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Close to $900,000 Awarded for Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI)

Following a trial that lasted over 6 weeks, reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff close to $900,000 in damages as a result of a 2002 car crash that occurred in Vancouver, BC.
The Plaintiff, while stopped at a red light, was rear-ended by a Ford F150 pick up truck.  The force of the collision was found to be ‘sufficiently strong to cause the plaintiff to suffer bruising across his chest where the seat-belt had restrained him’.  The Plaintiff was able to drive away from the scene.
The Defendant did not admit fault but was found 100% at fault for this rear-end car crash.
The Plaintiff alleged various serious injuries including a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI), Post Concussion Syndrome, Tinnitus, Dizziness, Loss of Balance and Depression.
The defence denied these injuries and insisted that the Plaintiff’s complaints were exaggerated.
The Plaintiff’s claim was largely accepted.  The court found that the Plaintiff ‘indeed suffered a mild traumatic brain injury which has resulted in a constellation of problems including a post concussion syndrome, a cognitive disorder, a major depressive disorder with anxiety, a pain disorder; and the significant exacerbation of his tinnitus.’
In the end the Court assessed damages as follows:

(i)

General damages – non-pecuniary

$200,000.00

(ii)

Past loss of income

$171,250.00

(iii)

Future loss of income earning capacity

$400,000.00

(iv)

Loss of opportunity

$10,000.00

(v)

Special damages

$26,955.75

(vi)

Costs of future care

$77,449.00

(vii)

Management and Tax Gross up

(to be determined)

This case is worth reviewing for anyone advancing an ICBC injury claim involving a mild traumatic brain injury.  Madam Justice Boyd engages in a thoughtful discussion of the competing medical evidence and provides articulate reasons why the Plaintiff’s physicians opinions were preferred over those of the Defence experts.
The court also makes interesting commentary on Waddell Signs starting at paragraph 34 of the reasons, particularly that:

[34] The defence also stressed the findings of Dr. Sovio, the orthopaedic surgeon retained by the defence, who examined Young in January 2006.  He concluded the plaintiff had exhibited significant exaggeration of his symptomology during several tests- thus exhibiting a number of positive Waddell signs.  As he put it, the plaintiff’s perception of his symptoms did not match the findings on physical examination.  The defence relies heavily on this opinion to support a finding the plaintiff is guilty of malingering or symptom exaggeration.

[35] I accept both Dr. Coen’s, and Dr. Rathbone’s evidence that the Waddell signs are notoriously unreliable for detecting malingering.  As Dr. Rathbone testified, the Waddell signs are “distinctly unreliable” in cases where the patient suffers depression.  Indeed the literature presented to Dr. Sovio at trial echoed that warning.  In cross-examination, Dr. Sovio adopted the extract from the SPINE journal (Exhibit 67, Tab 6, SPINE Volume 23, Number 21, pp. 2367-2371) to the effect that non organic signs cannot be interpreted in isolation.  He accepted the following summary at the outset of that article:

Behavioural responses to examination provide useful clinical information, but need to be interpreted with care and understanding.  Isolated signs should not be overinterpreted.  Multiple signs suggest that the patient does not have a straightforward physical problem, but that psychological factors also need to be considered.  …Behavioural signs should be understood as responses affected by fear in the context of recovery from injury and the development of chronic incapacity.  They offer only a psychological ‘yellow-flag’ and not a complete psychological assessment.  Behavioural signs are not on their own a test of credibility or faking.

Of course, as I will later note, in early 2006 the plaintiff was significantly depressed.  I have no doubt that any number of psychological factors were at play in the course of Dr. Sovio’s examination which may well have presented as the non-organic signs detected.  However, I do not conclude that the plaintiff was deliberately malingering or exaggerating his symptoms during that examination.

$75,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded to Cyclist Injurd in Car Accident

OK, I’m back in Kelowna, but this time more for pleasure than business, so this case summary will be a little light on the usual details.
Reasons for judgement were relesed today finding a motorist at fault for a 2003 impact with a cyclist. The Plaintiff suffered serious injuries and was awarded close to $500,000 in compensation for his losses and injuries.
In this case the cyclist was travelling on the side-walk. This is prohibited in law but simply violating the motor vehicle act does not automatically make one negligent for an accident. In this case the court found that while the cyclist was unlawfully riding on the sidewalk, he was not responsible for the accident because this did not cause the accident, rather
the accident was caused by (the Defendant) either failing to stop his vehicle before driving across the sidewalk in accordance with s. 176(1) of the Act, or by failing to look to his right before starting motion after looking away for a period of time during which a person could have appeared to the right of his vehicle.”
Here the court found that the Plaintiff was a credible witness that did not exaggerate his symptoms. The injuries were summarized by the Plaintiff’s treating family physician as follows:
fracture of the distal tibia, laceration of his scalp, laceration of his left shin, post-traumatic periostitis of the left shin, a partial tear of his anterior tibiofubular ligament (an ankle ligament) and retrocalcaneal bursitis (a bursa in the ankle/heel area).
In other words, a very serious ankle injury.  Evidence was also led that the Plaintiff suffered from a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) and that this resulted in some on-going cognitive problems.
The Plaintiff was a young man who suffered from a significant period of disability and there was evidence of some permanent partial disability.
Damages were assessed as follows:

a. Cost of future care: $73,078.00

b. Lost wages: $185,684.40 less the amount actually earned by the Plaintiff from December 3, 2003 to the date of trial;

c. Loss of future wages: $72,526.40.

d. Loss of earning capacity: $80,000.00

e. Non-pecuniary damages: $75,000.00

f. Special damages: $2,811.45.

g. In-trust claim: $14,040.00

Mild Trauamtic Brain Injury (MTBI) Claim Dismissed by BC Supreme Court

In a striking example of how complex brain injury litigation can be, lengthy reasons for judgment were released today dismissing a Plaintiff’s claim that 2 accidents caused/contributed to a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI).
The trial lasted over 30 days of court time spanning between November, 2006 – July 2007. The reasons for judgement give insight into just how complex the brain injury trial was. The reasons are well over 300 paragraphs long.
The Plaintiff was involved in 2 accidents. She sued for both and the trials for both claims were heard at the same time. The first accident happened in 2001 in Abbotsford BC when the Plaintiff’s vehicle was struck by a driver who failed to stop at a stop sign. Liability (fault) for this accident was admitted by the defence lawyer. The second accident happened in 2005 when the Plaintiff’s vehicle changed lanes and collided with the defendant vehicle who was pulling out from a parking lot. Liability was denied and the trial judge found the defendant was solely responsible for the accident.
With the determination of fault out of the way the court had to decide what injuries the Plaintiff suffered in both these crashes and their value. The Plaintiff said she suffered from a Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in the first accident and this injury was made worse in the second accident. This allegation was hotly contested by the defence lawyers.
The court heard from numerous witnesses including over 10 doctors. It is very common for ICBC brain injury claims to include opposing medical evidence and numerous ‘lay witnesses’ who give evidence of changes in a Plaintiff’s level of functioning after the accident. ICBC claims lawyers often refer to these witnesses as before and after’ witnesses.
The expert medical evidence included
1. The Plaintiff’s GP who diagnosed a ‘closed head injury
2. A Physiatrist who diagnosed ‘a head injury that has resulted in some brain dysfunction‘ along with ‘soft tissue aches and pains
3. A psychiatrist who treated the Plaintiff since 2002 who diagnosed ‘impairments…as a result of the accidents‘ and a ‘significant concussive injury in both accidents (which have gone on to become) a post-concussion syndrome, now persistent type…a personality change due to MTBI….a pain disorder that relates to (the Plaintiff’s) headaches and other chronic pain complaints…a post-trauma seizure disorder‘ He concluded that the Plaintiff ‘will continue to have significant disruption of her life and her ability to work is permanently compramised’.
4. A neuropsychologist who accepted the diagnosis of ‘closed head injury, possible seizure activity, chronic pain and post-concussive syndrome.’ He performed numerous tests and concluded that the Plaintiff ‘was suffering from psychological turmoil which was sufficiently severe to affect her score on neuropsychological tests’ and lastly that ‘the pattern of neurological test results was consistent with diffuse brain injury attributed as likely being caused by the car accident‘.
5. A urologist
6. A psychologist who saw the Plaintiff regularly since 2003
7. a Neurologist from the University of Colorado School of Medicine who diagnosed a ‘concussion with amnesia in the first accident and that she subsequently developed post-concussion syndrome’.
8. Another physiatrist who assessed the Plaintiff after the second accident and ‘attributed (her) symptoms after the first accident to post-concussive syndrome’. He also diagnosed various soft tissue injuries.
9. A psychologist who assessed the Plaintiff in 2006 who stated that ‘the plaintiff suffered from a brain injury based personality change arising from a frontal-lobe related impairment and emotional disturbance reactive to the trauma of the accidents
10. An orthopaedic surgeon who was hired by the defence lawyer. His opinion differed largely from most of the previous experts and gave evidence that:

Based on my assessment of Ms. Abma on May 9, 2003, she presented as an extremely symptom focused individual whose clinical examination strongly suggested a significant non-organic component to her various musculoskeletal/neurologic complaints. I base this latter opinion, that Ms. Abma has significant nonorganic illness, on the following findings:

1. Multiple areas of complaint.

2. No reported pain free interval.

3. Failure of all treatment modalities to date.

4. Significant pain behaviour and reaction on clinical examination.

5. Multiple areas of non-anatomic pain.

6. Regional numbness affecting her right arm.

7. Abnormal pain diagram.

All of these factors would suggest that there is a significant psychological social component influencing the reporting scenario and duration of Ms. Abma’s multiple musculoskeletal/neurologic complaints. In addition, Ms. Abma’s clinical records indicate that she suffered from anxiety/depression preceding her November 2001 motor vehicle accident, both of which can negatively influence an individual’s pain experience and their self perception of disability.

11. A Psychiatrist hired by the defence lawyer who noted that ‘there is no objective evidence to support the fact that this woman suffered any type of concussion or brain injury.’
12. An otolaryngolgist hired by the defence lawyer who ‘concludes that the plaintiff suffered a mild/modest neck sprain in the first motor vehicle accident classified as whiplash-associated disorder (WAD) Type 1. He considers that this may have re-activated the neck sprain from her 1996 motor vehicle accidents which demonstrated that her complaints continued for more than three years. Dr. Sinanan states “but for that factor, recovery from a Grade 1 WAD Type neck sprain usually is within six to eight weeks, 12 weeks at most
13. Lastly the court heard from a neurologist also hired by the defence lawyer and it was ‘uncontested’ that this doctor is the ‘foremost epilepsy expert in the Province of BC’. he concluded that the Plaintiff did not have a brain injury.
After all of this the court sided largely with the defence medical evidence. The key findings were made starting at paragraph 308 where the court held that:

[308] The most persuasive view of the plaintiff’s post-accident experience is described by Drs. Anton and Smith. Dr. Anton suggests that the plaintiff is suffering psychological injuries. Dr. Smith is also of a similar view: adjustment disorder with anxiety, which does not result from injuries sustained in either of the accidents, but arising from her belief that she is cognitively impaired as a result of the accident.

[309] I am not finding that the plaintiff is acting dishonestly. She believes that she is suffering from a brain injury. She is relying on the information she has been provided by her treating physicians. She has not proven on a balance of probabilities that she suffered a brain injury in the first accident. I find it much more likely that the psychological difficulties, including the cognitive, emotional and behavioural problems which the plaintiff has experienced, arose from her reaction to the brain injury diagnosis made by Dr. Ancill in April 2002. I do not accept the plaintiff’s assertion that all of her symptoms had their “genesis” in the motor vehicle accidents.

[310] Ultimately, I find that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the first accident are the physical injuries and to some extent the depression described in the evidence. The plaintiff suffered the following injuries as a result of the first motor vehicle accident on November 14, 2001:

1. aggravation of previous soft tissue injuries to her neck, back, shoulders and hips;

2. a contusion to the area above her left knee; and

3. some depression and anxiety (exclusive of that related to the diagnosis of a brain injury) attributable to the pain of her injuries.

As a result of this finding the court largely dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims for loss of income past and future, future care needs, and her in-trust claims for voluntary services provided by her family.
Ultimately little more than compensation for pain and suffering for soft tissue injuries was awarded.
As an ICBC Injury Claims Lawyer, one of the highlights of this case for me was found at paragraph 204 of this judgement where the court discussed its view of some of the neuropsychological test results.  These tests, which can be used to see if a pattern of cognitive defecits are consistent with brain injury, have some built in ‘fail-safes’ in them.  These measures are built in to help the neuropsychologist gauge whether the patient is applying their best effort.  In other words, these built in to see if the Plaintiff may be faking the injury.
In this case the “Fake Bad Scale‘ disclosed some ‘suspicious results‘.  The various doctors placed varying levels of importance on this fact.  Madam Justice Gropper made her views quite clear at paragraph 304 where she stated that “If the testing is invalid it does not mean there is something wrong with the test,; it suggests that there is something suspicious about how the individual is responding to the testing and whether she is applying her best effort to it.  It is a factor to be considered, not simply ignored.’
This case, while perhaps lengthy and difficult to read through, is worth reviewing for anyone involved in an ICBC claim alleging Mild Traumatic Brain Injury. This is one of the most aggresively litigated injuries and this case shows just how involved these trials can be, not just from the medical side of things but from the involvement of ‘before and after’ witnesses and many intimate details of a Plaintiff’s life.
Do you have questions about this case or an ICBC claim involving Mild Traumatic Brain Injury?  Do you need advice from an ICBC claims lawyer?  If so click here to arrange your free consultation with Victoria ICBC Claims Lawyer Erik Magraken (services provided for ICBC injury claims throughout BC!)

$19,840 Awarded for 15 Month Soft Tissue Injuries

In reasons for judgment released this week, Madam Justice Humphries of the BC Supreme Court awarded a 60 year old Plaintiff a total of $19,840 in compensation as a result of soft tissue injuries sustained in a British Columbia motor vehicle accident.
The Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended on July 25, 2005. The accident is the kind that ICBC typically likes to call an LVI (Low Velocity Impact) as the damage to the vehicle totalled $200.
A year later, in August 2006, the Plaintiff was involved in another rear-end accident. This time she was a passenger. This accident also is the type ICBC likes to characterize as an LVI accident as the vehicle damage cost approximatley $480 to fix. The Plaintiff testified the second accident did not aggravate her symptoms from the first accident and no issue was taken with this assertion at trial.
The Plaintiff filed a report in court authored by her family doctor. The doctor’s evidence was that the Plaintiff suffered from “Whiplash, left shoulder (muscle strain) and back muscle strain.”
The court found the Plaintiff to be a credible witness. The Plaintiff’s injuries were accepted on the basis “of 9 months of pain causing restriction, and a further six months of gradual improvement with ongoing fairly minor symptoms of decreasing frequency“.
In the end the court awarded damages as follows:
Pain and Suffering: $15,000
Past Wage Loss: $4,790.50
Mileage Expenses for treatments: $50
This case was a short one day trial heard in Vancouver, BC and is a good example of a simple ICBC claim getting heard without excessive burden on our justice system or the parties involved.
Do you have have questions about an ICBC whiplash claim or an LVI claim that you wish to discuss with an ICBC claims lawyer? If so click here to contact ICBC claims lawyer Erik Magraken for a free consultation.

$1.065 Million Awarded to Brain Injured Plaintiff

In highly anticipated reasons for judgement released today, following a 4 week trial in late 2007, Mr. Justice Maczko awarded a severely injured Plaintiff over $1,000,000 in compensation as a result of a motor vehicle accident.
The issues to be decided at trial were liability (who was at fault) and quantum (the value of the injuries) as a result of a significant accident which occurred in West Vancouver, BC in 2004.
The Plaintiff, who was 26 years old at the time, was standing in a roadway in West Vancouver when he was struck by a Hummer SUV driven by the Defendant. The Plaintiff sustained serious injuries including a traumatic brain injury, scalp wound, bilateral wrist and jaw fractures, the loss of several teeth, and soft tissue injuries to the neck and back. The traumatic brain injury was the most significant of these in terms of the Plaintiff’s employability and need for future medical care.
In the end the court found the Defendant entirely at fault an awarded over $1,000,000 in damages to the Plaintiff.
Addressing the issue of liability at paragraph of 127 of the judgement, the court held as follows:

[127] The Hummer travelled too quickly for the existing conditions. Mr. Samieian was negligent in moving his vehicle too quickly and travelling around the cube van when his view of his path was obscured. It is more likely that the accident arose from driver error than from a complete failure of all controls on the Hummer. It is unlikely that steering, braking and acceleration all malfunctioned at once, and without leaving anything detectable on inspection after the accident.

[128] As a result, the defendants are entirely responsible for the accident and for the losses it caused Mr. Dikey.

As is often the case in ICBC claims involving brain injuries, the court heard from numerous expert physicians including neurologists, a neuropsychologist, and a Physiatrist (physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist).
In the end the court made the following findings regarding the Plaintiff’s injuries:

[109] In summary, Mr. Dikey suffered many injuries as a result of the accident. The most significant injury in terms of functioning was the traumatic brain injury. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the injury was moderate when it occurred, but this is of little assistance in determining the long-term impact of the injury.

[110] Mr. Dikey’s continuing cognitive problems include significant limitations with memory, planning, organizing, attention, concentration, awareness, judgement, decision-making, language, reasoning, abstract thinking, mental flexibility, and calculations. He forgets to eat and take his medications regularly, and forgets appointments. He also suffers depression, isolation and limited social support and interactions. He has minimal initiation and motivation.

[111] Mr. Dikey suffered serious head and jaw injuries. Dr. Goldstein recommends investigating jaw reconstruction, likely requiring refracturing the jaw on both sides, and tooth replacement. Mr. Dikey and his family were undecided for several years about whether to pursue that treatment, owing to the risk of damage to a facial nerve. The evidence suggests that the risk is small and any damage that might occur would probably be temporary.

[112] Mr. Dikey suffered two broken wrists. His left wrist healed appropriately, but the right wrist did not. He does not have pain-free full range of motion of his right wrist owing to the way the fracture healed. The suggested surgery will give him a very good chance of increased range of motion without pain.

[113] Mr. Dikey suffered injury to his right knee. The recommended surgery for his right knee would have a good likelihood of relieving his right knee pain.

[114] Mr. Dikey has continuing pain from his soft tissue injury to his neck and back. His cuts and bruises have healed, but he has a visible scar on his forehead and in his scalp. His primary complaint is of headaches, which can be so bad at times that they lead to vomiting. They are his most frequent and significant cause of pain.

The court summarized the profound effects of the injuries as follows:
[142] Mr. Dikey’s life has changed profoundly as a consequence of the accident. He is unlikely to work, and has lost the self-esteem, enjoyment and income that is available from work. While he retains the ability to walk and talk and engage in the activities of daily living, his cognitive problems are such that he will require some assistance for the rest of his life. His most significant loss is the loss of cognitive abilities. He also suffers severe headaches. He has chronic pain in the neck. His pain and the lost function of his right wrist are likely to improve following surgery. He will likely have on-going problems with his neck and back.
In the end damages were assessed as follows:
$215,000 for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering)
$500,000 for lost future earning capacity
$350,000 for cost of future care
If you have questions about an ICBC claim or a brain injury claim that you would like to discuss with an ICBC claims lawyer feel free to contact Erik Magraken for a free consultation.

BC Supreme Court awards $229,890 for Concussion and Chronic Back Pain

In written reasons for judgement released today, a Plaintiff who was injured in a 2003 single vehicle accident was awarded a total of $229,890 for his injuries and losses.
The Plaintiff, who was 18 at the time, was the centre passenger in a pick-up truck that lost control. The accident was significant. The truck “crossed a cattle guard and then hit loose gravel. The Driver lost control and the truck slid off the embankment. It rolled a number of times and apparently flipped end over end once. In ended up lying on its right side.”
For a time, the Plaintiff lost consciousness. He suffered a concussion and for a while suffered symptoms of headaches, light headedness, imbalance and tinnitus (ringing in the ears.) These symptoms resolved by the time of trial. He also had a neck injury which largely resolved and a shoulder injury which fully resolved by the time of trial.
The Plaintiff’s main injury by the time of trial was chronic low back pain.
4 doctors testified on the Plaintiff’s behalf. His family doctor painted a positive picture of the Plaintiff.
A specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation (physiatrist) testified that the Plaintiff suffered from a soft tissue injuries to the cervical and lumbar spine (neck and low back).
A rheumatologist testified that the Plaintiff suffered from chronic back pain and that this pain “would have a significant negative influence upon his ability to compete in the workforce in the area of strenuous laboring jobs.”
A specialist in occupational medicine testified that the Plaintiff had not recovered from the soft tissue injuries to his back and that “it is unlikely the Plaintiff will have full resolution of his back injuries“.
The defence had the Plaintiff assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon. This is a common choice of ICBC for their ‘independent medical exams” when dealing with soft tissue injuries. The doctor hired by the defence testified that one of the factors leading to the Plaintiff’s ongoing complaints was ‘psychosocial factors‘ and that he would ‘strongly recommend that the plaintiff be assessed by a psychiatrist“.
The court preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s physicians and stated that “I conclude there is little, if anything, in (the defence doctors) report that would detract from the evidence from the other medical personnel or the lay witness evidence with respect to the Plaintiff’s present condition“.
In the end, damages were assessed as follows:

Non-Pecuniary Damages

$ 85,000

Past Wage Loss

$ 23,000

Future Wage Loss

$120,000

Cost of Future Care

$ 1,890

Total:

$229,890

"No Impact Crash" Nets $40,000 Pain and Suffering Award

In a case with a slightly unusual fact pattern where reasons for judgement were released today, a Plaintiff was awarded nearly $90,000 in damages as a result of a July, 2005 motor vehicle collision in Nanaimo, BC.
In a trial that lasted just over two days pursuant to Rule 66, Mr. Justice Wilson concluded that the Plaintiff sustained a soft tissue injury to her neck and shoulder as a result of the motor vehicle collision. Mr. Justice Wilson concluded that it took the Plainiff several months to “fully functionally recover” from her injuries (meaning she was able to functionally return to work as a painter) but that activity caused ongoing pain at the site of injury. The court accepted the evidence of an orthopaedic surgoen who assessed the Plaintiff and found “a significant amount of trapezius spasm” in late 2007 and attributed this to the motor vehicle collision. The court summarized the effects of the Plaintiff’s injuries as follows:
[63] I thus conclude that Ms. Levy was disabled from her employment duties for approximately three and one-half months; has had ongoing, but decreasing, pain in her neck and left shoulder since that time, now almost three years post-accident; and is likely to have some ongoing pain or discomfort with activities.
What made this judgement interesting is that the Defendant denied that an accident occurred at all.
The Plaintiff testified that her mini-van was rear-ended by the Defendant’s vehicle. The Defendant denied this. He testified that he felt no impact. It is not unusual for ICBC defence lawyers to lead evidence that an impact was ‘low velocity’ but evidence of no crash is certainly quite unusual. The defence lawyer also called an ICBC vehicle estimator who reviewed the Defendant’s vehicle and testified that it revealed ‘no new damage’, however, he did admit on cross-examination that a vehicle with a steel checker-plate front bumper welded to the frame can cause damage to another vehicle without it showing on the steel bumper.
After hearing all the evidence the court concluded that a collision did occur and that the Defendants were liable for this rear-end motor vehicle accident.
In the end Mr. Justice Wilson awarded damages as follows:

a. non-pecuniary damages: $40,000;

b. past loss of income and employment insurance benefits: $9,187.60;

c. loss of future earning capacity: $10,000;

d. special damages: $586.43;

e. pre-judgment interest.

3 Car Accidents Found to Have Little Effect on MS

In lenghty reasons for judgement released today, Mr. Justice Metzger found that injuries sustained in 3 seperate motor vehicle collisions had little impact on the Plaintiff’s functioning having regard to her MS related difficulties.
The only issue at trial was the value of the Plaintiff;s damages, fault for the accidents was admitted by the various defendants. The Plaintiff was diagnosed with MS about 5 months after the first of these 3 car accidents.
The Plaintiff sought a total of $223,550 in damages as a result of the collisions. The Plaintiff did not allege that the collisions played a role in the causation or aggravation of MS, rather that the impact of the accident related injuries on her functioning having regard to her MS was significant.
After over 3 weeks of evidence the trial judge concluded that the collisions caused soft tissue injuries (also referred to as connective tissue injuries) and that these were not particulalry significant.
Addressing the first collision the court concluded as follows:
The evidence is that the plaintiff’s injuries from accident #1 healed in their natural course and their effects were eventually overwhelmed or subsumed by the plaintiff’s unrelated progressive MS symptoms and disability. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s pain and suffering decreased over a five-month period, ending in August 2003.

The plaintiff did not adduce evidence of a compounding or synergistic effect between her MS and her accident related soft tissue injuries.

On a review of the usual contradictory cases presented by opposing parties, I am satisfied the plaintiff is entitled to $8,500 in non-pecuniary damages for accident #1

Addressing the second collision the court found that

I find that the maximum duration the soft tissue injuries could be reasonably attributed to the motor vehicle accident of January 25, 2005 is from that date until May 3, 2006, when the MS relapse overwhelmed all other concerns. After that point, even if there were residual symptoms, their significance was “miniscule” or unrelated and not attributable to the negligence of the defendant.
From April 1, 2005 to May 3, 2006, the plaintiff’s function was quite high as she was able to maintain a satisfactory level of performance at Royal Roads University. As the plaintiff’s friend Tiffany Young testified, the plaintiff was able to meet with her for coffee, to play scrabble and go on walks, even though she had ongoing low back or other soft tissue injury symptoms. Other friends confirmed Ms. Jacobs’ attendance at dinners, movies and concerts.

It is not clear how many of the plaintiff’s MS symptoms were confused with the soft tissue injury symptoms. The lay witnesses were not in a position to distinguish between the pre-existing symptoms and those that came after accident #2. None of the lay witnesses suggested that the plaintiff did not have an energetic and high degree of function at least until the May 3, 2006 MS relapse. Each described what could reasonably be expected to accompany mild, nagging soft tissue injuries. The plaintiff coped despite these nagging and disruptive symptoms.

Having considered the collection of competing authorities with respect to appropriate non-pecuniary damages, I am satisfied the plaintiff is entitled to $23,500 as a result of the January 25, 2005 collision.

Lastly, the court found that there was “no objective evidence of injury” as a result of the third collision. THe court awarded $1,500 for pain and suffering as a result of that collision.

The Plaintiff’s total award was $36,116. Addressing the central issue in the case the court found that

There is no evidence of a compounding or synergistic effect between the accidents and the MS beyond the temporary and minor reference made by Dr. Devonshire while the plaintiff was undergoing a period of chemotherapy. The plaintiff remained employed and active at all material times until the disabling MS relapse.

Damages are therefore segregated on the basis of three separate accidents with no overlapping injuries and no interplay between the MS and the motor vehicle accidents.

Do you have questions about this case or a similar ICBC case that you would like to discuss with an ICBC claims lawyer? If so feel free to contact the author.

Pedestrian Struck in Cross-walk Awarded over $700,000

After a trial that lasted over 20 days, A Plaintiff who was struck in a cross-walk in Whistler, BC was awarded $718,331 for his losses and injuries.
The accident was significant. The circumstances are canvassed at paragraph 2 of the judgement where it was held that “The Plaintiff was struck on his left side. He flew over the hood of the Defendant’s vehicle. His face smashed into the windshield. He then was thrown off the car landing on the pavement.
The Plaintiff suffered serious injuries including facial lacerations, a fractured nose, soft tissue injuries to the left knee, neck and back, a mild traumatic brain injury (also known as a concussion), dental and TMJ injuries, permanent facial scarring, depression, insomnia, fatigue, anxiety, panic attacks, chronic pain disorder and most significantly cognitive defecits due to his injuries.
As is often the case in ICBC claims involving chronic pain and head injury, the court had to deal with a mountain of medical expert witness testimony both for the Plaintiff and for the Defence.
In addition to obtaining opposing medical evidence, ICBC hired investigators to video the Plaintiff surreptitiously. As stated in my last blog, video surveillance is a common ICBC lawyer defence tactic. While ICBC lawyers defending claims don’t hire private investigators in every case, a safe general rule is that the more serious a Plaintiff’s injuries, the more likely the chance that ICBC defence lawyers have hired a private investigator.
Mr. Justice Williamson made an interesting comment regarding surveillance at paragraph 114 of his judgement where he held that “(the occupational therapist hired by ICBC) testified that there was a sense that (the Plaintiff) did not trust her and that (the Plaintiff) considered her as somehow or other a spy for ICBC. I note that the Plaintiff’ concern that ICBC was spying on him was accurate. The corporation hired investigators to video the plaintiff surreptitiously.”
After weighing all the evidence, the trial judge found that the Plaintiff “suffers from chronic pain syndrome, depression and continuing cognitive defecits.”
$135,000 was awarded for pain and suffering. The other damages awarded were as follows:
$450,000 for Loss of Earning Capacity (commonly referred to as future wage loss)
$101,436 for Past Wage Loss
$31,895 for Cost of Future Care

Judge states that $184,000 jury award is "Inordinately low" for Chronic Pain Disorder

In reasons for judgment released today, the Honourable Madam Justice Loo stated that the jury’s verdict in a case involving serious injuries including concussion, neck and back injuries, depression and a chronic pain disorder, was ‘inordinately low’ and not supported by the evidene.
The plaintiff was a 28 year old corrections officer who sustained serious injuries in an October, 2003 motor vehicle collision when his vehicle was struck by a semi-tractor trailer that ran a red light.
The jury heard 10 days of evidence. During this time a series of unusual developments occurred (the details of which could be found in Madame Justice Loo’s judgment at paragraphs 12-16) which include a juror getting discharged as a result of an anxiety attack, a juror getting discharged for unusual behaviour which caused him to be hospitalized and the jury discussing the case prematruely and against an express caution from the trial judge not to do so.
After hearing all the evidence the jury awarded $32,550 for past income loss, $17,673.86 for special damages, $30,000 for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, $75,000 for future loss of earning capacity and $28,205 for future care costs.
Madame Justice Loo felt compelled to take the unusual step of commenting on the jury’s verdict and did so in detail. This was apparently done with a view towards assisting the British Columbia Court of Appeal in a judgment that very likely will be appealed. After pointing out that this jury spent no more than 2.5 hours in deliberations, Madame Justice Loo held that ‘no jury reviewing all of the evidence as a whole could have reached such a verdict’.