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$25,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded in Low Velocity Impact

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized. 1 Comment on $25,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded in Low Velocity Impact

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday (Boyd v. Shortreed) by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dealing with a Low Velocity Impact (LVI).  The Plaintiff testified that she was involved in a rear-end crash and that she was injured despite having minimal damage to her vehicle.  Interestingly, the Defendant denied that the crash happened at all.
Mr. Justice Harvey rejected the Defendant’s evidence and concluded that a crash did occur.  Specifically he held that:
[33] The plaintiff reported the accident on April 19, 2005 by telephone and advised the adjuster for ICBC of the damage to her vehicle and the fact she had been injured.  Without first bringing the vehicle to ICBC, she took the car to an auto body shop for repairs and the bumper was fixed.  She testifies that the total cost of repairs was about $360.  No documentary evidence concerning the repairs was ever produced in evidence.  Photographs of the rear bumper of the plaintiff’s vehicle were of little assistance in determining whether there was any damage visible.  It is conceded that the damage amounted to nothing more than an abrasion or scratch requiring repainting.  There was no structural damage to the plaintiff’s car…

[59] There were other inconsistencies in the evidence of the defendant which cause me to reject his evidence as to the happening of the incident.  Accordingly, wherever the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant conflict, I accept the evidence of the plaintiff as being the accurate version of events.

[60] That being found, I conclude that the defendant struck the plaintiff’s car from the rear.  While I accept there was a situation of peril created by the driver of the tractor trailer, the proximate cause of the collision between the defendant’s vehicle and that of the plaintiff was the inattention of the defendant by travelling too close to the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle or, alternatively, the condition of the brakes on his vehicle which did not allow him to slow his vehicle in time to avoid hitting the plaintiff’s vehicle.

[61] I do not find the plaintiff’s reaction to the danger created by the tractor trailer driver to be wanting and decline to apportion any fault for the accident to her.  She reacted appropriately to a situation of emergency created by another driver who is not a party to the action.

[62] As a result, the defendant is 100% liable for the collision and resultant damages.

In valuing the Plaintiff’s Non-Pecuniary Damages at $25,000 Mr. Justice Harvey made the following findings with respect to her accident related injuries:

[76] The only new complaint arising from the accident appears to be the onset of mid-back pain.  This is based mainly on self report.  The extent and duration of these symptoms are described in some detail in the reports of Dr. O’Connor and Dr. McKenzie.  This complaint seems to have occasioned the most pain and has persisted, although significantly improved, to the date of trial.  Her recovery was estimated by the plaintiff to be at 85% of normal when she last attended Dr. McKenzie in August 2009.  There is no ongoing disability related to the complaints nor has there been for some since late in 2007.

[77] In summary, the plaintiff suffered an exacerbation of her previous symptoms in her neck and lower back.  I find these complaints had substantially resolved to their pre-accident condition inside of one year.  In April of 2006, according to the notes of Dr. Shah, there was a further onset of lower back pain but, on the whole of the evidence, I cannot relate this flare up to the accident of April 2005.  The injury to her mid-back was as a result of the accident.  It persisted longer and caused her more discomfort than the exacerbation of her pre-existing symptoms.

[78] Accordingly, taking all of this into account, I assess general damages in the amount of $25,000 in respect of her soft tissue injuries.

BC Personal Injury Law Round Up

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases. 50 Comments on BC Personal Injury Law Round Up

The volume of ICBC and other personal injury cases released by our Superior Courts over the past 2 days has been higher than usual so I present today’s BC Injury Law Update in a ‘round up‘ fashion.
The first case of note was from the BC Court of Appeal and dealt with limitations under the Local Government Act.  When suing a local government for damages a Plaintiff must comply with s. 286 of the Local Government Act which holds in part that a Plaintiff must give “notice in writing…within 2 months from the date on which the damage was sustained“.  Failure to comply with this section can be a bar to suing.  An exception to this limitation period, however, is contained in s. 286(3) which holds that:

(3)        Failure to give the notice or its insufficiency is not a bar to the maintenance of an action if the court before whom it is tried, or, in case of appeal, the Court of Appeal, believes

(a)        there was a reasonable excuse, and

(b)        the defendant has not been prejudiced in its defence by the failure or insufficiency.

Today the BC Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of what is a ‘reasonable excuse’.

In today’s case, Thauili v. Delta, the Plaintiff sued for injuries sustained while in a fitness class in a community center operated by Delta.  The Plaintiff did not give notice within the 2 months set out in s. 286 of the Local Government Act.  Delta brought a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim but this motion was dismissed.  Delta appealed to the BC Court of Appeal.  This too was dismissed and in so doing the BC Court of Appeal added clarity to the issues that can be considered when addressing a ‘reasobable excuse’ for not giving notice within the required 2 month period.  The highlights of this discussion were as follows:

[10] In Teller, a five-judge division of this Court considered the construction to be placed on the words “reasonable excuse”, taken in the context of s. 755 of the Municipal Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 290.  Section 755 contained the same notice requirement found in s. 286(1) of the Local Government Act as well as the same saving provision now found in s. 286(3).  Although not identically worded, there is no difference in substance between s. 755 of the Municipal Act and s. 286 of the Local Government Act.

[11] Teller did not propound a test to determine what constitutes “reasonable excuse”.  Rather, Teller instructs that “all matters put forward as constituting either singly or together a reasonable excuse must be considered.” (at 388)  The question is whether it is reasonable that the plaintiff be excused, having regard to all the circumstances.

[12] Teller expressly overruled those trial decisions which had excluded ignorance of the law as a factor to be considered in deciding whether there was reasonable excuse for the failure to give notice. …

[37] There can be no doubt that after its pronouncement, Teller became – and has remained – the governing authority on the construction of “reasonable excuse” found in the saving provision in s. 755 of the Municipal Act. …

[42] As to the purpose of the section, Southin J.A. said, at 383:

What then is the purpose of the section?  Clearly one of the purposes of the section is to enable a municipality to investigate a claim fully.  But that purpose is addressed by the second branch of the concluding sentence.  The only other purpose I can think of was to protect municipalities against stale claims in order to enable them to estimate their future liabilities and make budgetary provision for them.  But I know of no authority for that surmise. It really is difficult to make much sense out of the words “reasonable excuse” in the context….

43]         After considering the provenance of the section, the state of the law as revealed by the case authorities in 1957 when the provision was, in effect, newly enacted, and the case authorities, including Horie v. Nelson (1988), 20 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 79 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 27 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxv [Horie], Southin J.A. concluded, at 388:

[T]he maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse” is not a rule of law determinative of an issue of statutory interpretation in every instance.

In the end, the question is simply what do the words at issue mean in the context.  In my opinion, ignorance of the law is a factor to be taken into account.  So for that matter is knowledge of the law. But all matters put forward as constituting either singly or together a reasonable excuse must be considered.

Those decisions of the court below which exclude ignorance of the law as a factor are, therefore, overruled.

[50] The decision in Teller does not propound a test or establish criteria which must be met before the court may find a reasonable excuse for the failure to give notice; instead, the decision invites a determination informed by the purpose or intent of the notice provision, taking into account all matters put forward as constituting either singly or together a reasonable excuse.  The determination of whether there is reasonable excuse is contextual.  The question is whether it is reasonable that the plaintiff be excused, having regard to all the circumstances.

Ultimately the Court held that ignorance of the law can be a reasonable excuse in certain circumstances under the Local Government Act.

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The second case released today dealt with Pain and Suffering Awards for Soft Tissue Injuries.  In this case (Robinson v. Anderson) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 rear end car crash in Tsawwassen, BC.  Liability was admitted leaving the court to deal with the value of the injuries.

Mr. Justice Bernard awarded the Plaintiff $25,000 for her non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).  In so doing he summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries and their effect on her life as follows:

[18] It is not disputed that the plaintiff sustained soft-tissue injuries to her neck, back, left shoulder and right knee in the collision. Similarly, there is no suggestion that the plaintiff is a dishonest witness who is prevaricating or exaggerating in relation to her pain and the various consequences it has wrought upon her life….

[22] Causation is established where the plaintiff proves that the defendant caused or contributed to the injury: see Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 235. In regard to the instant case, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proved that the defendant caused or contributed to the injury which has manifested itself in ongoing symptoms of pain. The evidence establishes consistency and continuity in the plaintiff’s symptoms (albeit with some amelioration) and an absence of any intervening cause which might otherwise account for the plaintiff’s current pain. A dearth of objective medical findings is not determinative; this is particularly so for soft tissue injuries.

[23] Notwithstanding the aforementioned causal link, the evidence strongly supports finding that: (a) the plaintiff’s injuries are not permanent; (b) if the plaintiff takes reasonable steps to improve her fitness level, then significant, if not full, recovery is very likely; and (c) if the plaintiff does take those reasonable steps, then recovery is attainable within a relatively short time frame. In this regard, the medical opinions of both Dr. Hodgson and Dr. Werry (on May 6, 2009 and April 9, 2009 respectively) suggest that the plaintiff’s present symptoms would decrease substantially through a reduction of her “habitus” (body size and shape), increased physical activity, and working through that which is sometimes described as “the pain of reactivation”.

[24] There are similarities between the plaintiff in the instant case and the plaintiff in Nair v. Mani, [1991] B.C.J. No. 2830. Ms Nair was 49 years of age, overweight, and physically unfit at the time she was injured in a motor vehicle collision. She complained of ongoing back, thigh and knee pain. The plaintiff was not a malingerer, but the court found that she could have accelerated her improvement and lessened the impact of her injuries through exercise and weight loss. In relation to the plaintiff’s fitness the court said:

A defendant must take her victim as she finds her, be it with a thin skull or an out of shape musculature. But when it comes to the reasonable efforts expected of a plaintiff to aid her own recovery after the accident, then those reasonable steps include exercise and muscle toning so that an injury may be shaken off more quickly.

[25] The plaintiff’s weight is not relevant to causation; however, it is germane to the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate her losses. It is trite law that a plaintiff has an ongoing duty to mitigate his or her damages. In the case at bar, as in Nair v. Mani, the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate includes taking reasonable steps to reduce her body habitus and increase her fitness level…

[28] Assessment of just and fair compensation for non-pecuniary losses by reference to other cases is a daunting task. Each case is unique in its plaintiff and set of circumstances; nonetheless, I accept that the cases cited by the parties assist in defining reasonable upper and lower limits for a non-pecuniary damages award in the case at bar. The most salient factors of the case at bar are: (a) the absence of proof of a permanent or long-term injury; (b) the existence of some amelioration of symptoms; and (c) the absence of enduring and incessant debilitating pain. In relation to (c), I accept that the plaintiff has suffered from pain since the accident and that it has had an adverse effect upon many aspects of her life; I simply note that the intensity of the pain has not been to the degree suffered by many other plaintiffs.

[29] Having due regard to all the foregoing and the cases cited by counsel, I find that a fair and just award for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary losses is $25,000.

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In the third case released today the Court was asked to deal with the issue of fault when the occupant of a parked car opens his door and is struck by a cyclist.

In today’s case (Hagreen v. Su) the Defendant was parked and opened his car door.  As he did so the Plaintiff, who was travelling on his bicycle, drove into the open door and was injured.  The Defendant was found 100% at fault for the Plaintiff’s injuries and in so finding Mr. Justice Brooke summarized and applied the law as follows:

] On the day of the accident, Mr. Hagreen was wearing a helmet as well as reflective stripes on his jacket and boots and was proceeding eastward. Cars were parked on his right side in the 2400 block of East Broadway, and as a matter of course, the plaintiff said that while monitoring the vehicle traffic in the two lanes to his left, he also monitored the driver’s side of the parked cars, in order to alert himself to any potential risk. Mr. Hagreen estimated his speed at 25 to 30 km/hr when he said, without any warning, the driver’s door of Mr. Su’s vehicle opened; that he, Mr. Hagreen, yelled, “Whoa,” but immediately hit the door. He described his upper body hitting the door, and he injured his ankle as well when he hit the ground. Emergency services were called, the first responder being a fire truck before the ambulance arrived, and Mr. Hagreen was transported to hospital. He indicated that he believes that he passed out in hospital, but after being seen by a physician, he was told that he could go home. Mr. Hagreen said that when he tried to put his shirt on, he could not lift his left arm above his head, and this resulted in x-rays being taken of his left arm region. Mr. Hagreen saw his family doctor, Dr. Montgomery, who prescribed Tylenol and Codeine to treat the pain throughout the plaintiff’s upper body, principally in the area of the right collar bone. As a result of continuing complaints of pain in the left collar bone, the plaintiff was referred for physiotherapy which provided some relief for what he was told were soft tissue injuries. Mr Hagreen was off work for seven days, and on his return, he avoided heavy lifting and stretching which resulted in other employees having to do that work.

[4] The defendant, Mr. Su, said that on the day of the accident, it was raining and his child was ill, so he had moved the car to the front of the house to take the child to the doctor. He said that he checked what was behind him, and he saw a cyclist about six or seven houses back, and he felt that he had enough time to get out. He said that he put one leg out and turned his body when the bicycle crashed into the door. In cross-examination, Mr. Su acknowledged giving a statement shortly after the accident, and in that statement, he said that he opened the car door slightly and made shoulder check, then he opened the door further and moved both of his legs out, when he saw the bike approaching “really fast” and the resulting collision occurred. Mr. Su had earlier indicated that he had passed the test in English for a second language, although most of his customers speak Chinese rather than English. Mr. Su was asked in cross-examination whether it was true that he did not see the bicycle until the door was opened and that it was then too late, and he acknowledged that that was true but indicated that it was some few years past. It was put to Mr. Su that he did not see the bicycle until it was too late, to which he said yes, and it was put to him that that was the truth, to which he also said yes.

[5] I am satisfied that the defendant is solely responsible for the collision, having opened his door when it was unsafe to do so. Section 203(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318, says:

(1) A person must not open the door of a motor vehicle on the side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so.

[6] I find that the defendant, Mr. Su, is wholly responsible for the collision and that the plaintiff took all reasonable steps available to him to avoid the collision, but that the door was not opened by Mr. Su until the plaintiff was so close that he had no opportunity to brake or to take evasive action. I now turn to the question of damages.

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The last ICBC related case released today dealt with the issue of costs.  In this case (Mariano v. Campbell) the Plaintiff sued for injuries as a result of a car crash.  The claim was prosecuted under Rule 66 and the trial took 4 days (which exceeds the 2 days allowed under Rule 66).

When a Plaintiff sues and succeeds in a Rule 66 lawsuit their ‘costs’ are capped at $6,600 “unless the court orders otherwise” as set out in Rule 66(29).

In today’s case the Plaintiff was awarded a total of just over $115,000 after trial.  She brought an application to be permitted an additional $3,200 in costs.  Madam Justice Loo allowed this application.  This case is worth reviewing in full to see some of the factors courts consider when addressing additional costs to the successful party in a Rule 66 Lawsuit.

The Use of Clinical Records in ICBC Injury Trials

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

ICBC Injury Claims can be record intensive.  Every time you see your doctor, chiropractor, massage therapist, or other medical specialist they keep clinical records.  These records often take down your subjective complaints, the physician’s objective observations, the physician’s assessment of the problem and the plan or treatment prescribed.   These records, if addressing accident related injuries, are relevant and usually are produced to the Plaintiff and Defence lawyer in the course of litigation.
So what use can be made of these records at trial?  Can a Plaintiff corroborate in court testimony with these previously recorded out of court statements?  Reasons for judgement were released today thoroughly canvassing this area of the law.
In today’s case (Smith v. Wirachowsky) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 car crash in Nanaimo, BC.  It was a rear-end crash and the Plaintiff suffered various “mild to moderate” soft tissue injuries which were largely but not entirely resolved by the time of trial.  It was expected that the injuries would eventually resolve and damages of $35,978.66 were awarded which included an award of $30,000 for non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering).
During the course of the trial the Plaintiff attempted to introduce clinical records from the Plaintiff’s physiotherapist which recorded the Plaintiff’s complaints of pain.  Mr. Justice Halfyard ruled that the records were not admissible for that purpose and summarized the law relating to the use of clinical records at trial as follows:
[14] It was common ground that the clinical records qualified as “business records” within s. 42 of the Evidence Act.  It was also agreed that the plaintiff’s statements in the clinical records, if admitted, could not be used to prove the truth of their contents or to bolster the credibility of the plaintiff’s trial testimony. …

[22] In my opinion, the authorities and the rules of evidence establish that the fact that a plaintiff made a particular statement to a doctor or therapist can be relevant to the following issues (where such issues exist):

a) In cross examination of the plaintiff, to prove that the plaintiff made a previous statement (which is alleged to constitute a previous inconsistent statement or a damaging admission);

b) In re-examination of the plaintiff, to rebut the suggestion (by defence counsel) of recent fabrication or failure to complain;

c) In cross examination of a doctor who examined or treated the plaintiff, to prove that the plaintiff made a previous statement (which is alleged to constitute a previous inconsistent statement or damaging admission), where the plaintiff denied or did not admit making the statement;

d) Where a doctor’s or therapist’s particular recommendation for the plaintiff’s treatment is challenged, and the plaintiff’s statement is relevant to explain why that treatment was prescribed or administered; and

e) In cross examination of a medical expert witness called by either party, where it is alleged that the expert relied on a particular statement made by the plaintiff to him or her; or where it is alleged that the expert disregarded or failed to consider a particular statement made by the plaintiff.

[23] It should be noted that there are at least two ways in which a plaintiff’s statements recorded in clinical records may become admissible as proof of their truth.  The first way is where the plaintiff admits making a particular statement to a doctor or therapist which appears to be inconsistent with the plaintiff’s trial testimony, but then adopts the previous statement as being true (and rejects the conflicting trial testimony).  In that situation, the previous statement can be used as proof of its truth, if the trier of fact accepts the plaintiff’s testimony on this point.  More frequently, the plaintiff will reject the previous statement as being false and give an explanation for making it (such as mistake).  In that case, as is well known, the previous statement, if inconsistent, can only be used to assess the credibility of the plaintiff’s trial testimony.

[24] The second way is where the plaintiff admits making (or is shown to have made) a previous statement recorded in the clinical records which if true, would constitute an admission against interest.  In that situation, the plaintiff’s previous statement can be used by the trier of fact as proof of its truth (even if the plaintiff denies that his or her previous admission was true).

[25] Conclusion

[26] In the present case, the statements of the plaintiff to her physicians and therapists were not relevant to any issue in the trial that could have made them admissible at the instance of the plaintiff.  A potential exception could occur in a case where a plaintiff had told her doctor that she had recovered from an injury, but on a subsequent date or dates attended a doctor again and complained that an injury continued to generate symptoms of pain and disability.  In that situation, the plaintiff’s subsequent complaints to her doctor would be admissible in re-examination, to rebut the suggestion that the plaintiff had made no further complaints of pain after a certain point in time.  But of course the complaints made subsequently by the plaintiff could not be admitted to prove their truth.  It was not shown that this situation occurred here.

$55,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages for Chronic and Pervasive Back Pain

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgment were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry (Wilson v. Manzano), awarding a Plaintiff over $350,000 in total damages as a result of chronic soft tissue injuries sustained in a 2004 BC Car Crash.
The collision occurred at a relatively low speed with the Defendant accelerating from a stop on the mistaken belief that his light turned green.  He rear-ended the Plaintiff’s vehicle which was stopped in front of him.  The crash caused about $5,000 in damages to the Plaintiff’s vehicle.
The Plaintiff was injured despite the relatively low speed of the crash as she was in a vulnerable position at the moment of impact with her “head and upper body turned toward (a rear seat passenger).”
The Plaintiff’s GP gave evidence that she suffered from a ‘chronic myofacial pain in the upper lumbar area‘ as a result of this crash and that she went on to develop a ‘chronic pain syndrome in the back‘.  The medical evidence established that this injury was permanent and would likely continue to adversely effect the Plaintiff in the future including limiting the types of jobs she could take advantage of.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $55,000 Mr. Justice Bernard summarized the effect of these injuries on the Plaintiff’s life as follows:

[37] The collision in question was one of moderate impact. The significance of it in relation to injury is not the force of the impact, per se, but rather that the impact came without warning while Ms Wilson’s body was in a particularly vulnerable position in relation to the effect of the force upon her. Ms Wilson was seated in the driver’s seat, but not facing forward. Her head and body were twisted to the right so that she could converse face-to-face with her nephew who was seated in a rear passenger seat. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that she might have sustained an injury qualitatively different than the usual “whiplash” and that her prognosis for recovery might also be quite different.

[38] I am satisfied that Ms Wilson is neither an idle complainer nor a hypochondriac. At the time of the collision she was a strong, healthy, active and vibrant woman who was happily employed in a relatively physically demanding job. Within hours after the collision, she was in tears and paralyzing pain from a spasm in her lower back. At 4:30 a.m. she took a hot shower to help alleviate the spasm. She attended her job site the next morning and was in so much pain by the end of the day that she stopped at a medical clinic en route to her home and received pain medication. Thereafter she saw her family physician and went through a physiotherapy program. She wants to recover from her injury and get on with her life as she knew it, but she has been able to make very little progress in that regard.

[39] Ms Wilson’s back pain, caused by the collision, has not abated. I am satisfied that there is no prevarication or exaggeration in relation to her symptoms. I also find that there were no intervening events which might reasonably account for the pain she now suffers. There were some medical issues subsequent to the collision; however, I am satisfied that none of these were related to the chronic back pain from which Ms Wilson suffers. There has been continuity of symptoms since the collision. There is no evidence of events inconsistent with Ms Wilson’s claims; to the contrary, her family, friends, and co-workers corroborate her continuous suffering and the significantly negative impact the injury from the collision has had upon her life. Ms Wilson’s frustration with the pain and the manifold ways it has affected her life is palpable. The evidence establishes that her chronic back pain has forced her to give up most, if not all, of her activities and pursuits, both in leisure and work, which she found enjoyable, fulfilling, and rewarding. The pain she suffers has made her very unhappy. It has robbed her of a rewarding career and fulfilling pastimes. It has jeopardized valued personal relationships.

[40] I am similarly satisfied that her pain symptoms are now chronic, with no reasonable prospect of amelioration except over the course of many years, if not decades. In this regard, I accept the diagnosis and prognosis of Dr. Mason. He presented as a very knowledgeable physician and a reasonable man who knows Ms Wilson, as his patient, well. His opinion is corroborated, in critical aspects, by Dr. Gouws…

[48] I accept that each of the cases cited bear some similarities to the case at bar and establish a range of damages from $40,000 to $100,000. These cases offer some guidance; however, each set of circumstances is unique, as is each plaintiff. I consider two compelling aspects of the case at bar to be: (a) the pervasiveness of the injury upon the plaintiff’s life, and (b) the reasonable prospect of some amelioration of her symptoms over time. In all the circumstances, and having regard to the cases cited, I set the award for non-pecuniary losses at $55,000.

Pain and Suffering Awards with Pre-Existing and Progressive Conditions

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, Uncategorized. 54 Comments on Pain and Suffering Awards with Pre-Existing and Progressive Conditions

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court dealing with a fair range of damages for pain and suffering when an accident victim has a pre-existing condition which likely would have been progressive and painful without the accident.
In today’s case (Kaur v. Bhoey) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 BC Car Crash.  She was a passenger and her vehicle lost control and she struck a utility pole.  She was apparently concussed in this collision and was in and out of consciousness at the scene of the crash.
The Plaintiff had a pre-existing condition (osteoporosis with spinal compression fractures) which may have been progressive and led to chronic back pain even without the crash.
Mr. Justice Truscott found that the crash caused ‘soft tissue injuries‘ which caused a ‘kyphotic condition‘ otherwise known as a humpback.   The Court held that, despite the injury, there was “a significant risk that (the plaintiffs) osteoarthritis would have led to more back fractures and more pack pain and kyphosis”  He went on to award $50,000 in damages for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering.  In arriving at this figure Mr. Justice Truscott summarized the law and the key findings of fact as follows:

[5] The plaintiff had pre-existing medical conditions that may affect the value of her claim from this accident and that require consideration of the legal principles confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458.

[6] Athey confirms that an injury is caused by the defendant’s negligence as long as that negligence materially contributes to the injury even though there may be other causes that contribute to the injury as well.

[7] However, on the issue of the proper assessment of a plaintiff’s damages, Athey says, commencing at para. 35 on p. 473:

The defendant need not put the plaintiff in a position better than his or her original position. The defendant is liable for the injuries caused, even if they are extreme, but need not compensate the plaintiff for any debilitating effects of the pre-existing condition which the plaintiff would have experienced anyway. The defendant is liable for the additional damage but not the pre-existing damage… Likewise, if there is a measurable risk that the pre-existing condition would have detrimentally affected the plaintiff in the future, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, then this can be taken into account in reducing the overall award… This is consistent with the general rule that the plaintiff must be returned to the position he would have been in, with all of its attendant risks and shortcomings, and not a better position…

[137] I accept that the kyphotic condition the plaintiff suffers from was caused by her low back soft tissue injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident, and not by her pre-existing spinal compression fractures. I accept Dr. Hershler’s opinion in this regard.

[138] I accept Dr. Hershler’s opinion that the two compression fractures the plaintiff had before the accident in her low back were insufficient to cause this kyphotic condition.

[139] Dr. Hershler was able to push the plaintiff’s back to make her stand erect and that is some evidence that the kyphotic condition is being caused by pain and not by the compression fractures in her spine.

[140] This is not to conclude, however, that the plaintiff did not already suffer from some back pain before the accident caused by the compression fractures in her low back, in turn caused by her osteoporosis. Dr. Panesar’s records, and his evidence, as well as Dr. Yorke’s reports, set out previous incidents of back pain.

[141] I do accept, however, that prior to this motor vehicle accident these incidents were being generally controlled by medication.

[142] Still, such a finding does not answer the issue raised in Athey as to whether the plaintiff would have suffered her present state of back pain and accompanying kyphotic condition in any event of the motor vehicle accident, or at least there was a measurable risk of that occurring absent the motor vehicle accident that must be taken into account in reducing the overall award.

[143] With the plaintiff having a history of osteoporosis, with spinal compression fractures and incidents of back pain which Dr. Panesar referred to in 2001 as chronic, and with her advancing age, I am satisfied that the award for general damages must be discounted for the significant risk that her progressive osteoporosis would have led to more back fractures and more back pain and kyphosis, in any event…

[149] Taking into account here that the plaintiff is much older with a shorter life expectancy, and has pre-existing medical issues directly related to her present problem of low back pain, including progressive arthritis, I conclude there is a measurable risk that her pre-existing medical issues would have detrimentally affected her physically in the future regardless of the defendants’ negligence in this motor vehicle accident, and I assess her general damages for pain and suffering from this motor vehicle accident at $50,000.

$40,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded for Moderate Soft Tissue Injuries

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westinster Registry (Lehtonen v. Johnston), awarding a Plaintiff just over $60,000 in total damages as a result of a 2005 BC Car Crash.
The car crash was a rear-end collision.  The issue of liability (fault) was admitted and the trial focused on quantum of damages (value of the Plaintiff’s injuries).
The accident was found to be a “very minor” one and appears to fit ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact program as the Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained only $780 in damages.  Notwithstanding the minor amount of vehicle damage the Plaintiff alleged she suffered from serious injuries including a right hip misalignment.
Madam Justice Baker found that many of the Plaintiff’s complaints were not caused from the crash, however, despite the minor nature of this crash the Court found that the Plaintiff did suffer various injuries.  In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $40,000 Madam Justice Baker summarized the accident related injuries as follows:

[83] Having considered the evidence as a whole, with particular reference to the medical opinion evidence, I conclude that Ms. Lehtonen sustained a mild injury to the soft tissues of her neck and upper back and a mild to moderate injury to the soft tissues of her lower back as a result of the motor vehicle accident on July 30, 2005.

[84] While the injuries caused discomfort, Ms. Lehtonen did not lose or quickly recovered full range of motion in the affected areas. The neck and upper back symptoms improved significantly within the first six weeks after the accident, although the symptoms recurred from time to time, exacerbated by physical exertion.  The lower back symptoms caused by the accident persisted for about a year but after the first several months have not been proved to be disabling.  Ms. Lehtonen testified that her physical injuries improved steadily over the first six months after the accident and that she did not have an exacerbation of her anxiety or depression related to the accident during that period…

[86] I accept that Ms. Lehtonen continues to have a subjective perception of a variety of symptoms, but I consider it more probable than not that the symptoms she has experienced from the second half of 2006 to present are not caused by the relatively mild soft tissue injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident and are the result of a complex interplay of social, psychological and emotional factors unrelated to the motor vehicle accident; and fibromyalgia…

[90] I am satisfied that the discomfort from Ms. Lehtonen’s injuries likely did contribute to Ms. Lehtonen’s pre-existing depression and anxiety, although she denied this during the first six months post-accident.  I am also satisfied, however, that Ms. Lehtonen would have had depression even if the accident had not happened, and that any exacerbation of her mental health problems was temporary and minor.  The depression is, in my view, a chronic condition, that waxes and wanes….

[92] I am satisfied that Ms. Lehtonen had recovered from her physical injuries within a year following the accident. I accept that after that time she has continued to experience episodes of lower back discomfort from time to time.  However, her experience of other symptoms after that date is more probably caused by her complex pre-existing and ongoing psychiatric condition; in particular, depression and anxiety, exacerbated by adverse reactions to and, at times, abuse of medications prescribed to treat the depression and anxiety.  I also conclude that Ms. Lehtonen’s later and current subjective symptoms of soft tissue and joint pain are more probably the result of Ms. Lehtonen’s fibromyalgia than any sequelae of the motor vehicle accident injuries…

[94] As Chief Justice McEachern stated in Price v. Kostryba, [1982] B.C.J. No. 1518:

I am not stating any new principle when I say that the court should be exceedingly careful when there is little or no objective evidence of continuing injury and when complaints of pain persist for long periods extending beyond the normal or usual recovery.

[95] I might add that the same caution must be exercised when a plaintiff’s recovery not only deviates significantly from the normal course of recovery, but where a plaintiff develops new, different, unusual and more serious subjective complaints long after the event said to be the cause of those complaints.

[96] In saying this, I have not concluded that Ms. Lehtonen has fabricated these symptoms.  I accept that she subjectively perceives these things to be true.  I do not consider her perception of these symptoms to be reliable, however.  I consider it more probable than not that they are subjective physical manifestations of a complex interplay of emotional, physical and psychological factors unrelated to the motor vehicle accident.  Ms. Lehtonen’s statement to Dr. Riar that even the pain from a mosquito bite persists for months indicates that while these symptoms are real to her, they cannot be accepted on any objective evaluation.

[97] I am not persuaded that any symptoms that Ms. Lehtonen continued to experience subjectively more than 12 months after the accident, except for episodic and non-disabling muscle tightness and discomfort in her lower back, were caused by the motor vehicle accident.

Hyperextension Knee Injuries from Car Crashes Discussed

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Knee Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgment were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry (Cabrera v. Sandhu), awarding a Plaintiff close to $350,000 in total damages for injuries and loss as a result of a 2003 BC Car Crash including an award of non-pecuniary damages of $60,000.
The collision occurred in Coquitlam, BC.    It was a near head on collision for which the Defendant admitted fault.  The issue at trial was quantum of damages (value of the Plaintiff’s claim).
The Plaintiff suffered various injuries including a “medial meniscus tear” which was stabalized through arthroscopic surgery.  The Plaintiff also had a ‘partial tear of her ACL which had scarred back to her PCL” which required a second surgery to correct.  The Plaintiff did not fully recover from these knee injuries by the time of trial and it was accepted that she was plateaued and “left with a significant and permanent disability.”  It was also found to be probable that the Plaintiff would need further knee surgery in the future.
One of the key issues at trial was weather the knee injury was related to the collision because the Plaintiff’s knee complaints did not come until sometime after the crash.  In accepting that the knee injuries were related to the crash Mr. Justice Rice accepted the evidence of the Plaintiff’s surgeon, Dr. Guy, who gave evidence that “it is common that passengers seated in the front of a car sustain knee injuries after having their foot braced against the pedal or floor board at the time of an accident.  In that position, injuries occur as a result of hyper extension of the knee during the collision”
In addition to the knee injury Mr. Justice Rice found that the Plaintiff suffered from various soft tissue injuries described as a “mysofacial pain of the neck, upper and low back regions“.    These injuries had ‘resolved somewhat” by the time of trial but caused occasional pain to the Plaintiff.    The Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss was valued at $60,000 for these injuries.

More on Facebook and BC Injury Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Privacy Issues, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Further to my previous posts on the subject, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, showing that the use of Facebook photos by Defence Lawyers is a trend that is becoming well entrenched in ICBC and other BC Injury Claims.
In today’s case (Mayenburg v. Yu) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 BC Car Crash.  Liability (fault) for the crash was admitted by the Defendant.  The Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages were valued at $50,000.  In arriving at this figure Mr. Justice Myers accepted the evidence of Dr. Apel, an expert in physical and rehabilitation medicine.  Dr. Apel opined that the accident caused a soft tissue injury to the Plaintiff’s upper trapezius muscles described as a “myofascial pain of mild severity“.  Additionally the Plaintiff was found to have “myofascial chronic regional pain syndrome of the gluteus medius” and “mechanical back pain“.
The court accepted that the Plaintiff’s injuries were likely permanent, specifically noting that her “prognosis for complete symptom resolution is guarded“.
At trial the Defence Lawyer challenged the credibility of the Plaintiff and to this end tried to introduce 273 photos from the Plaintiff’s Facebook wall.
Mr. Justice Myers noted that “the bulk of these photos showed no more than (the Plaintiff) enjoying herself with her friends“.   He ruled that over 200 of these photos were inadmissible only permitting the photos that showed the plaintiff “doing a specific activity which she said she had difficulty performing”, he did not let the other photos in because they “had no probative value“.
Mr. Justice Myers did not agree with the Defendant’s challenges to the Plaintiff’s credibility noting that the admissible photos did not contradict the Plaintiff’s evidence, specifically he stated as follows:

[40]    This left a subset of approximately 69 photographs.  These showed Ms. Mayenburg doing things such as hiking, dancing, or bending.  However, even these photos do not serve to undercut Ms. Mayenburg’s credibility, because she did not say that she could not do these activities or did not enjoy them.  Rather, she said she would feel the consequences afterwards.

[41]    In effect, the defendants sought to set up a straw person who said that she could not enjoy life at all subsequent to the accident.  That was not the evidence of Ms. Mayenburg.

[42]    As indicated above, I accept the conclusions of Dr. Apel.  That said, Ms. Mayenburg’s injuries have had minimal effect on her lifestyle or her ability to carry on with the activities that she enjoyed beforehand.  Her damages must be assessed on that basis.

[43]    In terms of the facts relevant to assessing non-pecuniary damages (as opposed to loss of capacity) this case is remarkably similar to Henri v. Seo, 2009 BCSC 76, in which Boyd J. awarded the plaintiff $50,000.  I find that to be a suitable award in this case.

The Defence also tried  to minimize the extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries by pointing out that there was a “limited number of times she visited physicians to complain about her pain”  Mr. Justice Myers quickly disposed of this argument noting

[37]    I do not accept those submissions, which have been made and rejected in several other cases:  see Myers v. Leng, 2006 BCSC 1582 and Travis v. Kwon, 2009 BCSC 63.  Ms. Mayenburg is to be commended for getting on with her life, rather than seeing physicians in an attempt to build a record for this litigation.  Furthermore, I fail to see how a plaintiff-patient who sees a doctor for something unrelated to an accident can be faulted for not complaining about the accident-related injuries at the same time.  Dr. Ducholke testified how her time with patients was limited.

[38]    In summary, Ms. Mayenburg’s complaints to her doctors were not so minimal as to cast doubt on her credibility.

Lastly, this case is also worth reviewing as it contains a useful discussion of ‘rebuttal’ expert medical evidence at paragraphs 29-35.

More on Low Velocity Impacts and a Legal History Lesson

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized. 1 Comment on More on Low Velocity Impacts and a Legal History Lesson

Yet another “Low Velocity Impact” Injury Claim went to trial and yet again the Court found that a compensable injury existed despite the minimal vehicle damage.
In today’s case (Bourdin v. Ridenour) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 Car Crash in Kamloops, BC.  This was a crash that apparently fell into ICBC’s LVI Program as the minimal amount of vehicle damage was stressed at trial by the defence lawyer (the Plaintiff’s vehicle damage cost only $316 to repair). Despite this Madam Justice Hyslop found that the Plaintiff was injured in the crash.  In valuing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $22,500 the Court summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries as follows:

[87] Ms. Bourdin had constant pain for approximately five months after the accident.  However, she acknowledged some improvement during that period.  She was plagued with headaches, the severity of which she had never experienced before.  Dr. Vlahos’ clinical records note that Ms. Bourdin, on February 8, 2008, complained of having a “…new onset of headaches.  Head feels like it is in a vise”.  This description is a similar description of the headaches Ms. Bourdin suffered as a result of the motor vehicle accident.

[88] I do accept that Ms. Bourdin suffered from headaches and that they occurred as a result of the accident.  She has been nauseous and vomited with such headaches, the last of which was two weeks before this trial.  According to Ms. Bourdin, headaches of this nature occurred after the accident.  However, Ms. Bourdin did not describe headaches of this nature to either Dr. O’Farrell or Dr. Travlos.

[89] Ms. Bourdin’s neck, shoulder and mid-back were injured as a result of the accident.  She continues to suffer pain from these injuries today, but they are occasional.  At trial, Ms. Bourdin stated that her neck and shoulder pain are now triggered when she is reaching for something, and sometimes everyday events caused neck and shoulder pain without explanation.  She acknowledged improvement in the spring of 2006 and that this has been ongoing from 2006 to the date of trial.  Her chiropractors, her massage therapists and her comments to Dr. O’Farrell and Dr. Travlos confirm this.  She told Dr. O’Farrell that at the time he examined her, her pain was intermittent.

In discussing the LVI Defence to Injury Claims Madam Justice Hyslop quoted a 2006 case (Jackman v. All Season Labour Supplies Ltd.) in which Mr. Justice Smith of the BC Supreme Court pointed out that the LVI defence is not a principle of law but rather “a creature of policy created by ICBC“.  Specifically Mr. Justice Smith held

[12]      On the issue of vehicle damage, I note the comments of Madam Justice Ballance in Robbie v. King 2003 BCSC 1553, at paragraph 35:

The proposition that a low velocity accident is more or less likely to have a propensity of injury is a creature of policy created by ICBC. Although lack of impact severity is by no means determinative of the issue as to whether a person could have sustained an injury, it is nonetheless a relevant consideration particularly with respect to soft tissue injury. Ultimately, the extent of Ms. Robbie’s injuries are to be decided on the evidence as a whole.

[13]      Although lack of vehicle damage may be a relevant consideration, it has to be balanced against the evidence of the plaintiff and the medical evidence, including the complete lack of any medical evidence to support the assertion that the injuries are inconsistent with vehicle damage.

Now for the legal history lesson:

While it is well accepted by BC Courts that ICBC’s LVI Policy is not a legal defense to a tort claim, rather, vehicle damage is just “a relevant consideration” ICBC Defence Lawyers often quote a 1982 case from the BC Supreme Court (Price v. Kostryba) in which Mr. Justice McEachern quoted another BC Supreme Court decision (Butlar v. Blaylock) in which the Court held that:

I am not stating any new principle when I say that the Court should be exceedingly careful when there is little or no objective evidence of continuing injury and when complaints of pain persist for long periods extending beyond the normal or usual recovery…

An injured person is entitled to be fully and properly compensated for any injury or disability caused by a wrongdoer. But no one can expect his fellow citizen or citizens to compensate him in the absence of convincing evidence — which could be just his own evidence if the surrounding circumstances are consistent — that his complaints of pain are true reflections of a contuining injury.

However, this often cited quote comes from a case that was overturned on appeal.  In 1983 the BC Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision of Blaylock and held as follows:

12 With the greatest respect, I am of the opinion that there is no evidence upon which one could reasonably conclude that the appellant did not continue to suffer pain as of the date of the trial. After careful consideration of the expert testimony and the evidence of the appellant and his wife, I have reached the conclusion that the only finding open to the learned trial judge was that as of the date of trial the appellant continued to suffer moderate pain and in the words of Dr. Lehmann, his symptoms “will gradually subside with further time. Having been present for approximately two and a half years, it is doubtful that they will disappear completely.” (underlining mine).

13 There are three basic reasons which, in my view, support the conclusion that the plaintiff continued to suffer pain as of the date of trial. Firstly, the plaintiff testified that he continued to suffer pain. His wife corroborated this evidence. The learned trial judge accepted this evidence but held that there was no objective evidence of continuing injury. It is not the law that if a plaintiff cannot show objective evidence of continuing injury that he cannot recover. If the pain suffered by the plaintiff is real and continuing and resulted from the injuries suffered in the accident, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. There is no suggestion in this case that the pain suffered by the plaintiff did not result from the accident. I would add that a plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for pain, even though the pain results in part from the plaintiff’s emotional or psychological makeup and does not result directly from objective symptoms.
14 Secondly, all of the medical reports support the view that the plaintiff continued to suffer pain and that it was not likely that his symptoms would disappear completely.

15 Thirdly, and of great importance, is the report of Dr. Lehmann, which was not before the learned trial judge for his consideration. In that report, Dr. Lehmann stated that there were degenerative changes in the cervical spine which pre-existed the accident. He said “they were probably asymptomatic before the accident but I think are probably contributing to his prolonged discomfort.” (underlining mine). In my view, as this evidence is uncontradicted, these objective findings cannot be disregarded and should be given great weight.

I hope this ‘history lesson’ helps anyone confronted with ICBC’s LVI Program denying a tort claim because of little vehicle damage.

The Art of Valuing Pain and Suffering in ICBC Injury Claims

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized. 49 Comments on The Art of Valuing Pain and Suffering in ICBC Injury Claims

Today reasons for judgment were released by the Vancouver Registry of the BC Supreme Court in 2 separate Injury Claims where Pain and Suffering was valued.  In each case the Plaintiffs suffered different injuries which affected their respective lives to different degrees.  Yet both Plaintiffs were awarded exactly $55,000 for their non-pecuniary damages.  How can this be?  The answer is that valuing claims for pain and suffering is an art, not an exact science.
When asking a personal injury lawyer how much a claim for pain and suffering is worth it is difficult  if not impossible to value a claim at an exact dollar figure.  The only accurate answer is “whatever the judge or jury gives you“.  Instead of attaching an exact dollar figure to any claim personal injury lawyers learn that claims can best be valued within an approximate range of damages.  One judge can award a plaintiff $50,000 for a disc herniation and another can award a plaintiff with the exact same injuries $80,000 and there is nothing wrong in law with this so long as the award falls within the accepted range of damages for similar injuries.
Today’s cases demonstrate this quite well.  In the first case (Morrison v. Gauthier) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 BC Car crash.  Her vehicle was rear-ended in Coquitlam BC.  The Defendant was fully at fault for the crash.
The Plaintiff suffered fairly severe injuries which included an L4-5 disc herniation which from time to time “puts pressure on the L4 nerve root and that the result for the plaintiff is not just pain in the low back – which is always her lot – but intense pain that, amongst other things, travels down the back of her leg“.  In addition to this the Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries and a concussion in the collision.
Mr. Justice Stewart found that the effects of the Plaintiff’s back injuries were likely permanent and had a rather profound impact on her.  He stated that “the effect…on the Plaintiff’s life was dramatic…her capacity to (keep her work and home environment in order) has been severely reduced . ”  He went on to find that the Plaintiff was incredibly athletic before the collision and “was a woman who on the basis of the evidence placed before me, I can only describe as a dynamo” and as a result of the car crash “she became…ornery.  She withdrew from her friends.  She became moody and – stunning for her – one who sat idly watching television and gaining unwelcome weight.  To some extent she became – utterly new to her – a chronic complainer.”  Lastly he stated that (the defendant) “managed to reduce a woman operating at an athletic level undreamt of by 99% of the population to a woman who must now, often, be helped out of a chair.  (the Plaintiff’s) compensable loss if overwhelming“.
Mr. Justice Stewart awarded the Plaintiff $55,000 for her non-pecuniary damages.,
In the second case (O’Rourke v. Kenworthy) released today by the BC Supreme Court the Plaintiff was involved in a 2004 BC Car Crash.  The Defendant was 100% at fault.  Madam Justice Wedge found that the Plaintiff was injured in the crash.  Specifically the court found that the Plaintiff suffered from neck and back pain which was “severe for several months, which then alleviated considerably over the next year or so.”  The Plaintiff curtailed many of the physical activities which she enjoyed by after about a year she “resumed most of these activities despite continuing ot experience pain“.   By the time of trial she “continued to have pain in her neck and back, but it is not disabling.  She has been able to work, and she is currently able to work.  She participates in numerous sporting activities and continues to hike, which is her first love.  She has continued to travel extensively.   No medical professional offered the opinion that (the Plaintiff’s) pain is chronic in nature, or that it is caused by anything other than soft tissue injuries.  They all agreed that her symptoms are expected to improve and will likely resolve gradually over time…At most (the Plaintiff) is at risk of suffering exacerbation’s of her pain if she engages in certain rigorous activities.”
Scrutinizing the facts of the above two cases the first Plaintiff appears to have suffered more severe injuries which had a more profound effect on her life.  Yet both were awarded the exact same figure for pain and suffering.  This does not necessarily mean that either award was wrong in law, rather the difference can readily be explained by the fact that pain and suffering awards are assessed within rather large ranges of acceptable damages.  A more severe injury valued on the lower end of its respective range of damages can equal a more minor injury valued on the generous end of its range.
In the end, cases like this speak to the art of assessing pain and suffering in BC Injury Claims.  As with any art ‘feel‘ becomes important and this is gained through time and experience.  The more cases you read, the better you will get at the art of valuing non-pecuniary damages and determining the potential value of any given BC Injury Claim.