries have had a significant effect on the plaintiff’s life, both in terms of her career and her recreational activities. ..

[43] On a revinew of all of the evidence, and considering the significant impact these injuries have had and will continue to have on this young woman, I find that an appropriate award of damages is $50,000.

An interesting part of this decision dealt with the Court’s analysis of the competing medical evidence.  As is common in ICBC Injury Claims the Defence called the evidence of an ‘independent medical examiner’ (orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Maloon) who provided an opinion contrary to the Plaintiff’s treating physician with respect to the extent of the accident related injuries.  The court noted that Dr. Maloon’s competing opinion was ‘obliquely stated‘ and ultimately preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s doctors.  This case is worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of the competing expert evidence and the analysis of the Court in favouring the expert evidence in support of the Plaintiff’s case.