ICBC Law

BC Injury Law and ICBC Claims Blog

Erik MagrakenThis Blog is authored by British Columbia ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken. Erik is a partner with the British Columbia personal injury law-firm MacIsaac & Company. He restricts his practice exclusively to plaintiff-only personal injury claims with a particular emphasis on ICBC injury claims involving orthopaedic injuries and complex soft tissue injuries. Please visit often for the latest developments in matters concerning BC personal injury claims and ICBC claims

Erik Magraken does not work for and is not affiliated in any way with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC). Please note that this blog is for information only and is not claim-specific legal advice.  Erik can only provide legal advice to clients. Please click here to arrange a free consultation.

Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

BC Court of Appeal – “Segregated” Non-Pecuniary Awards Should be Avoided

October 1st, 2018

Several years ago it was more common to see BC courts awarding damages for ‘diminished housekeeping capacity‘ as a stand alone head of damage in injury litigation.  More recently the common practice is for courts to roll these in to the general damages awarded for non-pecuniary loss without a stand alone analysis.  Last week the BC Court of Appeal published reasons indicating the latter is the preferred practice.

In the recent case (Riley v. Ritsco) the Plaintiff was injured in a vehicle collision and sued for damages.  At trial non-pecuniary damages of $65,000 were assessed.  The Plaintiff successfully appealed and in doing so the BC Court of Appeal increased this head of damage to $85,000.  The Plaintiff also argued that the judge erred in not assessing damages for loss of housekeeping capacity as a stand alone head of damage.  In finding no error occured here the BC Court of Appeal provided the following guidance:

[101]     It is now well-established that where a plaintiff’s injuries lead to a requirement that they pay for housekeeping services, or where the services are routinely performed for them gratuitously by family members or friends, a pecuniary award is appropriate. Where the situation does not meet the requirements for a pecuniary award, a judge may take the incapacity into account in assessing the award for non‑pecuniary damages.

[102]     I acknowledge what was said in Kroeker about segregated non-pecuniary awards “where the special facts of a case” warrant them. In my view, however, segregated non-pecuniary awards should be avoided in the absence of special circumstances. There is no reason to slice up a general damages award into individual components addressed to particular aspects of a plaintiff’s lifestyle. While such an award might give an illusion of precision, or suggest that the court has been fastidious in searching out heads of damages, it serves no real purpose. An assessment of non-pecuniary damages involves a global assessment of the pain and suffering, loss of amenities, and loss of enjoyment of life suffered by a plaintiff. By its nature, it is a rough assessment and not a mathematical exercise.

[103]     The $85,000 figure that I have proposed for non-pecuniary loss takes into account all of the general damages the plaintiff has suffered and will suffer. It should not be augmented by a segregated award for loss of housekeeping capacity.


ICBC Vehicle Theft Claim Denied With Help of Damaging Cell Phone Records

September 25th, 2018

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, dismissing a lawsuit seeking insurance coverage for vehicle theft.

In the recent case (Winterbottom v. ICBC) the Plaintiff owned a Ford F150 which he reported stolen.  It was located a few days later in a remote location and was destroyed by fire.

ICBC denied coverage to the Plaintiff and he sued.  In dismissing the lawsuit the Court noted that cell phone records placed the Plaintiff in the vicinity where the truck was ultimately recovered.  Mr. Justice Blok provided the following reasons highlighting the utility of these records in dismissing the claim:

[113]     Cell phone calls involving Mr. Winterbottom’s phone were the central focus of the case.  At the risk of repetition, I summarize these as follows:

a)    Six calls (three incoming, three outgoing) made between 6:08 pm and 7:21 pm, all of which utilized a cell phone tower located at Ross Road, west of Abbotsford.  This suggests that Mr. Winterbottom’s phone was located south of the Fraser River, and not at his residence, which is where he said he was located at the time;

b)    Two incoming calls, both from Mr. Waardenburg’s phone, made at 9:32 pm and 9:48 pm, which utilized a north-side Sumas Mountain cell phone tower that serviced the very area where the burned-out Truck was found;

c)     An outgoing call to “Todd” at 9:49 pm, which involved a hand-off from the north-side Sumas Mountain tower to a tower located near the Mission Bridge, indicating a movement of the cell phone from east to west.  This would be consistent, for example, with the movement of the phone along Lougheed Highway on the north side of the Fraser River;

d)    Nine calls made between 10:01 pm on October 21 and 12:25 am on October 22, which utilized a cell tower site west of Mission, a location consistent with Mr. Winterbottom being located either at the Mission Springs pub or at his home;

e)    One call to Mr. Nygaard-Peterson made at 12:25 am on October 22 that involved a hand-off from the west Mission cell phone tower to an Abbotsford-area cell phone tower, indicating southbound movement of the phone, plus a second call at 12:46 am that utilized the second tower only.  These calls suggest Mr. Winterbottom was not located at his home or at the pub; and

f)      Three calls made in the morning of October 22, beginning at 8:39 am.  The first call involved a hand-off between two Abbotsford-area cell towers, indicating either movement of the phone or a call made in an overlap area.  The second call utilized the Ross Road cell tower west of Abbotsford.  A third call utilized the Ross Road tower and then handed the call off to a cell tower near Sumas Mountain, thus indicating a west to east movement of the cell phone.  In all cases, the calls are not consistent with Mr. Winterbottom being located at his home.

[114]     Neither Mr. Winterbottom nor Mr. Nygaard-Peterson had any explanation why they would have been phoning one another during the time they had said both of them were located at the Mission Spring pub, although Mr. Nygaard-Peterson speculated that he might have lost his phone or stepped outside.  Mr. Waardenburg had no recollection of the calls and had no idea why he would have been in phone contact with Mr. Winterbottom so often during the relevant time frame.  Both Mr. Winterbottom and Mr. Nygaard-Peterson denied being anywhere other than the Mission Springs pub or the Winterbottom home that night.

[115]     I conclude that the cell phone and cell tower evidence given by Mr. Funk is reasonably reliable and accurate.  His evidence was not undermined in cross-examination.  The plaintiff’s assertion that all cell towers utilized by Mr. Winterbottom’s cell phone were within their standard 35 km range in relation to the pub or the Winterbottom residence ignores Mr. Funk’s evidence that the 35 km figure is merely the licenced range and does not reflect the actual range or coverage.  Mr. Funk’s extensive field testing of actual coverages satisfies me that his evidence can be reasonably relied upon to determine general areas where a cell phone was located or where a cell phone was not located.  While there may be room for occasional aberrations due to topology or physical barriers, etc., for the large number of calls involved in this case to be inaccurate would mean that there would have to be aberrations in almost every instance.  I am satisfied from Mr. Funk’s evidence that this is unlikely in the extreme.

[116]     I agree with the observation of plaintiff’s counsel that the plaintiff appeared to give his evidence in a forthright manner.  So did his witnesses, although their evidence was generally to the effect that they were too drunk to remember much.  There were, however, problems with their evidence.  For example, there was no consistency between the plaintiff and his witnesses about how he got home from the pub.  I agree that those particular inconsistencies might be explained by extreme drunkenness, but the cell phone calls are not so easily explained away.  There is no explanation why the plaintiff and Mr. Nygaard-Peterson were phoning one another when, according to their evidence, they were both at the pub or, later, at the Winterbottom residence.  Mr. Winterbottom agreed he woke up at 10 am the next morning, but he could not explain how that testimony reconciled with the five cell phone calls made from his phone between 8:39 am and 9:43 am that morning other than to say he did not remember them.  Critically, his testimony about where he was located contradicted with the evidence of his cell phone location at various points that night and the next morning.  None of this evidence adds up.

[117]     The cell phone evidence is reliable and cogent, and it persuades me that Mr. Winterbottom was not where he said he was that night.  It also indicates that at one point in the evening Mr. Winterbottom’s cell phone utilized a cell tower that serviced the same rural area where the burned-out Truck was found.  Perhaps most importantly, the cell phone and cell tower evidence persuades me that Mr. Winterbottom’s evidence cannot be relied upon.

[118]      In a case such as this, the burden is first on the insured to show a loss falling within the scope of the insurance coverage, which here is theft.  The only evidence of theft comes from Mr. Winterbottom.  I conclude that there are so many difficulties with the evidence of Mr. Winterbottom, centred on the discrepancies between his testimony about where he was compared to the cell phone location evidence, that I cannot rely on his evidence to prove that a theft occurred.


BC Court of Appeal Discusses When Special Costs Against Lawyers Personally Should be Ordered

September 19th, 2018

In exceptional circumstances lawyers can be ordered to be personally on the hook for costs when litigation goes awry.  Today the BC Court of Appeal discussed when such orders are warranted and when they are not.

In today’s case (Nuttall v. Krekovich) the Plaintiff was seriously injured in a hit and run accident.  A lawsuit was started suing ICBC as a nominal defendant pursuant to s. 24 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act.  As the litigation progressed the Plaintiff’s lawyer came to believe that the Defendant may have been the driver and brought an application to add him to the lawsuit.  Shortly after obtaining this order the lawyer realized he was mistaken and discontinued the lawsuit against the Defendant.

The Defendant sought costs against the lawyer personally and the Chambers judge made such an order finding  the lawyers actions were “indefensible and an abuse of process meriting sanction in the form of an order of special costs payable by him personally”.

The lawyer successfully appealed the order with the BC Court of Appeal noting the chambers judge made several errors in ordering special costs against the lawyer.  In discussing the scope of special costs being ordered against a lawyer personally BC’s highest court provided the following reasons:

[25]         It is my view that the chambers judge made several errors that warrant intervention by this Court.

[26]         First, special costs have a punitive or deterrent element and are only appropriate where the conduct in issue is deserving of punishment or rebuke. This well-known principle stems from numerous cases, most recently enunciated in J.P. v. British Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2018 BCCA 325 at para. 28. The chambers judge erred in principle by failing to consider the cautious approach to an award of special costs against a lawyer personally, as well as the kind of reprehensible conduct that would justify such an award, mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 and more recently in Quebec (Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions) v. Jodoin, 2017 SCC 26.

[27]         In Young the court directed judges to be “extremely cautious” in awarding costs personally against lawyers given their duties to guard confidentiality of instructions and to bring forward with courage even unpopular causes:

… A lawyer should not be placed in a situation where his or her fear of an adverse order of costs may conflict with these fundamental duties or his or her calling.

[28]         In Jodoin, the court confirmed that the threshold for exercising the power to award costs against lawyers is high, such that there must be a finding of reprehensible conduct by the lawyer. Reprehensible conduct “represents a marked and unacceptable departure from the standard of reasonable conduct expected of a player in the judicial system” (at para. 27). Mr. Justice Gascon, for the majority, described the kind of conduct that would justify such an order at para. 29:

[29]      In my opinion, therefore, an award of costs against a lawyer personally can be justified only on an exceptional basis where the lawyer’s acts have seriously undermined the authority of the courts or seriously interfered with the administration of justice. This high threshold is met where a court has before it an unfounded, frivolous, dilatory or vexatious proceeding that denotes a serious abuse of the judicial system by the lawyer, or dishonest or malicious misconduct on his or her part, that is deliberate…

[29]         Consistent with these decisions, this Court has long held that such orders should be made only in “very special circumstances”, and not on the basis of mistake, error in judgment or even negligence: see Hannigan v. Ikon Office Solutions Inc. (1998), 61 B.C.L.R. (3d) 270 (C.A.); Pierce v. Baynham, 2015 BCCA 188 at para. 41.

[30]         Second, the chambers judge erred in concluding that Mr. Krekovic’s failure to disclose the entire circumstances of his investigation was in itself sufficient to justify an order for special costs. A special costs order is not justified only because counsel fails to disclose evidence that ultimately proves to be material or incorrect: see Pierce at para. 43. The chambers judge made no finding of dishonesty, accepting that Mr. Krekovic’s motivation to bring the application was “in pursuance of his duty to his client”. Given that, his failure to disclose more about his investigation does not constitute reprehensible conduct sufficient to justify an award of special costs. This is particularly so in the context of the evidence in the application that Mr. Krekovic clearly informed the court that his own investigation had not yielded any reliable information and he was relying only on information provided to him from another lawyer, the basis for which had not been disclosed.

[31]         Moreover, I cannot agree that disclosure of further information would necessarily have yielded a different outcome in the application. The chambers judge placed considerable importance on “the discrepancy between the date of birth that he had given for the Mr. Dhillon identified by Mr. Folick, and the date of birth of the Mr. Dhillon whom his investigation had previously identified as a potential defendant”. In fact, there was no discrepancy in the most recent date of birth provided by the investigator, Mr. Loncaric, and the date of birth later provided by Mr. Folick. The only discrepancy was with the earlier information Mr. Loncaric had given, which had not been confirmed. Had the application judge been informed of these or other details – such as the inconclusive information pointing to another Mr. Dhillon – the order may have nonetheless been granted. It is also important, in my view, that Mr. Dhillon did not attend himself to oppose the application. Instead, the application was opposed only by ICBC, who put the issue of the sufficiency of the information squarely before the court.

[32]         Additionally, Mr. Krekovic’s conduct after the order was granted demonstrates an effort to be prudent. He did not enter the order or serve the amended notice of civil claim without making further inquiries of Mr. Folick’s office about the reliability of the information, and as soon as he learned that the information was in fact incorrect, he advised Mr. Dhillon’s’ counsel that the action would be discontinued against him.

[33]         In my opinion, Mr. Krekovic’s conduct was far from being characterized as reprehensible.

[34]         Finally, the chambers judge referred to Rule 14-1(33) as allowing for an order for special costs. Rule 14-1(33) gives the court discretion to make various orders if it considers that a party’s lawyer “has caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause, or has caused costs to be wasted through delay, neglect or some other fault”. One of those orders is that the lawyer “be personally liable for all or part of any costs that his or her client has been ordered to pay to another party”.

[35]         This rule, which does not distinguish between party and party costs and special costs, has expanded the scope of conduct which might support a costs order against a lawyer. As explained in Nazmdeh v. Spraggs, 2010 BCCA 131, there is no requirement for “serious misconduct” to justify an order that a lawyer pay party and party costs, but it is still necessary to find reprehensible conduct on the part of the lawyer to justify an order for special costs. Moreover, the lower standard mandated by Rule 14-1(33) must also be exercised with restraint, as the Court reasoned at paras. 103‒104:

[103]    The power to make an order for costs against a lawyer personally is discretionary. As the plain meaning of the Rule and the case law indicate, the power can be exercised on the judge’s own volition, at the instigation of the client, or at the instigation of the opposing party. However, while the discretion is broad, it is, as it has always been, a power to be exercised with restraint. All cases are consistent in holding that the power, whatever its source, is to be used sparingly and only in rare or exceptional cases.

[104]    The restraint required in the exercise of the court’s discretion is not to be confused with the standard of conduct which may support its use. Care and restraint are called for because whether the unsuccessful party or his lawyer caused the costs to be wasted may not always be clear, and lawyer and client privilege is always deserving of a high degree of protection.

[36]         In conclusion, it is my view that Mr. Krekovic’s conduct in making the application to add Mr. Dhillon as a defendant did not approach the kind of reprehensible conduct required to justify an order for special costs against him as counsel.

[37]         I would allow the appeal and set aside the order of the chambers judge that Mr. Krekovic personally pay the special costs of Mr. Dhillon. I would also award costs to the appellant of this appeal and for the application for special costs in the court below.


BC Supreme Court Gives Scathing Reasons Rejecting ICBC Doctor as “Advocate”

August 17th, 2018

Adding to this site’s archived judgments of judicial criticism of expert witness ‘advocacy’, reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, holding a defence expert witness report as inadmissible due to advocacy.

In today’s case (Tathgur v. Dobson) the Plaintiff was injured in two separate vehicle collisions.  Fault was admitted for both by the Defendants.  In the course of the lawsuit the Defendants had the Plaintiff assessed by a physician who provided an opinion minimizing the Plaintiff’s injuries and their connection to the collisions.  In finding the opinion inadmissible and worth no weight Madam Justice Warren provided the following harsh reasons calling the doctor an “advocate” for the defence:

[93]         The question then is whether Dr. Grypma was in fact biased, impartial, or acting as an advocate for the defence.  If I find he was, he is clearly unwilling or unable to fulfill his duty, and his evidence is inadmissible as not meeting the threshold requirement of “qualified expert”.

[94]         Dr. Grypma included the certification required by Rule 11-2(2) in each of his reports, but that is not the end of the matter: see White at para. 48.  The concern is that notwithstanding the inclusion of this certification in his reports, Dr. Grypma assumed the role of advocate for the defence.  For the following reasons, I have determined that Dr. Grypma was acting as an advocate for the defence and, as a result, was not able and willing to provide fair, objective and non-partisan evidence.

[95]         As noted, Dr. Grypma’s opinions rested on five primary footings.  The second and third footings concerning Dr. Grypma’s rear-end accident theories are themselves opinions for which no foundation was expressed in the reports.  The failure to expressly note the foundation for those opinions would not, on its own, be sufficient to exclude the reports at the initial stage on grounds of bias or advocacy.  However, it became apparent that Dr. Grypma is not actually aware of an adequate foundation for these views.  When asked, in cross-examination, to explain the foundation for the opinion that a rear-end accident rarely causes injury to the lower back, Dr. Grypma testified that he had attended courses with others who agreed that an injury to the lower back is rare in a rear-end accident.  He did not say when he attended these courses.  He did not identify the entities or institutions that offered the courses or even their subject matters.  He did not identify who these others were who agreed with him.  He also said that he relied on the conclusions of two professors.  He did not say when those conclusions had been relayed to him or in what form, and he was able to name only one of these professors, having forgotten the name of the other.  He acknowledged not having referred to any scientific publication supportive of this opinion.

[96]         In the circumstances, it is not possible to evaluate the soundness Dr. Grypma’s rear-end accident theories or even determine whether they fall within the scope of his expertise.  More fundamentally, however, Dr. Grypma relied so heavily on opinions for which he had no proper foundation strongly suggests that he had taken up the role of advocate for the defence.  Any doubt about that was removed by Dr. Grypma’s response to being provided with a more complete set of Mr. Tathgur’s clinical records, which undermined another of the foundational footings for Dr. Grypma’s opinion.

[97]         It is not clear to me why Dr. Grypma did not have all of Mr. Tathgur’s medical records, including Dr. Manga’s clinical records and the 2009 MRI, before he wrote his first report in 2011.  It is apparent from his May 31, 2011 summary of the history provided by Mr. Tathgur that Dr. Grypma was aware that Mr. Tathgur had been treated by his family doctor, and that x-rays and an MRI had been performed.  In other words, he knew that relevant records existed.  While he is not required to conduct an investigation (Edmondson at para. 77) it would have been more helpful had he obtained access to these before offering an opinion, particularly before challenging the credibility of Mr. Tathgur’s complaints.

[98]         Nevertheless, irrespective of what Mr. Tathgur told Dr. Grypma about the initial onset of pain following the first accident, it is beyond dispute that Mr. Tathgur did report pain to Dr. Manga the day after the accident and, by the time Dr. Grypma wrote his August 21, 2015 report, he must have been aware of this.  Dr. Manga’s handwritten clinical records are not easy to read but the words “pain neck, low back” are legible in the clinical record for May 27, 2008, and there is also a hand-drawn sketch of Mr. Tathgur’s back with diagonal lines on it at the left side of the neck and the left low back, which is obviously intended to record the specific locations of reported symptoms.  In his August 21, 2015 report, Dr. Grypma complained that Dr. Manga’s records were not legible and he said he had to “go on Mr. Tathgur’s memory as [he found] the family physician’s records were not helpful”, yet he went on to specifically note that the family physician’s records indicated normal range of motion on May 27, 2008, the day after the first accident and the same day that the words “pain neck, low back” and the sketch appear.  He also referred to notations in the clinical records for September 5, 2009 and December 18, 2011 that support his theory, but made no mention of other references that did not support his theory, such as the references to spasm.

[99]         Again, Dr. Manga’s records are not easy to read.  It would have been understandable if Dr. Grypma had refused to comment on the clinical records at all unless they were transcribed.  However, he clearly could read some of the entries and he relied on those that were consistent with his previously stated views.  He cannot overcome the inescapable conclusion that he cherry-picked entries, ignoring those that undermined his opinion.

[100]     Similarly, in his December 3, 2015 report, he noted that the history given to Dr. Hershler concerning symptoms the day after the first accident was materially different from that which he said Mr. Tathgur gave him such that clarification was required, but then he went on to reiterate the same opinion (that significant injury from the first accident was unlikely) based largely on the fact that Mr. Tathgur experienced little or no pain after that accident.  Again, by this time he also had Dr. Manga’s clinical records, which clearly indicated complaints of pain on the day after the first accident.

[101]     For the foregoing reasons, I find that Dr. Grypma lost sight of his duty to the court and instead became an advocate for the defence.  His evidence is inadmissible as a result.  Even if I was not prepared to exclude the evidence, for the same reasons I would give it no weight.  Further and in any event, as discussed below, I accept Mr. Tathgur’s evidence that he did have significant pain the day after the first accident.  Leaving aside concerns of bias, partiality and lack of independence, this finding is incompatible with a key footing for Dr. Grypma’s core opinion and, for that reason alone, I would give his opinion no weight.


Inspire Sports Victoria Opens Doors to BC’s Biggest Gymnastics Facility

August 6th, 2018

Inspire Sports Victoria Logo

Apologies for this off-topic post but I am proud to announce that a project I have been involved with has reached completion.

Inspire Sports Victoria, BC’s largest and newest gymnastics facility, has opened its doors in Greater Victoria!  We had a great open house this weekend.  Thank you to everyone who came by!

We couldn’t be prouder of our team for their efforts in hosting an amazing open house or more grateful to everyone from greater Victoria who took the time to come through our doors!

With the open house complete our final flooring will be installed and final equipment assembled in the coming days.  Thank you everyone who helped make the dream of bringing a world class recreational and competitive gymnastics facility to Victoria a reality!  See you all at the gym this week!

I want to thank Cleve Dheensaw of the Victoria Times Colonist for this excellent article announcing our opening.

Inspire Sports Victoria caters to physical literacy for all, from entry level recreational classes to competitive training for elite athletes.

Our website can be found here and you can also follow us on Facebook and Instagram!

 


$85,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Chronic Tinnitus

August 2nd, 2018

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for chronic tinnitus caused by a motor vehicle collision.

In today’s case (Christensen v. Jand) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2013 collision.  The Defendant denied liability but was found 100% liable at trial.  THe crash caused soft tissue injuries that largely recovered and also tinnitus which had a poor prognosis for recovery.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $85,000 Madam Justice Forth provided the following reasons:

51]         Accordingly, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that as a result of the accident Mr. Christensen suffered soft tissue issues, which have largely resolved, except for some mild early morning stiffness, and tinnitus, for which he will continue to suffer on a permanent basis…

[65]         Mr. Christensen has suffered a permanent injury in the form of a ringing in his ears. There is a high unrelenting squeal in his right ear. This sound was reproduced by a computer and played during the trial. The sound was highly irritating and objectionable. Mr. Christensen testified that since the accident, he has been hearing the same sound. It is with him at all times and has impacted his personality, his outlook on life, his ability to sleep, his relationship with his children, and his occupation.

[66]         There is no treatment that can stop this noise. He has had to learn to accept it but thinks about it every day. This causes him anxiety.

[67]         He finds that loud noises bother him. He has become grumpier with his children.

[68]         In order to help him sleep, he drinks. He testified that he drinks two beers and a full glass of wine every night to help him sleep. He has concerns with this consumption since alcoholism has been an issue in his immediate family.

[69]         He is not a complainer and has returned to all of his past activities, except coaching soccer. There was approximately a four to six month period when he was not running. He has returned to running approximately the same distance as before.

[70]         He immediately returned to his scheduled work and has continued working.

[71]         His sister, oldest son, and his friend Darren Babey, testified to the change in his personality in that he was grumpier and less patient after the accident. His sister was most concerned in the initial two years, when she saw signs of depression, anger, and frustration. She testified to conversations during the initial two years when she had to “talk him off the ledge a little bit when he didn’t think he could beat this” and he once told her, “he’ll commit suicide with this”. Gradually her brother started to accept the “new norm”.

[72]         It is to Mr. Christensen’s credit that he has returned to work and his activities. He has continued to care for his sons as a single father. He has been able to learn to live with the constant noise and has adjusted to life with it.

[73]         I have reviewed the various cases provided, and in assessing the particular circumstances of Mr. Christensen, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damage is $85,000.


Defendant Not Justified in Punching Mouthy and “Belligerent” Plaintiff in the Face

June 29th, 2018

Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Supreme Court, Smithers Registry, demonstrating that punching someone in the face is rarely the legally acceptable solution to a problem.

In the recent case (Azak v. Chisholm) the Defendant was a contractor building a retaining wall on property neighbouring the Plaintiff’s.  A verbal confrontation between the Plaintiff and Defendant occurred with the court finding “the plaintiff confronted Chisholm about the Project in a belligerent manner that Chisholm did not like” and specifically with the Plaintiff calling the Defendant “a ‘f-ing asshole” and a “white piece of shit”.

The Defendant gave evidence as follows surrounding the altercation:

Chisholm told the plaintiff that “we are going to go to work and what are you going to do about it?”  The plaintiff responded by saying: “you’re going to find out right now” and that Chisholm was a “white piece of shit”.  Chisholm testified that he perceived this as a threat and he did not want to find out what the plaintiff had in mind.  Chisholm said “I’ve had enough”, jumped down from the retaining wall and hit the plaintiff in the face.

The punch resulted in a fractured cheek and nose that requires surgical correction.

The Plaintiff successfully sued for damages. In rejecting the Defendant’s claim of self defense and noting the burden on a defendant to successfully raise the defense Mr. Justice Weatherill provided the following reasons:

[70]         I find that, regardless of the harassment and insults the plaintiff had levied at Chisholm and regardless of how long the plaintiff’s difficult behaviour had been ongoing, Chisholm had no right or justification to do what he did.  I find that, whatever threat Chisholm perceived when he was first confronted by the plaintiff on the morning of July 2, 2013 had eased well before the Assault took place.  I do not accept that Chisholm was either afraid for his own safety or that of his co-workers.  Chisholm could easily have either removed himself from the property or had Nyce mediate the situation, as he had done many times previously.  Instead, I find that Chisholm simply and regrettably let his anger and frustration get the better of him.  

[71]         I find that Chisholm’s reaction was unreasonable and totally disproportionate to the circumstance he was in and I reject his claim that he acted in self-defence.  No reasonable person in Chisholm’s shoes would have felt physically threatened by what the plaintiff had said.

[72]         I find that the plaintiff has demonstrated, on the balance of probabilities, that Chisholm committed the tort of battery upon him, that Chisholm failed to demonstrate he was acting in self-defence and, therefore, Chisholm is liable to the plaintiff in damages.


BC Lions Streaker Alleges Brain Injury After Hit By Marcell Young – Quick Legal Breakdown

June 20th, 2018

Earlier this week a streaker thought it was a good idea to run onto the field during a CFL game.  Not taking too kindly to the unwanted interruption Marcell Young of the BC Lions took matters into his own hands and put an end to the streakers 15 seconds of fame.

The incident was captured by @Jadenfootball21 who published the hit via Twitter

 

 

The ‘fan’ has now hired a personal injury lawfirm and is alleging the incident caused brain injury.  The firm published a press release noting “Our client suffered serious injuries, including a mild traumatic brain injury, as a result of being violently struck by BC Lions player Marcell Young.  Our client has been released from the hospital and is now recovering at home.  His future prognosis remains unclear. ”  These allegations of injury have yet to be proven in Court.

So is there merit in this potential lawsuit?  While controversial, there can be.

The fan had no business being on the field.  Interrupting the game can bring a host of legal consequences for the fan.  However, security guards, players or anyone else looking to end the streaker’s ill-conceived fun must do so with a reasonable amount of force in the circumstances.  Exceeding this can bring damages under the tort of battery.

The law of battery is rather straightforward.  A Plaintiff simply needs to prove that the Defendant made intentional and unwanted contact with him and harm indeed occurred as a result of the contact.

From there a Defendant is free to raise defenses such as consent, provocation or self defense.  BC Courts have stated as follows when justifying battery via self defense:

Self defence imports the idea that the defendant is under attack at the hands of the plaintiff, or reasonably believes that he will be subject to such an attack, even if the plaintiff has neither the intention nor the power to make such an attack. Even if the circumstances entitle the defendant to claim he was acting in self defence, he cannot escape liability unless he discharges the burden of proving that the amount of force he used was reasonable in all the circumstances. This will depend on the court’s assessment of the situation, taking into account the form and nature of the plaintiffs attack on the defendant and the reasonableness of the response of the defendant.

And the following for provocation:

In order to amount to provocation, the conduct of the plaintiff must have been “such as to cause the defendant to lose his power of self-control and must have occurred at the time of or shortly before the assault.”  


$20,700 “Accelerated Depreciation” Claim Succeeds Following Vehicle Damage in Crash

June 5th, 2018

Reasons for judgement were published this week by the BC Provincial Court ordering a Defendant (insured by ICBC) to pay over $20,000 in vehicle depreciation after a crash.

In the recent case (Chiang v. Kunar) the Plaintiff purchased a Mercedes for just over $68,000.  The following year the Plaintiff was involved in a crash caused by the negligence of the Defendant.  The crash caused over $34,000 in repair costs leaving the vehicle far less valuable after repairs.  The Plaintiff sued to recover the value of this accelerated depreciation but ICBC argued that there was no loss.  In siding with the Plaintiff, who to his credit succeeded in litigation while self represented, The Honourable Judge K. Arthur-Leung provided the following reasons:

      I am satisfied that the Claimant has met the burden of proof, and that this low to mid-level luxury vehicle was indeed a customized vehicle that was in the high end of its own category of Mercedes Benz, and sustained accelerated depreciation.  The Bill of Sale shows thousands of dollars of extras that he ordered for this Vehicle.  It was a rare vehicle at the time that it was initially in the Vancouver market, and the experts both testified that it remains an in demand vehicle if it was not in an accident.

In addition, the decision of Rutter v. Adams, 2016 BCSC 554 (CanLII) at paragraph 314 relies upon Signorello v. Khan, 2010 BCSC 1448 (CanLII) to include quantification that “…such losses can include a ‘loss of use and the inconvenience of having to return the vehicle on several occasions’.”  In addition, in Cummings v. 565204 BC Ltd., 2009 BCSC 1009 (CanLII), the Court relied upon Reinders v. Wilkinson, 1994 CanLII 2527 (BC CA)1994 CanLII 2527 (BCCA) that it is not necessary for the party to sell the vehicle in order to succeed in a claim for accelerated depreciation.  The damage sustained to this Vehicle was not merely cosmetic and required significant repair, to wit it remains outstanding with ongoing operational and mechanical problems…

THEREFORE THIS COURT ORDERS JUDGMENT TO THE CLAIMANT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY AS FOLLOWS:

a)            The amount of $20,700.00, for accelerated depreciation of the Vehicle ($18,000.00 plus 15% tax);

b)            Interest on the sum of $20,700.00 as of February 26, 2015, in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act;

c)            The amount of $1,990.08 in general damages as claimed by the Claimant;

d)            Interest on the sum of $1,990.08 as of May 9, 2016, in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act;

e)            The amount of $472.50 for the cost of the Coast Auto Appraisal Report;

f)            Court attendance fees of Mr. Sparrow of Coast Auto Appraisal in the amount of $1,155.00;

g)            Court filing fees in the amount of $156.00; and

h)            Service fees in the amount of $30.00.


Victoria Soon to be Home to BC’s Biggest Gym!

May 30th, 2018

ISV

This post is a bit off topic but since most of my readers are British Columbians I thought this may be of interest.

I am proud to announce the launch of Inspire Sports Victoria!

Inspire Sports is an internationally affiliated organization that will be opening their first gym in Canada right in the heart of greater Victoria.  The gym will be the largest facility in all of BC!

With an emphasis on physical literacy for all, Inspire Sports Victoria is proudly registered with GymBC and will provide everything from entry level recreational classes to world class competitive training.

Our website has just been launched and can be found here.

You can also follow us on Facebook and Instagram.

If you live in the Greater Victoria area and are looking for a wonderful activity for you or your family please check us out!  Class registration will begin in June with our first full month of programs scheduled for August.  The full fall schedule should be out soon!