Skip to main content

Month: March 2009

ICBC Injury Claims and Pre-Existing Conditions

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases. 48 Comments on ICBC Injury Claims and Pre-Existing Conditions

Imagine being injured as a result of the carelessness of another in a BC Car Crash.  You advance an ICBC tort claim for compensation for your injuries and loss.   You are able to come to an agreement with ICBC with respect to the value of your injuries and losses but then ICBC wants to reduce the the pain and suffering settlement by 25% to account for a pre-existing medical condition that you have.  Is this fair?
The answer depends on the nature and severity of the pre-existing condition.  BC Courts generally categorize pre-existing conditions affected by traumatic injury in 2 ways: the ‘thin skull‘ category and the ‘crumbling skull‘ category.  In a thin skull situation a Plaintiff has a pre-existing condition that makes them susceptible to injury however the condition would not otherwise become symptomatic absent the trauma.  In thin skull situations the pre-existing condition does not reduce the value of the claim.  The thin skull principle is sometimes referred to as the ‘you take your victim as you find them‘ principle meaning it is no defence to an injury claim to say that a healthier victimn with no pre-existing condition would have suffered less injury.
This can be contrasted with the ‘crumbling skull’ situation where the Plaintiff has a pre-existing condition which is active or likely to become active even without the trauma.  In crumbling skull situations the value of the injuries and losses must be reduced to reflect the fact that a Plaintiff would have likely had some problems in any event.
Reasons for judgement (Gohringer v. Hernandez-Lazo) were released today by the BC Supreme Court explaining and applying these principles.
In today’s case the Plaintiff was injured when her car was struck head on by a street sweeper in April, 2005.  As a result of this significant BC Car Crash she suffered various injuries.  The Plaintiff did, however, have pre-existing back and neck injuries.  In valuing the Plaintiff’s pain and suffering at $75,000 Madam Justice Russell explained and applied the law of thin skull v. crumbling skull as follows:

Pre-existing condition and independent intervening event

[90]            It is trite law that the general purpose in assessing damages is to restore the plaintiff to their original, or pre-accident, position.  Through an award of damages a plaintiff is entitled to be restored to his or her original position, but they are not entitled to be placed in a better position:  Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 at para. 32, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 235.   Generally speaking, this requires the court to determine the plaintiff’s original position and position subsequent to the negligent act, and award damages to reflect the difference:  Athey at para. 32; Barnes v. Richardson, 2008 BCSC 1349 at para. 84.  In situations where the plaintiff has a pre-existing condition the thin skull or crumbling skull rule must inform the court’s assessment of damages.  

[91]            In a thin skull situation, the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition has not manifested, or in other words is not active or symptomatic, prior to the event in question.  As the tortfeasor takes his or her victim as they find them, the tortfeasor is liable for all injuries even if the injuries are “unexpectedly severe owing to a pre-existing condition”, as a result of their actions:  Athey at para. 34. 

[92]            In a crumbling skull situation, as in this case, the plaintiff has a pre-existing condition which is active, or likely to become active.  The pre-existing condition “does not have to be manifest or disabling at the time of the tort to be within the ambit of the crumbling skull rule”:  Barnes at para. 89, citing A. (T.W.N.) v. Clarke, 2003 BCCA 670, 22 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 at para. 62. In crumbling skull situations, the defendant is only liable for damages caused by the accident and responsible for returning the plaintiff to their original position.  As Major J. stated in Athey: the defendant is liable for the additional damage but not the pre-existing damage: at para. 35.   The defendant is therefore not liable for the effects of the pre-existing condition that the plaintiff would have experienced in any event: A. (T.W.N.) at para. 52.  If there is a “measurable risk” that the pre-existing condition would have impacted the plaintiff in the future then, regardless of the defendant’s negligence, a court can take this into account in awarding damages: at para. 35. 

[93]            In addition, the defendant claims an independent intervening event, subsequent to the Accident, also had significant impact on the plaintiff.  An independent intervening event is an unrelated event, such as disease or a non-tortious accident, that occurs after the plaintiff is injured.  The impact of such events is taken into account in the same manner as pre-existing conditions: Barnes at para. 96.  Thus, the plaintiff is only entitled to damages which flow from the difference between his or her original position and their “injured position”: Athey at para. 32.  If the unrelated event would have impacted the plaintiff’s original position adversely, the “net loss” attributable to the accident at issue will not be as great and damages will be reduced proportionately: Barnes at para. 96.

[94]            I note that our Court of Appeal has stated that a reduction in damages to reflect the impact of independent intervening events or pre-existing conditions applies equally to non-pecuniary and pecuniary damages:  A. (T.W.N.) at paras. 36-37; Barnes at para. 90. 

[95]            In this case the defendant does not contest that the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the Accident.  The defendant does however contest the severity of those injuries and the impact that those subsequently had on the plaintiff’s physical and emotional health, as well as her employment situation. 

[96]            The plaintiff had pre-existing back and neck injuries and suffered a knee injury subsequent to the Accident.  At issue is the impact of such injuries on the plaintiff’s ability to continue her position as a skating instructor, or whether the injuries resulting from the Accident were responsible for causing her to change positions.

[97]            The pre-existing conditions and knee injury caused the plaintiff to miss a number of months of work when they occurred.  I accept the evidence contained in Dr. MacIntosh’s report (January 26, 2005) that the plaintiff’s pre-existing neck and back injuries would have materially impacted the plaintiff’s ability to continue working as a skating instructor, given the physical demands of that position.  Likewise, I find the knee injury would have further impacted her ability to continue that job into the future.  Prior to the Accident, the plaintiff had complained, of neck pain resulting from teaching four classes in one day.  Further, the plaintiff left her position at Sportsplex soon after she returned to work following her knee injury as she was not able to perform her duties to the same level as previously.

[98]            I accept however, that the injuries from the Accident also impacted the plaintiff at work.  The evidence indicated that a number of her duties at Sportsplex aggravated the injuries suffered in the Accident.  While the evidence did not demonstrate that those injuries alone caused the plaintiff’s departure from Sportsplex, the evidence did show that the plaintiff’s abilities to perform her job duties were adversely affected as a result.

[99]            I conclude there was a real and significant chance that the plaintiff’s pre-existing injuries and the injury suffered after the Accident would have shortened the plaintiff’s career as a skating instructor, regardless of the injuries from the Accident.  These injuries ultimately affect the plaintiff’s original position and must be taken into account in the assessment of damages.  The risk that these injuries would have reduced the plaintiff’s chosen career will be taken into account based on its relative likelihood in determining the overall assessment of damages:  McKelvie v. Ng, 2001 BCCA 341, 90 B.C.L.R. (3rd) 62 at para. 17.  Accordingly, non-pecuniary damages should be reduced by 10% to reflect such a risk. 

[100]        In assessing all of the relevant evidence, I conclude the injuries continue to adversely affect the plaintiff in a number of ways and award $75,000 for non-pecuniary damages.  I will deduct 10% as a contingency to reflect the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition and the effect of the subsequent knee injury.

Can Future Wage Loss be Awarded in an ICBC Claim When There is no Past Wage Loss?

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Wage Loss, Uncategorized.

The answer is yes and reasons for judgement were released yesterday (Schnare v. Roberts) by the BC Supreme Court illustrating this fact.  In yesterday’s case the BC Supreme Court awarded the Plaintiff just over $240,000 in total damages as a result of a 2005 BC Motor Vehicle Collision.   
The Plaintiff was a school teacher and was on her way to school when her vehicle was rear-ended.  The crash was significant enough that the Plaintiff’s vehicle was pushed into the vehicle in front of hers.
The Plaintiff suffered various injuries and these and their effect on the Plaintiff’s life are summarized at paragraphs 56-57 as follows:

[56]            Based on the evidence of Ms. Schnare, Dr. Fagan, Mr. McLean and Dr. van Rijn, I conclude that, in the accident on March 14, 2005, Ms. Schnare suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck, upper, mid and lower back, including in and around her sacroiliac region.  As a result of the injuries, Ms. Schnare was left with a mobile sacroiliac joint.  I conclude further that the defendants’ negligence caused Ms. Schnare’s injuries.  While, as of the trial, Ms. Schnare had occasional neck pain attributable to the accident, I find that the most serious result of the injuries Ms. Schnare suffered in the accident has been the mobility in her sacroiliac joint, the pelvic misalignment and rotation, and the associated back pain.  The pelvic rotation was observed and identified (by Mr. McLean) at Ms. Schnare’s first physiotherapy assessment on March 31, 2005 (approximately two weeks after the accident).  Dr. van Rijn’s examination disclosed that Ms. Schnare had a mobile right sacroiliac region and he identified Ms. Schnare’s sacroiliac region as the probable pain generator and source of Ms. Schnare’s back pain.

[57]            I find that, as a result of her injuries, Ms. Schnare continues to suffer some neck pain and significant back pain, and that this pain – particularly her back pain – limits and interferes with most normal and routine activities of her daily life.  Based on the evidence, particularly from Mr. McLean, Ms. Schnare’s condition has improved since the accident, as a result of physiotherapy and Ms. Schnare’s own efforts.  However, I accept the opinion of Dr. van Rijn and conclude that Ms. Schnare’s accident-related symptoms caused by her injuries have resulted in some permanent disability.

In justifying an award for non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) for $85,000 the Court highlighted the following facts:

Ms. Schnare’s injuries have had a very significant effect on the quality of Ms. Schnare’s life.  She has back pain regularly, and from time to time flare-ups of severe pain; she fatigues easily; she is unable to enjoy activities such as hiking or car trips with her family; she is unable to participate in her children’s activities (including homework and sports) in the manner and to the degree she would like; household chores are more difficult; she feels like a spectator on family activities, rather than involved and engaged; her intimate relationship with her husband has changed; and her strong desire to pursue a career as a kindergarten teacher has been frustrated.

[63]            Taking into account in particular Ms. Schnare’s evidence, the evidence of Mr. Schnare, Ms. Schultz and Ms. Brebuck concerning Ms. Schnare’s circumstances before and after the accident, and the opinions stated by Dr. van Rijn, I conclude that an award of $85,000 is appropriate in the circumstances.

From there the court went on to discuss the law of diminished earning capacity (future wage loss).  Despite only having a minimal past wage loss the Court awarded the Plaintiff $125,000 for diminished earning capacity.  In doing so the Court summarized and applied the law as follows:

 

[64]            The principles governing a claim for loss of earning capacity are set out in Rosvold v. Dunlop, 2001 BCCA 1, 84 B.C.L.R. (3d) 158.  There, the court confirmed that, “Where a plaintiff’s permanent injury limits him in his capacity to perform certain activities and consequently impairs his income earning capacity, he is entitled to compensation.  What is being compensated is not lost projected future earnings but the loss or impairment of earning capacity as a capital asset.”  The standard of proof to be applied when evaluating hypothetical, future events that may affect an award is simple probability, not the balance of probabilities.  Huddart J.A. continued:

10.     The trial judge’s task is to assess the loss on a judgmental basis, taking into consideration all the relevant factors arising from the evidence:  Mazzuca v. Alexakis, [1994] B.C.J. No. 2128 (S.C.) at para. 121, aff’d [1997] B.C.J. No. 2178 (C.A.). Guidance as to what factors may be relevant can be found in Parypa v. Wickware, supra, at para. 31;Kwei v. Boisclair (1991), 60 B.C.L.R. (2d) 393 (C.A.); and Brown v. Golaiy (1985), 26 B.C.L.R. (3d) 353 (S.C.) per Finch J. They include:

1.    whether the plaintiff has been rendered less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment;

2.    whether the plaintiff is less marketable or attractive as an employee to potential employers;

3.    whether the plaintiff has lost the ability to take advantage of all job opportunities which might otherwise have been open to him, had he not been injured; and

4.    whether the plaintiff is less valuable to himself as a person capable of earning income in a competitive labour market.

11.     The task of the court is to assess damages, not to calculate them according to some mathematical formula:  Mulholland (Guardian ad litem of) v. Riley Estate (1995), 12 B.C.L.R. (3d) 248 (C.A.). Once impairment of a plaintiff’s earning capacity as a capital asset has been established, that impairment must be valued.  . . . The overall fairness and reasonableness of the award must be considered taking into account all the evidence.

[65]            Ms. Schnare seeks damages in the sum of $345,600 for lost earning capacity.  This sum is based on a full-time salary of $64,000 per year; on the assumption that, because of her injuries, Ms. Schnare is permanently unable to work more than 4 days per week; and on the further assumption that, but for her injuries, she would begin teaching full time in about 2010 and continue until age 65, a period of 27 years (20% of $64,000 = $12,800 multiplied by 27 years = $345,600).

[66]            When Ms. Schnare worked a full-time week in the fall of 2008, she determined that she could not keep it up, and that she needed the one day a week to recuperate.  Other than that one week, Ms. Schnare last taught full time during the school year September 2000 to June 2001.  At that time, the Schnares’ daughter was about two, and Ms. Schnare was pregnant with their son.  As noted above, the Schnares has discussed Ms. Schnare returning to work full time when their daughter entered grade 7.  Of course, that Ms. Schnare would in fact have returned to work full time once her daughter entered grade 7, but for the accident, is not a certainty.

[67]            Dr. van Rijn addressed the topic of Ms. Schnare’s potential “occupational restrictions” in his June 5, 2008 report.  He noted Ms. Schnare’s plans to move to grade 1, rather than teaching kindergarten, and observed that “some of the job requirements (including sitting on the ground) may not be as necessary, which will hopefully allow her to manage more easily.”  He continued (italics added):

She has permanent restrictions with respect to jobs requiring increasing physical effort and would be competitively unemployable in such work when compared to an able-bodied woman with similar interests and skill sets.  This represents a permanent loss in her work capability and has caused her to suffer a work handicap as a result of her injuries.  She is potentially less desirable an employee to perspective employers as a result of her accident related symptoms.

[68]            However, Dr. van Rijn does not say anywhere in his report that Ms. Schnare would be unable, because of her injuries, to work full-time as a teacher.  I compare what Dr. van Rijn says with the evidence referred to in Fox v. Danis, at para. 97, where the court had the benefit of opinion evidence to the effect that the plaintiff had lost the capacity to work full-time.  While Ms. Schnare may have restrictions, and therefore be less employable or “competitively unemployable,” with respect to “jobs requiring increasing physical effort,” Dr. van Rijn does not identify teaching grade 1, or indeed teaching any particular school grade, as a job of this type.  In addition, there is no evidence that Ms. Schnare has ever considered any type of work other than teaching.

[69]            I consider that the approach taken by Ms. Schnare with respect to damages for loss of earning capacity is excessively mathematical.  In my view, it seeks to have Ms. Schnare compensated as if it were certain that she would never work full-time again, and her approach produces a result that, overall, is neither fair nor reasonable, taking into account all of the evidence.  On the other hand, based on the evidence, I do not accept the defendants’ submission that Ms. Schnare should receive no award for loss of capacity to earn income.

[70]            In my view, based in particular on Ms. Schnare’s evidence and on the opinions stated by Dr. van Rijn in his June 5, 2008 report, Ms. Schnare has suffered some impairment of her earning capacity as a result of her injuries.  She has been rendered less capable overall from earning income from all types of employment available to an individual qualified as a teacher, and she has lost the ability to take advantage of all job opportunities that might otherwise have been open to her had she not been injured.  Specifically, Ms. Schnare has lost the ability to take advantage of the opportunity to work full-time as a kindergarten teacher, taking into account the physical demands of that job.  On the other hand, I do not consider that the evidence supports the conclusion that, as a result of her injuries, Ms. Schnare has lost the ability generally to take advantage of opportunities to work full-time as a teacher, should she choose to do so in the future.  In that light, the difference between Ms. Schnare’s likely future income had the accident not occurred and her income now that the accident has occurred may well be small.

[71]            Accordingly, Ms. Schnare is entitled to damages, but the amount should be more modest than what her counsel has submitted.  I conclude that the damages for Ms. Schnare’s loss of earning capacity should be assessed at $125,000.

The Health Care Costs Recovery Act and Your BC Personal Injury Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Tort Reform.

Very important legislation is coming into force in April 1, 2009 that applies to many BC Personal Injury Claims.   The new legislation is the Health Care Costs Recovery Act (and the Health Care Costs Recovery Regulation) and all BC Personal Injury Lawyers and people advancing their own BC Personal Injury Claims need to be familiar with this new law.
In a nutshell this act applies to all BC Injury Claims except for claims where the defendant is insured with ICBC, litigation under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act and WCB Claims.   If you are advancing an applicable BC Personal Injury Claim after April 1 and are covered by MSP you must advance a claim for the cost of past and future health care services.  
Section 3 of the act requires that people with applicable claims, whether or not they have a lawyer, must “include a health care services claim in that legal proceeding”
Section 4 requires Notice to the Government after you start your lawsuit in BC Supreme Court.  This applies whether or not you have a lawyer for your BC Personal Injury Claim.  Spcifically this section states that the government must be notified of applicable claims “within 21 days after commencing a legal proceeding referred to in section 3(1), written notice of the legal proceeding must be given to the government“.
Section 5 of the act is perhaps the most important which stats that “a legal proceeding referred to in section 3(1) must not be discontinued or dismissed by consent unless the consent of the minister is filed with the court.”
This Act requires people with applicable BC Personal Injury Claims to advance a claim on behalf of the Government for recovery of their past and future health care costs and to not settle a claim without the governments permission first.  
In addition to the above the Act has some unique sections requiring co-operation with the government and giving the government significant power to intervene in current lawsuits.  This law will change the way BC Personal Injury Claims are prosecuted and advanced by lawyers and non-lawyers and it is vital that people become quickly familiar with this new law.
One of the biggest concerns I have as a BC Personal Injury Lawyer is that this Act will create a lot of red tape in the settlement of BC personal injury claims.  I have developed a pro-active practice of notifying the government of applicable claims even before the legislation requires to minimize the red tape that will now be involved with claim settlement.  If you are advancing an applicable claim, with or without a lawyer, I suggest you do the same because the Governments involvement in the settlement process will undoubtedly add delay to the settlement of many BC personal injury claims.
If you have an active BC Personal Injury Claim that is not settled by April 1, 2009 or if you advance a Claim after April 1, 2009 you need to comply with this new law.  If you have a lawyer you should make sure that your Injury Claim Lawyer is familiar with this new law as it may apply to your claim.  Lastly, if you are advancing your own Injury Claim and have questions about how this will effect your claim seek legal advice promptly because this act imposes significant obligations that must be complied with.

$63,000 Awarded for Soft Tissue Injuries and Chronic Pain in ICBC Claim

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Chronic Pain Cases, ICBC Psychological Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court (Atwater v. Reese) awarding a Plaintiff just over $63,000 in total damages as a result of a 2006 motor vehicle collision.
The Plaintiff was a pedestrian who sustained injuries when struck by a car.  In my experience ICBC often denies liability in these circumstances with a hope of having the court find the pedestrian at least partially at fault for not keeping a proper lookout.  In this case the ICBC Defence Lawyer argued that while the motorist was at fault the Pedestrian was contributorily negligent.  The first part of the judgement deals with this allegation and in finding the driver 100% responsible Mr. Justice Macaulay stated as follows:

[16]            I do not accept that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to watch the car as she walked in front of it.  Nor do I accept that she could have avoided the accelerating car if she had been watching.  Once in front of the car, the pedestrians were within a foot or so of the car.  There is no evidence to support the contention that the plaintiff, who was walking ahead of her sister, could have avoided the impact in the circumstances.

[17]            The impact occurred because the defendant was going through the motions of driving without actually paying any attention to what was there by way of pedestrian hazard.  I find that the defendant is entirely responsible for the accident.

In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $50,000, Mr. Justice Macaulay made the following findings with respect to her injuries and prognosis:

[38]            I am satisfied that the plaintiff suffers from chronic pain but I share the view of the various professionals that her condition is still amenable to improvement provided she increases her tolerance for recreational activity.  She gave up too easily and must try harder so that she can avoid the physical and emotional downward spiral associated with inactivity.  I am also, however, satisfied that the plaintiff’s pain experience is real and not otherwise subject to conscious psychological control.

[39]            There is, accordingly, a risk that the pain will continue albeit, hopefully, at a lesser level with appropriate rehabilitation.  I do not expect her general pain level to increase nor is the plaintiff at risk of harming herself by increasing her activity level.

[40]            To the plaintiff’s credit, she missed minimal time from work after the accident.  This may have unwittingly contributed to her slow recovery and certainly affected her ability to participate in non-work activities.  She now has moved to more sedentary office work and is not waitressing as much.  The continuing waitressing she does now is of a lighter variety than before.  These changes should help over time, as well.

[41]            In my view, the plaintiff sustained a lower moderate soft tissue injury that has resulted in chronic pain and mild anxiety.  She is capable of achieving greater recovery than she has to date in spite of the time that has passed since the accident.

When trying to value your Non-Pecuniary Damages (pain and suffering) in an ICBC Injury Claim it is important to find cases with similar injuries and a similar prognosis to help establish a range of potential damages.  I intend to keep reporting non-pecuniary damages highlights in ICBC Injury Claims and look forward to growing this database.  As always, any feedback from my readers is welcome!

ICBC Injury Claims, Trials and Costs

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, Uncategorized. 56 Comments on ICBC Injury Claims, Trials and Costs

I’ve written many times about the costs consequences of ICBC Claims and Supreme Court Trials where a formal offer of settlement is made under Rule 37B.  What about when no offer is made, what are the costs consequences then?  In these circumstances Rule 57(9) of the Supreme Court Rules governs which holds that “Subject to subrule (12), costs of and incidental to a proceeding shall follow the event unless the court otherwise orders”
What this basically means is to the victor goes the spoils.  If you bring an ICBC Injury Claim to trial in BC Supreme Court and are successful unless the court otherwise orders you will be entitled to your ‘costs’.  But what happens if you are only partially successful in your ICBC Injury Claim?  Can you still get your full costs or can these be split?  
Reasons for judgement were released today (Heppner v. Zia) dealing with this issue.  In today’s case the Plaintiff brought an injury claim following a 2004 motor vehicle collision in New Westminster, BC.  Prior to trial the Plaintiff was seeking to settle her ICBC Injury Claim for $349,900 and ICBC was offering $20,000.
After a 15 day trial the court found that the Plaintiff was 50% responsible for the collision.  In addition to being found partially at fault, the Court rejected the Plaintiff’s claim that she sustained a disc herniation as a result of the collision and that she was permanently disabled from her employment as a result of the collision.  In the end the Plaintiff was awarded damages of just over $45,000 for her soft tissue injuries.
In the normal course the Plaintiff would be entitled to her costs as she was awarded an amount greater than ICBC’s settlement offer and an amount greater than the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction.  ICBC, however, argued that they were largely successful in defending the claim in both proving the Plaintiff was partially at fault and in refuting her claim that her disc herniation was related to the collision  ICBC argued that the costs should be apportioned accordingly.  Mr. Justice Cohen of the BC Supreme Court agreed.
In concluding that the Plaintiff should be deprived of her costs for that portion of the trial which involved the claim of an accident related disc herniation Mr. Justice Cohen summarized and applied the law as follows:

[11]            In Sutherland v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2008 BCCA 27 at para. 31, Finch C.J.B.C., for the Court, said, as follows:

The test for the apportionment of costs under Rule 57(15) can be set out as follows:

(1)        the party seeking apportionment must establish that there are separate and discrete issues upon which the ultimately unsuccessful party succeeded at trial;

(2)        there must be a basis on which the trial judge can identify the time attributable to the trial of these separate issues;

(3)        it must be shown that apportionment would effect a just result….

[16]            Upon a review of the authorities submitted by both sides, particularly the recent decision of Romilly J. in Shearsmith v. Houdek, 2008 BCSC 1314, I am satisfied that the issue of the plaintiff’s disc herniation is a discrete issue upon which the plaintiff did not succeed.

[17]            In the case at bar, the Court noted at para. 290 of the Reasons, that the main thrust of the plaintiff’s claim for damages was that she sustained a low back soft tissue injury that eventually lead to disc herniation surgery that has rendered her permanently disabled, and that this outcome was due directly to the accident.

[18]            At paras. 291-292 of the Reasons, the Court said, as follows:

[291]    The defence position is that given the history and the onset of symptoms of low back pain; the plaintiff’s prior history of work related low back injuries and complaints; that the plaintiff’s first onset of low back pain after the accident was caused by the same movement of bending forward as caused the plaintiff’s work related onset of low back pain; and that the plaintiff was working as hard after the accident as she was before the accident, it is impossible to conclude that the accident caused the plaintiff’s chronic low back pain.

[292]    The essence of the defence based on causation is that the plaintiff did not complain about low back pain until about two months after the accident, and then only intermittently thereafter.  The defendants assert that a significant increase in the plaintiff’s low back symptoms and the onset of new symptoms can actually be dated from the plaintiff’s fall down the stairs in her home in early March 2005.  It was this event, claim the defendants, that caused the plaintiff to undergo disc herniation surgery and is the real reason why she did not return to her occupation as a nurse’s aid.

[19]            At para. 317 of the Reasons, the Court concluded as follows:

[317]    In the result, I find that the evidence does not establish a temporal link between the accident and the onset of the plaintiff’s low back symptoms ultimately leading to the diagnosis of disc herniation and disc herniation surgery.  In my opinion, the plaintiff has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the accident caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s disc herniation.  She has failed to prove that her disc herniation would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendants.

[20]            Thus, in the circumstances of the case, I disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that the plaintiff’s disc herniation was not a discrete issue, but merely part of the overall burden on her to prove the extent of the injuries that she suffered as a result of the accident.

[21]            I also disagree with the plaintiff that it is not possible to attribute the time taken up in dealing with the issue of the plaintiff’s disc herniation, as opposed to the time taken up dealing with the plaintiff’s other injuries. 

[22]            I find that the plaintiff should be denied her costs associated with this discrete issue.

The Court then turned to the issue of liability and the fact that ICBC was successful in proving the Plaintiff 50% at fault for the collision.  Mr. Justice Cohen held that in these circumstances the Plaintiff’s trial costs should be reduced by 50% and summarized and applied the law as follows:

 

[25]            Finally, I turn to the matter of s. 3(1) of the Negligence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 333 (the “Act”).  The defendants submit that the costs awarded in favour of the plaintiff ought to be reduced by 50% to reflect the court’s finding on liability. 

[26]            Section 3(1) of the Act states:

Unless the court otherwise directs, the liability for costs of the parties to every action is in the same proportion as their respective liability to make good the damage or loss.

[27]            The plaintiff says that an application of s. 3(1) would work an injustice in this case.  Her position is that the issue of liability occupied relatively little time at the trial, perhaps no more than a day or two.

[28]            In Moses v. Kim, 2007 BCSC 1820, the plaintiff sought 100% of his taxable costs, notwithstanding that he was held 65% responsible for the accident.  At para. 13, Gray J., as part of her analysis of whether she should use her discretion to depart from the usual rule, set out the following criteria to be applied by the Court:

(a)        the seriousness of the plaintiff’s injuries;

(b)        the difficulties facing the plaintiff in establishing liability;

(c)        the fact that in settlement negotiations the amount offered was substantially below the ultimate amount;

(d)        whether the plaintiff was forced to go to trial to obtain recovery;

(e)        the costs of getting to trial;

(f)        the difficulty and length of the trial;

(g)        whether the costs recovery available to the plaintiff, if costs are apportioned according to liability, will bear any reasonable relationship to the party’s costs in obtaining the results achieved;

(h)        the positions taken by the parties at trial, in particular whether the positions taken were appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances;

(i)         whether the defendants made any settlement offers;

(j)         the ultimate result of the trial; and

(k)        whether the plaintiff achieved substantial success that would be effectively defeated if costs were awarded pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Negligence Act.

[29]            In the instant case, the Court found that the plaintiff sustained mild to moderate soft tissue injuries as a result of the accident, and held that the general damage award should be based on the fact that her condition had improved and recovered to the stage that by a year post-accident she felt well enough to return to work on a gradual basis.  Hence, the plaintiff’s general damage award was substantially less than the amount she sought.

[30]            As well, the award received by the plaintiff for general damages was substantially less than that offered by her prior to the trial ($349,000), and somewhat closer to the amount offered by the defendants ($20,000).  Moreover, the factors of whether the plaintiff was forced to go to trial to obtain recovery, the costs of getting to trial, and the difficulty and length of the trial are applicable to both sides. 

[31]            Finally, given the ultimate result of the trial, and the fact that, in my view, the plaintiff did not achieve substantial success that would be effectively defeated if costs were awarded pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Act, I find that there are no features of the action to warrant departure from the usual rule. 

[32]            Accordingly, the plaintiff’s costs shall be reduced by 50% to reflect the division of liability.

$40,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for TMJ, Hip Injury and STI's

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Brain Injury Cases, ICBC Shoulder Injury Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases. 61 Comments on $40,000 Pain and Suffering Awarded for TMJ, Hip Injury and STI's

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court (Pavlovic v. Shields) awarding a Plaintiff just over $134,000 in total damages as a result of injuries sustained in 2 separate motor vehicle collisions.
The first collision was in 2006 and the second in 2007.  Both were rear-end crashes and the Plaintiff was faultless in both collisions.  Often in ICBC Injury Claims involving multiple collisions where fault is not at issue damages are assessed on a global basis and that is what occurred in this case.
Mr. Justice Rice found that the Plaintiff had pre-existing back and shoulder pain before these accidents that that even without these accidents the Plaintiff would have continued to have pain in these areas.  The Court made the following findings with respect to the Plaintiff’s injuries and awarded $40,000 for her non-pecuniary loss (pain and suffering / loss of enjoyment of life):

[59]            In this case, the plaintiff had back and shoulder pain pre-dating both accidents.  This is a “crumbling skull” situation.  It is more probable than not that the plaintiff would have experienced ongoing problems with back pain, for which she had already seen a Dr. Ansel Chu on several occasions in 2003.  The plaintiff claims these injuries were fully resolved, and relies on Dr. Chu’s report of August 14, 2003, in which he states that the plaintiff had had good relief from pain following a series of trigger point injections.  However, Dr. Chu does not state that her injuries had resolved, merely that she was “doing quite well” and that she could make a further appointment with him if the pain flared up again.  That the plaintiff made no further appointments is likely explained by the fact that she went to Europe for an extended period shortly after her last appointment with Dr. Chu. 

[60]            The evidence from Dr. Petrovic’s report is that only two permanent injuries from the accidents are likely: the TMJ and the right hip.  He would defer to the experts on those and has a guarded prognosis for the remainder of her injuries.  Dr. Epstein testified that the TMJ injury is likely to improve with continued treatment.  Dr. Smit was of the opinion that the right hip would require surgery.   

[61]            I accept that the plaintiff had no pre-existing hip or jaw complaints and that these are her principal injuries.  The hip may require surgery and her jaw will require ongoing management and treatment.  The defendants are fully liable for these injuries.  Her other injuries – the neck, shoulder and back pain – are likely to improve over the next year.   The effects of the concussion resolved nine months after the accident.  Taking these factors into account, I consider an award of $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages appropriate in the circumstances, the bulk of which reflects the injuries to the jaw and hip, discounted by 20% to reflect the plaintiff’s pre-existing chronic back pain, for a total of $40,000.

Mr. Justice Rice also did a good job explaining 2 legal principles which often arise in ICBC Injury Claims – the ‘thin-skull’ principle vs. the ‘crumbling skull’ principle.  He summarized these as follows:

[54]            The defendant does not go so far as to deny that the accident caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.  The concern is as to the extent.  The issue is whether this is a “thin skull” or a “crumbling skull” situation.  Both address the circumstances of a pre-existing condition and its effect upon the accident victim.  The law is that the defendant need not compensate the plaintiff for any debilitating effects of a pre-existing condition if the plaintiff would have experienced them regardless of the accident: Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 at para. 35, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 235.  The court requires “a measurable risk” or “a real or substantial possibility and not speculation” that the pre-existing condition would have manifested in the future regardless of the plaintiff’s negligence.  The measurable risk need not be proven on a balance of probabilities, but given weight according to the probability of its occurrence: Athey v. Leonati, at para. 27.

[55]            The injury is deemed “thin skull” when there is a pre-existing condition that is not active or symptomatic at the time of the accident, and that is unlikely to become active but for the accident.  If the injury is proven to be of a thin skull nature, then the defendant is liable for all the plaintiff’s injuries resulting from the accident. 

[56]            A “crumbling skull” injury is also one where there is a pre-existing condition, but one which is active or likely to become active regardless of the accident.  If the injury is proven to be of a crumbling skull nature, then the plaintiff is liable only to the extent that the accident caused an aggravation to the pre-existing condition.

ICBC Injury Claims, Medical Exams and Access to Information

Written by admin on . Posted in Civil Procedure, independent medical exams.

When advancing an ICBC Injury Claim ICBC can typically arrange an ‘independent medical exam’ to assess your injuries.   This is usually done either through the power given to ICBC under the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation or pursuant to Rule 30 of the Supreme Court Rules.
When ICBC sends you to a doctor for an ‘indpendent’ examination the physician usually takes notes and often authors a report summarizing his/her opinion of collision related injuries.  Normally ICBC Injury Claims Lawyers negotiate the terms of these examinations to permit their client to have access to the medical examiners notes.
What if these terms are not discussed prior to the exam, are you entitled to have access to the notes that ICBC’s doctor generates as a result of the visit or can ICBC claim litigation privilege over these notes?
Reasons for judgement were released today (McLeod v. Doorn) dealing with this issue.  In today’s case ICBC arranged to have the Plaintiff examined by a physician.   The Plaintiff did not negotiate what access she would have to the physicians records when she agreed to this assessment.  After the exam the Plaintiff sought access to the doctor’s clinical records and ICBC refused to provide these on the basis that the notes were protected by litigation privilege.
The Plaintiff brought an application in Court to be granted access to these records and in granting the application Master Caldwell summarized and applied the law as follows:

[4] I have considered counsel’s submissions extensively; however, I am consistently drawn back to paras. 12 and 13 of the reasons of Finch J.A. (as he then was) in Stainer v. Plaza, [2001] B.C.J. No. 4:

In my respectful opinion this condition is too broadly expressed.  Some reports prepared by or for a doctor performing an independent medical examination may not be protected by a solicitor’s brief privilege.  Ever since Milburn v. Phillips (1963), 44 W.W.R. 637 (B.C.S.C.) our courts have recognized that statements made by a plaintiff to a doctor conducting an independent medical examination under compulsion of court order may be ordered to be communicated to the plaintiff’s solicitor.  And, insofar as the examining doctor makes observations or findings on physical examination, he becomes to that extent a potential witness as to matters of fact.  That there can be no property in a witness of fact is well settled: Harmony Shipping Co. S.A. v. Davis.[1979] 3 All ER (C.A.).

It therefore appears to me to be within the proper exercise of the discretion afforded under Rule 30 to impose, as a condition of ordering an independent medical examination, delivery up to a plaintiff of the examining doctor’s notes that record any history given to him by the plaintiff on the examination, and any notes that record the doctor’s observations or findings on physical examination.  It would not usually, however, be fair to go further, and to require the defendant or third party to disclose any documents prepared by the doctor which contain his confidential opinions or advice to the lawyer who requested the examination, whether for the purposes of trial preparation, cross-examination at trial, or otherwise.

[5] Defence counsel points out that there was no order made under Rule 30 and, therefore, this reasoning does not apply; however, because the plaintiff agreed to go without an order, she is stuck.  I fail to see how that can be correct.  Rule 1(5) states that the object of the Rules is to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits”.  Requiring a court order in the circumstances of this case hardly fits with such intention.

[6] I am of the view that the notes that record any history given to Dr. Piper and Mr. Kerr by the plaintiff at the examinations and any notes of those two professionals which record their observations or finding on physical examination, including raw test data, are to be produced to plaintiff’s counsel in the manner outlined in para. 4 of the proposed order.

More on ICBC Injury Claims and the LVI Defence

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC LVI (Low Velocity Impact) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

I’ve blogged and written many times about ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact Program (LVI) and today Mr. Justice Williams shared his opinions about the so called LVI defence.
In today’s case (Munro v. Thompson) the Plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury in a 2006 motor vehicle collision.  The Court found that the impact was indeed quite minimal when considering the vehicle damage.  In awarding $9,000 for the Plaintiff’s injuries (which the court found largely resolved several months following the collision) Mr. Justice Williams summarized the law as it related to Low Impact Collisions as follows:

[50]            The issue of the legitimacy of injury claims arising from accidents in which property damage is very minor is one that comes before the court not infrequently.

[51]            The accident at bar was a low velocity collision where damage to the vehicles was so minimal as to be almost non-existent.  All of the evidence supports that conclusion.  In such instances, claims for compensation for injury are often resisted on the basis that there is reason to doubt their legitimacy.  Furthermore, in this case the principal evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim is subjective, that is, it is his self-report.  There is not a great deal of objective evidence to support his description of the injuries he claims to have suffered.

[52]            In response to those concerns, I would observe that there is no principle of law which says that because the damage to the vehicles is slight or non-detectable, that it must follow that there is no injury.  Certainly, as a matter of common sense, where the collision is of slight force, it is probably more likely that resulting injuries will be less severe than where the forces were greater, such as to result in significant physical damage to the automobiles.  However, I would not hold that out as a reliable thesis, but rather a statement of very general expectation. Suffice to say, I do not accept that there can be no injury where there is no physical damage to the vehicles.

[53]            With respect to the lack of objective evidence of physical injury and ongoing symptoms, it is well accepted that the court must be cautious in assessing the evidence.  The determination must be made in a way that the outcome will be fair to both the plaintiff and the defendant.

[54]            The plaintiff, to succeed in his claim, must establish on a balance of probabilities that this incident caused injury to him, and that those injuries entitle him to an award of compensatory damages against the defendant.

[55]            I am satisfied in this case that Mr. Munro was injured as a consequence of the accident, notwithstanding its apparently minor nature.  Accordingly, it is necessary to determine the extent of the effect of those injuries on him and the quantum of the damages to which he is entitled.

If you are injured by the fault of another in a BC Car Crash and ICBC tells you that your crash fits their LVI criteria therefore you suffered no compensable injuries its worth reviewing cases like this.  ICBC’s LVI policy is not the law, it is simply a corporate policy that has no legal force.  If you were injured in a car crash through the fault of another in BC your rights to make a tort claim are not diminished any because of the amount of vehicle damage. 

ICBC Claims and the Onset of Pain in Pre-Existing Conditions

Written by admin on . Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases, ICBC Spine Injury Cases, ICBC Whiplash Cases, Uncategorized.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court (Haines v. Shewaga) awarding a Plaintiff $34,000 in non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) as a result of injuries sustained in a 2005 car crash in Nanaimo, BC.
One of the issues in this case which frequently comes up in ICBC Injury Claims is that of pre-existing conditions.
The Plaintiff was 22 at the time of the crash.  He never had mid back pain in the years prior to the collision.   His back was injured in the collision and he continued to have symptoms in his backat the time of trial (some 3 years later).   After receiving medical treatment it was discovered that the Plaintiff had pre-existing (although asymptomatic) condition known as degenerative disc disease.  
The court found that the Plaintiff suffered various soft-tissue injuries in the crash, namely that:
[62]            I accept that the plaintiff sustained a mild to moderate whiplash type injury to the soft tissues of his neck, upper back (on the right side) and mid back, as well as a minor injury to his sternum area (likely from the seatbelt).  I find that the plaintiff had substantially recovered from all of these injuries by the time of trial, except for the injury to his mid back.  I accept that he still experiences pain in that area, after heavy and prolonged physical exertion.  Some aspects of the work that he does as a deck installer will continue to cause him some pain, from time to time.  But based on the whole of the evidence (and particularly on the plaintiff’s work record), I am not satisfied there is a substantial possibility that this pain will disable him from working. 
With respect to the Plaintiff’s pre-existing and but now symptomatic degenerative disc disease Mr. Justice Halfyard found as follows:
[69]            In my view, there is no significant conflict between Dr. Filbey and Dr. Warren on the subject under discussion.  Nor would I discount Dr. Warren’s evidence on the ground that he now works almost exclusively for ICBC.  I accept the opinions of both of these medical experts.  As a consequence, I find that the plaintiff’s complaint of mid-back pain following the accident is strongly corroborated by the medical findings and opinions.  There is no evidence whatever to suggest that the plaintiff had experienced pain in his mid-back before the accident, and he firmly denies this.  I infer from the evidence given by the doctors that pain in the thoracic spine area from whiplash-type injury is far less common than pain in the cervical and lumbar spine.  In the result, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the motor vehicle accident caused the plaintiff’s latent pre-existing degenerative condition to become painful.
So how then, does a court value injuries when a pre-existing condition contributes to the duration of traumatic injury?
Here, Mr. Justice Halfyard reduced the Plaintiff’s award for pain and suffering by 15% to account for the chance that the Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease would have become symptomatic at some point in time in the future even if the accident did not occur, thus the damages of $40,000 were reduced to $34,000.
On a different note, this claim is worth reviewing to see how BC Courts can deal with the issue of credibility in ICBC Injury Claims.  The credibility of the Plaintiff often plays a crucial role in ICBC Soft Tissue Injury Cases.  Here the ICBC Defence Lawyer challenged the credibility of the Plaintiff.   The court indeed concluded that the Plaintiff was ‘not a credible witness’ and paragraphs 37-60 are worth reviewing for anyone interested in a discussion about factors courts consider when weighing the credibility of a Plaintiff in an ICBC Injury Claim.

ICBC Insurance Claims and the Duty to Disclose the Principal Operator

Written by admin on . Posted in Uncategorized. 97 Comments on ICBC Insurance Claims and the Duty to Disclose the Principal Operator

When you purchase a contract of insurance with ICBC one of the things that must be disclosed is who the principal operator of the vehicle will be.  Depending on the answer the rate of insurance may vary.
If a consumer misrepresents who the principal operator is this can result in a breach of insurance and if this occurs ICBC will not be responsible to honour the policy of insurance if a claim is made.
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court (Lexis Holdings International Ltd. v. ICBC) demonstrating the potential consequences that can flow from a principal operator misrepresentation.
In today’s case the Plaintiff company leased a BMW.  When purchasing insurance from ICBC the company’;s representative declared that ‘there was no principal operator of the BMW’.
The vehicle was subsequently vandalized and under the policy of insurance ICBC would have been expected to pay $33,090.35 for the damages.  When the Plaintiff claimed payment from ICBC under the policy of insurance ICBC declined to pay claiming that the Plaintiff ‘knowingly misrepresented a material fact regarding the principal operator’.
Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey of the BC Supreme Court agreed with ICBC and found that the Plaintiff’s representative knowingly misrepresented who the principal operator of the vehicle was at the time the insurance was purchased.  As a result of this the Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed and ICBC were awarded their costs for trial.
In reaching this conclusion Madam Justice Arnold-Bailey summarized the law as follows:

[16]            The general rule in insurance claims, stated at ¶24 of Bevacqua v. I.C.B.C., 1999 BCCA 553, is that once an insured has shown that the loss alleged falls within the perils insured against under the terms of the policy coverage, the onus falls on the insurer to prove any affirmative defences, including fraud.  In Kruska v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., [1984] B.C.J. No. 2812 (S.C.), Finch J., as he then was, stated the test for fraud in civil cases at ¶41:

41        The accepted test of actual fraud in a civil case derives from Derry v. Peek (1889), 14 A.C. 337. There must be a false representation, made knowingly, without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without care whether it is true or false. Nothing less than this will suffice for the defendant to succeed in this case.

[Emphasis added]

It is clear from this test for fraud that knowingly making a misrepresentation (per s. 19(1)(b) of the Act) is a form of fraud.  It is therefore ICBC that bears the burden of proving that Mr. Teap knowingly made a false representation in the matter of the principal operator of the vehicle without belief in its truth, or reckless as to its truth, as all parties have agreed that Lexis Holdings has shown that its loss falls within the policy coverage.

[17]            The standard of proof in this case, as with all civil cases, is on a balance of probabilities (F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 at ¶49).  However, because an allegation of fraud, or a misrepresentation amounting to a form of fraud, against an insured is quasi-criminal in nature, and, if proven, could “affect the insured’s life well beyond the outcome” of his claim, the court must be mindful that a careful scrutiny of the evidence is necessary before finding that such an allegation has been proven (Bevacqua at ¶44; Leon v. ICBC, 2002 BCSC 794 at ¶29).  As always, clear and cogent evidence is required (Bevacqua at ¶48).

[18]            The usual first step in such cases, as set out in Rai v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2005 BCSC 92, and followed by Madam Justice Smith in Deol v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1307 at ¶28, is to determine who the principal operator of the vehicle was at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim, based on who drove the vehicle most during the term of the owner’s certificate.  To “operate” and what constitutes a “principal operator” are defined in Part 1 of the Revised Regulation (1984) Under the Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, B.C. Reg. 447/83, as follows:

“operate”, in the case of a vehicle, includes to have care, custody or control of the vehicle;

“principal operator” means the person who will operate the vehicle described in an application for a certificate for the majority of the time the vehicle is operated during the term of the certificate;

[19]            Plaintiff’s counsel submits in the present case it is not necessary for the Court to determine who the principal operator of the BMW was during most of the term of the owner’s certificate of insurance because there is no issue as to other possible principal operators.

[20]            Counsel for ICBC disagrees and submits that the first step of the analysis as to whether there has been a breach of the policy based on a misrepresentation as to the insured’s declaration of principal operator is as articulated in Rai:  the Court must determine who drove the vehicle most during the term of the owner’s certificate in order to determine who was the principal operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident (or loss).  That being the case, counsel for the defendant submits that evidence as to Mr. Teap’s regular use of the BMW and his accessorizing and customizing it to his own taste is relevant to who was, in fact, the principal operator at the time of loss.

[21]            In the present case I find in relation to the first principle drawn by D. Smith J. in Deol from the judgment of Preston J. in Rai that there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn between a party allegedly misrepresenting that there was no principal operator for a vehicle and misrepresenting the principal operator to be a person other than himself.  I find evidence as to who was, in fact, the principal operator of the BMW between March 2, 2005, when it was insured, to the date of loss on November 10, 2005, to be relevant to alleged misrepresentation by Mr. Teap on March 2, 2005 that there was no principal operator.

[22]            Therefore, in terms of the first step in the analysis as set out in Rai, the evidence (including Mr. Teap’s November 15, 2005, statement to the adjuster and the bills for various modifications to the BMW) clearly shows, and Mr. Teap eventually admitted in his testimony, that he was the person who regularly operated the BMW and had the care, custody, or control of it for the majority of the term of the insured period.

[23]            The next step is to note that the appropriate time period the Court must consider in determining whether a misrepresentation was made is “the date the claimant applied for the insurance” (Deol at ¶28; Rai at ¶14).  There is no obligation for the insured to go back to an insurance broker to have this aspect of the contract changed at some later date should the principal operator of the vehicle change (Bolen v. ICBC, 2006 BCSC 1749 at ¶44-45).  That it is clear in hindsight that Mr. Teap was the principal operator of the BMW is hence not determinative of the issue.  Rather, the defendant must show on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Teap knew on March 2, 2005, at the time he entered into the contract of insurance with ICBC, that he was in fact going to be the principal operator of the vehicle (Deol at ¶28; Rai at ¶14).  This is the point where the parties disagree.

[24]            If this Court finds that Mr. Teap knew that he was to be the principal operator of the BMW on March 2, 2005, then the final and related step will be to determine whether Mr. Teap made the misrepresentation knowingly, pursuant to s. 19(1)(b) of the Act, which at the relevant time stated:

Forfeiture of claims

19(1) If

b)         an applicant for an owner’s certificate knowingly misrepresents or fails to disclose in the application a fact required to be stated in it,

all claims by or in respect of the applicant or the insured are rendered invalid, and his or her right and the right of a person claiming through or on behalf of or as a dependent of the applicant or the insured to benefits and insurance money is forfeited.

[Emphasis added]

[25]            In Whitelaw v. Ransom and Wellington Fire Insurance Co., [1958] B.C.J. No. 135, 15 D.L.R. (2d) 504, the Court of Appeal dealt with s. 169 of the Insurance Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 164, which used the similar wording:  “Where an applicant for a contract … knowingly misrepresents or fails to disclose in the application any fact required to be stated therein … a claim by the Insured shall be invalid and the right of the Insured to recover indemnity shall be forfeited” (¶25).  In separate majority reasons, Davey J.A. noted that both Sleigh v. Stevenson, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 433, O.W.N. 465, and General Accident Ass’ce Co. v. Button, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 352, 34 M.P.R. 25, articulated that “knowingly” is used in that section in the sense that the applicant is in “possession of information that what is in fact stated in the application is untrue or does not disclose the truth” (¶30-31).  This definition was also relied on by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Turgeon v. Atlas Assurance Co. (1968), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 308 at 314.

[26]            To find that the plaintiff knowingly misrepresented the material fact in question, I must therefore be satisfied on a balance of probabilities, after careful scrutiny of the evidence, that on March 2, 2005, Mr. Teap was in possession of information such that what was stated in the insurance contract was untrue or did not disclose the truth:  namely that he knew he was to be the principal operator of the BMW, contrary to the statement in the contract that there was no principal operator of the vehicle.

[27]            In assessing whether this test has been met, the Court will be mindful that mere speculation of fraud will not be sufficient:  Swales v. I.C.B.C., 1999 BCCA 767.

[28]            A number of cases were provided by counsel to illustrate instances where even very strong speculation and circumstantial evidence were not sufficient to establish fraud.

[29]            In Swales, for example, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered judgment in favour of a plaintiff whose insurance claim had been dismissed at trial.  The plaintiff claimed that his vehicle was stolen from a public parking lot while he was in a movie theatre.  The defendant ICBC became suspicious after engaging in an investigation of the claim and declined to pay the plaintiff, alleging that he was involved in the theft of his own vehicle.  At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the vehicle was taken without his knowledge, consent, or approval.  This was an error in law since it effectively reversed the onus of proof.

[30]            Furthermore, the defence counsel in Swales conceded at trial that there was no direct evidence of the plaintiff’s involvement in the theft, and so ultimately, “[t]he case was left to the jury solely on the basis of the plaintiff’s credibility and the suspicious circumstances on which I.C.B.C. chose to deny the claim” (¶6).  The Court of Appeal stated that the jury’s finding of fraud amounted to “nothing more than speculation” and that overall, the case “came down to showing that the plaintiff may have had a motive for wanting to have his vehicle stolen” (¶7).  Therefore, Finch J.A., as he then was, for the Court, concluded that there was no foundation from which a properly instructed jury could have reasonably inferred fraud on the plaintiff’s part.

[31]            In Yeterian v. I.C.B.C., 2004 BCSC 404, the defendant ICBC resisted the plaintiff’s insurance claim for the theft of his motorcycle.  ICBC alleged that the plaintiff himself was involved in staging the theft and relied primarily on the fact that when the police found the motorcycle abandoned and damaged some distance from where the plaintiff had parked it, the ignition and locking mechanisms were not damaged.  ICBC was also suspicious because the plaintiff swore that he was “almost certain” that he had locked the steering lock, in which case the motorcycle would only have been able to move in a circle.  Despite these points, the court was not convinced that ICBC had proven fraud on a balance of probabilities:  “The evidence discloses little but speculation to support I.C.B.C.’s position that he falsely reported a theft” (¶27).

[32]            In Johl v. ICBC, 2005 BCPC 0121, the claimant’s vehicle was involved in a hit and run accident.  The claimant claimed that his vehicle was stolen and that he was not the driver involved in the incident.  The defendant ICBC investigated the claim and, suspecting fraud, refused to pay his claim.  At ¶56, V. Romilly P.C.J. set out the circumstances that ICBC viewed as suspicious:

     Viewing the evidence, it seems that the defence views the following circumstances as casting suspicions on the Claimant:

1. The vehicle was involved in a hit and run some distance away from where the Claimant said he parked his vehicle and according to Constable Reimer individuals have been known to report their vehicle as stolen when they are involved in a hit and run, and that that immediately arouses his suspicion.

2. The Locksmith’s report.

3. The Security Alarm Expert report.

4. The supposed lack of cooperation by the Claimant in dealing with Constable Reimer.

5. The Claimant’s alleged deceit in passing off his cousin, (who I found looks very much like him) as himself in dealing with Constable Reimer, which indicates deceit on his part, which was continued in his evidence at trial.

6. The fact that his car was parked some thirty feet away from where he slept and no one was awakened by an alarm going off.

The claimant argued that these points amounted to “mere speculation” and did not constitute clear and cogent evidence.  The Provincial Court Judge agreed:  “The above in my opinion without any direct evidence of the Claimant’s involvement in the theft, amounts to mere speculation on the defence’s part” (¶60).

[33]            In Bolen, finally, the plaintiffs’ truck was stolen and, as in the previous examples, ICBC refused to pay for the claim due to a suspicion of fraud.  Unlike the previous examples, ICBC did not suspect that Mr. and Mrs. Bolen had actually participated in the theft.  Rather, ICBC alleged that they made misrepresentations in relation to a number of matters, including the principal operator of the truck, their use of the truck, and its value.  Fisher J. found at ¶42 that ICBC had not met its burden of proof in establishing that Mr. Bolen had misrepresented the principal operator aspect of the insurance contract:

     […] Despite my concerns about the reliability of the plaintiffs’ evidence on this issue, there is no evidence that contradicts Mr. Bolen’s testimony that he was working for his union in 2000, and did not need the truck for shift work until October 2002. Considering this, along with the rest of the circumstantial evidence about Mr. Bolen’s connection with the truck, I am not satisfied that ICBC has proved to the requisite standard that the plaintiffs misrepresented the principal operator designation in any application for an owner’s certificate before November 2002.

[34]            It is clear from the foregoing cases that speculation, suspicion or potentially unreliable evidence from a plaintiff who sustains a loss, constitute an insufficient basis upon which an insurer may deny a claim based on fraud or a type of fraudulent misrepresentation.

 

  • 1
  • 2