Show Your Work! – Medical Opinion Rejected For Failing to Outline Supporting Reasons


Remember grade school math problems?  You needed to not just give your teacher the answer but also show your work.  The conclusion without the supporting paper-trail wouldn’t pass muster in Grade 5.   The same is true with medical opinions in BC injury trials.  It is not enough for a doctor to relate injuries to a collision, the physician must explain the factual basis underlying their opinion.  Failure to do so can result in a Court placing little weight on a physicians opinions.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released recently by the BC Supreme Court.
In the recent case (Perry v. Vargas) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision.  She sued for damages claiming long-standing injuries with disabling consequences.  The Court accepted the Plaintiff was indeed injured but disagreed with the Plaintiff’s assertion of long-standing disability being related to the crash.
In the course of the trial the Plaintiff introduced evidence from her treating physician supporting her position.  The Court struggled in giving “much weight” to the physician’s opinion, however, noting that the physician provided “no insight into the reasons for (her) conclusion“.  In addressing the lack of reasoning underlying the opinion Mr. Justice Savage provided the following criticism:
[56]         I find it difficult to give much weight to Dr. Tesiorowski’s opinion with respect to causation. Most of the report appears to simply reiterate what she has been told by others. She was not in fact treating Ms. Perry for the complaints until the passing of Dr. Condon. She only did one physical examination. In the report she does not address any of the intervening events.
[57]         In my opinion there is another more fundamental problem with Dr. Tesiorowski’s report. There is no reasoning linking the current complaints with the December 4, 2006 Accident. That is, she states a conclusion as quoted above but provides no insight into the reasons for that conclusion. I examine this matter in greater detail below…
[122]     The report of Dr. Tesiorowski has another important failing. It refers to a history gained from Ms. Perry and others and then simply states a conclusion. To be useful an opinion must be more than a conclusory assertion on causation. In Montreal Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Quebec (Attorney-General) (1908), 41 S.C.R. 116 at 132, Idington J. said “I refuse to accept unless absolutely necessary the mere ipse dixit of any expert when presented for my acceptance merely as an act of faith, and without the aid of such reasons as his reasoning power, or means of, and result of the use of means of, observations may have developed”.
[123]     The same kind of concern is noted by Binnie J., speaking for the court in R. v. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51 at para. 56, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600. The opinion must assist the trier of fact to form an independent conclusion by “an act of informed judgment, not an act of faith”:
56          In Mohan , Sopinka J. held that the expert evidence in question had to be more than merely helpful. He required that the expert opinion be necessary “in the sense that it provide information, which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury, … the evidence must be necessary to enable the trier of fact to appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature” (p. 23). In Béland , supra , McIntyre J., speaking about the inadmissibility of a polygraph test, cited at p. 415 Davie v. Edinburgh Magistrates, [1953] S.C. 34 (Scotland Ct. Sess.) , at p. 40, on the role of expert witnesses where Lord Cooper said:
Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. [Emphasis added.]
The purpose of expert evidence is thus to assist the trier of fact by providing special knowledge that the ordinary person would not know. Its purpose is not to substitute the expert for the trier of fact. What is asked of the trier of fact is an act of informed judgment, not an act of faith.
[124]     As there is no reasoning linking the facts referenced in the medical report with the conclusory assertion on causation, I am unable to form an independent conclusion from this opinion. To accept the opinion would simply be a leap of faith, applying the logical fallacy of ipse dixit, in this context, “because she said it”.
[125]     For all of these reasons Dr. Tesiorowski’s opinion is of little assistance to the court.

Chiropractor Qualified to Opine on Diagnosis and Prognosis in BC Injury Trial


In my continued efforts to highlight unreported injury law decisions of the BC Supreme Court, reasons for judgement were recently provided to me addressing the qualifications of a chiropractor to opine on injury causation and prognosis.  This unreported case is a little dated (from 2008) however the discussion is of value and I am happy to publish the decision here.
In the recently provided case (Sloane v. Hill) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision.  She sued for damages and proceeded to jury trial.  In the course of the trial the Defendant objected to the qualifications of the Plaintiff’s chiropractor arguing that a “chiropractor has no basis in training or expertise” to offer opinions regarding diagnosis and prognosis for traumatic injuries.  Mr. Justice Grist disagreed and allowed the chiropractor to be qualified as an expert.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[5]  Chiropractors are licenced to provide this form of care, and there is no indication that chiropractors are generally incompetent in what they do or, in particular  in the process of forming diagnosis and prognosis.  If nothing else here, the forecast for the future ties to what the chiropractor expects to be the future cost of performing her services…
[6]  The chiropractor will testify and will be subject to cross-examination…
[8]  The admissibility of an expert’s report is dealt with in R v. Marquard [1993] SCJ No. 119 (SCC).  At issue is the witness’s ability, through experience and training, to aid the triers of fact in opinion based on special training or experience; opinion the triers are not likely to be able to form on their own.
[9]  Here, I think the chiropractor does offer something towards this end.  Further, through cross-examination and with the medical evidence to be called, I think there will be ample opportunity for counsel to put the opinion in proper perspective, and there is little likelihood of prejudice.  I think the public is well-acquainted with different healthcare providers, what they can offer and their limitations.
[10]  On balance, I am of the view these opinions can be taken in evidence.
As always I am happy to provide a copy of the full transcript of this unreported decision to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

It Is Not Appropriate to Order a Medical Exam By An Expert Who previously "Bordered on Advocacy"

In my continued efforts to track judicial comments addressing expert witness advocacy, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Cranbrook Registry, dismissing an application for a defence medical exam where the proposed examiner wrote a previous report that, in the Court’s view, “border(ed) on advocacy“.
In last week’s case (Moll v. Parmar) the Defendant sought to have the Plaintiff examined by a neuropsychologist.  Prior to the proposed exam the doctor wrote a “very vigorous critique” relating to the Plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions.  The Court held that, in such circumstances, it is “not appropriate for the court to order a medical examination…by an expert who has previously taken such a strong stance“.
In dismissing this application Mr. Justice Meiklem provided the following reasons:
[13]         Turning first to the Master’s errors alleged by the appellant, I initially gave rather short shrift to Mr. Harris’ submission that Drs. Craig and Williams had been recruited as advocates for the defence by virtue of the nature of the defence requests to them and the nature and content of their reports, that they should be viewed as lacking the necessary objectivity to warrant being appointed by the court to conduct IMEs of the plaintiff. After considering the retainer letters and the reports of Drs. Williams and Craig, I see considerable merit in the appellant’s argument with respect to Dr. Williams’ compromised objectivity. The circumstances in respect of Dr. Craig’s report are somewhat different.
[14]         The appellant’s concern was not only the advocacy bias apprehended by the plaintiff, but also the bias concerning the plaintiff’s condition that was already demonstrated by the roles these experts were retained for and the reports they had already delivered. He considered it highly improbable and purely theoretical that either of these specialists would be able to change any previously expressed views after their examinations of the plaintiff.
[15]         Dr. Williams’ report emanated from a retainer letter wherein the pertinent paragraph stated simply that Mr. Moll was advancing a claim for a head injury in a highway collision and then stated: “I ask that you please kindly review the enclosed report of Dr. Jeffrey Martzke dated May 1, 2012, together with the enclosed documentation set out in the attached schedule “A”, with a view to discussing Mr. Moll’s claim with me.” The letter promised to forward Dr. Martzke’s raw test data, which was forwarded in due course and reviewed by Dr. Williams.
[16]         Dr. Williams described the purpose of his report as responding to the reports of Dr. Martzke and Dr. Wallace (the plaintiff’s vocational consultant) and he said he limited his comments to aspects pertaining to the methods, procedures and process of the reports, as well as the sufficiency of the conclusions recommendations or diagnoses of Drs. Martzke and Wallace.
[17]         Dr. Williams’ report is, however, a very rigorous critique of Dr. Martzke’s methods and testing, as well as his conclusions, and in my view does at least border on advocacy, as argued by Mr. Harris. Dr. Williams’ criticisms of Dr. Martzke’s report and findings may well be found to be completely correct, and my comments will not fetter the trial judge’s rulings if the report is tendered, but I do not think it is appropriate for the court to order a medical examination of a plaintiff by an expert who has previously taken such a strong stance in accepting the role as a reviewer of a previous examiner’s report, particularly in view of the specific provisions of Rule 11-2(1) of the Civil Rules.

Permitting Late Expert Evidence in the Interests of Justice a Remedy to be Used "Sparingly"

Rule 11-7(6) discusses the circumstances when the BC Supreme Court can allow expert evidence to be introduced at trial which does not otherwise comply with the Rules of Court.  Reasons for judgement were released last week addressing this section.  In short the Court held that allowing non-compliant expert evidence to be introduced in the interests of justice is a discretion that “must be exercised sparingly, with appropriate caution, and in a disciplined way“.
In the recent case (Perry v. Vargas) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision.  On the last business day before trial the Plaintiff served a ‘supplementary report’ from her expert which bolstered the experts previous views, clarified statements made in the previous report, and lastly critiqued the defence medico-legal report.s
The Plaintiff argued the late report ought to be admitted as a ‘supplementary report’ pursuant to Rule 11-6(6) or in the alternative the Court should exercise its discretion to allow the non-compliant report in through Rule 11-7(6).  Mr. Justice Savage rejected both of these arguments and in doing so provided the following reasons:
[9]             Rules 11-6(6) (a party’s own expert) and 11-6(5) (a jointly appointed expert) are cognate provisions designed to deal with circumstances where an expert’s opinion “changes in a material way”. Rule 11-6(6) contains an election. In the case of one’s own expert, a party must determine whether it still seeks to rely on the expert report notwithstanding the material change. If it does so, the party must promptly serve a supplementary report.
[10]         Rule 11-6(6) was not intended to allow experts to add either fresh opinions or bolster reasons upon reviewing for the first time or further reviewing material under the guise of there being a material change in their opinion. To provide otherwise would surely defeat the purpose of the notice provisions contained in Rules 11-6(3) and 11-6(4) and the requirement of R. 11-7(1)…
[18]         Rule 11-7(6)(b) focuses on whether there is prejudice to the party against whom the evidence is sought to be tendered. Of course there are cases where reports are delivered a few days late where there is no prejudice. This is not such a case. Delivering a new expert report without any notice well outside of business hours on a Friday evening before a trial commencing Monday morning places the opposing party in obvious difficulties. In my view there is some prejudice to the defendants given the untimely delivery of the Late Report.
[19]         More generally, delivering expert reports on the eve of trial is antithetical to the purpose of the Rules regarding expert reports, which seek to ensure the parties have reasonable notice of expert opinions. Compliance with the Rules allows considered review of the expert opinions, the obtaining of important advice, and possible response reports. Under the former Rules, in Watchel v. Toby, [1997] B.C.J. No. 3150, 33 M.V.R. (3d) 115, Kirkpatrick J., as she then was, excluded in its entirety a late report delivered 12 days before trial where there was insufficient time to obtain any opinion evidence to answer the report.
[20]         Rule 11-7(6)(c) allows the court to admit expert evidence in the interests of justice. It is a separate provision so it can apply in circumstances where the relaxing provisions of Rules 11-7(6)(a) and (b) are not met. Effectively, it provides that the court retains a residual discretion to dispense with the other requirements of R. 11.
[21]         Context here is all important. This is the second scheduled trial. There was a trial management conference with comprehensive trial briefs prepared by both counsel.
[22]         In my view the discretion provided for in R.11-7(6)(c) must be exercised sparingly, with appropriate caution, and in a disciplined way given the express requirements contained in Rules 11-6 and 11-7. That is, the “interests of justice” are not a reason to simply excuse or ignore the requirements of the other Rules. There must be some compelling analysis why the interests of justice require in a particular case the extraordinary step of abrogating the other requirements of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. None was provided.
[23]         In the circumstances, the Late Report is not admissible.

Rule 11-6(8) Interpreted to Limit Scope of Expert Witness File Disclosure


Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the scope of expert witness file disclosure requirements under Rule 11-6(8).  In short the court held documents created after the preparation of the expert opinion need not be disclosed.
In today’s case (First Majestic Silver Corp. v. Davila) the Plaintiff made a mid-trial application requesting “notes made by the Defendants’ experts during the course of the trial when the Plaintiffs experts were testifying“.  The Defendant opposed arguing the new rules of court did not require production of such records.   Mr. Justice Myers agreed and provided the following comments:

[8]      While the plaintiffs referred to Rule 11-6(8) at the outset of their argument, the main thrust of their submission was based on the common law prior to the new rules.  I will elaborate that after I summarise the defendants’ position.

[9]      The defendants argued that the Rule replaced the common law.  They submitted that the rule limits production to what was clearly stated in the rule, namely the “contents of the expert’s file relating to the preparation of the opinion” [emphasis added].  Since their experts had already delivered their reports and therefore formulated their opinions (beyond which they were not entitled to go when giving evidence) the notes made during trial could not relate to that.

[10]    In reply, the plaintiffs argued that the only thing the rule does is to push back the time at which the expert’s file must be disclosed.  Under the prior case law, this was when (and only if) the expert takes the stand, and then the whole file need be disclosed.  They argue that the rule requires the same disclosure to be made, but in advance.  Relying on Lax Kw’alaams, they submit that there is no distinction between the different capacities of an expert when generating the file materials.  Rather, the whole file relates to an expert’s credibility once he or she takes the stand and must be produced.

[11]    On the plain wording of the rule, I do not agree that it only modified the timing for the disclosure.  The words “relating to the preparation of the opinion” must be given some meaning.  In effect the rule settles the gray area dealt with in the decisions cited above.  I therefore decline to order the notes made during the course of the trial.

More on Responsive Opinion Evidence Admissibility

Reasons for judgement were published recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing responsive expert reports and the discretion of the Court to adjourn a trial to permit late expert evidence to be introduced.
In the recent case (Lennox v. Karim) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2003 collision.   87 days prior to trial the Plaintiff served a medico-legal report diagnosing the Plaintiff with a meniscal tear.  The Defendant obtained a report addressing this injury and served it on the Plaintiff.  This report was served in less than 84 days before trail.  The Plaintiff objected arguing this report was late and that it was not truly responsive.  Mr. Justice Armstrong disagreed and admitted the report finding that it was responsive, and if not, the trial should be adjourned to allow admission of the report to address the relatively late disclosure of the meniscal tear.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[38] In this case, Mr. Lennox failed to alert the defendant to the central issue of a torn meniscus. His pleadings indicated an injury of both knees without any reference in specific to the torn meniscus. This is significant in this case, because the plaintiff was under the obligation to obtain a court order to permit Dr. Stewart to testify and if that order had been applied for, the defendant would have been put on notice at an earlier time as to the issue which became central to this case.

[39] In my view the Leith report, in the words of Smith J., is not a freestanding medical opinion that ought to have been served under Rule 11-6(3). It is in its entirety a responsive opinion directed solely to one opinion of Dr. Stewart relating to the plaintiff’s medical condition, that being the torn meniscus…

[42] If I am wrong in this decision, it would have also been my further opinion that in the circumstances of this case the defendant would have otherwise been entitled to an adjournment of the trial to secure the medical report of Dr. Leith if it was not otherwise admissible under 11-6(4). It seems to me that 11-1(2) is purposely directed at requiring the plaintiff and defendant to avoid the last minute introduction of medical evidence in cases which may have proceeded for many years on a different track or a different theory. I note that neither of the experts described in the CPC report have been or are going to be called as witnesses in this case, but I am not required to deal with that issue.

[43] It seems to me that Dr. Leith’s report can simply be admitted and I can ignore those provisions which in my view are not appropriate.

Expert Report Excluded for Tardiness and Credibility Comments

A short but useful analysis was set out in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing the admissibility of a tardy expert report.
In the recent case (Stanikzai v. Bola) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 collision.  In the course of the claim the Defendant served a medical report but did so out of the time required by Rule 11-6(3).  Mr. Justice Smith declined to exercise his discretion to admit the report under Rule 11-7(6) finding that the report “would not be of assistance in any event” noting the expert’s opinion improperly delves into credibility.  Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:

[28] The opinions of Dr. Caillier and Dr. Yu are not contradicted by any other medical opinion. At trial, the defendant sought to enter a medical report from an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Ponsford, that had not been served within the 84 day notice period required by Rule 11-6(3). I declined to exercise my discretion to shorten the required notice period and admit the report, largely because I found it would not be of assistance in any event.

[29] The essence of Dr. Ponsford’s opinion was that he was unable to provide a firm medical opinion because of what he regarded as inconsistencies and contradictions within the plaintiff’s history. Credibility is, of course, a matter for the court, not the expert witness.

Treating Experts, Formal Requirements and a Sensible Use of Discretion

I’ve previously shared my views about the technical requirements of the BC Supreme Court Rules as they relate to expert opinion reports and the fact that Courts should be flexible with these requirements as they relate to treating physicians.  Useful reasons for judgement were released last week dealing with a non-compliant report but ultimately allowing the report to be entered into evidence noting the shortcomings were better addressed by weight, not admissibility.
In last week’s case (Currie v. McKinnon) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 rear-end collision.  In the course of trial the Plaintiff introduced a report that failed to comply with the Rules of Court.  In exercising discretion under Rule 11-7(6) to allow the report in despite its non-compliance Madam Justice Adair provided the following short but useful comments:

[39] Dr. Rawson’s report is dated August 1, 2008.  No real attempt had been made to comply with Rule 11-6(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules (or even Rule 40A of the former Rules) in relation to the form and content of her report.  The report failed to set out the factual assumptions on which Dr. Rawson’s opinion was based, failed to set out the documents on which she relied in forming her opinion and, generally, failed to set out the reasons for her opinion.

[40] Accordingly, Mr. McKechnie (on behalf of the defendants) objected to the admissibility of Dr. Rawson’s report.  In the result, I ruled that the report would be admitted, and the defects in the report would go to weight.

The "Shoehorn" Prohibition To Responsive Defence Medical Exam Requests

(Image via wikipedia)
One rule that has perhaps received more attention than other in recent years is Rule 11-6(4) in the context of Responsive Medical Exams.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, further addressing this topic and coining the “shoehorn” prohibition to responsive independent medical exams.
In this weeks’ case (Turnbull v. Tarnohammadi) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was assessed by Dr. Salvian who expressed concern that the Plaintiff suffered from Thoracic Outlet Syndrome.  His records were exchanged in the litigation process.  As the expert evidence deadline neared the Plaintiff served a proper expert report setting out Dr. Salvian’s findings.
The Defendant then brought an application for the Plaintiff to attend a physician to obtain a ‘responsive‘ report.  Master Baker dismissed the application noting it should have been brought sooner and parties are not allowed to “shoehorn” a late request for a medical exam into the responsive evidence rule.  In dismissing the application Master Baker provided the following reasons:

[13] Dr. Salvian was consulted and gave a report which became part of the clinical records of the family doctor, Dr. Murphy.  The clinical records, including that report, were made known to the defence long ago.  In fact, Dr. Salvian’s, I will call it report number one, which was dated 2010, was listed in the plaintiff’s list of documents in April of 2011.

[14] In that report it is clear that Dr. Salvian, if he did not very specifically diagnose carpal tunnel syndrome or thoracic outlet syndrome — and I do not decide at this point whether he did or he did not — made it absolutely clear, at least to me, that that was a significant factor in his mind.

[15] On the last page of his report, page 20, he says:

In any event, it is my opinion that the carpal tunnel syndrome and the post-traumatic thoracic outlet syndrome and the soft tissue injury of the neck are directly caused by the flexion extension injury, …

He then talks a little more about spontaneous carpal tunnel syndrome.

[16] I also agree with Mr. Parsons that his latter report does not add significantly to that, not in such a fresh way that would justify surprise on the part of the defence.

[17] That being the case, I take Mr. Parsons at his word, and I agree it would have been perfectly appropriate had at some point before the 84-day deadline the defence requested an IME to deal with Dr. Salvian’s perspectives;  that would have been appropriate.

[18] To wait after that point is to — as I think one authority, perhaps Mr. Justice Macaulay used the phrase — “shoehorn” the opinion into a compacted, truncated chronology, i.e., the 42-day limit for a responsive report, when, in fact, it should have been anticipated well in advance of that and it should have been subject to the same 84-day rule.

[19] Again, nothing in this precludes the defence from delivering a responsive medical report.  It is just as in the Gregorich case, I do not see that it is necessary to do that to direct the independent medical examination.

Clinical Experience and the "Novel Science" Objection to Expert Evidence


One of the recognized objections to the introduction of expert opinion evidence in a personal injury trial relates to the opinion relying on novel or untested scientific theory.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal addressing this objection and taking a practical view of the benefits of experts providing opinions based on their years of experience in a clinical setting.
In last week’s case (Cassells v. Ladolcetta) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision.  He suffered from a pre-existing condition, namely psoriatic arthritis.  The Plaintiff presented evidence that this condition was aggravated due to the trauma of the collision.  This evidence was accepted at trial and damages were assessed accordingly.
The Defendant appealed arguing the medical opinion was based on novel science.  The BC Court of Appeal disagreed finding the foundation for an expert opinion can be laid based on clinical experience.  In dismissing the Appeal the Court provide the following reasons:

[13] The defendants challenged reliance on Dr. Gladman’s evidence on essentially the same basis at trial as they do now.  Their contention was and remains that her opinion was based on what they say is novel science: no scientific data established, beyond mere speculation, that her “theory” was valid.  They say that at most the theory is an unproven hypothesis.  They cite the criteria for evaluating the soundness of novel science found in R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 402, as drawn from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), and discussed in Taylor v. Liong, 2007 BCSC 231, [2007] 7 W.W.R. 50.

[14] The judge said the criteria pertain to the admissibility of expert evidence.  Admissibility requires the weighing of threshold reliability.  No issue had been taken with the admissibility of Dr. Gladman’s opinion which it was evident is consistent with a widely held belief in the scientific community.  Quoting from R. v. Terceira (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 175, 123 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (C.A.), aff’d [1999] 3 S.C.R. 866, to the effect the threshold test of reliability must adapt to changing circumstances, the judge said that, in the face of studies that did reflect a wide provisional acceptance of Dr. Gladman’s hypothesis, the lack of a conclusive study should not be fatal to either the admissibility or the weight of her opinion.

[15] Unlike instances where, as in Taylor, the opinion of an expert which is shown to be no more than uncertain theory has been ruled inadmissible, here, as the judge said, Dr. Gladman expressed her opinion on the basis of what she said she had seen in response to trauma among her patients with psoriatic arthritis.  What is said to be the inconclusive literature she referenced was, as the judge said, not the only foundation for the opinion she held.  It was an opinion based on thirty years of her experience.

[16] The judge reached the ultimate conclusion he did concerning the aggravation of the respondent’s psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis relying on the evidence of the various physicians whose opinions he had to consider.  Dr. Gladman’s opinion on the effect of trauma on psoriatic arthritis is consistent with the other opinion evidence which the judge found acceptable, as well as with the evidence of the respondent’s medical condition and, for that matter, the deterioration in his life after the accident.  I do not consider there to be any sound basis on which it can now be said the judge made an overriding and palpable error in concluding the respondent’s psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis were aggravated by trauma and stress attributable to the accident by relying on Dr. Gladman’s opinion.

Contact

If you would like further information or require assistance, please get in touch.

ERIK
MAGRAKEN

Personal Injury Lawyer

When not writing the BC Injury Law Blog, Erik is the managing partner at MacIsaac & Company, based in Victoria, B.C. He is also involved with combative sports regulatory issues and authors the Combat Sports Law Blog.

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