Author: admin

$100,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Breast Pain and Chronic Neck Pain

Written by admin on May 16, 2017. Posted in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries following a collision.
In today’s case (Kingston v. Warden) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2013 collision caused by the Defendant. The crash resulted in chronic neck pain along with a breast injury that did not subside until surgical intervention. The Plaintiff chose to have breast augmentation during the surgery and the Court found that only a percentage of the cost of the procedure was compensable.
In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 for these injuries Madam Justice Duncan provided the following reasons:

[126] I find on a balance of probabilities that the accident caused an injury to the plaintiff’s neck which has not fully subsided. With a focussed exercise program and possibly some injection treatments, the plaintiff may improve but there was no evidence the neck pain would ever go away. The complaint of neck pain is subjective, but the medical experts for both parties largely agreed that the plaintiff presented with soft tissue injury to her neck.

[127] I find on a balance of probabilities that the accident caused the plaintiff to feel pain in her left breast which was not alleviated until after the revision surgery. I acknowledge Dr. Malpass’s expert report was not as detailed as it should have been, in that he did not include with it the depiction of asymmetry he described in his evidence. I also acknowledge that the plaintiff appears to have taken advantage of surgical intervention to increase the size of the implants and re-position her nipples, rather than simply seek to be restored to her pre-accident appearance. Nonetheless, I do not accept the plaintiff was making up the pain or concerns about asymmetry to take advantage of surgery that might be eventually covered by a damage award stemming from the accident.

[128] I find on a balance of probabilities that the accident intensified the plaintiff’s headaches and caused them to be more frequent, but that in the time since the accident they have essentially returned to the pre-accident level, based on her report to Dr. Sovio…

[136] Before the accident the plaintiff was an active, fit person. While the defendant, Mr. Warden, characterized the accident as fairly minor, I accept the plaintiff’s perception of the accident as frightening to her. The plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries in addition to a worsening of headaches. Her neck pain continues to limit her activities, although the experts have said she can return to her usual activity level, bearing in mind she may not be able to snowboard or do other activities for as long or as vigorously as before the accident. 34

[137] The plaintiff underwent surgery to address pain and the appearance of her left breast, which conditions resulted from the accident. The plaintiff suffered a loss of self-esteem and increased her consumption of alcohol to cope with her pain, although I cannot find she has proven an addiction to alcohol stemming from the accident. I accept that the plaintiff has isolated herself from her formerly active social life and her relationship with her husband is not as close as it was before the accident.

[138] In all the circumstances I am satisfied an award of $100,000 for non-pecuniary damages is fit in the plaintiff’s case.

$120,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Pain with Somatization Issues

Written by admin on May 2, 2017. Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases.

Adding to this site’s archived postings of ICBC chronic pain cases, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic pain in a Plaintiff pre-disposed to somatization.
In the recent case (Alafianpour-Esfahani v. Jolliffe) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2012 rear end collision that the Defendant was responsible for. The Plaintiff alleged brain injury altogether this claim was not proven at trial. The court found the plaintiff was pre-disposed to somatization and suffered from a chronic pain disorder following the collision. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $120,000 Madam Justice Sharma provided the following reasons:

[123] In light of the following factors, I find Ms. Alafianpour-Esfahani is entitled to $120,000 in non-pecuniary damages:

a) the accident caused soft tissue injuries to her neck, back and shoulder that resulted in headaches and developed (in combination with her predisposition to somatization) into chronic pain;

b) she has not likely reached maximum medical improvement of her physical symptoms, but any further improvement depends upon the success of addressing the reactivity of her nervous system, which will be challenging;

c) her physical symptoms have been prolonged because of her psychiatric condition characterization by a vulnerability to somatization and pathological nervous system reactivity;

d) her prognosis for improving her condition by following a thorough program of desensitization is fair, but that is tempered by the chronicity of her condition because it has been left untreated fro 3 ½ years;

e) the accident has negatively impacted all aspects of her life, including her relationship with her family, her social interaction, her ability to work, her recreational activities, her ability to maintain her home and yard, her ability to cook for family and friends; her ability to provide emotional support to her children, especially her daughter and her ability to travel.

Court Discusses "Aggregate Effects" Of Joining Multiple Fast Track Cases

Written by admin on April 28, 2017. Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 15, Civil Procedure.

Update December 12, 2017 – Today the below decision was upheld on appeal with Madam Justice Russell providing the following reasons noting fast track cases can be aggregated –

[22] Since the rule is clear that a fast track trial heard as a single action can exceed three days and remain under the Fast Track Rule, then it seems equally clear that where two fast track trials are heard together, the fact that they will consume seven days of trial would not exclude them from the Rule.

[23] It appears to me that relatively simple cases that can be concluded within a short period of trial time and where the damages at least as calculated by plaintiff’s counsel, exclusive of costs, are $100,000 or less, must be conducted under the Fast Track Rule. I take this from the predecessor to Rule 15-1, Rules 66 and 68 of the former Supreme Court Rules, B.C. Reg. 221/90, as repealed by Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009: Singleton v. O’Neil, 2010 BCSC 298.

[24] The intention of the Rule is to provide for the quick and inexpensive resolution of comparatively simple actions with proportionality a specified and general objective of the Rules. The Rule is mandatory unless otherwise ordered by the court: Singleton, supra.

[25] As a result, here the actions were at all times appropriate for being conducted under Rule 15-1, and therefore, the jury notices were, in effect, not applicable as soon as it became clear that the criteria under the Rule were met. Even before the Notice of Fast Track was filed, the two actions were fast track actions and Rule 15-1(10) dictates that the trial must be heard by the court without a jury.

[26] There may well be situations where the action is so advanced as an ordinary action that the exercise of such discretion would not be appropriate and would result in serious prejudice to one party. I do not intend these reasons to remove that discretion where circumstances so dictate. But I do not find this situation to exist in the circumstances of this case.

[27] The difference of two days in time between the defendants’ Notice of Trial and the plaintiff’s Notice of Fast Track is immaterial to the nature of the two actions.

[28] Although the Master did not deal with the issue, counsel for the defendants raised the right to a jury trial and argued that it pre-empted Rule 15-1. Rule 12-6 deals with jury trials. However, Rule 15-1(5) states that in the event of a conflict between it and another rule, Rule 15-1 applies. This subsection appears to dispose of that argument.

[29] I did not understand counsel for the defendants to argue that the common law right to a jury trial displaces the operation of the Rules of Court. In my view, and in these circumstances, that would not be a viable argument.

[30] The decision of the Master to permit the two actions to continue to proceed under the Fast Track Rule is fact-based and discretionary and deserves deference.

[31] The issue of whether the Rule permits aggregation follows from the nature of the actions that Rule 15-1 allows.

[32] Particularly where two actions have been ordered to be heard together and both meet the criteria for the Fast Track Rule, it seems only sensible that they could both be dealt with under the Rule with the benefits of aggregating the time for trial and discovery and costs limits set out in the Rule.

[33] This is consistent with the Object of the Rules and Proportionality.

__________________________________________
Helpful reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing how matters such as trial length, the quantum cap and discovery timelines are aggregated when multiple fast track cases are joined.
In the recent case (De Jesus v. Doe) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions and sued for damages. The cases were scheduled for trial at the same time. The Defendants brought an application to remove them from Rule 15 arguing that with a total of 7 days for trial these cases were no longer fast track appropriate.
The court disagreed and in doing so Master Baker provided the following helpful reasons about “aggregate effects” of joining fast track cases together:

Court Finds Careless Driving Admission Not Binding in Subsequent Injury Lawsuit

Written by admin on April 25, 2017. Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, finding a motorist faultless for a collision even though that same motorist entered a guilty plea to a charge of driving a vehicle without due care and attention. While this is not the first noted circumstance of this occurring the Court provided helpful reasons setting out the circumstances where the prior admission will not be an abuse of process to re-litigate.
In today’s case (Chand v. Martin) the Plaintiff was operating a vehicle struck by a train. He was injured and a passenger in his vehicle was killed. The Plaintiff was charged with “driving a vehicle without due care and attention” and plead guilty (meaning an admission that he did so beyond a reasonable doubt).
The Plaintiff then sued a host of parties including the train conductor alleging they were at fault for the incident. The Court found that the train conductor was indeed negligent for the incident noting that he proceeded into the train crossing when the signal lights were not working and this created an unreasonable risk of harm.
The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff was also partly at fault and cannot escape this given the previous admission of careless driving. Madam Justice Russell disagreed and in allowing the issue to be re-litigated despite the previous guilty plea noted as follows:

[86] The key decision regarding the effect of a guilty plea in a subsequent proceeding involving the same facts is Toronto (City) v. CUPE Local 79, 2003 SCC 63. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada was considering whether the grievance of a dismissal following a conviction for sexual assault amounted to an abuse of process. The Court provided the following comments at paras. 51-53:

[51] Rather than focus on the motive or status of the parties, the doctrine of abuse of process concentrates on the integrity of the adjudicative process. Three preliminary observations are useful in that respect. First, there can be no assumption that relitigation will yield a more accurate result than the original proceeding. Second, if the same result is reached in the subsequent proceeding, the relitigation will prove to have been a waste of judicial resources as well as an unnecessary expense for the parties and possibly an additional hardship for some witnesses. Finally, if the result in the subsequent proceeding is different from the conclusion reached in the first on the very same issue, the inconsistency, in and of itself, will undermine the credibility of the entire judicial process, thereby diminishing its authority, its credibility and its aim of finality.

[52] In contrast, proper review by way of appeal increases confidence in the ultimate result and affirms both the authority of the process as well as the finality of the result. It is therefore apparent that from the system’s point of view, relitigation carries serious detrimental effects and should be avoided unless the circumstances dictate that relitigation is in fact necessary to enhance the credibility and the effectiveness of the adjudicative process as a whole. There may be instances where relitigation will enhance, rather than impeach, the integrity of the judicial system, for example: (1) when the first proceeding is tainted by fraud or dishonesty; (2) when fresh, new evidence, previously unavailable, conclusively impeaches the original results; or (3) when fairness dictates that the original result should not be binding in the new context. This was stated unequivocally by this Court in Danyluk, supra, at para. 80.

[53] The discretionary factors that apply to prevent the doctrine of issue estoppel from operating in an unjust or unfair way are equally available to prevent the doctrine of abuse of process from achieving a similar undesirable result. There are many circumstances in which the bar against relitigation, either through the doctrine of res judicata or that of abuse of process, would create unfairness. If, for instance, the stakes in the original proceeding were too minor to generate a full and robust response, while the subsequent stakes were considerable, fairness would dictate that the administration of justice would be better served by permitting the second proceeding to go forward than by insisting that finality should prevail. An inadequate incentive to defend, the discovery of new evidence in appropriate circumstances, or a tainted original process may all overcome the interest in maintaining the finality of the original decision (Danyluk, supra, at para. 51; Franco, supra, at para. 55).

[Emphasis added]

[87] I find that the case at bar fits within the exception emphasized above in CUPE Local 79 at para. 53. Mr. Chand had no memory of the collision, and so he could not offer a full and robust defence. In addition, the fine was quite minor, with the stakes of this subsequent proceeding being much higher. In those circumstances, it is not surprising that Mr. Chand chose to enter a guilty plea.

[88] Consequently, I find that in these circumstances, Mr. Chand’s guilty plea does not constitute proof in these proceedings that he was driving without due care or attention on the night in question. In keeping with the independent eyewitness testimony of Mr. Harkness and Mr. Angus, I find that Mr. Chand was not speeding or driving erratically.

$90,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Neck Injury With Headaches

Written by admin on April 19, 2017. Posted in ICBC Headache Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry, assessing non-pecuniary damages of $90,000 for a long standing neck injury with associated headaches.
In today’s case (Willett v. Rose) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2010 collision. At trial, some 7 years later, the Plaintiff continued to suffer from neck pain with associated headaches. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $90,000 Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:

[42] In summary, the evidence is undisputed that the plaintiff’s headaches, including migraine headaches, are more frequent since the accident. The events with which those headaches were associated before the accident–monthly menstrual periods–no longer occur. I also accept the plaintiff’s evidence that her headaches are more severe and usually associated with neck pain. All of the medical evidence acknowledges the mechanism by which neck pain can evolve into headaches, including migraines and confirms the existence of objective signs of neck injury.

[43] All of that evidence leads to the conclusion that, on the balance of probabilities, there is a causal link between the plaintiff’s neck pain and stiffness and her migraines. I find the neck pain and stiffness to have been solely caused by the accident.

[44] As for the migraines, the governing principle is that stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458: causation is established if an injury was caused or contributed to by the accident. Given the plaintiff’s long history of migraines, it may well be that some other factor is also playing a role in their onset, but I find that the injuries the plaintiff suffered in the accident are at least a major contributing cause of the migraines she now has. Or, to use the language of the Supreme Court of Canada in Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 2007 SCC 7, “but for” accident, the plaintiff’s migraines would not be as frequent or severe as they now are.

[45] It has now been seven years since the accident. The plaintiff still experiences neck pain and stiffness as a result of the soft tissue injuries to her neck. More importantly, the neck pain is a contributing factor to serious, sometimes temporarily disabling migraines that significantly interfere with both work and recreational activities and reduce her quality of life. No improvement is anticipated in the future…

[48] Considering all of the evidence and the authorities cited to me, I award non‑pecuniary damages of $90,000.

Damages for Surrogacy Fees Awarded in BC Injury Claim

Written by admin on April 18, 2017. Posted in Uncategorized.

In what I believe is the first case of its kind in British Columbia, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding damages for surrogacy fees for future potential pregnancies after a collision compromised the Plaintiff’s ability to safely carry a child.
In today’s case (Wilhelmson v. Dumma) the Plaintiff was “the sole survivor of a horrendous, high-speed, head-on collision that killed three other people”. The collision caused profound injuries leading to permanent disability. Included in the aftermath of this collision was an inability of the Plaintiff to safely carry a child. In awarding damages for surrogacy fees should the Plaintiff wish to have a child by such means Madam Justice Sharma provided the following reasons:

[375] Based on the evidence in this case, a specific award for surrogacy fees is more appropriate than assuming her loss is adequately compensated for within the award for non-pecuniary damages. While the lost ability to carry a child to term certainly has caused Ms. Wilhelmson pain and suffering, deserving of recognition within the non-pecuniary damages, the fact that she is unable to carry a child leads to a distinct future cost to allow her to have a biological child — the cost of hiring a surrogate. I find this cost is medically necessary and reasonable. Its necessity arose directly from the accident; therefore the cost must be borne by the defendant.

[376] I find some support for my view in Sadlowski v. Yeung, 2008 BCSC 456. In that case the plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy and she alleged the defendant, a gynaecologist, failed to adequately inform her of her medical condition and treatment options. The operation left the plaintiff infertile, and she alleges had she been adequately informed she would not have proceeded with the hysterectomy.

[377] The court awarded her $90,000 for the loss of fertility as a separate award from the $100,000 damages awarded for pain and suffering. In doing so, the court relied on Semeniuk v. Cox, [2000] A.J. No. 51 at 78 where the judge noted the “invidious task” facing a judge trying to quantify the loss of fertility. In Semeniuk Acton J. also stated (para. 35):

I am of the view on this point, however, that infertility is a type of loss not properly lumped together with the usual non-pecuniary categories of pain, suffering and loss of amenities. Those categories cover losses which, in my view, at of a different nature of quality than the loss of the ability to bear children or to achieve the family one has planned…..I prefer … to assess quantum for infertility discretely, by reference to the circumstances of each case.

[378] The court ultimately did not award a separate amount for surrogacy fees, but that was on the basis that the evidence of her desire to pursue surrogacy was “highly speculative”. The evidence present in this case was not “highly speculative”, and I am persuaded that the claim for surrogacy fees is medically justified and reasonable.

[379] Dr. Yuzpe testified about the approximate cost involved in hiring a surrogate in the United States. These estimates were not successfully challenged by the defence. I am satisfied that Dr. Yuzpe’s evidence regarding costs is reliable. His report cited an overall range of between $50,000 and $100,000 per pregnancy by surrogate. I find that an award at the low end of this range is appropriate and award $100,000 for surrogacy fees for two pregnancies.

Proven Cases of ICBC Fraud Almost Non Existent

Written by admin on April 13, 2017. Posted in Uncategorized.

Insurance Companies often talk about the high cost of fraud and ever rising claim rates. These discussions are often abstract or accompanied with large numbers. When you look behind the data there is often little to substantiate the numbers.
This pattern seems to be the case with ICBC’s claims that fraud costs policy holders $600 million per year. The reality, however, is there is no data to substantiate this.
Recently ICBC revealed, pursuant to an information request, the number of successful convictions against fraudsters. The numbers are negligible.
Richard McCandless, a self described “retired senior BC government public servant” made an information request for the number of fraud charges laid and the number of resulting convictions. ICBC replied and the data revealed that there are very few successful prosecutions and the trend, if anything, is moving downward.

Fraud is real and insurers and ratepayers have to pay the price. Insurers overstating fraud, however, is equally real and the public is entitled to be aware that proven fraudulent claims make up a small percentage of what insurers would have us believe.
Mr. McCandless’ full article can be found here.

Court Denies Defendant Costs to Prevent "Pyrrhic Victory" for Plaintiff

Written by admin on April 11, 2017. Posted in BC Supreme Court Costs Cases, BCSC Civil Rule 9.

Reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating the Court’s discretion for costs following trial where formal settlement offers were exchanged.
In today’s case (Bains v. Antle) the Plaintiff was injured in a collision and sued for damages. Prior to trial the Defendant presented a formal settlement offer of $185,000. The Court noted that “some of the plaintiff’s initial negotiating positions were clearly inflated” but ultimately it was reasonable for the Plaintiff to refuse the Defendant’s offer and proceed to trial in the face of medical evidence supporting her alleged claim of chronic pain and related disability.
The decision proved costly with a jury awarding the Plaintiff damages of $37,800. The Defendant asked to be awarded post offer costs and to strip the Plaintiff of her post offer costs. The Court refused noting the Plaintiff is of modest means and having her pay Defendant costs would reduce the verdict to a Pyrric victory. In awarding the Plaintiff costs Madam Justice Power provided the following reasons:

[36] It is my view that all of the financial evidence at trial supports the fact that the plaintiff was a person of modest means. Having already concluded that the settlement offer was not one which ought to have reasonably been accepted, it is evident that an order requiring the plaintiff to either pay the well-funded defendants’ costs, or in the alternative denying the plaintiff her costs, from September 20, 2016 onwards, would result in a pyrrhic victory and could have the effect of discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing valid claims.

[37] As a result, although not determinative, the relative financial circumstances of the plaintiff and the defendant insurer are a consideration that I have taken into account.

[38] I am not persuaded that in these circumstances the court should exercise the discretion afforded to it under Rule 9-1(4) and (5). Having considered all of the relevant factors, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to her costs at Scale B and disbursements, including the cost of this application. The defendants’ application is dismissed.

Video Surveillance Helps Deflate Personal Injury Claim

Written by admin on April 6, 2017. Posted in Uncategorized.

In the world of personal injury lawsuits, video surveillance usually amounts to hours of filming benign activity entirely consistent with a Plaintiff’s known injuries. Occasionally, however, video helps capture images inconsistent with a Plaintiff’s presentation. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, with such an outcome.
In today’s case (Ma v. Haniak) the Plaintiff was involved in three collisions and sued for damages. Fault was admitted by the Defendant motorists. The Plaintiff was self-represented and sought approximately $1.4 million in damages. The Court largely rejected the Plaintiff’s claims and awarded a small fraction of her sought damages. In reaching the conclusion that the Plaintiff’s claim was exaggerated Mr. Justice Armstrong noted as follows when reviewing video surveillance evidence:

[114] The defendants tendered video surveillance of Ms. Ma from 2007, 2009 and 2011.

[115] On September 21, 2007, Ms. Ma was observed working with her brother in their newspaper delivery business. Mr. Maung is seen loading the car with the newspapers. She appears to move without any restrictions in her range of movement and appears to be flexible and capable of moving bundles of newspapers. Although she shows no overt signs of pain, it is not possible to ascertain her actual condition from the video.

[116] Ms. Ma was able to crouch down, reach in and manually rearrange paper in her car and move several paper bundles.

[117] Mr. Maung appears physically capable of moving bundles of newspapers to the vehicle from nearby pallets.

[118] Between October 29, 2009 and November 2, 2009, Ms. Ma was observed and filmed by a private investigator. She was seen driving, entering and exiting her Mazda MPV without any apparent difficulty. Her movements seemed unrestricted and flexible; she carried a cane but did not use the cane to stabilize her walking or support herself.

[119] In August 2011, more than one-and-a-half years after MVA #3, Ms. Ma was observed and filmed by a private investigator; the recording lasts between 30 and 40 minutes of film.

[120] At Ms. Ma’s examination for discovery, she testified that she suffered pain when carrying things. She said she avoided carrying items and used the basket on her walker when necessary.

[121] Nevertheless, on August 9, 2011 Ms. Ma was attending an appointment with Dr. Magrega and used her walker when entering and leaving the office. Later that day she is seen walking and carrying items at a McDonald’s restaurant without any apparent limitation or need for assistance. On that day Ms. Ma is seen exiting her vehicle and walking towards a restaurant with a normal gait, moving at a normal speed and without the benefit of a walker or wheelchair. She collects food from a counter and carries a tray with a drink on top and a separate bag to a table inside the restaurant; she then walks outside to her car carrying a drink and a bag for a person in the vehicle. Ms. Ma’s comportment in this video is significantly different than her comportment at trial. At trial, she used a walker to move in the room and to the witness box. She did not demonstrate the marked flexibility and physical movement that appears on the video.

[122] What is observed on the video demonstrates significantly less restricted movement than she described in her testimony.

[123] She testified that when using the sliding doors to enter her van, she suffered severe pain and relied on family members and a cane to open and close the doors when possible. On the date of the video, she is seen freely opening and closing the doors, leaning in and delivering food to others who had not come into the restaurant. The video of the plaintiff was dramatically different from her self-described limitations.

[124] She testified that if she bumped into a person while being out and about, she would experience excruciating pain; she is seen to be bumped while in the restaurant lineup and shows no evidence of excruciating pain.

[125] On the video, she was clearly functioning without evidence of pain or limitation in her movement. She walked briskly and without the use of a cane or walker. Her facial expression showed no evidence of pain or discomfort.

[126] I except that surreptitious video presentations of injured plaintiffs can be misleading; in the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that Ms. Ma’s physical movements on August 9, 2011 were entirely incongruous with her testimony concerning her physical ability and dexterity at the time and since.

[127] Her only explanation for the apparent differences between her testimony and the video presentation was that she was “tricked” at the discovery. She also said that the limitations in her ability to move or walk distances without a walker do not become apparent until she has been active for approximately ten minutes.

…

[315] I agree with the defence that the plaintiff’s claim concerning the level of pain she has experienced after the accidents is wholly inconsistent with her appearance at trial and on the surveillance videos. Although the August 2011 video was taken almost five years before trial, the plaintiff’s examination for discovery evidence, which was given within two weeks of the video, is telling. It contradicted the plaintiff’s appearance in the video surveillance films. Her testimony and use of a walker at trial was consistent with her evidence at the examination for discovery but equally inconsistent with observations of her in the various surveillance videos. From these inconsistencies, I make an adverse finding about Ms. Ma’s credibility.

$110,000 Non Pecuniary Assessment For Chronic Pain and Major Depressive Disorder

Written by admin on April 3, 2017. Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC PTSD Cases, ICBC Thoracic Outlet Syndrome Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic injuries sustained in three separate collisions.
In today’s case (Parhar v. Clarke) the Plaintiff was injured in three collisions that the Defendants accepted blame for. She suffered chronic physical and psychological injuries as a result including thoracic outlet syndrome, chronic pain, major depression and anxiety. Her prognosis for further improvement was guarded. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $110,000 Mr. Justice Pearlman provided the following reasons:

[215] Ms. Parhar was 27 years old at the time of the first accident and 35 at the time of trial.

[216] The injuries she suffered in the accidents include injuries to the muscles of her neck, shoulder girdle and back with attendant muscle spasm, low back pain, thoracic outlet syndrome, persistent headaches, TMJ pain and dysfunction and soft tissue injuries to her knees and right hip.

[217] In addition, as a result of the defendants’ negligence, the plaintiff sustained a chronic pain disorder, a major depressive disorder, a generalized anxiety disorder and PTSD.

[218] Although there has been some improvement in the plaintiff’s condition, Ms. Parhar’s prognosis is guarded in light of the persistence of her symptoms of pain and her psychological conditions.

[219] Further psychological counselling would assist Ms. Parhar in coping with chronic pain and managing the functions of daily living. Exercise and conditioning will probably produce further improvements to her symptoms of neck, shoulder and back pain, and may also alleviate her headaches. However, after eight years of chronic pain, it is unlikely the plaintiff will make a full recovery and probable that she will experience flares of her back and neck pain, anxiety and depressive moods indefinitely.

…

[227] Taking into account the Stapley v. Hejslet factors, all of the authorities cited by counsel, the risk that the plaintiff would have suffered a recurrence of depression in any event of the accidents, and all of Ms. Parhar’s particular circumstances, I would assess her damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life in the amount of $110,000…