ICBC Law

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding a Plaintiff damages and costs for modest injuries following a motor vehicle collision.  Although the claim was straight-forward and damages were within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, the Plaintiff was awarded costs with Mr. Justice Burnyeat finding that the Supreme Court’s summary trial process is a reasonable alternative to the backlog litigants face in Small Claims Court.

In today’s case (Parmar v. Lahay) the Plaintiff sustained a modest whiplash injury as a result of motor vehicle collision.  ICBC ran the “Low Velocity Impact” defence arguing no compensation should be awarded.  The trial proceeded summarily and took less than one day.  The Plaintiff’s evidence was accepted and non-pecuniary damages of $12,000 were awarded.

The Court went on to award costs despite the modest quantum.  In doing so Mr. Justice Burnyeat provided the following reasons:

[9] I cannot reach the conclusion that the legal or factual complexity of the case, the need for discovery of documents and examination for discovery, and the need for a judgment enforceable outside of British Columbia are applicable reasons why this action was commenced in the Supreme Court of British Columbia rather than in Provincial Court.  However, I am satisfied that the summary trial procedure available in the Supreme Court and the availability of costs makes the Supreme Court a preferable and justified forum for this Action.

[10] I take judicial notice that this case reached the Court for decision much more quickly than if the Action had been commenced in the Provincial Court.  In this regard, I take judicial notice of the absence of a considerable number of judges at the Provincial Court level and the backlog in hearing matters that the failure to appoint more judges has produced.

[11] I also take into account the ability of the Plaintiff to have costs awarded in this Court but not in Small Claims Court.  In that that regard, I adopt the reasoning of Harvey J. in Zale v. Colwell, 2010 BCSC 1040, where he states:

In each of the above three decisions [Spencer v. Popham, supra; Faedo v. Dowell, 2007 BCSC 1985; and Kanani v. Misiurna, 2008 BCSC 1274] the primary reason for awarding the plaintiff costs, in circumstances not unlike these facing the plaintiff here, was the consideration that given the need to retain counsel to battle an institutional defendant, a reasonable consideration in determining the forum is the matter of indemnity for the costs of counsel.  (at para. 14)

[12] I also adopt the statement of Humphries J. in Kanani, supra:

… in a situation where the defendant put the plaintiff to the proof of having suffered any injury at all, thus making her credibility a crucial issue at trial, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to require the assistance of counsel.  She was therefore justified in commencing the action in Supreme Court where she could hope to recover some of the costs it was necessary for her to expend in retaining counsel to recover the compensation to which she was found to be entitled. This reasoning has application here as well. (at para. 8).

[13] I take into account that it may well be economically unrealistic for counsel to be retained for up to three appearances in Small Claims Court where the damages sought are nominal.  This must be contrasted with the institutional defendant and its unlimited resources.  In an action in Supreme Court, counsel for a plaintiff is only required to appear once in Court if an application pursuant to Rule 9‑7 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules is appropriate.  In the case at bar, the application has taken approximately one hour.

[14] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff should be entitled to his costs throughout on a Party and Party (Scale B) basis.

Reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for motor vehicle related injuries.

In yesterday’s case (Kardum v. Asadi-Moghadam) the Plaintiff was involved in 2 collisions.  He was not at fault for either.   The Plaintiff’s physicians provided evidence that he suffered from chronic soft tissue injuries as a result of these crashes.  ICBC’s expert (Dr. Grypma) provided evidence minimizing the Plaintiff’s injuries.  Mr. Justice Armstrong preferred the Plaintiff’s physicians and concluded that the collisions were responsible for the Plaintiff’s ongoing pain.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $70,000 the Court made the following findings:

[112] I conclude that Mr. Kardum suffered a chronic soft tissue injury to his neck, shoulder, and upper back region caused in the accidents of 2007 and 2009. In addition to those injuries Mr. Kardum suffers ongoing chronic headaches and disrupted sleep secondary to his neck pain. His prognosis is guarded and it is unlikely that he will become symptom free. The intensity of these symptoms will vary over time and he will likely achieve some improvement over the next one to two years. The measure of that improvement is unknown but may be a function of his efforts in pursuing the recommendations of Dr. Caillier…

[161] I conclude that Mr. Kardum suffers from chronic pain involving his left posterior lateral neck, his posterior shoulder, and upper back region. He continually has headaches and disrupted sleep secondary to the pain involving his neck. He has some prospect of improvement in symptoms but will likely have a measure of pain or discomfort for the balance of his life…

[173] I have concluded that the nature of Mr. Kardum’s injuries coupled with the duration of symptoms that are likely to be permanent will diminish his lifestyle and affect his social relationships. There may be improvement but there will be a permanent reduction in his enjoyment of a lifestyle that was, before the accidents, unbounded by any physical limitations. He has been resilient to the point of maintaining an active physical exercise routine but will continue to have the nagging discomfort and inconvenience of the symptoms he now complains about. He is a young man and will have these symptoms over many years; his will be a different life because of the accident.

[174] I conclude that Mr. Kardum is entitled to non-pecuniary damages of $70,000.

This decision is also worth reviewing for the Court’s comments on the various expert witnesses that testified.  In rejecting ICBC’s independent medical examiner Mr. Justice Armstrong provided the following reasons:

[111] Dr. Grypma is an orthopaedic surgeon. He is not a specialist in rehabilitation medicine. His opportunity to observe and examine Mr. Kardum was restricted to a single 1.5 hour examination on January 31, 2011. He confirmed that Mr. Kardum did not demonstrate any nonorganic symptoms. He was not aware of the amount of damage to the defendant’s vehicle in the first accident. He did not make the same observations of Mr. Kardum’s physical symptoms noted by Drs. Caillier and Schukett. Where there are conflicts between his opinions and the evidence of Drs. Caillier and Schukett, I accept the opinions of the latter two doctors.

If two or more events cause a single “indivisible injury” a Defendant who in part contributes to the injury can be held accountable for the entire loss.  This legal principle was concisely summarized in reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.

In last week’s case (Estable v. New) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2003 motor vehicle collision.  She suffered previous and subsequent trauma.  The Court found that while not the sole cause, the collision was a cause of the Plaintiff’s various soft tissue injuries.  The Plaintiff was compensated for these and in doing so Madam Justice Gropper provided the following short and helpful summary of the law of indivisible injury compensation:

[53] Divisible injuries are those which are capable of being separated out, such as injuries to different body parts or injuries to which the defendant has not contributed: Bradley, at para. 20; see also Athey, at paras. 22-25. Whether damage derived from multiple sources is divisible for the purpose of determining the extent of the liability of one defendant is a question of fact: Hutchings v. Dow, 2007 BCCA 148 at para. 13.

[54] If the injuries are divisible, the devaluation approach from Long v. Thiessen (1968), 65 W.W.R. 577 at 591 (B.C.C.A) is the appropriate method for determining the amount of damages that can be attributed to the defendant. This was discussed in Bradley at para. 33:

[33] The approach to apportionment in Long v. Thiessen is therefore no longer applicable to indivisible injuries. The reason is that Long v. Thiessen pre-supposes divisibility: Long requires courts to take a single injury and divide it up into constituent causes or points in time, and assess damages twice; once on the day before the second tort, and once at trial. Each defendant is responsible only for their share of the injury and the plaintiff can recover only the appropriate portion from each tortfeasor.

[emphasis in original]

[55] Indivisible injuries are those that cannot be separated, such as aggravation or exacerbation of an earlier injury, an injury to the same area of the body, or global symptoms that are impossible to separate: Bradley, at para. 20; see also Athey, at paras. 22-25.

[56] If the injuries are indivisible, the court must apply the “but for” test in respect of the defendant’s act. Even though there may be several tortuous or non-tortuous causes of injury, so long as the defendant’s act is a cause, the defendant is fully liable for that damage: Bradley, at paras. 32-37; see also Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 2007 SCC 7 at paras. 19-23.

In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $30,000 the Court made the following findings with respect to her injuries:

[60] I find that Ms. Estable’s remaining complaints were aggravated or exacerbated by the October 2003 injuries. These complaints include: pain in her neck, pain in her left and low back, and pain in her left anterior shoulder. They also include the injury to her sternum, although I find, based on the medical evidence, that this injury was a soft tissue injury and not a fracture.

[61] Applying the principles from Bradley, Ms. Estable has a claim against Mr. New for these complaints because they are indivisible; Mr. New’s negligence aggravated or exacerbated those injuries. While the post accident injury producing events may also have had a similar effect, Ms. Estable can recover her damages entirely from Mr. New. There may be other tortfeasers who are jointly liable, but Mr. New’s right to apportionment among them does not affect Ms. Estable’s right to claim the entire amount from him…

[77] Applying the enumerated factors, Ms. Estable is now 56 years old. She suffered soft tissue injuries of the cervical and lumbar spine and to the left shoulder. She suffered a chest contusion and the possibility of sternal fractures or rib fractures. Her injuries have caused her to change her lifestyle; she is unable to engage in performance art or yoga…

[81] I assess Ms. Estable’s non-pecuniary damages at $30,000.

I’ve written about this topic too many times to give a lengthy introduction other than to say it is clear that the “Low Velocity Impact” Defence is not a legal principle.  Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, yet again demonstrating this.

In today’s case (Cariglino v. Okuda) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  She was a passenger in a vehicle that was rear-ended.  Fault was admitted.  She suffered various soft tissue injuries.  The vehicle sustained $724 in damage and the Defendant advanced the classic LVI defence arguing that this little damage “indicates the relatively minor nature of the collision and the likelihood that the complaints of injury and loss made by the plaintiff are either not related to this collision or are embellished.”.

Mr. Justice McKinnon rejected this argument and in doing so provided the following comments:

[33] No medical opinions were proffered by the defence, rather defence submitted that the plaintiff’s evidence is “unreliable” as she downplays the role of significant family stressors in her life, fixating on the collision as the sole cause of all of her problems, both before and after the collision. Curiously, defence accepts that the plaintiff is credible but not reliable. That seems to me to be a distinction without a difference.

[34] I found the plaintiff to be generally credible and, for the most part, a reliable historian. Certainly she had stresses in her life that created difficulties but she was able to manage these much more easily before the collision. A defendant takes a plaintiff as he finds her. Here the defendant has caused injury to the plaintiff who was in a somewhat fragile state, given her many family issues.

[35] The defendant contends that the very minor nature of the collision would render “improbable” the nature and extent of the injuries the plaintiff contends she suffers. I was not provided with opinion evidence to support that contention and thus am unable to accept the bald proposition that minor damage equals minor injury.

The Court accepted that the Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries which largely improved in the first year following the crash and with further therapy should fully recover.  Non-Pecuniary damages were assessed at $35,000.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a chronic whiplash injury.

In last week’s case (Fiorda v. Say) the Plaintiff was involved in two collisions, the first in 2008 and the second in 2009.  The Plaintiff was not at fault for either crash.  Both collisions contributed to a chronic whiplash injury with possible facet joint involvement.  The symptoms of pain were still present by the time of trial and these were expected to carry into the future.  In assessing the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $40,000 Madam Justice Holmes provided the following reasons:

[25] Dr. Gabriel Hirsch, specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, conducted an independent medical assessment on April 4, 2011.

[26] Dr. Hirsch concluded that in the first accident, Ms. Fiorda sustained relatively minor injuries to her neck, upper back, and shoulder girdle region, from which she had made a good recovery by the time of the second accident.  He concluded that absent the second accident, Ms. Fiorda probably would have made a full recovery from the first.

[27] Dr. Hirsch concluded that the second accident caused injuries to Ms. Fiorda’s neck, thoracic spine, and lumbar spine, which probably involved soft tissue structures, such as muscles, tendons, and ligaments.  Given the accident mechanism as Ms. Fiorda had described it, it was also possible that Ms. Fiorda sustained an injury to a cervical facet joint.

[28] Dr. Hirsch recommended that Ms. Fiorda carry out a regular exercise program, ideally in a well-equipped community centre or gymnasium.  Because Ms. Fiorda had recently completed a functional restoration program under the guidance of a physiotherapist and kinesiologist, he felt she should be able to continue with a maintenance program on her own.  He recommended particular components of a regular exercise program for Ms. Fiorda to follow.

[29] Dr. Hirsch also suggested that Ms. Fiorda consider trigger point injections into the neck and shoulder girdle region, her most symptomatic areas.  He noted that those injections are funded by the Medical Services Plan.

[30] Dr. Hirsch noted that “there is some uncertainty” about whether Ms. Fiorda can continue in her work as a costume designer on a sustainable basis because of the long hours and many consecutive days, which do not allow her the opportunity to recuperate from a flare-up. ..

[45] In my view, the particular circumstances of Ms. Fiorda’s case support an award of $40,000.

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, providing comments critical of the practice of obtaining medical opinion evidence without accompanying physical examination of a Plaintiff.

In this week’s case (Ruscheinski v. Biln) the Plaintiff was involved in three collisions.  She sustained soft tissue injuries to her her neck and shoulder in the initial crash.  The following crashes had a ‘cascading effect‘ on these injuries resulting in chronic pain with partial disability.  Non-Pecuniary Damages of $85,000 were assessed.

In the course of the trial the Court heard from competing expert witnesses.  The Defendant’s expert never examined the Plaintiff.  For this reason the Court preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s experts and provided the following critical comments:

[82] Dr. Turnbull, a neurosurgeon, provided expert evidence on behalf of the defendants. He was the only medical expert whose opinion was adduced as part of the defendants’ case. His assessment is set out in his report dated April 26, 2011.  In his report, Dr. Turnbull opined:

Ms. Ruscheinski evidently suffered soft tissue injuries in the MVA of February 24, 2006 which may have been aggravated by the MVAs of September 9 and September 17, 2006.

[83] In my opinion, Dr. Turnbull’s choice of the word “evidently” results from the fact that he did not conduct an examination of Ms. Ruscheinski. Dr. Turnbull has not met, nor has he ever examined Ms. Ruscheinski. His opinions are based solely on his review of medical records.

[84] Dr. Turnbull also expressed in an opinion, in his report, that although Ms. Ruscheinski’s “soft tissue injuries have had ample time to heal”, her “symptoms may persist for some time.” He does not recommend any further treatment because, he explained, “passive treatments conducted more than two years after soft tissue injury are recognized as having little value.”

[85] I prefer the evidence of Drs. Feldman and Wasti over the defence expert, Dr. Turnbull. I accept Dr. Feldman’s opinion (supported by Dr. Wasti) that meeting a patient, obtaining their history directly, and conducting a thorough examination are essential to provide an accurate diagnosis of a patient’s injuries and to determine an appropriate prognosis.

[86] In my opinion, when dealing with cases where chronic pain is suggested or suspected, an examination of a patient that is designed to look for objective evidence of injury, such as muscle spasm, as opposed to feigned pain behaviour, coupled with an appropriate and thoughtful approach to taking a patient’s history, will lead to a diagnosis and prognosis that is much more reliable than a records review. I accept Dr. Feldman’s evidence that without a physical examination of Ms. Ruscheinski, it would not have been possible to detect the winging of her scapula.

[87] Dr. Turnbull agreed in cross-examination that muscle spasm and tenderness provide an objective basis for a diagnosis and prognosis. Those objective findings were found by Drs. Feldman and Wasti. Dr. Turnbull is not in a position to contradict the findings of Drs. Wasti and Feldman because he did not examine Ms. Ruscheinski. Further, Dr. Turnbull did not address Dr. Feldman’s findings, the findings from the flexion/extension x-rays, nor the focused treatment recommended by Dr. Feldman that consists of active and passive treatments. Finally, I wish to note that Dr. Turnbull acknowledged that most of his patients with neck and back pain do not have a history of being involved in motor vehicle accidents.

[88] My view of the matter is also supported by the remarks of Burnyeat J. in Dhaliwal v. Bassi, 2007 BCSC 549, 73 B.C.L.R. (4th) 177, where he wrote at paras. 2-3:

[2]        The role of an expert is to assist the Court. I am not assisted by receiving the “opinion” from a psychiatrist who has not seen a person and who bases his opinion only on documentation made available to him where much of that documentation will ultimately not be in evidence. Ordinarily, counsel will provide the factual assumptions to the expert that counsel will then proceed to prove in evidence. Those factual assumptions should be clearly stated in the statement of the expert. It is not for an expert to merely review a number of documents, many of which will not be in evidence and make certain findings of fact. …

[3]        As well, the Court has commented a number of times on it being inadvisable to rely on the opinion of a medical advisor who has not seen a plaintiff: see for instance Parish v. Scott, [1966] B.C.J. (Q.L.) No. 2839 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 5 and 29. …

Adding to this site’s ICBC claims pain and suffering database, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a moderate soft tissue injury.

In today’s case (Olianka v. Spagnol) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision.  Fault was admitted.   The evidence was not particularly contested and the trial proceeded summarily.  The Court found the Plaintiff suffered moderate soft tissue injuries that were temporarily disabling with symptoms that were expected to linger into the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $30,000 Mr. Justice Blair provided the following reasons:

[28] Based on the authorities and the unique evidence found in this case, I find that the appropriate award for Mr. Olianka’s non-pecuniary damages is $30,000, taking into account all contingencies, given the extent of the soft tissue injuries to his neck and back, the disability period of 27 months post-collision, as well as the lingering and ongoing aspect of his injuries, the limitations that the injuries imposed, not just on his ability to work, but also on his ability to partake in those physical activities which occupied his life prior to the collision and which he has only recently been able to resume albeit to a limited extent.

As I’ve discussed on many occasions, there is little credible medical evidence to suggest that a low impact collision cannot result in injury.  The LVI defense fails at trial far more than it succeeds.  That said, there is no denying that a claim for damages can be met with more skepticism if the triggering event is a low impact collision as opposed to a severe crash.  For this reason ICBC and other insurers like to highlight the minimal forces involved when Low Velocity Impact claims proceed to trial.  This was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.

In last week’s claim (Ryan v. Klakowich) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  Fault for the crash was admitted.  The collision involved minimal forces with the defendant testifying that the impact was “like bumping a shopping cart against a counter“.  Despite this, and despite some reliability concerns the trial judge raised with the Plaintiff’s evidence, the Court accepted the Plaintiff sustained real injury.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $25,000 Madam Justice Ross provided the following reasons:

[73] Ms. Ryan’s complaints arise from a collision of very low impact, producing minimal damage to her vehicle and none to the defendant’s. Her injuries are said to be soft tissue injuries for which there are no objective indicators. In such circumstances Ms. Ryan’s credibility is of particular importance since the physicians are to large extent dependent upon her subjective reports in reaching their opinions.

[74] I find Ms. Ryan to be a poor historian. It is my impression that she minimized the extent and duration of the injuries she suffered in previous accidents, both in her testimony and in her reports to physicians in preparation for this litigation. She also minimized the significance of the other medical conditions with which she was dealing. It is her testimony that the burden of taking care of her mother did not interfere with her work or with her social life because her other siblings would fill in. However, this was inconsistent with what she told Dr. Anderson. He reported that she was in considerable distress concerning the care of her mother on several occasions, reporting that the disproportionate burden fell upon her and that her siblings were not providing sufficient assistance…

[78] The medical evidence is of limited assistance since the opinions are to a great extent dependent upon Ms. Ryan’s subjective reports. In addition, Dr. Anderson had not treated Ms. Ryan before the 2008 Accident and so had no personal knowledge of Ms. Ryan’s condition prior to the 2008 Accident. Ms. Ryan did not provide Dr. Jung with a full history. Finally, the additional investigations that Dr. Jung and Dr. Bishop recommended have not been undertaken. In the result, there is no medical opinion that bears on the causation of the neurological symptoms Ms. Ryan now complains of in her right arm.

[79] I accept that Ms. Ryan suffered mild to moderate soft tissue injuries to her neck and shoulder girdle in the 2008 Accident. As a consequence, she experienced pain and stiffness in her neck, upper back and shoulder and headaches. I accept that these symptoms have lingered. While it is the case that many, perhaps most people, would not have suffered such injuries in such an accident, I accept that the combination of her previous injuries, scoliosis and osteoporosis would render her more fragile and susceptible of injury…

[83] I award $25,000 in non-pecuniary damages.

As frequently discussed, the Low Velocity Impact (LVI) defence has been criticized many times by the BC Supreme Court.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating yet again that the LVI defence is not a recognized legal principle.

In today’s case (Dolha v. Heft) the Plaintiff was involved 2008 rear end collision.  Fault was admitted.  The Plaintiff suffered a “mild to moderate” whiplash injury which resolved in several months.  The Court awarded the Plaintiff $7,000 for non-pecuniary damages.  Prior to doing so the Court criticized the LVI Defence as having “no scientific justification“.  In assessing damages Madam Justice Bruce provided the following reasons:

[16] Based on the evidence led in this summary trial application, I find there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the plaintiff’s claims that she suffered pain in her neck and upper back, as well as headaches and dizziness, immediately following the accident and for a period of six to nine months thereafter. Moreover, there is no evidence to contradict Dr. Samaroo’s opinion that these symptoms arise from soft tissues injuries caused by the accident. There is no scientific justification for concluding that a low velocity collision is incapable of causing injuries. The minor nature of the collision is only one factor to consider when assessing the severity of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. While the medical evidence before the court is primarily based on the subjective complaints of the plaintiff, there is no evidence that the plaintiff’s symptoms continued beyond what would normally be expected for these types of soft tissue injuries. Thus the caution expressed in Butler and Price is not relevant on the facts of this case….

[19] Turning to the factors relevant to the assessment of non-pecuniary loss, it is apparent that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were of a minor nature. While she experienced pain and required medication to alleviate this symptom, the plaintiff had full range of motion in her back and her neck throughout her convalescence. In addition, the symptoms experienced by the plaintiff were not sufficiently severe that she required passive modalities such as physiotherapy, massage therapy or chiropractic manipulation. The plaintiff last saw her doctor for pain due to accident-related injuries in late November 2008, some five months after the collision. The plaintiff’s injuries resolved entirely after a relatively short period of six to nine months. The headaches persisted for about a year; however, they decreased in intensity and severity over time. The plaintiff has no residual effects from the injuries. Lastly, the plaintiff’s lifestyle was only moderately impacted by the injuries. She was unable to run for a couple of months.

[20] The plaintiff suffered some emotional anxiety as a result of the accident and had sleep difficulties. The sleep problem resolved quickly and the increased anxiety was modest in severity and did not persist over a lengthy period of time.

[21] Lastly, the plaintiff is a relatively young woman who does not suffer from any particular emotional or physical condition that rendered or could have rendered the injuries she suffered more disabling.

[22] Having regard to the range of non-pecuniary damages awarded in the cases cited by the parties, and the particular circumstances of the plaintiff, I find an award of $7,000 is appropriate.

Adding to this ever-growing British Columbia non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) caselaw database, reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing a claim involving lingering soft tissue injuries.

In today’s case (Manson v. Kalar) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end collision in 2008.  The crash was fairly significant resulting in over $5,000 in damage to the Plaintiff’s vehicle.  Fault for the collision was admitted focusing the trial on the value of the claim.

Madam Justice Boyd ultimately found that the Plaintiff suffered mild-moderate soft tissue injuries and that while these were on-going some three years after the fact there was still room for improvement.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $25,000 the Court provided the following reasons:

[38] …The plaintiff here has suffered injuries which are limited to his lower back and neck.  He has pursued very little treatment for his injuries and, despite his doctor’s recommendations, he has not attended few physiotherapy treatments or undertaken any core muscle conditioning programs.  Nevertheless it is expected that he will recover in the foreseeable future.  As I have already noted, while I satisfied that his ongoing pain and discomfort has limited his participation in his former sporting activities, some of his social withdrawal appears to be the result of other factors. ..

[46] …In the case at bar, the plaintiff has suffered a mild to moderate soft tissue injuries, where the symptoms have persisted for almost three years since the accident and are still not resolved.  In these circumstances, I find that a fair and reasonable award of damages is $25,000.

For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts of other recent BC court cases dealing with damages for soft tissue injuries.