Skip to main content

Month: March 2013

Motorist Fully At Fault For Collision Following U-Turn Behind Reversing Vehicle

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing fault for a collision involving a Defendant who u-turned into a parking spot behind a backing up vehicle.
In this week’s case (Ferguson v. Yang) the Plaintiff stopped along the curb of 8th Street in New Westminster to drop his daughter off for school.  There was a gap behind him with a white van parked behind him.  The Defendant, who was approaching from the opposite direction made a u-turn and pulled into the gap.  At the same time the Plaintiff was backing up and a collision occurred.

Although there was a dispute as to how the collision occurred the Court found the above scenario the likely one as the Defendant’s evidence was “fraught with inconsistencies and obvious exaggerations“.  In finding the Plaintiff faultless for the collision Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:
41]         In my view, the u-turn performed by the defendant in an attempt to secure a parking spot across the street in a school zone where parents were busy dropping their children off for school was a maneuver fraught with danger.  Moreover, I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s backup lights were illuminated, that the defendant ought to have seen them and that he ought to have anticipated the plaintiff’s vehicle was in the process of reversing into the space the defendant was attempting to move into.  Captain MacPherson saw these backup lights.  Had the defendant been keeping a proper look out, he would have seen them as well.
[42]         The defendant has failed to satisfy me that the plaintiff was contributory negligent in any way.  
[43]         The law does not require perfection on the part of the plaintiff to guard himself against every conceivable eventuality.  He must only guard himself against those eventualities that a reasonable person ought to have foreseen, within the ordinary range of human experience.  The plaintiff was entitled to proceed on the assumption that all other vehicles would do what is there duty, namely observing the rules of traffic: Pacheco (Guardian ad Litem of) v. Robinson (1993), 75 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (C.A.) at para. 11; Dechev v. Judas, 2004 BCSC 1564 at para. 22.
[44]         The plaintiff checked the area around his vehicle by looking in his side and rear view mirrors and by looking over his right shoulder.  He did all that he ought to have done.  A reasonably prudent driver should not be expected to anticipate that while in the course of backing up, another vehicle will perform an aggressive and illegal u-turn from the other side of the street in an attempt to occupy the space behind him.
[45]         The plaintiff had no warning of the impending collision.  I do not believe the defendant’s evidence that he was stopped and that he honked his horn prior to the collision.
[46]         In Carson v. Henyecz, 2012 BCSC 314, Madam Justice Hyslop stated at para. 99
            The duty imposed on a reversing driver is not just when the driver starts to reverse, but throughout the entire reversing procedure and to its completion.  The object is to be aware as reasonably possible to what is behind the driver and in the driver’s path while in reverse.
I agree with those comments.  I find that, in the circumstances here, the plaintiff conducted himself appropriately and was as aware as reasonably possible to what a reasonable driver should have anticipated would be in his path while reversing his vehicle.  He could not have reasonably anticipated that the defendant would do what he did.  
 

Lost "Fringe Benefits" Must Be Taken Into Account When Calculating Diminished Earning Capacity

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, confirming that lost ‘fringe benefits’ are recoverable as part of a diminished earning capacity analysis.
In last week’s case (Combs v. Bergen) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 collision.   She missed several months from work causing a past loss of income of just over $18,000.  During her time off work she lost the benefit of employer contributions to her Canada Pension Plan and to her pension. She sought recovery of these losses.  Mr. Justice Steeves agreed these were compensable and provided the following reasons:
[61]         The plaintiff seeks past income loss in the amount of $18,287.25 and the defendant agrees with this amount. However, the plaintiff also seeks payment for her employer’s contributions to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and s to her pension. These amounts are $831.05 and $1,737.29, respectively. The defendant opposes any payment for these amounts.
[62]         There is authority for the plaintiff’s submission on benefits to the effect that “the compensatory principle requires that the full value of lost fringe benefits must be taken into account when computing loss of working capacity” (Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Personal Injury Damages in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 240). This reasoning was adopted by the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Taylor v. Hogan (1998), 160 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 93 at para. 41 (Nfld. C.A.). I conclude that is appropriate in this case.
[63]         Past income loss is set at $18,287.25 plus CPP and pension contributions. Total is $20,855.59.

From Medical Marijuana to Surveillance and More

As readers of this blog know, I often extract one point of interest when creating case summaries and when more than one point is noteworthy I create multiple point specific posts.  I do this because it makes it easier to search archived posts by case specific topics.
Reasons for judgement were released this week with so many nuggets it would be too burdensome to address them each individually so please excuse the multi point summary.   In short this judgement showcases video surveillance successfully attacking a claim, credibility findings, comments on self-serving medical appointments, claimed care costs for medical marijuana and other points of interest.  The entire judgement is worth a read.
In this week’s case (Datoc v. Raj) the Plaintiff was involved in an intersection t-bone collision.  Both motorists claimed they had a green light which simply could not be true.   The Court found that despite credibility problems with the Plaintiff his account of the collision appeared more reliable and the Defendant was found fully at fault.  The Plaintiff  claimed damages of over $450,000.  The Court rejected most of these claimed damages and in doing so illustrated the following points:
Video Surveillance Successfully Used
Video evidence was presented which documented inconsistent presentations of the Plaintiff in court versus out of court.  Mr. Justice Sigurdson provided the following comments in finding the plaintiff was “significantly exaggerating” his claims:
[103]     I was shown video surveillance evidence of the plaintiff taken over a number of days in the months shortly before the trial.  These videos showed the plaintiff getting in and out of his car, driving his car and taking photographs as a real estate photographer.  This included squatting, and holding a tripod above his head to take pictures.  He moved fluidly, in and out of the driver’s seat, apparently without discomfort.  He and his counsel acknowledge a dramatic difference between his presentation on the video and his presentation in court.  The plaintiff explains the difference by saying that he is capable of doing what he does on the surveillance video only because of medical marijuana he takes in the morning and at the end of the day.  However, the plaintiff introduced no medical expert report to support this contention, only his evidence that this was the effect on him of his taking medical marijuana.  I did not find persuasive his evidence that marijuana would have the dramatic and persisting effect that he asserts.  The video surveillance showed him during different times of the day, not simply in the morning (shortly after he would have ingested a marijuana cookie), but into the afternoon as well, and his condition appeared to be no different no matter what the time of day.
[104]     Generally, surveillance evidence can be relatively unhelpful to assess the condition of plaintiffs as to whether they are performing activities without pain, or whether their ability to perform activities is because of use of pain medication, or stoicism, or other factors.  However, the difference in this case between the manner in which the plaintiff presented himself in court and how he was shown on the surveillance video was dramatic.  I did not find the plaintiff’s explanation persuasive that the dramatic difference was from his taking marijuana while working, and not taking it while in court…
[106]     I have concluded, based on a consideration of all of the evidence, that the plaintiff is significantly exaggerating the extent of his injuries.
Medical Marijuana
The Plaintiff claimed damages of $20,000 for the cost of medical marijuana.  While damages for medical marijuana are not unprecedented in British Columbia, a common analysis involves a plaintiff’s recreational interest in marijuana.  The defendant pursued such an analysis with apparent success.  In rejecting these claimed damages the Court provided the following analysis:
[60]         On cross-examination, the plaintiff was asked about his posting on the internet under the name Nismo200sx in light of his comment that he had only taken marijuana once or twice before.  Although those postings suggested an interest in marijuana beyond simply as a treatment for his back pain, the plaintiff denied any recreational interest in marijuana…
[112]     The plaintiff said that prior to his prescription for medical marijuana, he tried marijuana once or twice, but he did not care for it.  However, there is evidence to suggest the plaintiff’s interest in marijuana is more than purely for medical treatment purposes.  His internet postings suggest that.  Given my concerns about the reliability of the plaintiff’s evidence, and in the absence of expert evidence, I am not persuaded that medical marijuana is required by the plaintiff to treat his injuries…
[120]     The plaintiff seeks future care costs for medical marijuana of $200 per month or $2,400 a year for a suggested award of $20,000.  The evidence does not support the claim that medical marijuana is reasonably necessary: see Milina v. Bartsch (1985), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33 (S.C.).  As such, I award nothing for the cost of future care.
Frequency of Doctor Visits
The last point of interest deals with the Plaintiff’s frequency of doctor’s visits  I have canvassed this topic previously.  In this week’s case the Plaintiff pointed to having 128 doctor visits as supporting his claim for injury.  The Court, however, found that there was no reasonable justification for this and instead came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was simply papering his claim.  The following observation was made by Justice Sigurdson:
 [65]         Up to June 2012, the plaintiff saw Dr. Irene Chan, a general practitioner, 128 times for his injuries.  From July 8, 2008 to June 2012, the complaints he made to her were virtually the same on each occasion.  Dr. Chen was not called as an expert witness but testified simply with respect to some of the observations she made…
[107]     It is difficult to know what to make of the fact that the plaintiff attended his general practitioner for 128 visits and appears to have repeated his symptoms almost without change on each visit.  He explained in his testimony that he went to his doctor to report changes in his condition; however his doctor noted each of his attendances with the plaintiff reporting no changes.  The evidence left me with the impression that the plaintiff was creating a record of his injuries for his claim as there appears to be no reasonable medical justification for the number of attendances before his family doctor.  Rather than supporting his credibility, this evidence of the numerous attendances on his family doctor left me with the opposite impression.