ICBC Law

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a Plaintiff to provide particulars of claimed special damages.

In this week’s case (Amezcua v. Norlander) the Plaintiff was injured in two collisions.  The Defendants applied, at a Case Planning Conference, that the Plaintiff produce particulars of special damages.  In agreeing that this was an appropriate order Master Baker provided the following reasons:

[5] …In particular leading authorities on pleading confirm that it is appropriate to expect a party to plead details of special damages and, if they are not given, to demand particulars.  The author of Odgers On High Court Pleading and Practice cites, as an illustration, Hayward v. Pullinger & Partners Ltd.:

But when any special damage is claimed, without sufficient detail, particulars will be ordered of the alleged damage…

More recently and locally the authors of Conduct of Civil Litigation in British Columbia comment:

Special damages must explicitly be claimed and proved.

And further, in relation to past wage loss:

…but the weight of the authority treats these as special damages which therefore must be specifically pleaded; the defendant is also entitled to particulars.

I cite this latter quote not in respect of wage losses per se, but for the implicit assumption that a defendant is entitled to particulars of special damages.

[6] I cannot see, then, why a party should not be required to particularize his or her special damages to date.  The same, of course, cannot be said for general damages, but the defence is not asking for that.  The plaintiff will therefore give particulars of her special damages to date.

Last year I had the pleasure of being interviewed by the Georgia Straight with respect to ICBC’s obligation to fund massage therapy under their Part 7 Benefits plan.  This week I had a further interview with reporter Carlito Pablo addressing the BC Government’s Bill 52 which seeks to overhaul BC’s traffic ticketing dispute system.  You can view his article here.

For those of you visiting this site looking for further information on this topic you can click here to read my previous article where I share my concerns of the Government proposal which strips your right to a meaningful hearing when disputing a traffic violation “notice” and the increased insurance premiums that can accompany conviction.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, dealing with the issue of fault following a collision caused by an unidentified motorist.

In last week’s case (Orminston v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 cycling collision. As he proceeded down hill a vehicle ahead of him in his lane of travel “was almost stopped at the centre line”. The Plaintiff had room on the right side of the vehicle and attempted to pass. As the Plaintiff did so the motorist veered to the right causing the Plaintiff to lose control.

The motorist left the scene and remained unidentified. The Plaintiff sued ICBC pursuant to section 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. ICBC admitted that the collision occurred and involved an unidentified motorist, however, ICBC argued the Plaintiff was fully responsible.

Ultimately Mr. Justice McKinnon found both parties at fault. In assessing 30% of the blame to the Plaintiff the Court provided the following comments:

[26] Section 158(1) limits the ability of a “motorist” to pass on the right. It is permissible only in three specific instances, none of which existed at bar. Even when permitted, the move cannot be made if it would be “unsafe” to do so and if the movement caused the vehicle to “drive off the roadway”. “Roadway” is defined in section 119(1) and does not include the shoulder. Section 158(2) stipulates that a motorist must not overtake or pass if the movement cannot be made safely, or if it involves driving off the roadway. The latter, says defence, makes it clear that the plaintiff was not entitled to use the shoulder, at any point, or for any purpose, in attempting to pass. ..

[36] This unidentified vehicle was not near any intersection nor any roadway that might lead a cyclist to believe there was a possibility of a turn into his line of travel. It was descending a steep hill but for unknown reasons came to almost a complete stop at the centre of the road. In my view the facts at bar are not at all similar to those cited in Janzen…

[41] I accept that this unidentified driver was almost stopped at the centre line when he/she made a sudden veering motion that took the vehicle over the fog line onto the shoulder. Such an action, at the very least, constitutes driving without reasonable consideration for others. Clearly Mr. Ormiston also bears some responsibility for this collision, given the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act to which I have referred. It remains to ascertain the extent to which each is liable.

[42] In Salaam v. Abramovic, 2010 BCCA 212, the British Columbia Court of Appeal offered the following comment about assessing statutory obligations in respect to liability:

[18] While the statutory provisions provide guidelines for assessing fault in motor vehicle accident cases, they do not, alone, provide a complete legal framework

[21] …In the end, a court must determine whether, and to what extent, each of the players in an accident met their common law duties of care to other users of the road. In making that determination, a court will be informed by the rules of the road, but those rules do not eliminate the need to consider the reasonableness of the actions of the parties. This is both because the rules of the road cannot comprehensively cover all possible scenarios, and because users of the road are expected to exercise reasonable care, even when others have failed to respect their right of way. While s. 175 of the Motor Vehicle Act and other rules of the road are important in determining whether the standard of care was met, they are not the exclusive measures of that standard.

[43] In Shinkaruk v. Crouch, 2011 BCSC 1762, Saunders J. followed these general statements of principle, noting:

[18] A breach of the Motor Vehicle Act is not in itself determinative of liability; all of the surrounding circumstances may be taken into account.

[44] In my respectful view, given the provisions of the Negligence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 333 and the facts that I have found, the defendants bear the greater liability. I find them 70% responsible for the losses claimed. The plaintiff will be assessed 30%.

For those of you visiting this site after reading Mr. Mulgrew’s article published in today’s Vancvouer Sun, welcome.

If you are looking for more information on my comments on Bills 44, 52 and the BC Government’s Justice Reform Initiative you can find my previous articles here and here and here.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for various soft tissue injuries and a labral tear caused by a motor vehicle collision.

In this week’s case (Foster v. Kindlan and Pineau) the Plaintiff claimed damages from two motor vehicle collisions, the first in 2007, the second in 2009.  Fault was not at issue in either claim.  These collisions caused various soft tissue injuries and a labral tear which continued to pose difficulties for the plaintiff at the time of trial and were expected to continue into the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Mr. Justice Savage provided the following reasons:

[64] In this case the Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries to the neck, back, knee, and shoulder and a labral tear to her left hip.  Prior to the 2007 Accidents she led a physically demanding lifestyle working as a fitness instructor, and had a high level of physical fitness.  She was, however, transitioning out of this employment at the time of the 2007 Accident, by training for career as an LPN that would not involve fitness as part of her daily employment activity.

[65] Ms. Foster was not entirely asymptomatic from her 2005 Accident at the time of the 2007 Accident.  It is also apparent that she has had ongoing back issues that required periodic chiropractic treatment unrelated to the 2007 Accident and 2009 Accident.  She also had an earlier knee injury that required surgery.  These factors affect the “original position” to which Ms. Foster must be returned by the award of damages.

[66] I find it unlikely that Ms. Foster will have surgery to the labral tear, based on the opinions of Dr. O’Connor and Dr. Gilbart, whose opinions are to be preferred over that of Dr. Sam.  Dr. O’Connor and Dr. Gilbart have more specialized experience in this area than Dr. Sam, who is a general family physician.  While Ms. Foster experiences pain during her physically demanding employment activities, she is able to take extended (one week or longer) motorcycle trips without any impairment that is apparent to her companions.  The videotape evidence shows a cautious rider but not one prevented from enjoying this pursuit.

[67] Ms. Foster has suffered emotionally during periods where she has not been able to work.  However, her emotional state has not prevented her from taking foreign holidays and motorcycle trips to the Sunshine Coast, Tofino, the East Kootenays and Idaho, and local trips to Chilliwack, Harrison Hot Springs and the Tri-cities area.  Moreover, her emotional issues have had a variety of causes, including relationship issues which are admittedly unrelated to the two accidents.

[68] I have reviewed the cases provided by counsel.  There are aspects of those cases that are helpful, but there are also differences that prevent direct application.  The Defendants’ cases generally involve less seriously injured persons.  Many of the cases submitted by the Plaintiff involve a prognosis for chronic daily pain.  That is not the prognosis for Ms. Foster.  In the circumstances, I award $75,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

While ICBC can deduct Canada Pension Plan disability benefits from an UMP Claim, can the same be done for additional “Children’s Benefits” paid by the CPP?   Arbitrator Yule addressed this question in an UMP Arbitration Decision that was recently provided to me.  In short Arbitrator Yule held that Children’s Benefits are non-deductible.

In the unpublished decision (H v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was awarded damages following a jury trial.  The Plaintiff applied for payment under his own UMP Coverage as the at-fault motorist was underinsured.  While the parties largely agreed on the deductibility of past CPP benefits from ICBC’s payment obligations, they could not agree on whether the additional CPP funds the Plaintiff received as “Children’s Benefits” were deductible.  In finding that they were not Arbitrator Yule provided the following reasons:

37.  In one sense it may well be thought that it must be a “benefit” to the Claimant to receive money (which must be paid to him in these circumstances) under a statutory scheme (the CPP) which imposes no constraint on his use of the monies.  On the other hand, it seems to me the underlying rationale for the payment of the disabled cobtributor’s child’s benefit is the expectation that the money will be used by the recipient in a general way in the partial discharge of the recipient’s legal duty to support and maintain the children who are entitled to the benefits.  In this sense, I think the benefit or right is that of the child and not of the parent or custodial person.  It is significant that the benefits payable under Division A of Part II of the CPP, one is described as “a disability pension” (what the Claimant receives on account of his own disability) and another - the benefit at issue - is described as “a disabled contributor’s child’s benefit” [emphasis added].  It is difficult to transform what the statutory CPP scheme describes as “a child’s benefit” into the parent’s/custodial person’s benefit for the purpose of s. 148.1(1)(i).  At least here where the monies are payable under another statutory scheme, I think “benefit: or “right” in s. (f.2) should be guided by the description of the benefitin the statory scheme, and where the statutory scheme itself defines the benefit as the child’s beneift, it shoudl be considered to be the child’s benefit.  This interpretation also  maintains consistency with the construction of ss. (f.2) where I have concluded that the entitlement to the child’s benefit is that of the child.

38.  Accordingly I conclude that the children’s benefits paid to the Claimant are not deductible from his UMP Compensation.

Like many UMP Cases, This decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

One of the changes in the new BC Supreme Court Civil Rules is the requirement for parties to produce a list of witnesses in their trial brief to be exchanged 7 days prior to a Trial Management Conference.

In addition to this Rule 12-5(28) prohibits a party from calling a witness who was not listed “unless the court orders otherwise“.  The first reasons for judgement that I’m aware of addressing this subrule were recently shared with me.

In the unreported case (Topkins v. Bruce) the Defendant attempted to call an unlisted witness at trial.  Mr. Justice Curtis refused to allow the witness to testify providing the following reasons:

[4] …The new Rules say that you must give a list of your witnesses no later than 28 days before the trial, or the Trial Management Conference.  There is a Trial Management Brief, which happebd to be late filed; that is not a big deal, a late filing, but it just adds to the approach, I guess.  Although the defendant knew that Mr. Simm existed, the Trial Management Brief says “lay witness number one” and “lay witness number two”.  This not only does not conform with the Rules, but if permitted would deliberately frustrate them.

[5]  The purpose of knowing who the witnesses are is so that the other side can prepare their case, and the Judge, if they want, can order a statement concerning the witnesses, as well as estimate the proper lenght of trial.

[6]  At the Trial Management Conference, September 30th, a direction was given that the witness list will be provided at a subsequent date.  The name of the witness was not provided until after that date.  The explanation is taht the address for the witness was not discovered until later.

[7]  In the circumstances of this case, I am not prepared to allow Mr. Simm to testify, because one, I do not think his evidence is going to be particularly relevant in the circumstances of the case; two, his name was not disclosed, although it was known at the Trial Management Conference, and three, he name was not disclosed, although  known, on the date that the Trial Management Conference Judge had directed that his name be given.

To my knowledge this decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the issue of vicarious liability following an assault.

In this week’s case (Van Hartevelt v. Grewal) the Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with the Defendant R. Grewal.  While there were competing versions of what occurred Mr. Justice Savage found that this Defendant pummelled the Plaintiff “with his fists…sending him to the ground” then “kicked (the Plaintiff) forcefully in the ribs as he lay on the floor“.

The Defendant was found liable and ordered to pay over $65,000 in damages including punitive damages.

The Defendant was the son of the owners of the Rani Lynn Apartments which is where the altercation took place.  The Plaintiff was a tenant there.  The Plaintiff also sued the owners arguing they ought to be found vicariously liable for the assault.  Mr. Justice Savage agreed and found the owners jointly and severally liable (except for the punitive damage award).  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons illustrating that vicarious liability can flow beyond a formal employer/employee relationship:

[52] I accept Mr. G. Grewal’s evidence that he did not charge family members rent while they were living at the Randi Lynn.  However, he did not charge rent to Mr. R. Grewal, and at other times other relatives living at the Randi Lynn on the expectation that they would perform services for him at the apartment…

[54] …As a family member receiving free rent Mr. R. Grewal was beholden to the Second Named Defendants and was expected to do their bidding at the Randi Lynn…

[64] While it is true that independent contractors will not generally attract such liability and that employees generally will, it is not the case that the employer/employee relationship is the only one that can attract vicarious liability…

[65] Therefore, the main considerations in the present case are whether the relationship was sufficiently close to justify the imposition of liability, whether the tort was sufficiently connected to the assigned tasks of the tortfeasor to be regarded as the materialization of the risks created by the enterprise, and whether the imposition of liability would satisfy the policy goals outlined in Bazley.  I answer all of these questions in the affirmative.

[66] The reason that employers are often found to be vicariously liable whereas those hiring independent contractors are not is that in the former case, the employer has created the risk and is in the best position to mitigate it.  Thus, it is both efficient and fair to impose vicarious liability.  In the present case, although it was not a typical employment relationship, the Second Named Defendants created the risk associated with Mr. R. Grewal, were or should have been aware of the risk, and were in the best position to mitigate this risk.

[67] The Second Named Defendants were aware of the violent history of Mr. R. Grewal and were aware of the recent confrontation between Mr. R. Grewal and Mr. Van Hartevelt; a confrontation that arose in the context of  Mr. R. Grewal’s role as an on-site owner representative.  As such, the risk of violent confrontations initiated by Mr. R. Grewal was caused by the enterprise of the Second Named Defendants and they were in a unique position to mitigate this risk.  They were specifically made aware of the risk by Mr. Van Hartevelt’s letter of July 12, 2006.  The fact that the Second Named Defendants did not take steps to mitigate the risk renders them blameworthy.

[68] There is also the assertion, albeit made by Mrs. R. Grewal, that the ‘owners’ of the building were entitled to enter Mr. Hartevelt’s suite.   This was made in the presence of Mr. R. Grewal.   Mr. R. Grewal, rather than correcting this misapprehension, schooled as he was in tenancy matters, remained and the events followed.

[69] In my opinion there is a sufficiently close relationship to justify the imposition of vicarious liability in this case.

As previously noted, BC’s Government and Judiciary are involved in a public row with the Government accusing the Courts of being inefficient and the Judiciary responding with complaints of underfunding.  Additionally these two branches of Government are involved in litigation with the BC Court of Appeal recently upholding an order forcing the Government to produce otherwise confidential Cabinet submissions in a salary dispute with the BC Provincial Court.

Enter Bill 44.  This legislation, which just passed first reading, seeks to create “Civil Resolution Tribunals” which will run side by side with BC Courts.  Their jurisdiction is anticipated to be ever-expanding by simple Order in Council with the ability of the Government to include anything that “could be dealt with by a Claim in Provincial Court under the Small Claims Act”.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this scheme is set out in Section 20 which holds that, except in very limited circumstances, parties must “represent themselves“.  It does not take much imagination to understand that stripping people of the right to a lawyer provides a great advantage to institutional litigants.

The Government sets out that this legislation is designed to create “accessible, speedy, economical, informal, and flexible” dispute resolution.  Although these goals are laudable, on scrutiny the Government does not appear to put its money where its mouth is with Section 9 specifically exempting claims against the Government from the jurisdiction of these tribunals.

As Vaughn Palmer points out, this Bill is included in a “loaded up” legislative agenda making full scrutiny difficult with limited time.  Legislation taking disputes away from the judiciary and further stripping people of the right to representation deserves public scrutiny.  I imagine BC’s Provincial Court judges will have strong opinions on the matter as well.  Whether these are voiced remains to be seen.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the admission of evidence relating to diminished earning capacity in which the Court highlights the ability of lost opportunities being proven through factual, as opposed to opinion, evidence.

In this week’s case (Fabretti v. Singh) Plaintiff was employed as a Regional Vice President at an independent financial services organization.  The Plaintiff was injured in a collision and advanced a claim for diminished earning capacity.

In the course of the claim the Plaintiff obtained a report from his employer’s National Sales Director who provided evidence with respect to the Plaintiff’s employment opportunities.  The Defendant objected to the admissibility of this report for a number of reasons.  Mr. Justice Savage ultimately held that the report was not admissible as it was not written by a ‘properly qualified expert‘.

The Court noted, however, that much of the evidence could likely be admitted simply as a matter of fact (as opposed to opinion).  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[19] In this case, the subject matter of Mr. Andruschak’s Report is the plaintiff’s future earning capacity. However, Mr. Andruschak’s experience is properly viewed as concerning the earning possibilities for RVPs at Primerica generally; his experience is not in preparing objective reports on how such earning possibilities might manifest themselves in specific individual into the future.

[20] Thus, while having firsthand knowledge and experience in RVPs’ earning potential at Primerica, based on their actual earnings, which is information that may be useful to the Court, Mr. Andruschak does not offer particular expertise in the subject matter of the Report, purporting to prepare an objective estimate of future income and thus income loss for a specific person. As such, on the basis that Mr. Andruschak does not qualify as an expert, the Report cannot be admitted on that basis.

[21] Given my findings regarding Mr. Andruschak’s qualifications as an expert, it is unnecessary for me to canvass the defendant’s arguments regarding the Report’s formal compliance with the Rules. As I have said, however, much of the information in the report is potentially relevant and germane. I will leave it to counsel to review and discuss that matter amongst themselves. If required I will make further rulings on the proposed evidence. It may be that Mr. Andruschak’s evidence would be better presented simply viva voce with the assistance of a few graphs or charts.