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This Blog is authored by British Columbia ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken. Erik is a partner with the British Columbia personal injury law-firm MacIsaac & Company. He restricts his practice exclusively to plaintiff-only personal injury claims with a particular emphasis on ICBC injury claims involving orthopaedic injuries and complex soft tissue injuries. Please visit often for the latest developments in matters concerning BC personal injury claims and ICBC claims
Erik Magraken does not work for and is not affiliated in any way with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC). Please note that this blog is for information only and is not claim-specific legal advice. Erik can only provide legal advice to clients. Please click here to arrange a free consultation.
March 10th, 2014
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Court of Appeal addressing the current landscape of judicial discretion when awarding costs in cases with formal settlement offers in play.
In this week’s case (Wafler v. Trinh) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2005 collision. Prior to trial ICBC made three formal settlement offers, the final being $222,346. The Plaintiff rejected this offer and proceeded to trial. A jury assessed damages at $70,000 and after appropriate deductions this resulted in judgement of over $53,000. ICBC applied for post offer costs. Mr. Justice Voith did not agree that such a result was appropriate but did strip the Plaintiff of post offer costs and disbursements. Given that the trial lasted 10 days this is a significant financial consequence.
ICBC appealed arguing “the purpose of the appeal on costs was to reverse what he described as a trend in the trial court wherein plaintiffs who succeed in “beating” an offer to settle are routinely awarded double costs but defendants who have made an offer to settle that was rejected but well within the claim value are deprived an order of costs. The defendant says this is unjust. In other words, the defendant submits there should be significant consequences to plaintiffs who fail to accept a reasonable offer.”
The BC Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal finding the trial judge fairly exercised his discretion. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:
 Pursuant to Rule 14-1(9) of the Supreme Court Rules, Mr. Wafler, as the successful party, is entitled to his costs unless the court orders otherwise. Pursuant to Rule 9-1(4), the court may consider an offer to settle when exercising its discretion in relation to costs. Rule 9-1(5) enumerates the orders the court may make. In making an order under subrule (5), the court may consider the factors listed in subrule (6).
 The purpose for which costs rules exist, as stated in Giles v. Westminster Savings and Credit Union, 2010 BCCA 282, was referred to by the trial judge at para. 18 of his reasons (reproduced at para. 50 above).
 I do not quarrel with the general proposition that a plaintiff who rejects a reasonable offer to settle should usually face some sanction in costs, even in circumstances in which it cannot be said that the plaintiff should have accepted the offer. To do otherwise would undermine the importance of certainty and consequences in applying the Rule. The importance of those principles was emphasized by this court in Evans v. Jensen, 2011 BCCA 279:
 This conclusion is consistent with the importance the Legislature has placed on the role of settlement offers in encouraging the determination of disputes in a cost-efficient and expeditious manner. It has placed a premium on certainty of result as a key factor which parties consider in determining whether to make or accept an offer to settle. If the parties know in advance the consequences of their decision to make or accept an offer, whether by way of reward or punishment, they are in a better position to make a reasoned decision. If they think they may be excused from the otherwise punitive effect of a costs rule in relation to an offer to settle, they will be more inclined to take their chances in refusing to accept an offer. If they know they will have to live with the consequences set forth in the Rule, they are more likely to avoid the risk.
 That said, under the present Rule, unlike its predecessor which mandated the result, it is for the trial judge to determine in any particular case the nature and scope of whatever sanctions are to be applied. The permissive wording in Rules 9-1(5) and (6) indicates the legislature intended to preserve the historically discretionary nature of costs awards, including an award of costs where an offer to settle has been made.
 In my opinion, the judge adequately considered the factors under Rule 9-1(6) which were relevant in this case. Most significantly, the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff in this case did not suffer any consequences from his failure to accept the offers to settle ignores the fact that, as a successful party, he was deprived of his costs and disbursements from December 21, 2011, approximately six weeks before the jury’s verdict made on February 3, 2012. The verdict followed a ten day trial. Thus, the impact of the judge’s costs order was to deprive Mr. Wafler of taxable costs for the preparation of and attendance at a ten day trial, together with disbursements incurred after the offer, which presumably included fees for attendance by experts.
 In these circumstances, I do not think it can be fairly said that the plaintiff in this case was not penalized for his failure to accept the defendant’s offer. In my view, the costs order reflected the underlying purpose of Rule 9-1.
 In the result, I would dismiss the cross-appeal.
March 7th, 2014
Fraud vitiates consent to sexual contact exposing the fraudulent party to criminal and civil prosecution. The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this today in a case involving ‘condom sabotage’.
In today’s case (R v. Hutchinson) the complainant “agreed to sexual activity with her partner, H, insisting that he use a condom in order to prevent conception. Unknown to her, H had poked holes in the condom and the complainant became pregnant.”. This led to conviction for aggravated sexual assault.
In upholding the conviction and discussing when fraud vitiates consent the Supreme Court of Canada reasoned as follows:
 The Criminal Code sets out a two-step process for analyzing consent to sexual activity. The first step is to determine whether the evidence establishes that there was no “voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question” under s. 273.1(1). If the complainant consented, or her conduct raises a reasonable doubt about the lack of consent, the second step is to consider whether there are any circumstances that may vitiate her apparent consent. Section 265(3) defines a series of conditions under which the law deems an absence of consent, notwithstanding the complainant’s ostensible consent or participation: Ewanchuk, at para. 36. Section 273.1(2) also lists conditions under which no consent is obtained. For example, no consent is obtained in circumstances of coercion (s. 265(3)(a) and (b)), fraud (s. 265(3)(c)), or abuse of trust or authority (ss. 265(3)(d) and 273.1(2)(c)).
 We conclude that the first step requires proof that the complainant did not voluntarily agree to the touching, its sexual nature, or the identity of the partner. Mistakes on the complainant’s part (however caused) in relation to other matters, such as whether the partner is using effective birth control or has a sexually transmitted disease, are not relevant at this stage. However, mistakes resulting from deceptions in relation to other matters may negate consent at the second stage of the analysis, under the fraud provision in s. 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.
 Applying this template to the facts in this case leads us to conclude that, at the first step, the complainant voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity in question at the time that it occurred. The question is whether that consent was vitiated because she had been deceived as to the condition of the condom. This question is addressed at the second step. The accused’s condom sabotage constituted fraud within s. 265(3)(c), with the result that no consent was obtained. We would therefore affirm the conviction and dismiss the appeal.
March 5th, 2014
While BC Courts do recognize that the cost of medical marijuana can form a basis for damages in a personal injury claim, one matter that, to my knowledge, has never been addressed is whether failing to take prescribed medical marijuana can amount to a failure to mitigate damages. This issue was dealt with in reasons for judgement released today.
In today’s case (Glesby v. MacMillian) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 collision. Liability was admitted. In the course of the claim a physician suggested medical marijuana. The Plaintiff did not follow this advice. The Defendant apparently argued the damages should be reduced for this failure to mitigate however Mr. Justice Baird declined to do so. The Court, despite having reservations about the Plaintiff’s credibility, accepted her explanation for not following the advice to try medical marijuana. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following comments:
 Dr. Hershler examined the plaintiff on May 2, 2013, some five months before trial. His diagnosis was much the same as Dr. Kleinman’s, but without discussion of a possible interrelationship of physical and psychological factors. Soft tissue injury and chronic pain were the culprits, he said, and echoed Dr. Kleinman’s recommendation that the plaintiff should embark upon a core strengthening program. He also encouraged the plaintiff to consider the use of medical cannabis to manage her pain. The plaintiff has not taken this advice, either. She has reservations about the legality of the acquisition and use of cannabis, and, in any event, she is a committed life-long abstainer from narcotics and drugs of all sorts…
 I decline to find that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her losses by not taking medical cannabis. Dr. Hershler’s advice came after the end of what, for the reasons just stated, I consider to be a reasonable recovery period. In any event, I accept as sincere the plaintiff’s reservations about the acquisition and use of cannabis.
March 4th, 2014
When a claim is prosecuted under the fast track (Rule 15) the Court has discretion to remove the case in appropriate circumstances. Reasons for judgement were recently published by the BC Supreme Court addressing such an application.
In the recent case (Peters v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was struck in a crosswalk by an unidentified motorist. She sued ICBC for damages under section 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. The case was prosecuted under Rule 15 and was set for trial. The initial trial date was adjourned because there was no judge available. The trial was reset and following this the Plaintiff applied to remove it from the Fast Track arguing damages in excess of $100,000 would be sought. Mr. Justice Gaul dismissed the application noting it was brought too late in the litigation process. In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following brief reasons:
 The plaintiff’s law suit has been in the fast track stream under Rule 15-1 since shortly after it was launched in the fall of 2011. The plaintiff’s examination for discovery has been completed. The matter was set to go to trial as a fast track trial in the fall of 2012 and would have but for a lack of judicial resources. The matter is now set for trial, again under Rule 15-1, for June of this year. I agree with the defendant’s argument that it is too late at this point to change tack and to remove the case from the provisions of Rule 15-1.
 For all of the above reasons, the plaintiff’s application is denied.
February 28th, 2014
Reasons for judgment were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing fault for a collision between a rollerblader and a vehicle.
In this week’s case (Chabot v. Shaube) the Plaintiff was rollerblading and entered an intersection in a marked crosswalk. She had the right of way. She passed 4 of 5 lanes when the Defendant motorist, who failed to see her, moved forward attempting a right had turn. A collision occurred. Despite having the right of way the Plaintiff was found 10% at fault for the collision due to her speed when crossing. In reaching this division of fault Mr. Justice Brown provided the following reasons:
 The defendant should not have rolled to a stop and proceed as she did, considering the traffic, the time of day and the marked crosswalk in front of her. Her passenger saw the plaintiff and called out a warning.
 As for the plaintiff, once she chose to skate across the intersection, she should have skated at a pace that slow enough to allow her to stop as quickly as if she were walking or at most slowly jogging, which is, for all practical purposes, instantaneously, after allowing a moment to see and react. In other words, she departed from the standard of care of a reasonable person in similar circumstances. By skating at a fairly brisk jog, she failed to exercise sufficient care for her own safety when crossing a busy intersection during morning rush hour at UBC…
 The plaintiff was not walking. She was travelling considerably quicker than a pedestrian walking. She does not have to guard against every conceivable eventuality, or to assume a vehicle in the designated right turn lane might not respect her right of way. Only, considering the circumstances, to be more vigilant and to take reasonable precautions for her own safety, considering she was skating across the intersection, could not see traffic on the other side of the bus and could not stop as quickly as she could on foot.
 The law does not declare the plaintiff broke the law by skating across the crosswalk. Cyclists are obligated to dismount when they enter a crosswalk, see s. 183(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 318. But the Motor Vehicle Act does not include roller blades in its definition of “cycle”, see s. 119(1) “cyclist”; they are pedestrians. Further, I appreciate inline skating is a popular way to get around in good weather. Some road skaters appear very adept and agile skaters. I accept the plaintiff was an experienced skater and that she knew how to stop properly on skates. She was not obliged to remove her skates to cross. But having chosen to skate across the crosswalk, she needed to take reasonable precautions for her own safety, commensurate with her speed and visibility of traffic beyond the stopped bus.
 As noted in Karran, “fault may vary from extremely careless conduct, by which the party shows a reckless indifference or disregard for the safety of person or property, whether his own or others, down to a momentary or minor lapse of care in conduct which, nevertheless, carries with it the risk of foreseeable harm.” I find the plaintiff’s conduct falls within the range of a momentary or minor lapse of conduct, which nevertheless, carries with it the risk of foreseeable harm. Based on this finding, and the circumstance that she was always within a marked crosswalk, I apportion 90% fault to the defendant and 10% to the plaintiff.
February 27th, 2014
While BC Courts do recognize that collision related injuries can lead to the demise of a financially interdependent relationship and lead to increased costs, the evidence to advance such a claim must be persuasive. Reasons for judgement were released this week rejecting such a claim and discussing the requirements of advancing damages for “lost opportunity of family income“.
In this week’s case (Liu v. Bourget) the Plaintiffs were injured in a collision and sued for damages. They alleged a variety of losses including that they separated, and thereby incurred greater expenses, as a direct result of the accident. Mr. Justice Skolrood rejected this claim on the evidence and in doing so provided the following reasons:
 Ms. Cheng and Mr. Liu submit that they have incurred increased expenses from the fact that they now live in separate residences which they say is a direct result of the accident. They say that an award of $50,000 is reasonable in the circumstances.
 Ms. Cheng and Mr. Liu cite Grewal v. Brar et al, 2004 BCSC 1157, where the court awarded the plaintiff $30,000 for the possibility that her marriage might fail as a result of the consequences of the accident. The award was in effect a modified award for damages for loss of marriageability, a head of damages that the courts have long recognized.
 This type of award was described by Mr. Justice Lambert of the Court of Appeal in Reekie v. Messervey (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 481 at 494, 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 316 (C.A.) at 330-331, as follows:
This aspect of the damage award was called “loss of opportunity to marry” by counsel and by the trial judge. But marriage is not the significant point. the significance lies in the loss of an opportunity to form a permanent interdependency relationship which may be expected to produce financial benefits in the form of shared family income. Such an interdependency might have been formed with a close friend of either sex or with a person with whom a plaintiff might have lived as husband and wife, but without any marriage having taken place. Permanent financial interdependency, not marriage, is the gist of the claim. For the sake of simplicity and consistency, I will now usually call this head of loss: “Lost opportunity of family income”.
 Mr. Justice Lambert went on to describe categories of loss arising under this head of damages which are summarized by Mr. Justice Cole in Grewal as: (1) loss of the benefit of increased income, (2) loss of the benefit of shared expenses, and (3) loss of the benefit of shared homemaking (Grewal at para. 157).
 In Grewal, Mr. Justice Cole rejected the defendant’s argument that this type of award was not available to persons who, at the time of the accident, were already involved in a marriage or inter-dependent relationship (paras. 158-159).
 In the present case, Ms. Cheng and Mr. Liu’s claim is premised on their position that their marital separation is a result of the accident. I have found that the accident was one of many contributing factors to the breakdown and that there was a good likelihood that they would have separated in any event. I also note that unlike in Grewal, there is no evidence from an economist or other expert attempting to value the additional expenses resulting from the separation. Nor was there evidence from Ms. Cheng and Mr. Liu outlining their expenses pre and post-accident.
 Taking all of these factors into account, Ms. Cheng and Mr. Liu have not satisfied me that an award under this head is warranted.
February 27th, 2014
Adding to this site’s archived caselaw addressing non pecuniary damages for collision related brain injuries, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Chilliwack Registry, addressing damages for lingering concussive issues.
In this week’s case (Fadai v. Cully) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision. He sustained soft tissue injuries along with a mild traumatic brain injury. While many of his symptoms cleared prior to trial he continued to have issues with impulse control which was a consequence of his brain injury. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $100,000 Mr. Justice Schultes provided the following reasons:
 To summarize, I find that Mr. Fadai suffered soft tissue injuries to his head, neck, shoulder and left wrist as a result of the accident, including severe headaches, and that these injuries resolved by about a year after it.
 I also find that he suffered a mild traumatic brain injury in the accident which led to difficulties with his short-term memory, which resolved by about two years after it. He also has some degree of impairment of his control over his impulses and anger as a result of the accident, which was ongoing at the time of trial. The extent of that impairment is captured by the incidents that were observed by his family and friends. Given the expert evidence that such problems resolve within two years if they are to resolve at all, I will proceed on the basis that the difficulty with self-regulation will be permanent…
209] Obviously every case has its own unique factors that influence the amount awarded, but considering the helpful common themes of these authorities I would say that the physical injuries in the cases cited on behalf of Mr. Fadai were all more serious and enduring than his soft tissue injuries. This is also true of the cases cited on behalf of Mr. Cully, except for Gatzke, in which it appears that the duration and severity of the injuries were slightly lower. In making these comparisons, I have kept in mind that although his physical symptoms had largely resolved within a year or slightly more, Mr. Fadai’s headaches during at least the first six months were quite severe.
 I would characterize the effects of the mild traumatic brain injuries in Gougen, McKinnon and Scoates as being somewhat more serious than Mr. Fadai’s, because I have found that in his case the component of short-term memory loss and concentration problems have largely resolved, and that his difficulty is now mainly with self-regulation.
 Taking all of this into account, I conclude that an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $100,000.
February 26th, 2014
Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing non-pecuniary damages for ‘crossover toe’ sustained in a collision.
In today’s case (Chow v. Schuler) the Plaintiff was struck by the Defendant’s vehicle while crossing a crosswalk. Although the Defendant disputed fault he was found fully liable for the collision. The Plaintiff suffered a knee strain and eventually developed cross-over toe which required surgical correction. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Mr. Justice Kent provided the following reasons:
 There is no doubt that the plaintiff did suffer pain and disability both in the immediate aftermath of the accident and the later development of “crossover toe” and the surgical treatment of same. Her mobility was significantly affected and she has been unable to fully return to all of her pre-accident recreational activities including, of course, ballroom dancing. However, while the plaintiff’s pain and discomfort has not completely disappeared, she testified she presently only experiences pain if she walks too long or too fast or if she otherwise puts pressure on her leg in attempting to move objects or the like.
 The plaintiff did seek counseling assistance from a professional psychologist at the suggestion of her family doctor. She was experiencing nightmares about being struck by vehicles and she was having difficulty sleeping. She developed a fear of crossing the road. She testified that the counseling did assist and that today she has no such fears and nightmares are rare.
 An award of general damages for non-pecuniary loss must be fair to all parties and fairness is measured against awards made in comparable cases. This, of course, is only a rough guide as each case depends on its own unique facts. The factors usually considered in making these types of awards, as outlined by the Court of Appeal in numerous cases including Boyd v. Harris, 2004 BCCA146 and Stapley v. Hejslet, 2006 BCCA 34, include:
a. Age of the plaintiff;
b. Nature of the injury;
c. Severity and duration of pain;
d. Nature and extent of resulting physical and mental disability;
e. Emotional suffering;
f. Impairment of life including family, marital and social relationships; and
g. Loss of lifestyle.
Here, having regard to all of these factors as well as the cases cited by counsel, I award the plaintiff general damages in the amount of $50,000.
February 25th, 2014
The BC Government announced the introduction of Bill 13, the Off Road Vehicle Act, which seeks to overhaul the Province’s system regulating the use of off road vehicles.
You can find the text of the proposed legislation here.
Below is the BC Government’s press release:
VICTORIA – Bill 13, the Off Road Vehicle Act introduced today, promises certainty, safety and regulatory structure for thousands of off-road enthusiasts.
The proposed Off Road Vehicle – or ORV – Act replaces the 40-year-old Motor Vehicle (All Terrain) Act with a modern management structure, designed to align with existing regulatory regimes at minimal cost.
Increased use of quads, snowmobiles and other ORVs has helped British Columbians get out and enjoy the beauty of the province’s backcountry. Bill 13 will help ensure these vehicles are driven in a safe and environmentally responsible manner.
The act, if passed and brought into force, will:
- Establish a one-time registration system specifically designed to integrate with the pre-existing structure of the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia’s vehicle registry, reducing implementation costs. ORVs will have to be registered and display a clearly visible number plate before they can be operated on Crown or other public land.
- Allow the development of regulations on the rules of operation (such as wearing helmets), safety standards and conditions of use for a wide range of modern ORVs, including snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles or “quads”, dirt bikes and utility terrain vehicles.
- Assist in identifying stolen or abandoned ORVs, by requiring ORVs to be registered in a database that is accessible to peace officers at all times.
- Provide officers with more effective enforcement tools to target the small number of irresponsible ORV owners that endanger others or damage sensitive habitat. This includes the ability to stop and inspect ORVs for violations, seize an ORV for safety or evidence purposes, and increase the maximum fine for offences from $500 to $5,000.
Included in the proposed ORV legislation is an amendment to the Special Accounts Appropriation and Control Act establishing the ORV Trail Management Sub-account. This will ease the process of providing future investments directly into developing and maintaining trails, delivering lasting benefits to the ORV tourism industry in rural communities.
The proposed ORV Act is the result of extensive consultation, and represents a fair compromise for all user groups. Implementation, including registration provisions, is anticipated in the fall of 2014.
February 21st, 2014
Adding to this site’s archived database addressing damages for wrist injuries, reasons for judgement were released this week by BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with a wrist fracture following a cyclist collision.
In this week’s case (Jang v. Ritchie) the Plaintiff was walking along a trail when the Defendant “was cycling along the same trail travelling in the same direction as Mr. and Mrs. Jang. Mr. Ritchie lost control of his bicycle and drove into Mr. Jang striking him in the back“. The Defendant was found fully at fault for the collision. The Plaintiff broke his wrist which required immediate surgical attention and went on to cause long term limitations. In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $80,000 Madam Justice Fenlon provided the following reasons:
 I also find that Mr. Ritchie’s negligence caused Mr. Jang’s injuries. The injuries were fully described in the medical opinion of Dr. Melvin Serink, an orthopaedic surgeon. Dr. Serink stated in his opinion:
… [Mr. Jang] suffered a comminuted fracture involving his left distal radius and ulna. He subsequently was treated with a closed reduction and a Hoffman external fixator. Postoperatively he developed Sudeck’s dystrophy with generalized pain and swelling related to his wrist and PIP joints of his left hand. As a result of his injury, he has been left with permanent soft tissue contractures involving the PIP joints of the fingers involving his left hand. He also has been left with complaints of pain and weakness related to his left wrist associated with generalized stiffness. … [Mr. Jang] is aware of stiffness associated with loss of extension and flexion. As a result of his Sudeck’s he does have decreased power and dexterity related to the fingers of his left hand. …
His range of motion shows loss of extension and flexion by approximately 50% percent. Supination is decreased by approximately 20%. His power grip is significantly decreased secondary to generalized pain related to the PIP joints.
X-rays of his left wrist from January of this year  [show] the complete loss of the space involving the radiocarpal joint. The un-united ulnar styloid is evident. The early osteophyte formation involving the distal radial styloid is also evident.
I have paraphrased slightly to insert Mr. Jang’s name and so on.
 I accept Dr. Serink’s uncontradicted opinion in this case. His observations are consistent with Mr. Jang’s testimony and my own observations of Mr. Jang’s left hand, which is fixed in a somewhat claw-like position. I also find that Mr. Jang’s condition is permanent. The progressive nature of the injury-induced arthritis in his hand will, if anything, increase Mr. Jang’s symptoms as time goes by. Dr. Serink examined Mr. Jang and provided the following opinion in this regard:
As a result of the destruction of the articular cartilage involved in his original fracture, he has developed significant post-traumatic degenerative arthritis. The soft tissue contracture which occurs as a result of the Sudeck’s dystrophy will be permanent. As a result, he will be left with complaints of pain, weakness and generalized stiffness. These complaints will not significantly improve with rest, time or further physiotherapy. At the present time [Mr. Jang] is well motivated and is using Tylenol on a p.r.n. basis for pain control….
 Mr. Jang was in a cast for three months and underwent extensive physiotherapy. Despite that, he continues to have constant pain. He described the pain as eight on a scale of 10. He gets shooting pains on activity. Mr. Jang manages the pain by using Tylenol 3 and heat and by massaging his hand.
 Mrs. Jang touchingly described her husband of 30 years as “hard on the outside, but soft on the inside, a nice man”. She and her daughter, Angela, both described the difficulties they have observed Mr. Jang having now with even simple tasks such as opening a jar.
 Counsel for Mr. Jang took me to a number of cases with somewhat similar facts including Paras v. Muirhead (1996), 71 B.C.A.C. 17; Ferguson v. All-Can Express Ltd.,  B.C.J. No. 78 (S.C.); Jackson v. Jeffries, 2012 BCSC 814; Lowe v. Larue,  A.J. No. 1465 (Q.B.); and Kumlea v. Chaytors (1993), 76 B.C.L.R. (2d) 337 (C.A.). Counsel submits non-pecuniary damages in the range of $60,000 to $85,000 would be appropriate.
 While the cases provided to me are helpful, they are not, of course, determinative. Each case must be decided on its own facts. The cases referred to me include some differences such as plaintiffs who are younger or plaintiffs with soft tissue injuries as well as a wrist injury. In many of the cases, the injuries the plaintiffs experienced were not as severe as the injury experienced by Mr. Jang.
 Having considered all of the cases and the particular facts of this case, I am satisfied an award of $80,000 is appropriate for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.