ICBC Law

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, awarding just over $450,000 in damages for injuries and losses arising out of a 2006 BC Motor Vehicle Collision.

In today’s case (Power v. White) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2 vehicle collision.  As the Plaintiff was driving down the Island Highway a deer ran into his lane of travel threatening collision.  The Plaintiff reacted suddenly by changing into the right lane and braking as hard as he could.  Unfortunately this was not sufficient and the Plaintiff’s vehicle struck the deer.  Shortly afterwards the Defendant, who was travelling in the right lane, collided with the rear of the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Fault was at issue however the Mr. Justice Verhoeven found that the Plaintiff reacted reasonably to the threatened collision and that the Defendant was 100% at fault for failing to drive with all due care and attention.

The Plaintiff suffered various injuries the most serious of which was a tear to his pectoralis major muscle.  This injury did not fully heal and was expected to effect the Plaintiff well into the future.  The Plaintiff’s family doctor provided the following evidence with respect to the severity of this injury:

In review, Mr. Power sustained injuries to his right pectoralis major (partial tear) to the right T-6 area as well as some transient injuries to the soft tissues in his right shoulder and base of neck and right buttock area. These complaints started after his accident and have been persistent and continuous since that time. Institution of physiotherapy, chiropractic and exercised based therapy have been useful in increasing some of his functional capacity since the accident, but have plateaued in that the pain from either his right pectoralis area or the T-6 area have limited any further advancement of intensity or duration of his exercise. These injuries have significantly limited his recreational activities, particularly swimming, biking and running as well as his ability to care for his house and yard, particularly the use of his power saw, shovels and mowing his lawn. At work he generally does not have a lot of limitation as he is able to get up from his seat when he needs to but does have limited sitting capacity as has previously been outlined. He does and would have some problems turning some of the heavy valves and climbing the ladders if there is a breakdown at the mill, however he does have a partner and this has generally worked out that the partner has done this.

Mr. Power has sustained significant injuries from the accident. His functional limitations have been outlined in detail. They are significant for his recreational and household and yard activities. At this time I do not see a significant future recovery for these and at the moment I am unable to find a surgeon who would consider repairing this injury, although I will persist in searching the literature for a possible solution for this problem. Mr. Power has shown he is determined to remain active, having returned to work promptly after his accident, followed all of my instructions as well as his therapist’s instructions to the letter and done a persistent and significant job in increasing his activities to what is now his limit due to pain in the aforementioned areas and I do not see his disabilities resolving in the near future.

Mr. Justice Verhoeven awarded the Plaintiff $135,000 for his non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life).  In reaching this figure the Court provided the following reasons:

[82]         In this case, Mr. Power has suffered a very significant and permanent loss to the lifestyle he previously enjoyed. Virtually all of his previous physical activities have been severely curtailed. Prior to the accident Mr. Powers physical vigour was central to his life and lifestyle. His mood and emotional well being have been negatively affected. His relationship with his wife has been harmed. His ability to improve and maintain his property, quite obviously a source of great pleasure and pride to him formerly, is all but completely gone. He has not and will not in future be as physically fit as he previously was. It is reasonable to infer that this may affect his health long term. I think it likely that Mr. and Mrs. Power will sell their five acre property and move into a residence that does not require so much effort to maintain…

[84]         In all these circumstances, I assess the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary loss at $135,000.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing whether the BC Supreme Court has discretion to make costs awards after a formal settlement offer is accepted that specifically addresses costs consequences.

In today’s case (Hambrook v. Sandhu) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2004 BC collision.  He sued for damages.  The defence lawyer (instructed by ICBC) made a formal offer to settle the case for $75,000 plus costs up to the time that the offer was made with the Defendant being entitled to costs thereafter.  (this offer was made under the old Rule 37 which has now been repealed).

The Plaintiff initially dismissed the offer and continued in the lawsuit.   Three days before trial the Plaintiff accepted the offer.  The parties could not agree on the costs consequences.  The Plaintiff argued that Rule 37B (the rule that governed at the time of acceptance) gave the Court discretion to award her costs up to the date the offer was accepted.   Mr. Justice Verhoeven disagreed and held that when a settlement offer is accepted that specifically spells out the costs consequences there is no discretion for the Court to exercise under Rule 37B.  The Court provided the following reasons:

[28] But it has also been held that a settlement agreement containing terms as to payment of costs leaves the court with no room for the exercise of discretion pursuant to Rule 37B:  Buttar v. Di Spirito, 2009 BCSC 72 at para. 17..

[30] Madam Justice Gerow held that the court had no discretion to award costs in the matter before her. She stated at para. 11:

[11]      Both parties advanced arguments that the court has discretion under Rule 37B to make an order regarding costs. However, it is my opinion that the court has no discretion to make an order regarding costs in this matter. Mr. Buttar accepted the offer put forth by the defendants, including the offer regarding costs, without reservation. It is my view that Rule 37B does not confer a discretion on the court to set aside an agreement that has been entered into between the parties regarding costs.

[31] On this basis, where a party has specified the costs consequences of acceptance of its offer to settle, within an offer to settle to which Rule 37B applies, and a settlement agreement results in accordance with the offer, the court does not retain a discretion to depart from the terms of the agreement.

[32] Put another way, it remains open to litigating parties to make an offer to settle within the meaning of Rule 37B and to specify the costs consequences of acceptance of the offer. In my view this is a positive result. It allows the parties to create their own bargain. It provides for certainty, and avoids the need for applications to court where a settlement agreement is reached, while preserving the court’s discretion in cases where no settlement occurs…

[37] In my view the agreement that the parties made was unambiguous. The defendants’ offer was clear in relation to the costs consequence of acceptance; the defendants would pay the costs until the date of the offer, and if the plaintiff were to accept the offer after that date, then the defendants would be entitled to costs after that date.

[38] After July 1, 2008, when the new rule came into effect, the defendants’ offer remained open for acceptance in accordance with its terms. The defendants had not withdrawn it or amended it. The new rule affected the costs consequences in the event that the offer was not accepted, and the court went on to render a judgment. That did not occur…

[61] The plaintiff will receive costs in accordance with Appendix B, Scale B, for the time leading to delivery of the defendants’ offer to settle. The defendants will receive costs following that date. No argument was presented to me that there should be any distinction between the tariff items and disbursements. The applicable costs will include both tariff items and disbursements.

In my continued efforts to get us all prepared for the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules I will again point out that Rule 37B will be replaced with Rule 9 under the New Rules. The new rule uses language that is almost identical to Rule 37B which should help cases such as this one retain their value as precedents.

Reasons for judgement were released today (Lutz v. Lim) awarding a Plaintiff just over $64,000 in total damages as a result of 2 BC motor vehicle collisions.

Fault was admitted for both crashes leaving the court to deal with the issue of damages.  The Plaintiff suffered a complicated soft tissue injury to his right foot as a result of the first crash.  The Plaintiff’s doctors gave the following opinion with respect to the Plaintiff’s foot injury:

In summary, Mr. Lutz continues to experience significant pain in his right foot, in spite of orthotics and custom-made workboots. He is able to function at work but finds that, after he has been on his feet for more than two hours at a time, the pain in his foot increases. I believe he has a permanent partial disability as a result of the initial motor vehicle accident of April 26th, 2005, when a car ran over his right foot….

Because of the change of foot position, the increased metatarsalgia, and the swelling that occurred around the time of the accident, I think that the accident has given him significant change in his foot shape and deterioration in his foot function as it existed prior to this point.

I think, with regard to the future, he will require custom orthotics and shoes to maintain his employment…

I also think that this would help him improve his recreational activities.

I think that there will be ongoing disability from this injury. He is unlikely to be able to take employment that requires a greater degree of loading of the forefoot than he presently has. His job is well-suited to his various musculoskeletal injuries, but if he has to take part in a job that requires a greater degree of physical activity, I suspect that his foot will become the most rate-limiting area. Therefore, a job more strenuous than he presently has would be inappropriate unless further reconstructive surgery was done to his foot.

In awarding the Plaintiff $45,000 for his non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for his foot injury Mr. Justice Verhoeven summarized the severity of the injury and the effects on the Plaintiff’s life as follows:

[101] Doing the best I can on the evidence, I conclude that the plaintiff has suffered a substantial amount of damage to his foot in the MVA. I conclude, as well, that the MVA has caused a permanent disability in his foot. I conclude that the risk of surgery being required is caused by the MVA injuries. On the evidence, I am unable to find that there was a measurable risk of surgery being required prior to the MVA injuries….

[110] In my view, and adopting the language used by Major J. in Athey v. Leonati, the plaintiff’s foot injury is more in the nature of a “thin skull” case than it is of a “crumbling skull”. The plaintiff’s prior foot injury left him vulnerable to future injury. There is little more than speculation to suggest that his current complaints and his ongoing need for treatment would have or might have occurred in any event. There is therefore insufficient evidence to allow me to reduce the award based upon such a contingency…

[124] In summary, the plaintiff now has had foot pain steadily for the past four-and-a-half years. He has a permanent partial disability with ongoing discomfort in relation to the foot. There is some restriction on his work activities, although he has not made a claim for loss of earnings or earning capacity. He was 38 years of age at the time of the first MVA. He is now 42. There is a significant risk of surgery being required as a result of the accident injury. Although he has not lost any time from work and for the most part he has carried on with his pre-MVA activities, I take into account his stoical nature. He has had to wear orthotics in his footwear and this will continue indefinitely. He suffered a minor injury to the right hand as well.

[125] I accept the submission of plaintiff’s counsel that an appropriate compensation for non-pecuniary loss arising out of MVA No. 1 is $45,000.