ICBC Law

BC Injury Law and ICBC Claims Blog

Erik MagrakenThis Blog is authored by British Columbia ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken. Erik is a partner with the British Columbia personal injury law-firm MacIsaac & Company. He restricts his practice exclusively to plaintiff-only personal injury claims with a particular emphasis on ICBC injury claims involving orthopaedic injuries and complex soft tissue injuries. Please visit often for the latest developments in matters concerning BC personal injury claims and ICBC claims

Erik Magraken does not work for and is not affiliated in any way with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC). Please note that this blog is for information only and is not claim-specific legal advice.  Erik can only provide legal advice to clients. Please click here to arrange a free consultation.

Posts Tagged ‘Mr. Justice McKinnon’

Motorist Fully At Fault Despite Being hit While Stationary

April 28th, 2014

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry, finding a motorist who was struck while stationary fully at fault for a collision.

In last week’s case (Hart v. Jackson) the Defendant lost control of his vehicle in winter driving conditions and drove into a snow bank.  A good Samaritan helped him retrieve his vehicle leaving it facing southbound in the northbound lane.  The Defendant’s vehicle’s wheel wells were packed with snow such that it could not be steered.  The Defendant spend several minutes using a ice scraper to remove the snow.  At the same time the Plaintiff vehicle was driving Northbound.  When he realized the Defendant vehicle was in his lane he applied his brakes but could not avoid the collision.

In finding the Defendant fully at fault for the crash Mr. Justice McKinnon provided the following reasons:

[15]         In my view, Mr. Jacobsen was not a credible witness. He argued with plaintiff’s counsel, dismissed the plaintiff’s expert opinion about the Kia’s woeful lack of winter readiness, and generally set himself up as an expert northern driver fully alert and ready for winter conditions.

[16]         It was somewhat telling that even the defendant’s expert engineer was critical of the defendant’s position that “all weather tires” were perfectly adequate for northern winter driving.

[17]         The defendant testified that he drove at a constant speed of 75 KPH, which clearly was too fast, given the state of his vehicle, particularly the condition of his tires. Before the collision at issue in this case, the defendant’s vehicle began to slide as it rounded the curve referred to earlier and it ended up in the snow bank off the northbound lane. A passing motorist stopped to assist and pulled him out, leaving the Kia facing southbound in the northbound lane. According to Mr. Jacobsen he was “at most a foot away from the snow bank”.

[18]         Unfortunately, the wheel wells were packed with snow and thus the Kia could not be steered. The defendant had no shovel and so was reduced to chipping away at the wheel wells with a snow scraper to free up the steering. Although his vehicle was equipped with four way flashers he did not turn these on but did have his head lights on.

[19]         He said that as he was close to completing this task, he heard a flashing or skipping noise, turned to his left and saw a silver pickup sliding toward him. He said he turned and leaped into the ditch, never taking any strides.

[20]         Mr. Jacobsen denied ever admitting to either Mr. Landolt or Mr. Hart that the collision was his fault, indeed he capped that denial by asserting that “I was parked, it wasn’t my fault”. As stated earlier in this judgment, I did not find Mr. Jacobsen to be a credible witness. I found that the plaintiff and Mr. Landolt were credible and prefer their evidence over that of the defendant Jacobsen…

[35]         Mr. Jacobsen had his Kia parked in the northbound lane facing southbound. It is not entirely clear just how much of the Kia was in the northbound lane but it was to a substantial degree such that a northbound driver like Mr. Hart could conclude he was facing an immediate hazard.

[36]         The defendant was not just momentarily parked in this hazardous position but remained there for some 15 minutes, all the while scraping away at the wheel wells with a tool not designed for such work. Thus we have a vehicle, substantially in the northbound lane with a pedestrian walking around it posing an additional hazard to northbound traffic. The Kia’s head lights were on but the hazard lights were not. Given the curve and hump, the true nature of the hazard would not be readily apparent to the driver of a northbound vehicle until he rounded the curve and was so close to the parked vehicle that a collision was inevitable…

[41]         The two experts both agree that Mr. Jacobsen ought not to have been driving on “all season” tires which they testified were completely inappropriate for northern driving.

[42]         In my view, Mr. Hart was faced with the “agony of collision” doctrine. Given the curve and hump that obscured any clear view of just where the Kia was, he could not appreciate just what hazard was facing him. By the time he was able to see that the Kia was in fact parked substantially in his northbound lane there was almost no time to react. He cannot be faulted for opting to brake as opposed to some other manoeuvre: see Soto v. Peel, 2013 BCSC 409; Ayers v. Singh (1997), 85 B.C.A.C. 307, 69 A.C.W.S. (3d) 207; and Brook v. Tod Estate, 2012 BCSC 1947.

[43]         I also accept that Mr. Jacobsen had a duty to warn oncoming motorists of the hazard he had created by at least operating his four way flashers. The better course would have been to flag the curve with emergency reflectors but he had no such equipment: see Skinner v. Fu, 2010 BCCA 321.

 


“Uncertainty” About Payment of ICBC Benefits Undermines Defendant’s s. 83 Application

June 10th, 2013

I have previously discussed Part 7 benefits deductions following BC motor vehicle collision injury trials.  In short, a Plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced by the Part 7 benefits (past and future) that they are entitled to.

Reasons for judgement were recently released by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing this deduction finding that if there was uncertainty as to whether Part 7 payments will be made there should be no deduction of damages.

In the recent case (Tsang v. Borg) the Plaintiff had damages for future care of $5,000 assessed at trial.  The Defendant asked the Court to largely discount this award pursuant to s. 83 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act on the basis that many of the Plaintiff’s future treatments will covered by ICBC under the no fault benefits plan.  Mr. Justice McKinnon noted this argument was “inconsistent” with the Defendant’s trial position and in any event the evidence required for the deduction fell short of the mark.  In dismissing the application the Court provided the following reasons:

[9]             At trial the defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s injuries for the most part were not caused by the accident. In Paskall v. Schelthauer, 2012 BCSC 1859, the court held that the regulations limit the benefits to injuries that the corporation views flow from the accident. It strikes me as inconsistent for the defendants to now argue that the plaintiff is entitled to benefits payable under part 7 and more to the point, raises the distinct possibility that in future, the corporation will deny claimed benefits as “not flowing from the accident”.

[10]         In her affidavit, Shelley Ruggles, the insurance adjuster assigned to administer the plaintiff’s entitlement, indicates some uncertainty about whether future treatments are recoverable. She writes, “Further requests for treatment could be covered under s. 88 of the Regulations”. This suggests some uncertainty.

[11]         It is only where there is no uncertainty as to whether the insurer will accept the treatment and pay the cost that deductions can be made, see Ayles (Guardian ad litem of) v. Talastasin, 2000 BCCA 87. At bar there is no such certainty and I therefore resolve the issue in favor of the plaintiff.

[12]         The award of $5,000 stands.


Cyclist Assessed 30% Fault For Passing Slow Moving Vehicle on the Right

May 16th, 2012

(Update July 8, 2014 – the below decision was overturned on Appeal with the BC Court of Appeal finding there was no evidence to prove negligence on the motorists part)

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dealing with the issue of fault following a collision caused by an unidentified motorist.

In last week’s case (Orminston v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 cycling collision. As he proceeded down hill a vehicle ahead of him in his lane of travel “was almost stopped at the centre line”. The Plaintiff had room on the right side of the vehicle and attempted to pass. As the Plaintiff did so the motorist veered to the right causing the Plaintiff to lose control.

The motorist left the scene and remained unidentified. The Plaintiff sued ICBC pursuant to section 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. ICBC admitted that the collision occurred and involved an unidentified motorist, however, ICBC argued the Plaintiff was fully responsible.

Ultimately Mr. Justice McKinnon found both parties at fault. In assessing 30% of the blame to the Plaintiff the Court provided the following comments:

[26]Section 158(1) limits the ability of a “motorist” to pass on the right. It is permissible only in three specific instances, none of which existed at bar. Even when permitted, the move cannot be made if it would be “unsafe” to do so and if the movement caused the vehicle to “drive off the roadway”. “Roadway” is defined in section 119(1) and does not include the shoulder. Section 158(2) stipulates that a motorist must not overtake or pass if the movement cannot be made safely, or if it involves driving off the roadway. The latter, says defence, makes it clear that the plaintiff was not entitled to use the shoulder, at any point, or for any purpose, in attempting to pass. ..

[36]This unidentified vehicle was not near any intersection nor any roadway that might lead a cyclist to believe there was a possibility of a turn into his line of travel. It was descending a steep hill but for unknown reasons came to almost a complete stop at the centre of the road. In my view the facts at bar are not at all similar to those cited in Janzen

[41]I accept that this unidentified driver was almost stopped at the centre line when he/she made a sudden veering motion that took the vehicle over the fog line onto the shoulder. Such an action, at the very least, constitutes driving without reasonable consideration for others. Clearly Mr. Ormiston also bears some responsibility for this collision, given the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act to which I have referred. It remains to ascertain the extent to which each is liable.

[42]In Salaam v. Abramovic, 2010 BCCA 212, the British Columbia Court of Appeal offered the following comment about assessing statutory obligations in respect to liability:

[18] While the statutory provisions provide guidelines for assessing fault in motor vehicle accident cases, they do not, alone, provide a complete legal framework

[21] …In the end, a court must determine whether, and to what extent, each of the players in an accident met their common law duties of care to other users of the road. In making that determination, a court will be informed by the rules of the road, but those rules do not eliminate the need to consider the reasonableness of the actions of the parties. This is both because the rules of the road cannot comprehensively cover all possible scenarios, and because users of the road are expected to exercise reasonable care, even when others have failed to respect their right of way. While s. 175 of the Motor Vehicle Act and other rules of the road are important in determining whether the standard of care was met, they are not the exclusive measures of that standard.

[43]In Shinkaruk v. Crouch, 2011 BCSC 1762, Saunders J. followed these general statements of principle, noting:

[18] A breach of the Motor Vehicle Act is not in itself determinative of liability; all of the surrounding circumstances may be taken into account.

[44]In my respectful view, given the provisions of the Negligence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 333 and the facts that I have found, the defendants bear the greater liability. I find them 70% responsible for the losses claimed. The plaintiff will be assessed 30%.


ICBC's LVI Defence Rejected Yet Again

October 26th, 2011

I’ve written about this topic too many times to give a lengthy introduction other than to say it is clear that the “Low Velocity Impact” Defence is not a legal principle.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, yet again demonstrating this.

In today’s case (Cariglino v. Okuda) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  She was a passenger in a vehicle that was rear-ended.  Fault was admitted.  She suffered various soft tissue injuries.  The vehicle sustained $724 in damage and the Defendant advanced the classic LVI defence arguing that this little damage “indicates the relatively minor nature of the collision and the likelihood that the complaints of injury and loss made by the plaintiff are either not related to this collision or are embellished.”.

Mr. Justice McKinnon rejected this argument and in doing so provided the following comments:

[33] No medical opinions were proffered by the defence, rather defence submitted that the plaintiff’s evidence is “unreliable” as she downplays the role of significant family stressors in her life, fixating on the collision as the sole cause of all of her problems, both before and after the collision. Curiously, defence accepts that the plaintiff is credible but not reliable. That seems to me to be a distinction without a difference.

[34] I found the plaintiff to be generally credible and, for the most part, a reliable historian. Certainly she had stresses in her life that created difficulties but she was able to manage these much more easily before the collision. A defendant takes a plaintiff as he finds her. Here the defendant has caused injury to the plaintiff who was in a somewhat fragile state, given her many family issues.

[35] The defendant contends that the very minor nature of the collision would render “improbable” the nature and extent of the injuries the plaintiff contends she suffers. I was not provided with opinion evidence to support that contention and thus am unable to accept the bald proposition that minor damage equals minor injury.

The Court accepted that the Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries which largely improved in the first year following the crash and with further therapy should fully recover.  Non-Pecuniary damages were assessed at $35,000.


Massage Therapy and ICBC Part 7 Medical Benefits

January 4th, 2010

(UPDATE: November 29, 2011 – the below case was upheld today by the BC Court of Appeal.  Reasons can be found here)

Reasons for judgement were released recently by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the scope of ICBC’s obligations under Part 7 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation.  These benefits are commonly referred to as Part 7 Benefits (Click here for some background on these).

In today’s case (Raguin v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was insured with ICBC and incurred several hundred dollars in massage therapy expenses.  ICBC refused to pay for these and the Plaintiff sued.

At trial ICBC’s lawyer argued that “Massage therapy is not a ‘treatment’ contemplated under section 88 of the regulations“.

Mr. Justice McKinnon disagreed with ICBC’s position and called it ‘without merit‘.  The court went on to hold that “Section 88 is not a section that restricts Section 7 benefits to a prescribed list of treatments.  Rather it is a general section that simply sets out an obligation to provide treatments that are recommended by a physician.  The treatments that are set out in section 88 are merely a general list subject to expansion, as indeed various cases that have been cited have expanded…The doctor ‘recommended’ massage therapy, which in my view is sufficient to trigger an obligation to pay.”

Unless this case is overturned on appeal it is beneficial for BC Injury Victims to have clarity that Part 7 of the Regulations covers massage therapy expenses even though these are not specifically mentioned in the regulation.