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BC Injury Law and ICBC Claims Blog
This Blog is authored by British Columbia personal injury lawyer Erik Magraken. Erik is a partner with the British Columbia personal injury law-firm MacIsaac & Company. He restricts his practice exclusively to plaintiff-only personal injury claims with a particular emphasis on claims involving orthopaedic injuries and complex soft tissue injuries. Please visit often for the latest developments in matters concerning BC personal injury claims and ICBC claims.
Erik Magraken does not work for and is not affiliated in any way with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC). Please note that this blog is for information only and is not claim-specific legal advice. Erik can only provide legal advice to clients. Please click here to arrange a free consultation.
Archive for the ‘ICBC Privacy Issues’ Category
April 30th, 2012

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the production of private social media data in the context of a personal injury claim.
In today’s case (Fric v. Gershman) the Plaintiff sued for damages for injuries sustained in a 2008 collision.  The Plaintiff apparently suffered from “chronic severe headaches and soft-tissue injuries” following the crash.  The Plaintiff, who was a first year law school student at the time of the crash, plead damages for various losses including diminished earning capacity.
ICBC sought production of the Plaintiff’s entire Facebook profile, vacation photos and metadata related to digital photos in her possession.  Master Bouck held that while some of this relief was too broad, relevant photos need to be disclosed and ordered production accordingly.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:
[54] After considering all of these authorities, I have concluded that some of the plaintiff’s photographs, including those held on the private Facebook profile, ought to be disclosed.
[55] The pleadings define the issues between the parties. Here, there is also evidence on which the court can exercise its discretion to allow for broader document discovery under Rule 7-1(14).
[56] In her pleadings, the plaintiff alleges that the accident led to not only loss of amenities of life, but also loss of mobility and diminished earning capacity.
[57] The diminished capacity is said to be the result of pain and fatigue. Ms. Fric claims that the injuries effected her academic achievements and thus ability to secure employment after her second year of law school. The ongoing symptoms continue to impact Ms. Fric’s working capacity.
[58] How this diminished capacity is measured is yet to be determined. However, the defence fairly argues that a damage award for a young professional’s diminished earning capacity can be very significant. Although plaintiff’s counsel downplays this aspect of the claim, there is no suggestion that the plea is to be withdrawn.
[59] Ms. Fric has also testified that the accident-related injuries have negatively impacted her social life and ability to perform certain sports or recreational activities, either pain-free or at all. While Ms. Fric has remained an active individual, the symptoms from the accident-related injuries are allegedly unresolved. Obviously, the ongoing complaints will influence the award claimed for pain and suffering.
[60] Photographs which show the plaintiff engaging in a sporting or physical recreational activity — from hiking to scuba diving to curling to dancing — are relevant in discovering the plaintiff’s physical capacity since the accident.
[61] I do not agree with the plaintiff’s submission that such information is only relevant when there is a claim or evidence of total disability.
[62] In terms of proportionality and ensuring a fair trial on the merits, the defence should be given an opportunity to discover the plaintiff on all aspects of her physical functioning and activity level since the accident.
[63] Allowing such discovery does not preclude the plaintiff from arguing that some of the produced photographs are inadmissible at trial. The trial judge may accept that the prejudicial effect of a particular photograph outweighs any probative value.
[64] Nonetheless, the order sought by the defendants is too broad…
[70] In my view, the appropriate relief is to order Ms. Fric to produce an amended list of documents which identifies the photographs and video in her possession and control in which in which she is featured:
1. Â participating in the December 2008 Law Games; and
2. Â on a vacation taken since November 18, 2008.
[71] The photographs should be identified by location, date and time (if this information is available to the plaintiff). The defence may then choose to either inspect the photographs (electronically or otherwise) and/or pay for the photographs’ duplication.
[72] Before disclosure, the plaintiff may edit the photographs to protect the privacy of other individuals appearing in those photographs…
[75] The plaintiff is not obliged to include commentary from the Facebook web‑site. If such commentary exists, the probative value of this information is outweighed by the competing interest of protecting the private thoughts of the plaintiff and third parties: Dosanjh v. Leblanc.
[76] Costs of the application will be to the defendants in the cause.
Tags: bc injury law, facebook, Fric v. Gershman, Master Bouck, Metadata, Rule 7, Rule 7-1, Rule 7-1(1), Rule 7-1(14) Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | No Comments » | top ^
January 2nd, 2012

As previously discussed, video surveillance is a reality in personal injury litigation and surveillance depicting a Plaintiff acting inconsistently with their evidence can impact an assessment of damages. Â Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, demonstrating surveillance evidence in action.
In last week’s case (Wilkinson v. Whitlock) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 collision in Vernon, BC. Â The Defendant drove through a red light and was found fully at fault for the crash. Â The Plaintiff suffered from back problems as a result of the collision. Â In the course of trial the Plaintiff testified as to the effects of these injuries. Â ICBC introduced video surveillance evidence which gave the impression “of an individual less limited than (the Plaintiff’s) evidence at trial and on discovery would lead one to conclude“. Mr. Justice Barrow provided the following reasons considering this evidence:
[16] There is reason to approach the plaintiff’s evidence with caution. She was defensive and evasive in cross-examination. I accept that anxiety may explain her defensive posture, but it does not account for her tendency not to answer questions directly. I do not, however, take much from these circumstances.
[17] As to the videotape evidence, it is of some assistance. The plaintiff was videotaped in January and February of 2008, May of 2009, and June and October of 2010. The plaintiff’s left hip and groin became, on her description, excruciatingly painful for no apparent reason when she was shopping. Although Ms. Wilkinson could not recall the date of this event, I suspect it was likely in the fall of 2008. Ms. Wilkinson testified that although the pain in her hip or groin varies, it often causes her “to waddle” when she walks as opposed to walking with a normal gait. On examination for discovery she agreed that it caused her to waddle most of the time. She said that it was a particular problem when she walked after driving.
[18] The January and February 2008 videotape evidence is of little assistance - the recordings are brief and do not show the plaintiff walking to any extent. The May 2009 videotape evidence is much more extensive. On May 19, 2009 the plaintiff was at a gas station purchasing flowers. To my eye, her gait appeared normal. On June 14, 2009 the plaintiff was videotaped while at a garden centre, and again her gait appeared normal. A year later, on June 15, 2010, there is videotape of her walking. There is no apparent limp but she does appear stiff and careful in the way she moves. On June 17, 2010 Ms. Wilkinson was videotaped walking to her car with a grocery cart full of groceries. She was captured loading the groceries into the hatchback of her vehicle. She did all of that without apparent limitation. On June 19 of that year she purchased a three or four foot tall house plant which she loaded and unloaded from her car, again without apparent limitation. Finally, there is a lengthy videotape of her on June 19, 2010 at a garden centre with Mr. Bains and her daughter. She is captured squatting down, standing up, and walking about the store without noticeable limitation. In summary, the videotape reveals some minor stiffness or limitation on some occasions. There are also occasions when she appeared to have little or no visible limitation. Generally, the impression left by the videotape evidence is of an individual less limited than Ms. Wilkinson’s evidence at trial and on discovery would lead one to conclude.
This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s application of the mitigation principle. Â Mr. Justice Barrow found that the Plaintiff was prescribed therapies that she failed to follow and these would have improved the symptoms. Â The Court did not, however, reduce the Plaintiff’s damages finding that it was reasonable for her not to follow medical advise given her financial circumstances. Â Â Mr. Justice Barrow provided the the following reasons:
[50] Returning to the principles set out in Janiak, and dealing with the second one first, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that continued physiotherapy at least during 2008 would have reduced some of the plaintiff’s symptoms and increased her functionality. Further, I am satisfied that the supervised exercise program that Mr. Cooper recommended would have yielded ongoing benefits. I reach this conclusion because Ms. Wilkinson did benefit from both Mr. Saunder’s and Mr. Cooper’s assistance. There is no reason to think those benefits would not have continued and perhaps provided further relief.
[51] The more difficult issue is whether it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to not have followed up on these therapies. She testified that it was largely due to a lack of financial resources. I accept her evidence in that regard. She was in the midst of renovations which were costly. In addition she had lost the assistance that Mr. Harrison was to have provided. The renovations were also time consuming and physically taxing. Further, she underwent a very difficult separation from Mr. Harrison which extracted both a financial and emotional toll. In all these circumstances I am not persuaded that the defendant has established that it was unreasonable for the plaintiff not to pursue a fitness regime more diligently than she did. Most of the impediments to the pursuit of such a program will be no longer exist once this trial is over. I will address the implications of that when dealing with the damages for future losses.
Tags: bc injury law, failure to mitigate, mitigation of damages, Mr. Justice Barrow, surveillance, video surveillance, Wilkinson v. Whitlock Posted in ICBC Back Injury (soft tissue) Cases, ICBC Liability (fault) Cases, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | No Comments » | top ^
December 6th, 2011

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dismissing a defendant application requesting the production of a Plaintiff’s Facebook postings, Twitter postings, Computer Hard Drive and Iphone.
Today’s case (Dosanjh v. Leblanc and St. Paul’s Hospital) involved allegations of medical malpractice.  The plaintiff said she suffered “cognitive impairment that has affected her thinking process“.  She sued for damages.  The Defendants brought an application seeking that the Plaintiff produce her private social media account information and computer hard-drive data arguing that this information would be relevant to the claimed damages.  Master Taylor dismissed the application finding such a broad application, even in the face of alleged cognitive injuries, was “a classic fishing expedition, but without the appropriate bait.“.  Master Taylor provided the following reasons:
[28] The defendant has not indicated the material fact or facts which it believes can be proved by searching the plaintiff’s personal computer and her social media sites. Rather, the defendant merely says that health, enjoyment of life and employability are in issue. Surely more is or should be required to meet the test of Rule 7-1(1)(a)(i) than just saying a particular matter is in issue in order to infringe on a litigant’s privacy.
[29] To be able to obtain a litigant’s private thoughts and feelings as expressed to friends or family members after the fact is, in my view, similar to a party intercepting private communications of another party.
[30] I am unable to envisage any rational justification for breaching the privacy rights of an individual in civil proceedings simply because it is alleged that the individual’s general health, enjoyment of life and employability are directly at issue. Merely because a record may be made of the communication shouldn’t make it any different than a private telephone conversation. If not, surely applications in civil proceedings for recordings of private communications can’t be far behind…
[33] I am satisfied that the defendant’s application is entirely too broad and lacks the focus required by Rule 7-1(1)(a)(i). In fact, I am more inclined to call this application a classic fishing expedition, but without the appropriate bait. I observe as well that the order made by the court in Bishop, supra, was focussed on the times the plaintiff spent on his Facebook account on his computer, and did not give the defendant cart blanche to troll through the plaintiff’s correspondence as is sought in the application before me.
Tags: bc injury law, Computer Hard-drive, Dosanjh v. Leblanc and St. Paul's Hospital, facebook, master taylor, Rule 7, Rule 7-1, Rule 7-1(1), Rule 7-1(1)(a), Rule 7-1(1)(a)(i), Rule 7-1(11), Rule 7-1(14), Rule 7-1(17), twitter Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | No Comments » | top ^
September 5th, 2011

Last year I uploaded this video providing a basic overview of some key information for Plaintiff’s attending an examination for discovery in an ICBC Claim.  If I could add one more tip to the issues discussed it would be this: Google yourself before attending.  It’s a safe bet that ICBC already has.
One of the most basic tasks any lawyer can undertake in preparing for discovery is to Google their subject.  Who knows what will come up.  Maybe some embarrassing photos on Facebook, maybe a boastful biography on a dating site, perhaps even some unwitting self-surveillance on YouTube.  Whatever comes up, if it can harm your interests, it likely will be brought out at discovery.
10 minutes of your time can help you and your lawyer greatly in preparing for discovery.  If there is something that needs to be explained its better that this gets discussed for the first time in the privacy of your lawyer’s office as opposed to under oath before a Court Reporter.  A bit of time reviewing potentially harmful (or embarrassing) information can go a long way in taking the bite out of an examination for discovery.
For more on examinations for discovery in ICBC Claims you can click here to access my archived posts on the topic.
Tags: bc injury law, examination for discovery, google Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | No Comments » | top ^
August 31st, 2011

A regular reader of this blog shared some views with me recently and I thought these were worth repeating.  These relate to chronic pain complaints and the value, if any, of video surveillance.  Specifically the reader shared the following thoughtful observation:
This Fall we will again be watching hockey on tv [ video evidence ] Can you tell me which player[s] are playing hurt ? And trust me …. they are …. some very much. We often know this at the end of the year …. as teams ” hide ” or deny that certain players are hurt … in that the opposing players do not focus on and target their injuries. Video tapes ? I don’t trust them
What do you say? Â Is there value to video surveillance? Â Does it effectively weed out fraudulent claims or is it an unnecessary invasion of privacy?
As always I welcome others views, feel free to leave a comment. Â You can click here to read a 2008 article sharing some of my views of video surveillance.
Tags: bc injury law, chronic pain, privacy, video surveillance Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | No Comments » | top ^
August 25th, 2011
This week the BC Court of Appeal released reasons for judgement ordering a new trial following a chronic pain case which resulted in a $525,000 damage assessment.
In this week’s case (Houston v. Kine) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision.  She allegedly suffered from PTSD and a chronic pain disorder as a result of the crash.  The matter went to trial although did not conclude in the time initially allotted.
There was a 5 month gap before the trial recommenced. Â During this break ICBC undertook surveillance of the Plaintiff over two periods of time. Â The Defence lawyers, however, failed to disclose this evidence in compliance with the Rules of Court. Â As a result the trial judge refused to let the evidence in. Â The Court went further, however, and held that the witnesses who made the videos could not testify as to their observations of the Plaintiff as doing so would undermine the decision to exclude the video evidence.
The Defendants appealed arguing that the witnesses were wrongly excluded. Â The BC Court of Appeal agreed and found that while “the defendants’ choice at trial to withhold the existence of the videotapes….was inappropriate” and that this evidence was rightly excluded it was improper to exclude the witnesses themselves to testify. Â In ordering a new trial the BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons:
[31] The obvious difficulty with the viva voce evidence was that the observers were unknown to the defendants prior to the hiatus in the trial. The earliest that they could have been identified was in November of 2009. By then, the plaintiff’s preparation for trial was all but over. To constrain the defendants’ ability to react to the plaintiff’s evidence to “prevent surprise or ambush” in my view unfairly restricted their ability to have the proceeding determined on its merits. As the trial judge accepted that there was no restriction on calling lay witnesses, she erred in imposing that restriction respecting witnesses who could comment on the plaintiff’s activities during the hiatus in the trial.
[32] The trial judge’s second reason for refusing to allow the observation witnesses to testify was that:
It would be inconsistent with my previous order and with the objects of the Rules, expressed in R. 1(5), “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits,” to allow the defendants to, in effect, ambush the plaintiff with this evidence, which has been disclosed only recently.
[33] In my view the trial judge here misapplied Rule 1(5), focussing on speed in the completion of the proceedings at the expense of their merits. The Rule and the third factor in Stoneemphasize the importance of the determination of a proceeding on its merits. In order to determine a proceeding on its merits, the admissible evidence that is tendered by a party and is relevant to matters in issue should be considered.
[34] In addition, given that the original trial estimate was exceeded by the plaintiff’s case, necessitating the adjournment of the trial that caused the hiatus that brought about the acquisition of new evidence by the defendants, I am unable to accept that the delay resulting from the proposed evidence should have been treated any differently from the delay that was occasioned by the initial inadequate trial time estimate. The failure to do so prevented the determination of these proceedings on their merits. I conclude that the trial judge erred in law in refusing to permit the witnesses to give viva voce evidence at the trial…
[36] Here, the credibility of the plaintiff was a critical factor in the trial judge’s assessment of quantum, and the evidence of the observers was intended to directly address the plaintiff’s credibility. In my view, the refusal of the trial judge to permit the defendants to adduce evidence to challenge the plaintiff’s physical abilities at the date of the trial was unfair, and given the importance of this evidence to the ultimate award of damages for future diminished earning capacity and future cost of care, I see no alternative but to order a new trial on damages. I would thus allow the appeal and order a new trial.
Tags: bc injury law, credibility, Houston v. Kine, List of Documents, privileged documents, Rule 7, Rule 7-1, Rule 7-1(1), Rule 7-1(6), Rule 7-1(7) Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 1, BCSC Civil Rule 7, Civil Procedure, ICBC Privacy Issues | Direct Link | 1 Comment » | top ^
July 5th, 2011

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, ordering production of a Plaintiff’s vacation photos in an ICBC injury lawsuit.
In today’s claim (Abougoush v. Sauve) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 motor vehicle collision. Â She alleged that her injuries disabled her for a period following this collision. Â During this period she travelled to Las Vegas, Palm Springs and the Caribbean. Â Photos were taken during these trips.
ICBC asked for the photos to be produced. Â The Plaintiff opposed arguing that any probative value in the photos was outweighed by Privacy concerns. Â Mr. Justice Rogers reviewed the photos and ultimately ordered them disclosed. Â The Court noted some difficulty reconciling the activities depicted in the photos with the “Plaintiff’s perception of what is a physical activity” based on her affidavit evidence. Â In ordering production of the digital photos and metadata Mr. Justice Rogers provided the following reasons:
[7] The photographs in question depict the plaintiff in various indoor and outdoor tropical settings. The plaintiff is depicted engaging in various activities including swimming, walking on a beach, going on a catamaran power boat, and visiting the Grand Canyon. The photographs clearly establish that the plaintiff did not spend the majority of her time curled up in her parent’s motorhome or resting poolside in a chaise lounge.
[8] I have referred to the pleadings, of course, in order to determine what matters are in question, but I have also referred to the plaintiff’s Affidavit #1, particularly the extracts set out above. The pleadings establish that the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s physical injuries, their effect on her enjoyment of life and their effect on her ability to participate in physical activity are matters in question. The photographs, when they are compared to the plaintiff’s affidavit evidence, are clearly relevant to the plaintiff’s perception of what is a physical activity. They are also relevant to the plaintiff’s tolerance for physical activity over a several week period.
[9] The photographs do not show the plaintiff in embarrassing or socially unacceptable situations. There is nothing about the photographs that would prevent their owner from, for example, posting them on a social networking site such as Facebook. I do not consider that the plaintiff’s demeanour or comportment in any of the photographs in the binder is such that they must be withheld from the defendants in order to preserve her privacy.
[10] In my opinion, the plaintiff’s pleadings and her affidavit evidence make the entire photographic record of her trips to Las Vegas and Palm Springs, and to the Caribbean, relevant to matters in question in this suit. All of the photographs in the binder provided to me must, therefore, be produced to the defendants.
[11] From what I can see of the camera that the plaintiff used to take many of these photographs (the camera can be seen in the reflection off the plaintiff’s sunglasses in some of her self-portraits), I believe it was a digital device. Digital cameras typically record the time and date when the photograph was taken. Some cameras capture the camera’s GPS co-ordinates as well. These data are known as metadata. These data are relevant to a matter in issue in this lawsuit because they may provide information from which the camera user’s tolerance for physical activity from day to day or over several days may be inferred. More particularly, the metadata may be relevant to the plaintiff’s ability to, for example, be active throughout a given day and then go walking on the beach in the evening, or it may be relevant to the plaintiff’s ability to spend an evening at a nightclub until some given hour, and then tolerate swimming the next morning. For that reason, the metadata associated with these photographs must also be produced to the defendants. That discovery may be accomplished by providing the defendants with digital copies of the photographs with the metadata preserved intact in those copies.
Tags: Abougoush v. Sauve, bc injury law, document production, Metadata, Mr. Justice Rogers, privacy, Rule 7, Rule 7-1, Rule 7-1(1), Rule 7-1(11), Rule 7-1(12), Rule 7-1(13), Rule 7-1(14), Vacation Photos Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | No Comments » | top ^
June 21st, 2011

(Note: I’m informed that the case discussed in the below post is under appeal.  When the appellate decision comes to my attention I will update this post)
As previously discussed, one of the areas being worked out by the BC Supreme Court is the extent of document production obligations in personal injury lawsuits under the New Rules of Court. Â Further reasons for judgement addressing this subject were recently brought to my attention.
In the recent (unreported) case of Shackelford v. Sweeney the Plaintiff was injured in a 2009 motor vehicle collision. Â He alleged serious injuries including a head injury with resulting cognitive difficulties. Â The Plaintiff was a successful self-employed recruiter and his claim included potentially significant damages for diminished earning capacity.
In the course of the lawsuit ICBC applied for various records supposedly to investigate the income loss claim including production of the Plaintiff’s computer hard-drive, phone records and banking records.  The application was partially successful with Master Taylor providing the following reasons addressing these requests:
[7] Â In relation to the cellphone records, the plaintiff gave evidence at his examination for discovery that he conducted most of his business over the telephone or the Internet, and he rarely met with people, and therefore it is suggested that the cell phone records relating to his business are probative. Â I agree that they can be probative, but I do not believe that the actual phone numbers themselves would be probative in any particular method or way. Â What is probative is how much the plaintiff used his phone on a daily or weekly basis to conduct his business
[8] Â Accordingly, I am going to order that the cellphone records that relate to his business, from January 1, 2007, to the present date, be produced, but in all circumstances every phone number but the area code is to be redacted….
[13] Â The Defendants also seek an order that the plaintiff produce the hard drive from the laptop he was using when he was operating (his recruiting business)…
[17]  …As there is an ongoing obligation by the Plaintiff to produce all business records in relation to this claim, I say that the obligation continues with respect to the hard drive that exists, and that the plaintiff has the obligation to examine the hard drive himself and/or with counsel, and extract any of his business records from there and provide them to the defendants.
[18] Â If the Plaintiff requires the services of a technician to assist in that regard, then the cost of that will be borne by the defendants. Â Once the business records have been extracted and redacted for privacy concerns, those documents will be henceforth provided to the defendants within 14 days thereafter…
[21] Â I think that only leaves bank statements relating to business income. Â I think the plaintiff has a positive obligation to provide some information with respect to his income, showing his income being deposited into his bank account. Â Where that in the bank statements shows, it should be left unredacted, but where it shows anything related to his wife or private unrelated business purchases , those may also be redacted.
This case is worth reviewing in full for other matters such as a declined request for production of the Plaintiff’s passport and client names.
At this time this case is unreported however, as always, I’m happy to e-mail a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests the reasons for judgement.
Tags: banking records, bc injury law, client names, Computer Hard-drive, document disclosure, hard drive, master taylor, passport, phone records, Rule 7, Rule 7-1, Rule 7-1(1), Rule 7-1(11), Rule 7-1(12), Rule 7-1(13), Rule 7-1(14), Shackelford v. Sweeney Posted in BCSC Civil Rule 7, ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | No Comments » | top ^
May 30th, 2011

Today Bill 13 (The Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act No. 2) received First Reading. I’ve had a chance to review some of these newly proposed laws and came across a potentially troubling section seeking to give ICBC significant powers to access the medical records of British Columbians.
Specifically, the Government is proposing to amend section 25 of the Motor Vehicle Act as follows:
Information-sharing agreement for Medicare Protection Act purposes
25.02 (1) The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may enter into an information-sharing agreement with the Medical Services Commission under the Medicare Protection Act for the purposes of collecting, using and disclosing personal information necessary for the administration of
(a) section 25 (1.3) of this Act, and
(b) the Medicare Protection Act, as it relates to the enrollment and renewal of enrollment of beneficiaries under that Act.
(2) If the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia enters into an information-sharing agreement under subsection (1), the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia may, in accordance with the agreement, collect and use personal information from, and disclose personal information to, the Medical Services Commission.
This new power is being given to ICBC to help introduce a new Care Card which is designed to cut down on fraud.  While fraud protection is laudable its important not to exceed this goal by unnecessary erosion of the privacy rights of British Columbians.  A review of the proposed change does not seem to put any concrete limits on ICBC’s power to access medical records or the use these can be put to once obtained.
If you have concerns about this new proposed power I suggest you contact your local MLA or BC’s current Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General (Shirley Bond) and voice these before this bill passes into law.
Tags: Bill 13, ICBC Access to Medical Records, Motor Vehicle Act Section 25.02 Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Tort Reform, Uncategorized | Direct Link | 3 Comments » | top ^
February 19th, 2011

Controversial reasons for judgement were recently released by the The Court of Queen’s Bench of New Brunswick. Â The Court required a Plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit to preserve all contents on her Facebook homepage and have these produced. Â While requiring Social Medial Data production is not necessarily unique, the way the Court required this evidence to be preserved will cause concern for many.
In the recent case (Sparks v. Dube) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision in Fredericton in 2008. Â She hired a lawyer and sued for damages. Â In the course of the lawsuit the defence lawyer brought a motion, without notifying the plaintiff’s lawyer, requesting personal information from the Plaintiff’s Facebook account. Â The Court granted the motion and made the following contraversial orders:
1)Â Â A Preservation Order and, in the alternative, an Interlocutory Injunction are hereby made and issued compelling Erica Sparks: 1) to preserve and maintain without deletions or alterations the entire contents of her personal Webpage(s) on the social network Facebook including but not limited to photographs, text, links, postings, event details and video clips until further direction of the court, and 2) to participate in the carrying out of the following orders where her participation is required;
2)Â Â The Interlocutory Injunction shall expire ten days after these orders take effect instituted;
3)  The Applicant-Defendant shall personally and immediately serve all orders and a copy of this judgment upon the Plaintiff’s solicitor, Mr. James Crocco who shall not disclose any of the orders set out herein nor the contents of this judgment except on terms as they are allowed by these orders;
4)Â Â Upon being served, Mr. James Crocco shall arrange for a solicitor in his firm or an agent lawyer of his choice to be appointed to carry out as soon as reasonably possible, and in the case of the Interlocutory Injunction within ten days of the taking effect of these orders, the orders set out that pertain to his client Erica Sparks subject to the following terms:
a)Â Â The appointed solicitor shall be remunerated by the Defendant for his or her services;
b)Â Â That solicitor shall immediately contact Ms. Sparks and, without disclosing the nature of the subject matter to be discussed, schedule a meeting with her at a location convenient to access and download data from the Internet and reduce it to usable form, such as hard copy for data so suited or memory stick or other such device for videos, as soon as reasonably practicable;
c)Â Â Upon personally meeting with Erica Sparks at the location chosen the appointed solicitor shall apprise her of the terms and conditions of the Preservation Order and Interlocutory Injunction as well as the other orders contained herein that pertain to her;
d)  Immediately upon disclosure of the terms and conditions of the orders set out, Erica Sparks, in the presence of the solicitor engaged, shall create a permanent tangible records in hard copy, wherever possible, or to other suitable device, of the entire contents of her Webpage(s) on Facebook including, but not limited to, all photographs, text and links and shall record by a memory stick or other suitable device any videos posted or linked to Erica’s Sparks’ Webpage, one copy of which shall be sealed upon the carrying out of that part of these orders and delivered to Mr. James Crocco to be held and preserved by him until further direction of the court; but the delivering of a sealed copy of the entirety of her Webpage(s) shall not operate to preclude Erica Sparks from providing her counsel, Mr. James Crocco, or anyone else of her choosing with a copy of the entirety of her Webpage(s) in order to prepare for the Production Hearing or further proceedings;
5)Â Â Upon complying with the said orders the solicitor appointed to supervise the downloading of the material referred to herein shall immediately review all of the material downloaded to ensure that the orders have been carried out in full and shall then certify to the court in writing that there has been strict compliance with the orders contained herein, and that the sealed packet represents the entire contents of the Facebook Webpage(s) of Erica Sparks as well as videos posted or linked to it or them;
6)  Upon the successful execution of the orders set out herein and the execution of the certification of strict compliance with the orders contained herein by the solicitor appointed to supervise the downloading of the material referred to herein  Erica Sparks shall be free to resume unrestricted access to her Webpage(s) on Facebook including its substantive composition;
7)  The Motion begun on December 9, 2011 shall be adjourned to a date to be fixed by the Clerk of the Court of Queen’s Bench for the Judicial District of Woodstock;
8)Â Â The Defendant shall then file with this court and serve on the Plaintiff, in timely fashion, a Notice of Motion for the production and disclosure of the contents of the sealed packet of information/data;
9)Â Â Once a date for a Production Hearing has been set Mr. James Crocco shall bring to that hearing the sealed packet of data retrieved from the Facebook Webpage(s) of Erica Sparks pursuant to the orders contained herein;
10)               Upon completion of the execution of the orders contained herein, that apply to the retrieval of the entire contents of Erica Spark’s Facebook Webpage(s) on the terms as set out in these orders, the temporary oral sealing order sealing the entire file and court record in this matter that was imposed on December 9, 2010 at the conclusion of the ex partehearing shall be lifted without further order of the court.
11)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Plaintiff shall upon execution of these orders and the holding of a Production Hearing, in timely fashion, file a further and better Affidavit of Documents;
I understand that this order is being appealed and look forward to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal’s views on this matter. Â While there are cases requiring Plaintiffs to produce social media data in personal injury lawsuits in BC, I am not aware of any cases in this Province going as far as the above decision. Â Arguably the New BC Rules of Court focus on proportionality, narrower document disclosure obligations, and general prohibition of “fishing expeditions” in discovery of documents would prevent such an order from being granted in BC.
Tags: Disovery of Documents, facebook, Preservation Order, privacy, Social Media, Sparks v. Dube Posted in ICBC Privacy Issues, Uncategorized | Direct Link | 3 Comments » | top ^
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