ICBC Law

BC Injury Law and ICBC Claims Blog

Erik MagrakenThis Blog is authored by British Columbia ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken. Erik is a partner with the British Columbia personal injury law-firm MacIsaac & Company. He restricts his practice exclusively to plaintiff-only personal injury claims with a particular emphasis on ICBC injury claims involving orthopaedic injuries and complex soft tissue injuries. Please visit often for the latest developments in matters concerning BC personal injury claims and ICBC claims

Erik Magraken does not work for and is not affiliated in any way with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC). Please note that this blog is for information only and is not claim-specific legal advice.  Erik can only provide legal advice to clients. Please click here to arrange a free consultation.

Posts Tagged ‘Rule 12-6(5)’

Potentially “Harsh” Result No Reason To Strike Jury in Injury Claim

November 14th, 2017

Reasons for judgment were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a plaintiff request to strike a jury notice in an ICBC injury claim.

In the recent case (Froese v. Wilson) the 17 year old Plaintiff who “became severely intoxicated at a house party” left riding in the cargo box of a pickup truck which then moved and “caused him to fall out of the truck.”.

The Plaintiff sued for damages and the matter was set down for a 20 day trial with the Defendant electing trial by jury.  The Plaintiff objected noting that a total of 19 expert witnesses would likely testify, the matter was too complex for a jury and the jury “may take a harsher view of the plaintiff’s conduct than would a judge in assessing liability“.  The court noted that while this may be true it is no reason to strip a party’s right to trial by jury.  In reaching this conclusion Mr. Justice Smith provided the following reasons:

[17]         This trial is set for 20 days—a length no longer unusual for a jury trial. Although there is a multiplicity of expert evidence, it comes from experts in fields that are commonly at issue in personal injury cases and there appears to be a great deal of common ground as to the nature of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the motor vehicle accident. As said above, the main areas of disagreement relate to the long-term impact of those injuries and the cause of the plaintiff’s ongoing symptoms. I am not persuaded that those areas of disagreement are so complex that they cannot be considered by a properly instructed jury on the basis of properly presented and explained expert evidence.

[18]         Counsel for the plaintiff also alluded to a concern that a jury may take a harsher view of the plaintiff’s conduct than would a judge in assessing liability. That is entirely speculative and I presume jurors will be attentive to whatever instructions the trial judge gives them on how they are to go about assessing the relative blameworthiness of both parties. However, the possibility that a jury verdict may reflect community attitudes that differ from those of judges is one of the frequent justifications for retaining the jury system.

[19]         Counsel also argues that the outcome of this trial may determine the course of the rest of the plaintiff’s life and subjecting him to the uncertainties inherent in a jury trial is inconsistent with the object of a just determination on the merits set out in R. 1-3.

[20]         Although I have a certain sympathy with the plaintiff’s concern about the risks and uncertainties in a jury trial, the fact remains that R. 12-6 continues to give either party the right to unilaterally select trial by jury. Unless the party who does not want a jury trial can meet the onus of showing that it is not appropriate in a particular case and the presumptive right to a jury trial should be denied, a jury trial and verdict must be considered to come within the “just determination” envisioned by R. 1-3.

[21]         The plaintiff has failed to meet the onus in this case and the application to strike the jury notice must be dismissed.


Complex Wage Loss Claim Fuels Successful Jury Strike Application

December 7th, 2016

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, granting a Plaintiff’s jury strike application.

In today’s case (van Driesum v. Young) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2011 collision and sued for damages.  The trial was scheduled for 18 days before a jury at the Defendants election.  The Plaintiff succeeded in striking the jury from the case largely on the basis that his wage loss claim was complex.  In granting the application Mr. Justice Macintosh provided the following reasons:

[6]             The overall question is trial fairness, weighing the Defendant’s presumptive right to a jury against the risk of unfairness to the Plaintiff by having a jury attempt to decide facts and answer questions which are too intricate or complex.  My conclusion is that this case should not proceed with a jury.

[7]             The motor vehicle accident giving rise to the claim occurred on February 23, 2011.  That year also serves as the approximate dividing line between what I will characterize as two separate careers for the Plaintiff.  The methods for determining income loss and lost-earning capacity are complicated within each of his two careers.  In what I am viewing as the Plaintiff’s post‑accident career, or second career, determining income loss and lost-earning capacity are, in my view, particularly complex.

[8]             Before the accident, the Plaintiff practised law for 20 years.  For the last 17 of those years, he was a partner in a Victoria law firm.  During at least part of that time, he practised law through the business model of a personal law corporation.  Money he received from the firm went into his law corporation.  He did not take all that money out, at least not regularly.  Also, he split income with his wife in reliance on the applicable tax laws.  Accordingly, his income tax returns do not tell the full story of his pre‑accident earnings.  They need to be interpreted together with his personal law corporation’s annual financial statements, and the particulars of his income splitting with his wife.

[9]             In the result, determining the Plaintiff’s pre‑accident earning history will not be a straightforward exercise.  The complexity of that exercise, however, pales when it is compared with determining the Plaintiff’s earnings, lost earnings, and diminished earning capacity post-accident.

[10]         The Plaintiff has maintained, at different times, at least three personal companies:  through one, after his accident, he became the president of a mining company; through another, also after the accident, he consulted on WorkSafe BC claims; the other was his pre‑existing personal law corporation, which remained in place until December 31, 2014, to receive the Plaintiff’s declining earnings from his residual practise of law.  That included some post‑accident legal work by the Plaintiff, as well as some pre‑accident legal work which gave rise to post‑accident remuneration.

[11]         It will, in my view, be extremely difficult for the trier of fact to sort out both the Plaintiff’s true earnings in the post‑accident period, and the extent to which the accident impaired his earning capacity.

[12]         Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s post‑accident earnings history, and evidence of earning capacity, is over-layered with a dispute the Plaintiff had with a post‑accident business colleague, who was a former client from the Plaintiff’s law practice.  Plaintiff’s counsel characterized the evidence of that dispute as amounting to a trial within a trial in this proceeding, and that is not an unreasonable analogy.

[13]         The difficulties for a jury in this case would be increased by the difficulties a judge would have in properly charging the jury in matters of causation and the quantification of damages.

[14]         The brief summary above, of the complexities in determining both causation and damages, and in the judge charging the jury, probably would have caused me to strike the jury even if there were no other relevant facts.  When I add the other complexities of the case, which are associated with the accident itself, and the related medical evidence, the complexity is only increased.

[15]         I will preface this next part of the analysis by saying that what I call the accident evidence and medical evidence, viewed in isolation, would probably not have caused me to strike the jury.  That evidence becomes relevant on this application, however, when it is added to the evidence associated with determining the past and future income loss, and diminished earning capacity, discussed earlier in these reasons.

[16]         Liability is in issue.  All the elements of the damages claimed are also in issue.  The Defendant, through his pleadings and his expert witnesses, disputes diagnosis, causation, mitigation, prognosis and the Plaintiff’s working capacity.  It is probably the case, as well, that at least some clinical records will have to become part of the evidentiary record.

[17]         The Plaintiff plans to call nine expert witnesses in at least seven disciplines, and the Defendant plans to call four expert witnesses and tender eight expert reports.  I further note that the Plaintiff intends to object to all or part of three of the Defendant’s expert reports, and the Defendant intends to object to all or part of four of the Plaintiff’s expert reports.

[18]         The law is clear in saying that the judge’s discretion on this application must be exercised having primary regard to his or her assessment of the relevant factors present in the particular application:  see Rados v. Pannu, 2015 BCCA 459, at paras. 30‑32 and Such v. Dominion Stores Ltd., [1961] O.R. 190 (Ont. C.A.).  In other words, the analysis, not surprisingly, is driven by the facts present in the application at bar.

[19]         What is appropriate for a jury to try has to do not only with the jury’s capacity to understand the evidence as it is presented and rebutted, but also to retain over several weeks what they have heard and then analyse it in the context of the questions they are required to answer.  (See Wipfli v. Britten, [1981] B.C.J. No. 1706 (F.C.) at paras. 30 and 31.)

[20]         When the facts in this application are viewed through the legal prism of the cases cited above, I find that the Plaintiff has established the three grounds he relies upon, noted above in paragraph 5.  As stated above in paragraph 6, I conclude that I should exercise my discretion to strike the jury.


BC Court of Appeal – Jury Trial OK in Case With 40 Expert Reports

November 10th, 2015

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal finding a personal injury lawsuit with 40 expert reports totaling over 700 pages was not too complex for a jury to determine.

In today’s case (Rados v. Pannu) the Plaintiff alleged serious injuries as a result of a motor vehicle collision including “a traumatic brain injury; a vestibular injury that has impaired the appellant’s balance and induced bouts of nausea, dizziness and vomiting; various musculoligamentous and other physical injuries; and, a major depressive disorder”.

The Defendants elected a jury trial and the Plaintiff objected arguing the case was ‘too complex’ and pointed to the sheer volume of competing expert evidence.  The Plaintiff pointed to many cases where discretion was exercised to strike a jury in similar cases.  In finding that judicial discretion does allow for competing results and more than ” adding up the number of experts and medical issues or the number of pages of documents or the length of trial” is needed the Court provided the following reasons:

[22]         As I turn to consider the appellant’s argument, it is useful to remember that a decision whether to strike a jury notice is not only discretionary, but also engages important issues of trial management. The determination of such issues is properly a matter for the trial court. Furthermore, the onus is on the applicant to displace the presumptive right to a jury: MacPherson v. Czaban, 2002 BCCA 518 at para. 17, leave to appeal ref’d [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 480. Accordingly and appropriately, decisions of this kind attract considerable deference from this Court. These decisions turn critically on an assessment by the trial court of multiple factors bearing ultimately on the question whether a matter can be conveniently tried with the jury or should be heard without one.

[23]         The appellant points to numerous cases in which jury notices have been struck which share similarities with this case in terms of the number of medical issues, the number of experts, the nature of the issues and the length of trial. He suggests the result in this case cannot be reconciled with the results in those cases. Thus, he argues that the bar for striking a jury notice has been raised to a level beyond anything that can be accounted for by the inevitable variability of outcome inherent in the exercise of discretion.

[24]         I accept that, as was pointed out in Cochrane v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2005 BCCA 399 at para. 28:

It is unassailable that decisions under Rule 39(27) are driven by the particular facts of the case.  Even so, the facts in prior decisions are helpful in determining whether the discretion to grant or refuse an order to strike a jury notice has been exercised judicially.

[25]         It follows from this that, even allowing for the inevitable variation in outcomes arising from exercises of discretion, one would expect decisions with broadly similar facts to produce broadly predictable outcomes if discretion is being exercised judicially…

[30]         In my opinion, while other similar cases can assist in assessing whether discretion has been exercised judicially, broad and general similarities may mask material differences. The analysis does not begin and end with adding up the number of experts and medical issues or the number of pages of documents or the length of trial. Those factors may be indicative of whether the trial may be conveniently heard with a jury, but they are not necessarily the last word. They were not here because the judge delved deeply into an analysis of the factual circumstances engaged in the trial and exercised his discretion based on his assessment of those circumstances.

[31]         The appellant is not able to point to any relevant factors the judge failed to take into consideration in exercising his discretion, nor can he point to any irrelevant factors he did consider. He is not able to point to any consideration receiving too much or too little weight. In short, the appellant was not able to direct us to any specific error in the exercise of discretion that would warrant this Court interfering with the order.

[32]         The appellant suggested that if this order is not set aside, this Court would be endorsing a much higher bar for striking a jury notice than has previously been the case in this province. I do not accept that submission. In my view, this case turned on its specific and particular factual circumstances as they stood at the time of the application and as they were analyzed by the judge.  The judge then properly applied the relevant considerations to the exercise of his discretion. The case turned on its facts and does not represent a departure of principle or a resetting of the height of a bar.

[33]         Finally, it should be pointed out, as the chambers judge did, that when this matter comes on for trial, the trial judge “may order the trial to proceed without a jury if the interests of justice then require the making of such an order”. It may be that the case that goes to trial may be quite different to what now appears to be the case. As noted by Seaton J.A. in Ball v. Novlesky, [1981] B.C.J. No. 677 (C.A.) at para. 16, we and the chambers judge can examine the issue only on the basis of the record before us. The case at trial may be different and the trial judge would be free to deal with the issue then, if necessary.

[34]         In my opinion, the submissions of the appellant do not rise above an attempt to reargue the case that was rejected by the chambers judge. I do not think that the appellant has identified any error in principle in the exercise of the chambers judge’s discretion. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.


ICBC Rate Hike Letter to PolicyHolders Does Not Taint Injury Claim Jury Pool

July 14th, 2014

Interesting reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, discussing whether ICBC should lose the right to trial by jury due to a letter they sent their policy holders blaming increased insurance rates on ‘rising injury costs’.

In today’s case (Yates v. Lee) the Plaintiff was injured in a 1998 collision.   He was 6 years old at the time.  His matter was set for trial in February, 2015 and ICBC, the insurer for the Defendant, elected to proceed via jury trial.  The Plaintiff argued that the Court should use its inherent jurisdiction to strip ICBC of their right to jury trial suggesting that the letter ICBC sent their policy holders “has tainted the jury pool by creating a real potential for bias against plaintiffs among jurors who are policy holders“.  Mr. Justice Pearlman disagreed finding there was no reason for the Court to use its inherent jurisdiction and the trial judge could deal with any suggestion of bias.  In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons:

[12]         Shortly after November 1, 2013, ICBC began including in the insurance renewal notices sent to each of its policy holders the following statement:

          ICBC Rate Changes:

Rising injury costs mean we’re asking the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC) for 4.9% increase to Basic insurance rates. The BCUC has approved an interim rate increase of 4.9% effective November 1, 2013 and will make a final decision after a public hearing process. If a final approved rate differs from the interim rate, your Basic premiums will be adjusted for the difference, subject to the BCUC’s final Order. We are also able to reduce our optional rates to lessen the impact on you.

[13]         The renewal reminder also included a statement of the insured’s estimated total premium for the year…

[53]         Here, at best, the material filed by the plaintiff goes no further than establishing a possibility for bias on the part of some prospective jurors who are  ICBC policyholders. In addition to relying on the renewal notice itself, the plaintiff referred to Norsworthy v. Green, (30 May 2009), Victoria Registry 06 2644 (B.C.S.C.).  There, Macaulay J. commented, obiter, that every potential juror knows that ICBC funds damages awards, and that this creates the risk that prospective jurors may believe the higher an award in a given case, the greater the likelihood that their own insurance premiums may rise. Macaulay J. observed that such thinking is improper, and would, if disclosed, demonstrate bias. The plaintiff also filed newspaper and Internet articles referring to Shariatamadari v. Ahmadi (4 May 2009), Vancouver Registry S061583 (B.C.S.C.), where the trial judge’s investigation into complaints of juror misconduct revealed that one of the jurors, during deliberations, had expressed concern that a high damage award would drive up their own auto insurance rates. This material falls well short of establishing that a real potential exists in the circumstances of this case that some jurors may be incapable of setting aside any prejudice they may have as a result of the renewal notice, and deciding this case impartially, after receiving appropriate instructions from the trial judge.

[54]         Even if this court had the inherent jurisdiction to strike a jury notice for juror partiality, I would decline to exercise that jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case for the following reasons:

(a) the court is asked to find that ICBC’s communication to its policy holders through the renewal notices constitutes prejudicial pre-trial misconduct in the absence of an adequate evidentiary foundation;

(b) to grant the relief sought would skirt the challenge for cause process by having the court make a determination of juror partiality without requiring the plaintiff to satisfy both branches of the well-established test for juror partiality, and without any inquiry to determine whether particular members of the juror pool selected for this case could not serve impartially; and

(c) another decision-maker, the trial judge, has all the powers necessary to ensure trial fairness…

[59]         Chester provides further support for my conclusion that the plaintiff’s assertion of juror partiality is a matter which, if pursued, must be raised before the trial judge for determination through the challenge for cause process, rather than before a chambers judge who has neither the inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, nor an adequate evidentiary foundation on which to do so.


NHL Player’s Wage Loss Claim Not “Too Complex” For a Jury

May 15th, 2014

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing whether a Jury was capable of determining an NHL player’s wage loss claim in a personal injury lawsuit.

In today’s case (Franson v. Caldarella) the Plaintiff, Cody Franson, was injured a in 2008 collision.  At the time he “was in the second year of a three-year Entry Level two-way contract with the National Hockey League (NHL) and the American Hockey League (AHL), and was in training camp preparing for tryouts for the Nashville Predators.”

The lawsuit claimed that the collision related injuries delayed his entry into the NHL by one year.  He claimed damages for loss of opportunity for this year and further alleged that his subsequent NHL contracts would have been more favorable had the delay not occurred.  The Plaintiff brought an application to strike the Defendant’s jury notice arguing that the intricacies of NHL contract negotiations are too complex for a jury.  Madam Justice Fisher disagreed and dismissed the Plaintiff’s application.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[21]         The essence of the plaintiff’s position is that issues (2) and (3) will require answers to questions which rely on complex technical evidence. The main questions as I understand them are:

(a) What were the chances that the plaintiff would have played any games for Nashville in the 2008-2009 season?

(b) If his chances were good, how many games would he have played?

(c) If he had played a certain number of games in that season, would he have been able to negotiate more favourable terms in his contract in subsequent years as a Restricted Free Agent?..

[26]         The plaintiff submitted that the trier of fact will be required to understand the methodology, assess it, and determine which statistics and methodology is appropriate in order to calculate these damages. I do not disagree that the trier of fact will have to understand the methodology used by Mr. Gurney but I question whether it will be necessary to determine another appropriate methodology and apply that. These kinds of hypothetical damages in circumstances of uncertainty are not normally assessed by way of a mathematical calculation. The expert evidence is presented as a tool to assist the trier of fact in its assessment. In my view, a jury will be capable of understanding Mr. Gurney’s methodology when it is properly explained and it will also be capable of assessing the criticisms of that methodology by Prof. Weiler.

[27]         It is my view that a jury is capable of assessing this kind of evidence and determining the issues arising from it, including the use of hypotheticals and contingencies, with proper direction.

[28]         Moreover, this will not be in inordinately long trial, set for up to 14 days, a time estimate that is reasonable given the number of witnesses and issues to be addressed. In my opinion, a jury will be able to understand the evidence and retain that understanding for the length of the trial.

[29]         For all of these reasons, the plaintiff’s application is dismissed.

 


Paraplegia Claim Not Too Complex For Jury Trial

January 6th, 2014

Reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing a jury strike application in a paraplegia injury claim.

In the recent case (Laktin v. Vancouver (City)) the Defendants “were responding to a call that the Plaintiff might be suicidal” when one of the Defendant police officers “shot the plaintiff, rendering him paraplegic“.

The Plaintiff sued for damages and elected trial by Jury.  The Defendants brought an application to strike the jury notice arguing the trial was too complex for a jury to hear.  Mr. Justice Pearlman disagreed finding that despite the severe nature of the injury the matter was appropriate for jury trial.  In reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following reasons:

[35]         This is not a trial that involves multiple accidents or actions, or that raises complex issues of causation of the plaintiff’s physical injuries. The jury may have to determine the extent to which the  psychological injuries claimed by the plaintiff result from a pre-existing condition rather than the incident of January 21, 2006. That will involve the jury making findings of fact that are well within the capabilities of a modern jury.

[36]         The defendants have identified numerous issues of fact and law relating to issues of liability, the statutory and common law defences to the plaintiff’s claim of battery available to the defendants, the apportionment of fault, and damages.  It is the responsibility of the trial judge to instruct the jury concerning the legal principles that will apply to the facts as found by the jury.  The court will instruct the jury on the application and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Police Act and the Criminal Code. 

[37]         The duties of care owed by the defendants to the plaintiff are a matter of law for determination by the trial judge rather than the jury. It will be the responsibility of the trial judge to determine whether the City of Vancouver owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, and whether, as a matter of law, there is any basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the City, other than its liability under s. 20 of the Police Act for the torts of municipal police officers.

[38]         Whether, as a matter of law, the application of the doctrine of ex turpi causa would be justified in the circumstances of this case is also a matter for the trial judge.

[39]          The defence correctly submits that the provisions of ss. 34 and 37 of the Criminal Code in force at the time of the incident that gave rise to this action add a level of complexity to this trial.   However, juries in criminal cases have been frequently called upon to apply those provisions, and with the assistance of instructions from the trial judge, have done so. I see no reason why a civil jury, properly instructed, cannot perform a similar task.

[40]         In my view, finding the facts regarding what occurred in the sequence of events that culminated in Constable Coulthard shooting the plaintiff, and determining whether the force used by the police was justified in all of the circumstances are tasks well suited to a jury composed of eight members of the community.


Coughing Rib Injury Case Not “Too Complex” For Jury Trial

November 1st, 2013

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, addressing whether a unique causation issue in a personal injury claim was too complex for a jury.

In today’s case (Jackson v. Yusishen) the Plaintiff was rear-ended by the defendant’s truck in 2009.  The Plaintiff sustained some injuries and sued for damages.   Some 6 months following the crash the plaintiff “coughed and the pain in his chest and back suddenly increased in intensity“.  He was ultimately diagnosed with “one or two fractured ribs…hernias of the intercostal area and of the diaphragm“.  He had multiple surgeries to correct these complications that had not been successful.  The biggest issue for trial was for the jury to decide whether the ribs were compromised in the collision and whether the collision caused or contributed to the ultimate complications the Plaintiff was diagnosed with.

The Defendant elected trial by Jury.  The Plaintiff argued the matter was too complex for a jury to decide.  Mr. Justice Rogers disagreed and held that a jury could address this issue.  In upholding the jury election the Court provided the following reasons:

[23]         It is possible that the jury may find that the accident weakened the plaintiff’s ribs such that the later coughing episode caused them to fracture. In that event, the standard language of an Athey instruction will suffice to guide the jury’s deliberations. Again, juries are regularly instructed on similar Athey issues – this case would not present any greater complication on that issue than any other.

[24]         Once the jury has determined whether the accident caused rib fractures or a weakening of the ribs that later turned into fractures, the rest of the jury’s duties will be relatively straight forward. If their answer to that question is yes, then they will have to assess the degree to which the injuries have impaired the plaintiff’s function and award damages accordingly. For that task, they will have the assistance of expert reports of the type that are conventionally adduced in personal injury cases. Those reports include a functional capacity evaluation, a vocational assessment, a cost of future care report, and an economist’s assessment of the present value of various loss scenarios. Again, in serious personal injury cases, juries are routinely asked to consider such reports. There is nothing about the content of the reports in this case that suggest that a jury would not be able to conveniently consider their content and render a verdict accordingly.

[25]         If the jury’s answer to the causation question is no, then their task will become very nearly trivial.

[26]         Although there are a number of expert reports that will go into evidence in this case, the reality is that the jury will likely not be required to scour each and every word in each and every report. For example, the plaintiff’s economist’s reports may be useful to the jury should it wish to award future losses to the plaintiff, but it is unlikely that the jury will need to go beyond picking what appears to it to be the appropriate multiplier for a given loss and a given set of positive and negative contingencies.

[27]         In my opinion, the jury’s task of hearing, examining, and considering the evidence in this case will not exceed the bounds of convenience. The jury will be asked to conduct a scientific inquiry into what the radiographs could and did show of the plaintiff’s rib structure, but that will be a relatively narrow and focused inquiry. The jury will be guided by the opinions of qualified medical practitioners and by counsel’s submissions. It is not every contest of medical opinion that will disqualify a jury from trying a personal injury claim, and in my view, the scientific inquiry that the jury will make on this issue will be within its capacity.

[28]         Once the jury gets past the issue of causation, this case will become a relatively straightforward assessment of personal injury damages. The evidence on quantum issues is entirely conventional and is of the sort that juries are often asked to consider and assess. The jury may have to make some difficult decisions, but the path to those decisions will not, in my view, be so intricate or complex as to overwhelm the jury’s capacity to arrive at a just and proper judgment.

[29]         For these reasons, I have concluded that the plaintiff’s application to strike the jury notice must be dismissed.

 


BC Court of Appeal Upholds Jury Strike Applicaiton in “Prolonged” Personal Injury Case

October 8th, 2013

Reasons for judgement were release this week by the BC Court of Appeal upholding a judges decision to strike a jury notice in a complex and prolonged personal injury trial.

In this week’s case (Wallman v. Gill) the Plaintiff alleged that “he suffered serious injuries” in a rear end collision.   The trial was scheduled with “at least 23 experts…as well as some 31 civilian witnesses” and was expected to last 7 weeks.  The Defendants wished to have the trial judge proceed before a jury but a chambers judge struck the jury notice finding the trial was too prolonged and complex for a jury.  In upholding this decision the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:

[7]           The decision to strike a jury notice is a discretionary one that relates to the management of a trial and may not be interfered with lightly on appellate review: MacPherson v. Czaban, 2002 BCCA 518. Absent an error of principle, or failure to give sufficient weight to all relevant considerations, deference must be accorded to such an order.

[8]           The legal test to be applied on review of a discretionary order is whether the judge “has given weight to all relevant considerations”: Mining Watch Canada v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries & Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 6 at para. 43. The appellants contend that the chambers judge acted on irrelevant considerations or alternatively failed to apply established legal criteria. With respect, I do not agree.

[9]           In this case, the chambers judge found that the issues for trial will require a scientific investigation. This is a factual determination for which deference must be accorded absent palpable and overriding error, which is not alleged. In the exercise of his discretion, he found that the scientific investigation into the proposed evidence could not conveniently be undertaken by a jury. In reaching that conclusion, the judge was satisfied that a proper review of the evidence and the legal issues could not be ensured by a jury that would be required to understand and retain opinion evidence from a large number of expert witnesses over a protracted period of time…

[13]        These decisions, in addition to many others, demonstrate the type of considerations that must be weighed when faced with an application to strike a jury notice. The management of a proposed civil jury trial requires the judge to ensure, as best as he or she can, that all who are involved, including the parties, their counsel, the potential jurors and the trial judge are able to satisfactorily perform their respective duties and responsibilities in order to meet the common objective of a fair trial.

[14]        In this case, the chambers judge applied the correct legal test under R. 12-6(5) for the striking of a jury notice and in my view cannot be said to have erred in the exercise of his discretion in striking the jury notice in order to ensure the proper conduct and management of the trial of this action. Accordingly, I find no basis upon which this Court might interfere with the order and therefore I would dismiss the appeal.


BC Court of Appeal Discusses Two Routes of Challenging Jury Notices

March 22nd, 2013

Last year I discussed the fact that the BC Supreme Court can deal with Jury Strike applications both under Rule 12-6(5) and also as part of the trial management process.  Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Court of Appeal (Wallman v. Gill) addressing this reality but also providing comments on the limits of when the trial management process is an appropriate forum for such an application.   The Court provided the following feedback:

23]         By analogy, although the application to strike the jury in this case was heard by the judge who had been appointed to manage the action, he did not hear it in the course of a trial management conference under R. 12-2(9), but in regular chambers under R. 12-6(5). Indeed, he could not have heard it at a case management conference since it is evident the parties filed affidavits on the application, and this would not have been permitted under R. 12-2(11)(a). Thus, the order striking the jury is not a limited appeal order.

[24]         I would be sympathetic to the plaintiff’s argument that the Legislature did not intend to create a “two-tier” system for appealing orders directing the mode of trial if I were satisfied that was the practical effect of this ruling. However, I am not convinced that this is the case. This argument fails to recognize the unique role of the case management conference. It is held late in the proceeding, when the trial is sufficiently imminent that the parties have been able to prepare a comprehensive trial brief, and meet in person with the judge to make informed decisions about how the trial will proceed. In this limited context, R. 12-2(9)(b) permits a trial management judge to decide whether the trial should be heard with or without a jury, either on application by one of the parties or on his or her own initiative, and without affidavit evidence. I venture the view that this power will be exercised rarely. If the parties have been unable to agree on the mode of trial, it seems most unlikely they would leave this to be determined late in the day at a case management conference, without the benefit of affidavit evidence. It is reasonable to assume that, instead, there will have been an earlier application under R. 12-6(5) to determine this issue. Further, it seems unlikely a trial management judge would then consider revisiting an earlier order dealing with mode of trial or, if no earlier application had been brought, alter the mode of trial in a summary manner late in the day.

 


Jury Strike Application Succeeds in Complex Personal Injury Case

December 20th, 2012

Earlier this month I highlighted two decisions addressing whether injury trials with numerous expert witnesses were too complex for a jury to hear.  The first case dismissed the jury notice and the second case upheld the notice.

This week a futher judgement was released addressing this topic finding a case with 475 pages of expert evidence was too complex for a jury.

In this week’s case (Moll v. Parmar) both the Plaintiff and Defendant filed a jury notice.   At the trial management conference the Defendant indicated that a jury trial was still anticipated.   As trial neared, however, the Defendant changed their view and brought an application to strike the Plaintiff’s jury notice.  Mr. Justice Abrioux found that the case was too complex for a jury and in so doing provided the following reasons:

[43]         What militates against the action proceeding before a jury is the sheer volume of medical reports, and in many instances, the scientific aspect of the evidence. I have reviewed many of the medical and other experts’ reports which were provided to me in October 2012. As I noted above, they comprise approximately 475 pages. The reports refer to other reports and assessments. The neuropsychological reports deal with many different tests, as do the vocational and functional capacity evaluations.

[44]         I  emphasize that what is in the record before me are experts’ reports, that is, evidence which, depending on admissibility issues, will be before the trier of fact. In that regard they are to be distinguished from, as I have noted, hospital and other records which may well have much less significance or importance to the trier of fact.

[45]         In my view, there can be little doubt that the issues in this case will require a prolonged examination of documents or accounts or a scientific or local investigation. The plaintiff presents two alternative theories, the first being whether the accident caused an organic brain injury, which is scientifically complex. The reports of the neuroradiologist attest to this…

[51]         I am satisfied that both tests set out in Rule 12-6(5)(a)(i) and (ii) have been met. First this case does involve a scientific investigation which will include a prolonged examination of documents, in particular experts’ reports, that cannot conveniently be heard by a jury. Secondly, the issues are sufficiently intricate and complex that the trial should not proceed with a jury. Justice would not be done if that were to take place. Accordingly, I direct that the trial be heard by the trial judge without a jury.