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ICBC Now on Twitter

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized. 46 Comments on ICBC Now on Twitter

Over the past few weeks I have posted a couple times about the potential uses that information on social media sites can be put to during personal injury litigation.  The first case involved the production of a hardrive to let the Defendant learn about the Plaintiff’s use of Facebook, the second case involved the contradiction of a Plaintiff’s testimony with photos from her Facebook account.
It is only fitting with these recent cases highlighting the use of social media in personal injury litigation that ICBC joins twitter.  I just stumbled on their account (right after the Canucks sealed their second straight against the Blues!) and as I write this post ICBC only has one ‘tweet’ which discusses BC’s new ‘enhanced’ driver’s licences.  To date ICBC is following no-one and has 13 followers.
I’m not sure who from ICBC is behind this account but hopefully they will designate an approachable person to run it and constructively use the service.  I would like to see ICBC use Twitter to enable them to better their product (auto insurance) and interact beneficially with their customer base.
As recent cases highlight, however, Social Media outlets can be used to spy on people involved in injury litigation and folks need to be careful with respect to the type of information they share on sites such as Facebook and Twitter.  Through twitter I have seen countless people discuss their experiences with ICBC, both good and bad and have read many details shared about people’s ICBC claims and the process involved in dealing with these.  ICBC will undoubtedly use Twitter in a similar fashion to compile and digest this information.
In any event, as one of the few BC Injury Lawyers on Twitter I’d like to welcome ICBC to the service and hope they use this technology productively to better serve British Columbians. 

Facebook Photos Used to Contradict Plaintiff in ICBC Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Privacy Issues, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

Last week I posted on a recent BC case which ordered that a computer hard-drive be produced to permit a Defendant to examine the amount of time an allegedly brain injured Plaintiff spent on Facebook.
As evidenced in reasons for judgment released today by the BC Supreme Court Facebook’s role in the realm of BC personal injury litigation is becoming more prevalent.
In today’s case (Bagasbas v. Atwal) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 car crash in Surrey, BC.  From the submissions of the defence lawyer it seems that this case was defended on the basis of ICBC’s LVI program. The Plaintiff sued for damages claiming $40,000 for her pain and suffering due to a whiplash injury and other soft tissue injuries.
In the course of the trial she testified that as a result of her injuries “she could no longer kayak, hike or bicycle“.  The defence lawyer contradicted this by producing to the Plaintiff “photographs posted on her Facebook page that showed her doing these activities“. 
In assessing the Plaintiff’s pain and suffering at $3,500 Madam Justice Satanove made the following comments:

[7]                The medical evidence before me was rather vague.  Combining this evidence with the plaintiff’s subjective evidence of her complaints, I find that on a balance of probabilities the plaintiff suffered a mild whiplash to her right neck, shoulder and upper back in the accident of June 1, 2006.  I further find that the whiplash had probably substantially resolved itself within three months.  Any further complaint of pain in the fall of 2006 is not supported by the objective evidence of the plaintiff’s rather strenuous activities.  The photographs of the plaintiff dancing illustrate arm, neck and back movements, executed in approximately two inch heels, that contradict any claims of restricted range of motion or significant pain in these areas.  It has been said many times in many cases that the court must be careful in awarding compensation where there is little or no objective evidence of continuing injuries, or in the absence of convincing evidence that is consistent with the surrounding circumstances (Butler v. Blaylock, [1981] B.C.J. No. 31 (S.C.); Price v. Kostryba (1982), 70 B.C.L.R. 397 (S.C.)).

[8]                Unfortunately, because of the inflated view the plaintiff took of her injuries, none of the cases cited by her counsel were of assistance in fixing non-pecuniary damages.  Similarly, because the defendant refused to recognize any damages, his counsel provided no case law on an appropriate range of compensation.

[9]                On my own research, this case is in line with the damage awards made in Bonneville v. Mawhood, 2005 BCPC 422; Siddoo v. Michael, 2006 BCPC 12; and particularly, Saluja v. Wise, 2007 BCSC 706, which are in the range of $1,500 to $6,500.  Taking the whole of the evidence into account, which reflected some injury and pain, but not much loss of enjoyment of life, I award the plaintiff $3,500 for non-pecuniary compensation.

This case along with last week’s decision show that the use of information contained on social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook is alive and well in BC Injury Litigation.  Lawyers and clients alike need to be aware of the potential uses such information can be put to in their claims.

ICBC Negotiations – Formal Rule 37B Offers and the Effects of a Counter Offer

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 86 Comments on ICBC Negotiations – Formal Rule 37B Offers and the Effects of a Counter Offer

Under the old Rule 37 when a formal settlement offer was made by ICBC the Plaintiff could continue to negotiate and make counter offers without jeopardizing the ability to accept ICBC’s formal settlement offer at a later date.  This was so due to rule Rule 37(10) and 37(13) which held that a formal offer to settle did not expire by reason that a counter offer was made.
As readers of this blog know Rule 37 has been repealed and replaced with Rule 37B.  What if ICBC makes a formal settlement offer under Rule 37B that does not contain any language addressing under what circumstances the offer expires.  Would a counter offer act as a rejection of the formal offer such that it can’t be accepted at a later date?
The first case that I’m aware of dealing with this issue was released today by the BC Supreme Court (More Marine Ltd v. The Ship “the Western King”).
In today’s case the Defendant made a formal offer under Rule 37B to settle a lawsuit for “$40,000 inclusive of interest and costs“.  The Plaintiff made several counter offers which were not accepted.  The Plaintiff then purported to accept the defence formal settlement offer.  The parties could not agree on the documents that would be signed to conclude the settlement and the Plaintiff brought a motion to enforce the settlement.
In dismissing the Plaintiff’s motion Madam Justice  Satanove held that in the circumstances of this case the Plaintiff’s counter offer acted as a non-acceptance of the Rule 37B formal offer which then extinguished the formal offer of settlement.
Her summary of the law as applied to this case could be found at paragraphs 5-11 of the judgement which I reproduce below.

[5]                The plaintiffs’ argument would have succeeded under the old Rule 37 which provided in subsections (10) and (13) that an offer to settle did not expire by reason that a counteroffer was made, and an offer to settle that had not been withdrawn could be accepted at any time before trial.  Rule 37(8) provided that a party could withdraw an offer to settle before it was accepted by delivering a written notice of withdrawal in the prescribed form.

[6]                However, Rule 37B contains none of these provisions.  It simply provides a mechanism for the Court to consider an offer to settle when exercising its discretion in relation to costs.  It has been described as “significantly different, and represents a radical departure, from its predecessor Rule 37” (Alan P. Seckel & James C. MacInnis, British Columbia Supreme Court Rules Annotated 2009 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2009) at 372-374).

[7]                In my view, Rule 37B does not change the common law with respect to settlement agreements, which in themselves are just another form of contract.  The old Rule 37 expressly changed the common law in this regard, but the old Rule 37 is repealed.  If the Legislature had intended the provisions of old Rule 37(8), (10), and (13) to continue to apply to the new Rule 37B, it would have retained the wording of those subsections.

[8]                Turning then to the common law of contracts, it is trite to say that a counteroffer constitutes non-acceptance of a previous offer.  The previous offer must be revived in order to be accepted after a counteroffer has ensued.  (United Pacific Capital v. Piché, 2004 BCSC 1524; Cowan v. Boyd (1921), 49 O.L.R. 335 (C.A.)).

[9]                Applying these principles to the chronology of facts in this case, when the plaintiffs issued the counteroffer of January 6, 2009, they were communicating non-acceptance of the Rule 37B offer of November 28, 2008 from the defendants, and this latter offer was no longer extant.

[10]            The only question that remains is whether the November 28, 2008, offer was revived.  The plaintiffs’ purported acceptance in their letter of March 3, 2009, could be construed as a form of offer to the defendants in the same terms as the defendants’ November 28, 2008 offer, but the defendants’ letter of March 5, 2009, once again evidences a counteroffer by its terms.  The subsequent correspondence between the parties reflects further negotiations between them, but no consensus ad idem.

[11]            In conclusion then, based on my interpretation of new Rule 37B, there is no binding separation agreement for me to enforce and the plaintiffs fail in their application.

This case is a reminder that the common law of contract is alive and well regarding settlement offers under Rule 37B and that many of the statutory terms that applied to Rule 37 formal offers no longer are in place.  Formal settlement offers made by ICBC should be carefully scrutinized to see if a counter offer can be made or if doing so will extinguish the formal offer.

Working out the Kinks – More on Rule 37B and BC Injury Cases

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 50 Comments on Working out the Kinks – More on Rule 37B and BC Injury Cases

Very important reasons for judgment were released today (AE v. DWJ) by the BC Supreme Court giving more interpretation to Rule 37B.  (Click here to read my previous posts discussing this rule.)
Rule 37B is still relatively new and the courts have not come up with a consistent application of this rule.  Today’s case takes this rule in a potentially new direction that can make access to justice a little less costly and risky for Plaintiff’s advancing injury claims.
In today’s case the Plaintiff was awarded damages of $348,075 after taking into account contributory negligence.  After statutory deductions the judgment in the Plaintiff’s favor was less than the Defendant’s formal offer of settlement.
The Defendant’s lawyer applied to court for an order that “the defendant should receive his costs (After the date that they made their formal settlement offer)”.
In declining to make this order Mr. Justice Goepel stated that under Rule 37B “the court cannot award costs to the defendant (where the defendant beats their formal settlement offer at trial) but is limited to depriving a party of costs or awarding double costs“.  This is the first case I’m aware of interpreting Rule 37B in this fashion.
Below I reproduce the highlights of Mr. Goepel’s reasoning:

Judicial Discretion In Awarding Costs

[48] The discretion a Supreme Court judge has in awarding costs was summarized in Stiles v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) (1989), 38 B.C.L.R. (2d) 307 at 310, 39 C.P.C. 2(d) 74 (C.A.):

The power of a Supreme Court judge to award costs stems from s. 3 of the Supreme Court Act which confirms that the judges of the Supreme Court have the inherent powers of a judge of superior court of record.  The power to award costs is governed by the laws in force in England before 1858 and by the enactments, including the Rules of Court, affecting costs made in British Columbia since 1858.  Generally, the decisions on costs, including both whether to award costs, and, if awarded, how to calculate them, are decisions governed by a wide measure of discretion.  See Oasis Hotel Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 28 B.C.L.R. 230, [1981] 5 W.W.R. 24, 21 C.P.C. 260, [1982] I.L.R. 1-1459, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 455 (C.A.).  The discretion must be exercised judicially, i.e. not arbitrarily or capriciously.  And, as I have said, it must be exercised consistently with the Rules of Court.  But it would be a sorry result if like cases were not decided in like ways with respect to costs.  So, by judicial comity, principles have developed which guide the exercise of the discretion of a judge with respect to costs.  Those principles should be consistently applied: if a judge declines to apply them, without a reason for doing so, he may be considered to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously and not judicially.

[49] In Cridge, Lowry J.A. noted the right of the Lieutenant Governor in Council to restrict the exercise of a Supreme Court judge’s discretion in awarding costs at para. 23:

While, subject to abiding by established principles, a Supreme Court judge has a broad discretion in awarding costs, it remains open to the Lieutenant Governor in Council in promulgating the Rules of Court to restrict the exercise of that discretion as may be appropriate where it is thought that to do so will achieve a desired objective.  The purpose of Rule 37 is to encourage the settlement of litigation through prescribed consequences in costs as in sub-rule (24).  Given that the sub-rule provides for the litigants’ entitlement to costs while affording no discretionary alternative, I consider it clear that there is no room for judicial discretion where sub-rule (24) applies.

[50] A trial judge cannot impose cost sanctions that are not authorized by the Rules.  An example of an ill fated attempt to do so is Kurtakis v. Canadian Northern Shield Insurance Co.(1995), 17 B.C.L.R. (3d) 197, 45 C.P.C. (3d) 294 (C.A.).  In Kurtakis, the trial judge awarded the plaintiff three times special costs.  The Court of Appeal reversed noting at para. 9 that there was “no statutory authority for such an order … and therefore no basis upon which such an order could be made.”

[51] Rule 37B has returned to judges a broad discretion in regards to costs orders arising from an offer to settle.  The discretion is however not unlimited and must be exercised within the parameters set out in the Rule.  Rule 37B(5) dictates the cost options open to a judge when an offer to settle has been made.  A judge can either deprive the party, in whole or in part, of costs to which the party would otherwise be entitled in respect of steps taken in the proceeding after the date of the delivery of the offer to settle or award double costs of some or all of the steps taken in the proceeding after the delivery of the offer to settle.  As noted in Baker, the section is permissive and a judge is not compelled to do either.

[52] What a judge cannot do, however, in my respectful opinion, as a result of an offer to settle, is to order costs to a defendant where the offer to settle was in an amount greater than the judgment.  While that cost option had existed since the time of the 1890 rules, either as an exercise of the court’s discretion or because it was mandated by the terms of the rule, it is not an option available under Rule 37B.  The drafters of Rule 37B(5) have removed that option and presumably determined that the potential deprivation of costs to which a plaintiff would otherwise be awarded is a sufficient incentive for plaintiffs to settle litigation.  As noted in Cridge, the Lieutenant Governor in Council has the right to limit the court’s discretion.  Accordingly, I hold that pursuant to Rule 37B(5) the court cannot award costs to the defendant but is limited to depriving a party of costs or awarding double costs

[53] The defendant does not seek double costs in this case.  It would be a rare case that a plaintiff who recovers damages would face the sanction of double costs. I would expect those sanctions would be limited to situations in which a plaintiff’s case is dismissed or when the plaintiff was awarded more than its offer to settle.

If this precedent holds then Plaintiffs will face fewer financial risks when proceeding to trial.  The costs consequences of going to trial and losing (not beating an ICBC formal offer of settlement) can be prohibitive and today’s case may lead the way to better access to justice in British Columbia for the victims of others negligence.

Can ICBC Talk to my Doctors About my Injuries?

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized. 102 Comments on Can ICBC Talk to my Doctors About my Injuries?

When you are injured by another motorist in British Columbia and advance an injury claim does ICBC have access to your treating physicians to receive information about the nature and extent of your injuries?
If you are seeking no-fault benefits from ICBC under Part 7 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation the answer is yes.  Section 98 of the Regulation reads as follows:

98 (1)  An insured shall, on request of the corporation, promptly furnish a certificate or report of an attending medical practitioner, dentist, physiotherapist or chiropractor as to the nature and extent of the insured’s injury, and the treatment, current condition and prognosis of the injury.

(1.1)  The certificate or report required by subsection (1) must be provided to the corporation

(a) in any form specified by the corporation including, without limitation, narrative form, and

(b) in any format specified by the corporation including, without limitation, verbal, written and electronic formats.

(2)  The corporation is not liable to an insured who, to the prejudice of the corporation, fails to comply with this section.

What if you are injured by a person insured with ICBC and make a tort claim  in the BC Supreme Court against them for your pain and suffering and other losses?    In the course of defending the Claim can the lawyer hired by ICBC have access to your treating physicians to discuss the nature and extent of your accident related injuries?  

Reasons for judgement were released today (Scott v. Erickson) by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dealing with this issue.

In today’s case the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 motor vehicle collision.  In the course of her recovery she was treated by a neuropsychologist.  The injury lawyer defending the claim brought an application to speak with the Plaintiff’s treating neuropsychologist.  In dismissing this application, Master McCallum of the BC Supreme Court summarized the law relating to defendants access to treating physicians in injury litigation as follows:

[8]                The Defendant applies for two orders.  The second application for permission to speak to a doctor may be disposed of summarily.  I refer to the decision of Wilkinson J. in Swirski v. Hachey, [1995] B.C.J. No. 2686 where the court held that there was no necessity for an application for permission to speak to plaintiff’s treating doctors concerning information relevant to the claims made in the action.  The court suggested that notice should be given of an intention to seek informal discussions with plaintiff’s treatment providers and confirmed that treatment providers were not compelled to participate in such meetings.

[9]                The Plaintiff in the case at bar knows of the Defendant’s intention to speak to Dr. Martzke and Dr. Martzke will know that he is free to participate or not as he pleases.  No order is necessary.  As the court said in Demarzo v. Michaud, 2007 BCSC 1736, if the Defendant’s counsel wishes to compel the treatment providers to participate in discussions, an application under Rule 28 is the appropriate vehicle.

In other words, there is no property in a treating physician and a court order is not required for a defendant to approach a Plaintiff’s treating physicians.  However, the treating physicians are under no duty to participate in discussions initiated by the defendant in a lawsuit.  As a result of the professional obligations of treating physicians in British Columbia, many decline to participate in such discussions.

Lawyers involved in the defence of BC injury claims should also keep their professional duties as set out in Chapter 8, section 14 of the Professional Conduct Handbook in mind which states as follows with respect to cotacting opposing expert witensses:

 

Contacting an opponent’s expert

14. A lawyer acting for one party must not question an opposing party’s expert on matters properly protected by the doctrine of legal professional privilege, unless the privilege has been waived.

[amended 12/99]

15. Before contacting an opposing party’s expert, the lawyer must notify the opposing party’s counsel of the lawyer’s intention to do so.

[amended 12/99]

16. When a lawyer contacts an opposing party’s expert in accordance with Rules 14 and 15, the lawyer must, at the outset:

(a) state clearly for whom the lawyer is acting, and that the lawyer is not acting for the party who has retained the expert, and

(b) raise with the expert whether the lawyer is accepting responsibility for payment of any fee charged by the expert arising out of the lawyer’s contact with the expert.

[amended 09/06]

17. In Rules 14 to 16, “lawyer” includes a lawyer’s agent.

In situations where treating physicians refuse to particiapte in an interview set up by the defence lawyer in an injury claim today’s case appears to indicate that Rule 28 of the BC Supreme Court Rules is the proper tool to use to compel the witness to share any relevant facts he/she may have knowledge of.  Rule 28 states as follows:

Order for

(1)  Where a person, not a party to an action, may have material evidence relating to a matter in question in the action, the court may order that the person be examined on oath on the matters in question in the action and may, either before or after the examination, order that the examining party pay reasonable solicitor’s costs of the person relating to the application and the examination.

Expert

(2)  An expert retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial may not be examined under this rule unless the party seeking the examination is unable to obtain facts and opinions on the same subject by other means.

Affidavit in support of application

(3)  An application for an order under subrule (1) shall be supported by affidavit setting out

(a) the matter in question in the action to which the applicant believes that the evidence of the proposed witness may be material,

(b) where the proposed witness is an expert retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial, that the applicant is unable to obtain facts and opinions on the same subject by other means, and

(c) that the proposed witness has refused or neglected upon request by the applicant to give a responsive statement, either orally or in writing, relating to the witness’ knowledge of the matters in question, or that the witness has given conflicting statements.

Notice of application

(4)  The applicant shall serve notice on the proposed witness at least 7 days before the hearing of the application.

Subpoena

(5)  Where a party is entitled to examine a person under this rule, by serving on that person a subpoena in Form 21, the party may require the person to bring to the examination

(a) any document in the person’s possession or control relating to the matters in question in the action, without the necessity of identifying the document, and

(b) any physical object in the person’s possession or control which the party contemplates tendering at the trial as an exhibit, but the subpoena must identify the object.

[am. B.C. Reg. 95/96, s. 12.]

Notice of examination

(6)  The examining party shall give notice of examination of a person under this rule by delivering copies of the subpoena to all parties of record not less than 7 days before the day appointed for the examination.

Mode of examination

(7)  The proposed witness shall be cross-examined by the party who obtained the order, then may be cross-examined by any other party, and then may be further cross-examined by the party who obtained the order.

Application of examination for discovery rules

(8)  Rule 27 (15), (20) and (22) to (26) apply to an examination under this rule.

$36,000 Non-Pecuniary Damages Awarded for Rib Injury

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgment were released last Thursday (Grier v. Saadzoi) awarding a Plaintiff just over $46,000 in total damages as a result of injuries suffered in a 2004 British Columbia motor vehicle collision.
The crash happened in Surrey, BC.  The collision resulted in significant vehicle damage totalling the Plaintiff’s car.  The Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries and rib pain.
In assessing the Plaintiff’s pain and suffering at $36,000 Mr. Justice Brooke summarized the Plaintiff’s injuries as follows:

[24]            I find that the plaintiff was a credible witness, who neither exaggerated nor diminished the injuries that she sustained or the continuing pain and discomfort she has.  She was a reliable historian.  She struck me as a person who is getting on with her life, despite having to put up with some pain and discomfort.  I am also satisfied that she has followed the advice that she has been given in terms of stretching and exercise and that she avoids, where she can, physical activity which will trigger any discomfort in the area of her rib.

[25]            The plaintiff has made a good recovery from the soft tissue injuries that she sustained in a forceful motor vehicle collision.  I find that the pain associated with the lower left rib was caused by the collision and that whether Dr. Vallentyne is correct, that the pain is a result of subcostal muscular involvement or Drs. Luoma and Coghlan are correct, that the pain is associated with the first floating rib, that the injury and its consequence is likely permanent.  Fortunately, however, the result is a modest impairment of her overall capacity and it can be controlled, to some extent, by avoiding certain physical activity, as well as involving herself in an exercise and stretching program and taking medication to assist her in sleeping and to moderate the pain.

[26]            Non-pecuniary damages are a “once and for all” award to compensate a plaintiff for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life caused by the injury to the date of assessment and for the future.  In assessing damages, the ranges of damages awarded in comparable cases can be a useful guide, but in each case, the court must fashion an award that provides compensation to the plaintiff.  This is not a case like Price v. Kostryba, [1982] 70 B.C.L.R. 397 (S.C.), or Butler v. Blaylock Estate, [1981] B.C.J. No. 31 (S.C.), where complaints of injury continue long after the normal period for recovery, but rather one where the injury is real and continues to cause pain and discomfort and will likely do so for the foreseeable future.  I assess non-pecuniary damages at $36,000.

One aspect of this judgment that interested me was the court’s summary and analysis of the surveillance evidence the defendant’s used during the trial.  Video surveillance is commonly used by ICBC in the course of defending soft tissue injury claims and this judgement shows that surveillance video is not always a damaging thing.  

In today’s case the video showed the Plaintiff doing various physical activities including riding a motorbike.  This did not appear to hurt the Plaintiff’s case any as this video did contradict her evidence about her limitations.  The surveillance evidence was summarized at paragraph 19 as follows:

[19]            As part of the case for the defendant, a series of videos was put in evidence showing the plaintiff riding a motorbike off road and shopping and going about her normal household activities.  Clearly, the videotape was made surreptitiously and without the plaintiff’s awareness.  While the tape does not display any particular discomfort evinced by the plaintiff, her activity is restrained when compared to the activity of her husband who was with her.  She says that before the accident, they operated their motorbikes off road and on rugged and uneven terrain.  What was depicted in the video was the operation of the motorbikes on a relatively level gravel road.  It was noted that the plaintiff’s husband took the motorbikes out of the truck and that the plaintiff played no role in that.  Nevertheless, the videotapes do demonstrate that the plaintiff is able to continue at least some of her former activities, although perhaps not with the same intensity nor without pain.

As I’ve previously posted, Video surveillance does not in and of itself hurt a personal injury claim, overstating the effects of injuries does. It does not matter if you’re painting your house, lifting weights, or doing any number of physical activities that are caught on film. If you can be active and not aggravate your injuries that is a good thing. If, on the other hand, a personal injury claimaint tells others that they are limited and video surveillance shows otherwise, that could be very damaging. This goes to a person’s credibility. If a person is caught in a lie with respect to the effect of their injuries that will have a very negative effect on the value of an ICBC claim.

Rule 18-A and Your ICBC Injury Case

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Spine Injury Cases. 38 Comments on Rule 18-A and Your ICBC Injury Case

One of the tools in a BC Trial Lawyers arsenal is BC Supreme Court Rule 18-A.
Rule 18-A permits claims to proceed to court via ‘summary trial’.   In summary trials no live witnesses are called, instead the evidence is put before the Judge by way of affidavit evidence.  From there the lawyers make their submissions and a ruling is made.  By this method the time, and therefore the cost, of trial can be cut down significantly.  
Rule 18-A is, however,  not without its shortcomings.  Without live witnesses taking the stand and getting faced down by a judge or jury it is difficult to weigh credibility.  Where there are 2 different sides to the story and credibility plays a central role Rule 18-A is usually not an appropriate way to proceed to trial.
In personal injury litigation the credibility of the Plaintiff is usually a key issue at trial and for this reason Rule 18-A is rarely used.  That said, this rule can be effective for certain ICBC and other personal injury claims and reasons for judgement were released today by the New Westminster Registry of the BC Supreme Court illustrating this fact.
In today’s case (Smith v. Bhangu) the Plaintiff was injured when she was 14 years old in a BC Car Crash.  The issue of fault was admitted.  This left the issue of quantum of damages (value of the ICBC case) to be decided by the trial judge.
Both lawyers agreed that Rule 18-A was appropriate for this case.  The Plaintiff;s MRI showed a herniated lumbosacral disc injury.  There was no dispute that the Plaintiff suffered from this condition, rather the key issue was whether the Plaintiff’s herniated lumbrosacral disc was related to the car accident.  In agreeing that it was, Mr. Justice Grist made the following findings:

[21]            I am satisfied that the evidence provides, on a balance of probabilities, a causal link between the motor vehicle collision and the lower back condition. I accept the Plaintiff’s evidence that the lower back complaints presented after a period of weeks or months from the motor vehicle collision and that there were no prior or subsequent events causing or contributing to the condition. Further, I accept that following the initial visit to the doctor, she did not present these continuing complaints for medical treatment until lower back spasms developed in 2004 and 2005. I also note Dr. Hershler’s comment that, based on the history and his physical examination, both the neck and lower back symptoms were referable to the motor vehicle collision.

[22]            The upper back condition continues to be symptomatic from time to time, but as in many cases, has shown improvement, and the overall effect of the assessments in the medical reports is an expectation of further progress.

[23]            The lower back condition, however, is more of a problem. The MRI shows a herniated lumbrosacral disk which continues to cause episodes of back pain, sometimes debilitating to the point of prompting attendance at an Emergency Ward. I accept that at age 14, this was not likely a degenerative condition and, as I have previously indicated, on the evidence, is most likely attributable to the collision.

General damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) were assessed at $65,000 and a further $80,000 was awarded for the Plaintiff’s diminished earning capacity to reflect the fact that her chronic condition will likely effect her vocationally over her lifetime.
What is remarkable about this case is that the trial took only one day.  Often times when ICBC Claims with serious injuries proceed to trial the process takes numerous days or even weeks.  Rule 18-A permitted this case to be adjudicated with one day of court time with costs savings to both parties.
While Rule 18-A is inaproppriate for many personal injury claims, this case shows that it can be used effectively in certain circumstances.  When prosecuting an ICBC injury claim this rule should not be automatically brushed aside and should be considered in appropriate circumstances.

Personal Injury Claims and Privacy – Can ICBC access your Facebook Account?

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, ICBC Privacy Issues.

If you pursue a personal injury claim in the BC Supreme Court you will be bound by the Rules of Court with respect to production of relevant documents.
With our ever-expanding use of technology, more and more documents may become relevant in Injury Litigation.  So, can computer records ever be relevant in personal injury claims?  
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court (Bishop v. Minichiello) dealing with this issue.  In today’s case the Plaintiff allegedly suffered a brain injury as a result of the negligence of the defendants.  The Defendants wished to analyze the Plaintiff’s computer hard drive to ‘determine the period of time the plaintiff spends on Facebook between eleven at night and five in the morning‘.  The Plaintiff refused to produce his computer hard-drive and this resulted in a Court motion seeking an order compelling the Plaintiff to do so.
Mr. Justice Melnick granted the motion and ordered that ‘the parties agree on an independent expert to review the hard drive …to isolate and produce to counsel…the information sought or a report saying that the information sought is not retrievable.’.
In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Melnick engaged in the following analysis and application of the law:

IV. ANALYSIS

[46]            Electronic data stored on a computer’s hard drive or other magnetic storage device falls within the definition of “document” under R. 1(8) of the Rules of Court: Ireland at para. 6. 

[47]            Rule 26(1) requires disclosure of documents relating to any matter in question in the action.  The decision of whether to grant an order requiring production under R. 26(10) is a discretionary one: Park at para. 15.  The court has used its discretion to deny an application for the production of documents in the following two circumstances: firstly, where thousands of documents of only possible relevance are in question; and secondly, where the documents sought do not have significant probative value and the value of production is outweighed by competing interests such as confidentiality and time and expense required for the party to produce the documents: Park at para. 15.  Additionally, privacy concerns should be considered in a determination under R. 26(10), where the order sought is so broad it has the potential to unnecessarily delve into private aspects of the opposing party’s life: Park at para. 21.

[48]            Disclosure in the civil litigation context is largely informed by an inquiry into relevance and probative value.  Relevance should be granted a broad scope: Peruvian Guano at 62.  Relevancy is to be determined upon a description of the nature of the documents sought and a reasonable interpretation of the pleadings: Boxer at 359. 

[49]            Relevant to this particular application are the values enshrined in s. 8 of the Charter – the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.  Rule 26(10) confers no power to make an order that is really authorization for a search: Privest Properties Ltd. at para. 38.

[50]            Metadata is information recorded or stored by means of a device and is thus a document under R. 1(8): Desgagne at para. 29.  Metadata is a report of recorded data that is generated by computer software.  It is not something created by the user; rather, it is based on what the user does with their computer.  In both Park and Desgagne, it was held the threshold of relevance had not been met to order production of records of the frequency and duration of computer use.  However, Mr. Justice Myers in Park stated at para. 42 that he did not mean to say that hard drives and other electronic documents need never be produced under R. 26.  Thus, in the appropriate case if the threshold of relevance is met, a hard drive may require production.

[51]            This threshold was found to be met in Chadwick.  Despite agreeing with the plaintiffs that this was a case in which the hard drive was to be regarded as a file repository and not a document itself, Mr. Justice Myers held that such a distinction was not to be determinative of the application. 

[52]            Mr. Justice Bauman, for the Court of Appeal, held that leave to appeal the order should not be granted and the application was dismissed.  The Court of Appeal stated that while an appropriate case may give rise to important issues such as privacy, solicitor-client privilege, expense, and time, this was not that case as Mr. Justice Myers’ order was of narrow scope.

[53]            Similarly, the application at hand is of narrow scope.  The defence wishes to have the plaintiff’s hard drive of his family computer produced and analyzed to determine the periods of time the plaintiff spent on Facebook between eleven at night and five in the morning, each day.

[54]            Examination for discovery evidence of the plaintiff’s mother confirms that the plaintiff is the only person in the family using the family computer between those hours.  The plaintiff suggests that, at times, friends may use the computer once he logs onto Facebook.  But that is an evidentiary issue for trial.  The issues of privacy and solicitor-client privilege are basically resolved as only the plaintiff has the password to his Facebook account and he has not used this account to converse with his counsel.

[55]            It is true the Bishop family computer is more akin to a filing cabinet than a document; however, it is a filing cabinet from which the plaintiff is obligated to produce relevant documents.  This sentiment was approved in Chadwick.  Simply because the hard drive contains irrelevant information to the lawsuit does not alter a plaintiff’s duty to disclose that which is relevant.  If there are relevant documents in existence they should be listed and produced (or simply listed if they are privileged). 

[56]            The defence argues that this case is distinguishable from Baldwin and that the information sought is relevant.  The plaintiff advised Dr. Zoffman that his sleep varies with the time one of his friends goes to bed.  This is because he spends a substantial amount of time on Facebook chatting with this friend.  The plaintiff alleges that ongoing fatigue is preventing him from maintaining employment and thus his late-night computer usage is relevant to matters at issue in this lawsuit.

V. CONCLUSION

[57]            The information sought by the defence in this case may have significant probative value in relation to the plaintiff’s past and future wage loss, and the value of production is not outweighed by competing interests such as confidentiality and the time and expense required for the party to produce the documents.  Additionally, privacy concerns are not at issue because the order sought is so narrow that it does not have the potential to unnecessarily delve into private aspects of the plaintiff’s life.  In saying that, I recognize the concern of the plaintiff that to isolate the information the defence does seek, its expert may well have consequent access to irrelevant information or that over which other family members may claim privilege.  For that reason, I direct that the parties agree on an independent expert to review the hard drive of the plaintiff’s family computer and isolate and produce to counsel for the defendant and counsel for the plaintiff the information sought or a report saying that the information sought is not retrievable, in whole or in part, if that is the case.  I grant liberty to apply if counsel cannot agree on such an independent expert or if other terms of this order cannot be agreed. 

[58]            At the conclusion of the hearing on March 5, having been made aware that the passage of time was critical because of the potential for the memory of the plaintiff’s family computer to be “overwritten” with ongoing use, I directed that within two weeks of that date, an expert engaged by the plaintiff’s counsel, at the expense of the defence, produce two copies of the hard drive to be deposited with the court pending this ruling.  One of those copies should be used for the analysis I have now ordered.  The other copy should remain with the court as a backup to be accessed only with further order of the court. 

This case should serve as a reminder that technology is rapidly changing the potential scope of document production in Injury Litigation.  Lawyers and Plaintiff’s advancing BC Injury Claims need to be aware of the scope of documents that may be relevant and when doing so should not be so quick to overlook the potential relevance of electronically stored documents not only on a computer hard drive but also those that can be found on social networking sites such as Twitter, MySpace and Facebook.

 

More on ICBC Claims, Soft Tissue Injuries and Assessment of Damages

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, ICBC Whiplash Cases. 54 Comments on More on ICBC Claims, Soft Tissue Injuries and Assessment of Damages

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, (Runghen v. Elkhalil) awarding a Plaintiff just over $147,000 in total damages as a result of injuries and damages sustained in a BC car crash.
The collision occurred in 2004 when the Plaintiff’s vehicle was rear-ended.  The issue of fault was admitted leaving only an assessment of damages at issue at trial.
In awarding $40,000 for pain and suffering (non-pecuniary damages) Madam Justice Fenlon made the following findings with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries:
[16]            Based on the evidence of the experts, which is largely consistent, I find that Ms. Runghen suffered mild soft tissue injuries to her cervical and lumbar spine as a result of the accident; I further find that due to those injuries, she has headaches and chronic pain that has affected her ability to function both at home and at work.  I also find that Ms. Runghen’s pain and related incapacity are likely to markedly improve once an appropriate treatment plan is put in place.
Madam Justice Fenlon engaged in a thoughful discussion at paragraphs 17-34 of the judgement which is worth reviewing for anyone ingterested in seeing some of the factors courts take into consideration when valuing pain and suffering in ICBC soft tissue injury claims.
The balance of the judgement deals largely with claims for past wage loss and diminished earning capacity.   Awards were made under both of these heads of damages.  The court found that the Plaintiff’s ability to work was diminished as a result of chronic pain and that this would likely continue for at least some time after the trial.  In awarding $35,000 for diminished earning capacity the court engaged in the following analysis:

[50]            As noted earlier in these reasons, I accept that the chronic pain experienced by Ms. Runghen to date has been a limiting factor in her ability to take on longer hours at work.  I expect that limitation will continue to some extent over the next year, as she engages in a rehabilitation exercise program.  After that time, it is probable that she will be able to increase the amount of time she works to be more in keeping with what she would have been doing prior to the accident.  In coming to this conclusion, I recognize that Ms. Runghen had not established her career as a massage therapist and that we do not have a solid base line from which to work.

[51]            I am mindful that there is no certainty possible in terms of predicting what will occur in the future; there is a possibility, even with the correct treatment for her injuries, that Ms. Runghen may still experience some limitations.

[52]            Applying the considerations identified in Brown v. Golaiy (1985), 26 B.C.L.R. (3d) 353 (S.C.), I find that Ms. Runghen is likely to be somewhat less capable, overall, of earning income from all types of employment and that, in particular, she is likely to be less capable of earning incoming from her chosen field of massage therapy.  Ms. Runghen may have to consider retraining in another field or another area of specialization within massage therapy if she wishes to work full-time.

[53]            In my view, given the potential for marked improvement in Ms. Runghen’s condition that both Dr. Cameron and Dr. McGraw identified in their reports, and based on Ms. Runghen’s own experience with a similar but truncated rehabilitation program with Karp, it would not be appropriate to apply the precise mathematical calculation of future income loss used by Ms. Runghen.  Rather, this is an appropriate case to award a sum that takes into account the various contingencies and possibilities, without overcompensating Ms. Runghen by assuming the status quo and calculating a set wage shortfall over the next 36 year’s of her working life.  I set that sum at $25,000. 

[54]            I find that Ms. Runghen will need approximately six months to put in place and complete a four-month exercise rehabilitation program.  During that time, she will continue to work at her current level.  I therefore award damages of $10,000 to cover loss of income during this period.  

[55]            In summary, I award Ms. Runghen  a total of $35,000 for loss of future income and loss of earning capacity

 

$120,000 in Damages for “Gifted Athlete” Injured in BC Car Crash

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Knee Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgment were released last week (Atkison v. Niles) by the BC Supreme Court awarding just over $120,000 to a ‘gifted athlete’ who was injured in a 2003 BC motor vehicle collision.

The Plaintiff was 16 at the time of the collision. He was a passenger in a vehicle involved in an intersection crash. As a result he suffered a knee injury which was expected to have some permanent consequences. The injury was diagnosed as either a posterior cruciate ligament tear or damage to the trochlea groove of the femur. As a result of this knee injury it was agreed that the Plaintiff had an increased risk of developing progressive osteoarthritis eventually requiring knee replacement surgery.

The Plaintiff played as catcher for an ‘elite’ league in White Rock at the time of the crash. By the time of trial in 2009 the Plaintiff was playing at the University of New Mexico as a first baseman and had aspirations of going pro after graduating.

In quantifying the Plaintiff’s pain and suffering (non-pecuniary damages) at $55,000 the Court noted the following facts:

[15] More significantly, he suffered a permanent injury to his left knee that has caused and will continue to cause intermittent pain, particularly with certain body positions. He will suffer the early onset of osteo-arthritis and require knee replacement surgery, likely in his 40’s. If he lived a sedentary life, as Dr. Hill recommends, the time for that surgery could be extended to the 60’s. However, the plaintiff is a gifted and active athlete. Extending the time for surgery by remaining inactive would constitute a drastic negative impact on his lifestyle. There is evidence that, because of the limited life span of a knee replacement, other surgeries may be required. While the defendant points to ongoing medical research which may provide other alternatives in future, that remains speculative at present.

[16] A significant impact for this plaintiff has been the impact on his baseball career. The evidence is that he was particularly suited to playing the position of catcher, a position he has not been able to occupy since the accident, nor will he ever. There is evidence, which I accept, is that he would have been most attractive to professional baseball had he been able to play that position. There is also evidence that, playing at first base, he does not have the size that professional baseball seeks for that position. There is also evidence that the knee injury had some impact on his foot speed, which would also diminish his chances of playing professionally.

In assessing the Plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity (future wage loss) at $100,000 the Court noted the following:

[20] The plaintiff will be graduating from university with a general degree. Thus he has no earnings history. As earlier stated, his goal has long been to play professional baseball. That has not been a unrealistic goal given his exceptional talent.

[21] However, he is less attractive to professional baseball because of the knee injury, both because of that fact and the fact that the injury required him to move permanently to a position where he is less valuable. The evidence of professional baseball scout Mr. Archer in that regard is consistent with common sense. Measuring that lessened opportunity is a particularly difficult exercise at his youthful age, except to say that it is real and not insignificant.

[22] If that dream is not realized, the plaintiff intends to seek a career as a firefighter or in a trade, as his brother and father have done. While there is no expert evidence on the issue, It is plain and obvious that the plaintiff, with his permanent knee injury, will be less attractive to future employers, particular those occupations requiring physical exertion.

[23] Finally, I must consider the very real possibility that the plaintiff will be forced to undergo at least one major knee surgery and the effect this will have on his employability and ability to earn income in the physically demanding careers most likely open to him.

The Plaintiff’s total damages were then reduced by 22.5% because he was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the collision and this contributed to the severity/cause of his injuries.