ICBC Law

In the latest judicial demonstration that the so-called Low Velocity Impact Defence is not the law, reasons for judgement were released yesterday by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, awarding damages following a motor vehicle collision.

In yesterday’s case (Sun v. Sukhan) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 rear end collision.  Fault was admitted by the rear motorist.  The collision caused very little vehicle damage.  The Defendant stressed this during trial.  Madam Justice Maisonville provided the following reasons addressing the value of this evidence:

[22] The damage to the vehicle was described by the assessing adjuster, with respect to the bumper, as a plastic face all warped, and a gross total damage of $927.31 was found including all taxes. Total labour costs were estimated to be $607.20.

[23] From the pictures that were put in evidence on the summary trial, the vehicle appeared to have sustained only minor damage, but again that does not mean that the plaintiff did not suffer genuine injuries, nor is it the case that with soft tissue injuries there is always a physical presentation that can be seen or felt. The pain remains real to the victim of the accident, and his credibility is not an issue on this application.

The Court went on to find that the collision caused soft tissue injuries that largely resolved after 21 months but continued to occasionally flare.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $20,000 the Court provided the following reasons:

[55] In all of the circumstances, I find while the plaintiff’s injuries had largely resolved within one year and nine months, he has some ongoing complaints of pain, coupled with his inability to perform certain activities as a consequence of his fear of causing flare-ups to his lower back such as carrying heavy objects.

[56] Taking evidence as a whole, I find that the plaintiff has, on a balance of probability, proved he was injured from this accident for one year and nine months and that he presently has some minor complaints on occasion relating to his lower back and neck, but that these are not preventing the plaintiff from enjoying his pre-accident state of health and activity level.

[57] I award the following:  Non-pecuniary  damages: $20,000

For more on this topic you can click here to access my archived posts addressing ICBC’s Low Velocity Impact Policy.

As previously discussed, a collision is not necessary in order for a motorist to be responsible for personal injuries caused to others.  This was demonstrated again in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry.

In this week’s case (Prempeh v. Boisvert) the Plaintiff was a passenger on a bus operated by the Defendant.  The Defendant “vigorously and abruptly applied the brakes to avoid a collision with the two vehicles which had stopped ahead of him“.  This caused the plaintiff, who was standing holding a metal handle, to be thrown down the aisle.  The Plaintiff was injured in the process.

The Plaintiff alleged the driver was negligent in braking hard.  The Defendant disagreed arguing this action was necessary to avoid collision.  Ultimately Madam Justice Dardi found the driver fully liable for the incident for driving without due care an attention.  In assessing the driver at fault the Court provided the following reasons:

[22] Mr. Boisvert was required to brake hard to avoid hitting the two vehicles that had stopped on the roadway in front of the bus he was operating. The first of the vehicles had stopped to turn left on Hamilton Street. The second car stopped behind the left-turning vehicle without a collision and without accompanying honking or screeching of brakes. It can reasonably be inferred that this occurred within a time frame that should have permitted a reasonably prudent user of the road driving behind those vehicles an opportunity to react and brake without incident. The application of the brakes was not a reaction to an emergency or unexpected hazard.

[23] Moreover, Mr. Boisvert properly conceded that, regardless of an abrupt or unexpected stop of a vehicle ahead, in order to prevent accidents prudence mandates that at all times a bus driver drive defensively and maintain a safe cushion or certain distance from a vehicle travelling in front of the bus. This is precisely to be able to stop safely in the event of an unexpected manoeuvre by that vehicle.

[24] I cannot find with precision whether the sudden and hard application of the brakes occurred because Mr. Boisvert was travelling too rapidly, not maintaining a diligent look-out or because he failed to maintain a safe distance from the vehicle in front of him. However, in weighing all of the evidence I have concluded that Mr. Boisvert’s sudden and vigorous application of the brakes, in the context of all the circumstances in this case, establishes a prima facie case of negligence against Mr. Boisvert. It is not conduct attributable to a reasonably prudent bus driver.

[25] Having found a prima facie case of negligence the onus is upon the defendants to establish that Mr. Boisvert was not negligent or that the incident was attributable to some specific cause consistent with the absence of negligence on his part.

[26] I note that Mr. Boisvert’s assertion at his examination for discovery that he could have stopped smoothly but the bus brakes on the new trolley bus “grabbed” and caused a “hard stop” is no answer to this claim.

[27] Mr. Boisvert was an experienced bus driver. The plaintiff was entitled to expect that he would operate the bus in a safe, proper and prudent manner. The plaintiff cannot be expected to assume any risk associated with the operation of the vehicle which could not reasonably be anticipated by a passenger. The usual braking of a driver as he moves through traffic would not cause a passenger to be thrown to the floor so violently. Moreover it is well established on the authorities that the responsibility of a public carrier extends to ensuring that its modes of conveyance permit the bus to be operated in a safe and proper manner: Visanji at para. 32.

[28] I have considered all of the authorities provided by both parties. Though useful as providing guidance on the governing principles, each case turns on its own facts. I note that unlike the circumstances in Lalani v. Wilson, [1988] B.C.J. No. 2408 (Q.L.) (S.C.), upon which the defendant relies, the bus driver here was aware that the plaintiff had fallen - the possibility of injury was self-evident. Mr. Boisvert’s attention was drawn to such a possibility at the time of the incident and in compliance with the bus operator training manual he should have recorded all pertinent information regarding the incident. While the court in Lalani found it would have been unfair to shift the burden, this is not so in this case.

[29] On balance I am not satisfied that the defendants have shown that Mr. Boisvert conducted himself in a reasonable and careful manner consistent with the high duty of care imposed on those engaged in public transit. In the result, I conclude that Mr. Boisvert, however fleetingly, breached the standard of care of a reasonably prudent bus driver. I find the defendants negligent.

Further to my recent post on this topic, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing the recovery of private MRI costs in a personal injury lawsuit.

In last week’s case (Piper v. Hassan) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 rear-end collision.  The Defendant admitted fault for the crash.  The Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries and an aggravation of pre-existing back pain and depression.  The Plaintiff sought substantial damages at trial although much of the claim was not accepted with the Court finding that much of the Plaintiff’s symptoms would have occurred absent the collision due to pre-existing degenerative changes in the plaintiff’s back.

In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff obtained a private MRI.  At trial the Plaintiff sought to recover the cost associated with this.  The Defendant opposed this arguing it was not a reasonable expense.  Mr. Justice Pearlman disagreed and allowed recovery of this item.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[172] Mr. Piper also paid $1,975 for the full spine MRI performed May 18, 2007. The defendant submits this was an unnecessary expense. I disagree.  Dr. McGrath had recommended an MRI study. At a time when the plaintiff was experiencing increased back pain and sought medical advice to determine its cause and possible treatment, it was not unreasonable for him to pay for a private MRI, rather than wait in line for publicly funded radiology. The full spine MRI assisted both Dr. Yu and Dr. McGraw in their diagnoses of the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries attributable to the motor vehicle accident, showed the progression of degenerative changes to the plaintiff’s spine, and aided Dr. McGraw in forming his opinion that the plaintiff had not suffered a disc herniation. I find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,975 for the MRI study.

Reasons for Judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a chronic low back injury following a motor vehicle collision.

In last week’s case (Connolly v. Cowie) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 rear-end collision.  Fault was admitted by the rear motorist.  The 35 year old plaintiff suffered from chronic low back pain following the collision.  Ultimately the injury was diagnosed as an “indiscreet pain syndrome” affecting the plaintiff’s left sacroiliac region.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Mr. Justice Butler provided the following reasons:

[41] In summary, I conclude that Ms. Connolly suffered a significant low back strain as a result of the accident.  The accident has caused injury to the myofascial tissues in her left sacroiliac region.  The injury has not resolved in spite of her aggressive attempts to continue with exercise and chiropractic treatment and some physiotherapy.  She now has chronic pain which is not disabling, but does restrict the type and extent of activities and exercises she can perform.  She is still able to do most household tasks, but it is likely she will continue to experience pain with activities.  It is unlikely that the pain symptoms will resolve…

[45] Here, Ms. Connolly is unable to continue with long distance running.  She does not take medications like Ms. Dutchak, but has persisted with more restricted activities.  In the past, she thrived on the combination of exercise and camaraderie with a group of fellow competitors.  Her inability to continue with that is a significant loss to her.  She has continued to exercise and is now focusing on cycling as a replacement for her previous passion, but has had to give up her dream of working as a fitness instructor.  She put much thought and several years of work into attempting to develop a skill that would provide her with income and help fulfil her desire to do strenuous exercise with like-minded people.  She is no longer able to do that and this is a significant loss.

[46] In addition to these significant losses, she has to put up with continuing pain and it is likely this will not abate in the future.  Considering all of the circumstances, I find that $50,000 is an appropriate award for non-pecuniary loss.

To access my archived posts of other recent BC Supreme Court decisions assessing damages for SI Joint Injuries in ICBC Claims you can click here.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for largely recovered soft tissue injuries.

In last week’s case (Hussain v. Cho) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 rear-end collision.  Fault was admitted by the rear motorist.  The collision caused soft tissue injuries to the Plaintiff’s neck and upper back muscles (specifically the left erector spinae and thoracic paraspinal muscles).

These injuries kept the Plaintiff off work for 6 weeks.  The injuries largely recovered in the first year following the crash but continued to cause some minimal albeit improving symptoms at the time of trial.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $25,000 Mr. Justice Jenkins provided the following reasons:

[21] Based on the above and all of the evidence, I find Ms. Hussain’s injuries arising from the motor vehicle accident of August 24, 2008 consisted of soft tissue injuries to the left erector spinae and thoracic paraspinals evidenced by pain in her mid and lower back, shoulder and neck and as well as headaches. Although Dr. Menzies did state that Ms. Hussain was “probably substantially recovered” from the injuries caused by that motor vehicle accident within one year, she did continue to suffer some pain and headaches for more than a year after the accident. Also, Ms. Hussain’s injuries from the February 2011 “slip and fall” were a “little” worse due to the injuries suffered August 24, 2008…

[26] Considering all of the above findings and authorities, I find the plaintiff to be entitled to a total of $25,000 in non-pecuniary damages which includes $5,000 for diminishment of homemaking capacity. Homemaking was a very significant activity for Ms. Hussain before the accident and it is clear that she struggled at that activity for some time thereafter.

Adding to this site’s archives for non-pecuniary damages for sacroiliac joint injuries, reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing such an injury with pre-existing contribution.

In last week’s case (Fuchser v. Wilson) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2008 collision.  Fault was admitted.   The Plaintiff suffered from various pre-existing injuries including sacroiliac joint pain.  The collision aggravated the Plaintiff’s pre-existing injuries and also caused some new injuries.  The injuries made meaningful recovery in the first year following the collision but continued to bother her at the time of trial.  Madam Justice Russell valued the the Plaintiff’s non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 then reduced this award by 15% to reflect the Plaintiff’s pre-existing condition.  In arriving at this figure the Court provided the following reasons:

[129]   Ms. Fuchser’s medical records show continuing issues with her sacroiliac joint and upper and lower back over several years. In fact, if Dr. Hershler had indeed reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records, he would have found that she had suffered from both upper and lower back pain and on-going pain in her right sacroiliac joint and right upper back as recently as three days before the accident. She reported these issues on a visit to her osteopath on December 4, 2008.

[130]   It is simply not accurate to say that Ms. Fuchser’s symptoms essentially began following the accident. It may be accurate to say that they became worse, based on her reports, but certainly she had suffered from the same or similar symptoms on and off over several years…

[169]   It is my view that the plaintiff in this case suffered from pre-existing conditions, namely scoliosis, pelvic malalignment and sacroiliac joint pain, all associated, which were active and unpredictable. In addition, she suffered right sided pain in her upper back, which was part of her overall condition, but was exacerbated by stress.

[170]   The accident of December 7, 2008 caused an exacerbation of her conditions and she suffered from increased pain which in turn affected the ways in which the pre-existing conditions manifested themselves. She again suffered sleeplessness as she had when her sacroiliac pain had been acute in the past. Her right upper back became stiff and painful, similar to how she had reacted to stress and lower back pain in the past. The headaches were a new manifestation, but no doubt related to the cervical strain she suffered in the accident.

[171]   There can be no doubt that she lived with increased pain over a period of about a year before she began to show improvement…

[173]   I find that there was a measurable risk that the degenerative changes would have become symptomatic without the accident. Dr. Klein agreed that the earlier low back problems she had had came on without any precipitating cause and that the scoliosis and disc protrusion could have explained those problems. He also agreed that tightness in the muscles (as in her right upper back) can be caused by stress…

[193]   I have carefully considered the cases on damages set out in both the plaintiff’s and the defendants’ brief of authorities. I award $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages to be subject to deduction for the pre-existing condition.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a wrist and back injury sustained in a collision.

In last week’s case (Rutter v. Allen) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 collision.  The Defendants were found at fault for the rear-end crash which caused about $18,000 in damage to the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

The Plaintiff sustained a left wrist Triangular Fibrocartilage Tear (a tear to the cartilage at the base of the wrist joint) and soft tissue injuries to the low back.  The TFC tear required surgical correction.

The low back pain became chronic and continued to cause discomfort at the time of trial.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $65,000 Mr. Justice Joyce provided the following reasons:

[26] Mr. Rutter alleges that he sustained an injury to his wrist as a result of the accident, specifically an “ulnar carpal impaction with a tear of the triangular fibrocartilage”. In January 2010, Dr. Perey, an orthopaedic surgeon, operated on Mr. Rutter’s wrist to shorten the ulnar bone, which largely resolved the problem with the wrist, although Mr. Rutter testified that he still had occasional sharp pains in his wrist…

[40] In my view, there is a body of evidence, which I accept that supports the opinions of the medical experts. The evidence as a whole supports a finding, on balance, that the accident was the underlying cause of the problem and that but for this accident, Mr. Rutter would not have developed the wrist problem that was eventually corrected by surgery…

[52] Mr. Rutter has an underlying spondylolisthesis, which is a condition in which the vertebrae are out of proper position, but this was largely asymptomatic prior to the motor vehicle accident.

[53] I find that Mr. Rutter’s suffers chronic back pain that was caused by the accident of December 15, 2006. I find further that it is unlikely that he will return to his pre-accident level of activity, although it is likely that he can achieve some improvement with regular exercise, including core muscle strength training…

[65] Mr. Rutter led a very active life before the accident and was involved in a number of sports, particularly golf and running. His injuries, particularly the back injury, have led to a significant change in lifestyle for Mr. Rutter. Since the accident, Mr. Rutter has had to reduce his sporting activities substantially. He is also curtailed somewhat in his day-to-day activities, including assisting with housework and household maintenance. He has difficulty sleeping and, at times, is more irritable than he was before the accident. Fortunately, Mr. Rutter has been able to maintain his full-time employment despite his symptoms. I am satisfied that Mr. Rutter finds his life today more frustrating and less enjoyable than previously. Mr. Rutter suffers chronic back pain that is likely to continue well into the future, although Dr. le Nobel is of the opinion that if Mr. Rutter engages in an exercise regime that is developed and maintained with the assistance of a physiotherapist and kinesiologist some improvement in his symptoms is probable…

[77] In my view, the chronic low back pain which Mr. Rutter experiences has a more significant impact on his life and the prognosis for significant improvement is not as good as was the case inMawji and Perez. In my view, the authorities cited by Mr. Rutter are more representative of an appropriate range of non-pecuniary damages considering the nature and effect of his injuries. I assess non-pecuniary damages at $65,000.00.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, addressing damages for chronic soft tissue injuries arising from a motor vehicle collision.

In last week’s case (Milburn v. Ernst) the Plaintiff was operating a motorcycle when it was rear-ended by the Defendant’s vehicle.  The impact “resulted in the motorcycle becoming embedded in the gill of the (Defendant’s vehicle); to the point that only half of the motorcycle could be seen protruding from the front of the car“.

The Plaintiff, although he missed little time from work, suffered soft tissue injuries that were expected to pose long term limitations.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $50,000 Madam Justice Fitzpatrick made the following findings and provided the following reasons:

[96] After having considered the evidence from Mr. Milburn, the evidence of his independent witnesses and the medical evidence referred to above, I find as a fact that Mr. Milburn suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident:

a)       he was bruised in the pelvic region, he had wrist pain and he had some cognitive dysfunction and sleep disturbance, all of which were resolved shortly after the accident;

b)       he had some chest pain in the fall of 2007 arising from his temporary use of crutches after the knee surgery;

c)       he had severe pain in his neck, back and shoulder, all of which were largely resolved by December 2007;

d)       the disc bulges found to be present in Mr. Milburn’s spine were not caused by the accident but were rendered symptomatic as a result of the accident; and

e)       he continues to experience discomfort and mild pain in his neck and back from time to time, which increases to the point of severity depending on his level of physical activity and his level of physical fitness…

[105] I accept the evidence of Mr. Milburn that he enjoyed an active and physical life before the accident. In the aftermath of the accident, he experienced significant pain and discomfort relating to his injuries at that time which, for the most part, were resolved by December 2007.

[106] Since the accident, he has struggled to deal with the back and neck pain that arises from time to time, particularly given his employment, which is physically demanding and at times, can be quite physically demanding. He has not, however, required prescription medicine to deal with that, which speaks to the severity of the pain that he experiences from time to time. In addition, his doctors have recommended that with a proper exercise regime and with care taken in the manner of lifting and other physical activities, he should be able to minimize the difficulties that he might otherwise have. This recommendation appears to have been taken up by Mr. Milburn in that he is now regularly exercising on his own.

[107] His need of physiotherapy for some years now has been infrequent, a sign that the need for more formal treatment has not been great, despite what he describes as “flare-ups” in his condition.

[108] Based on the medical evidence of Dr. Badii, which I accept, his condition is not expected to materially improve from this time forward and as such, it is to be expected that Mr. Milburn will continue to suffer some pain in the future.

[109] In addition, I find that the accident has resulted in Mr. Milburn abandoning some of his recreational activities, such as kickboxing, snowboarding and rollerblading. In addition, some of his favourite activities have been curtailed. His love and enjoyment of motorcycling is now somewhat limited to the extent that he has to stop frequently while on long rides. In addition, acting roles with stunt assignments are no longer open to him, an activity that he particularly enjoyed although such roles were limited.

[110] I accept that the accident has also affected his personal life in that he has some pain accomplishing more physically demanding tasks around the home. I note, however, that he continues to enjoy what can only be called very physical activities, and no doubt more enjoyable activities, such as weightlifting, ATVing, scuba diving, snorkeling and horseback riding.

[111] I find that Mr. Milburn is entitled to non-pecuniary damages in the amount of $50,000.

This case is also worth reviewing for the Court’s discussion of the ‘adverse inference‘ principle.  In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff obtained two privileged medico-legal reports.  The Plaintiff maintained the claim of privilege through trial and did not introduce these reports into evidence.  The Defendant argued that an adverse inference should be drawn.  Madam Justice Fitzpatrick disagreed and provided the following reasons:

[87] The defence also points out that in Mr. Milburn’s list of documents, he listed two privileged medical-legal reports dated June 11 and 12, 2010. These were commissioned by Mr. Milburn’s counsel but were never served or presented at trial. The defence submits that an adverse inference should be drawn that the evidence in those reports would be contrary to Mr. Milburn’s case. Cases cited in support include Buksh v. Miles, 2008 BCCA 318 at paras. 30-35, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 608; Bronson v. Hewitt, 2010 BCSC 169 at paras. 323-337, 58 E.T.R. (3d) 14; Bouchard v. Brown Bros. Motor Lease Canada Ltd., 2011 BCSC 762 at paras. 118-122. In Buksh, at para. 31, the court cites from Barker v. McQuahe (1964), 49 W.W.R. 685 (B.C.C.A.) at 689, that in a personal injury claim, the plaintiff “ought to call all doctors who attended him in respect of any important aspect of the matters that are in dispute, or explain why he does not do so.”

[88] In my view, this is not an appropriate case to conclude that an adverse inference should be drawn. There is no evidence that the authors of those reports even saw Mr. Milburn. If so, Mr. Milburn could have been examined on the point and copies of clinical notes obtained, such as was done in Bouchard (see also para. 35 of Buksh). Mr. Milburn’s counsel has advised that this evidence was not submitted because it was of no assistance to the court, not that it was adverse to the current medical evidence. In fact, there may have been any number of reasons why the reports were not submitted and while it is possible that they contradicted the reports of Drs. Behroozi and Badii either in whole or in part, it is equally possible that they did not materially add to those reports. As was noted by the court in Bronson at para. 329, an adverse inference can only be drawn if such testimony would be superior in respect of the facts to be proved.

[89] Counsel for Mr. Milburn is entitled to prepare his case, and obtain whatever expert reports that might assist in advancing his case. To suggest that any decision not to use an unidentified expert report leads to an adverse inference in respect of any case is going well beyond the general proposition relating to adverse inferences. The disclosure process is intended to provide opposing counsel with the means of testing the claim of privilege, not to allow such claims to be made that an adverse inference should be drawn in these circumstances.

Reasons for judgment were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a long-standing sacroiliac joint injury.

In last week’s case (Madsen v. Bekker) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2006 collision.  He suffered various injuries the most serious of which was a strain to his sacroiliac joint.  His symptoms largely recovered although mildly continued through trial and were expected to linger into the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $40,000 Mr. Justice Truscott provided the following reasons for judgement:

154] I accept the opinion of Dr. McGraw that the plaintiff sustained a strain of his left sacroiliac joint and I reject the opinion of Dr. Watt that it was rather a soft tissue injury to his left iliopsoas muscle and his left piriformis muscle.

[155] Dr. Watt may not have diagnosed a sacroiliac joint strain but he was not prepared to disagree with Dr. McGraw’s diagnosis of that.

[156] Dr. McGraw proved his diagnosis through the image-guided diagnostic block of the joint on March 3, 2009 and October 22, 2009.

[157] In his report of July 24, 2008 Dr. McGraw diagnosed grade 1 soft tissue injury to the lower back area and Dr. Watt in his report of February 9, 2011 also described complaints of non-radiating low back pain at the time of his assessment of January 17, 2011. To that extent the diagnosis of both doctors is similar…

[159] I am prepared to accept some present minor low back injury related to a strain of the left sacroiliac joint causing mild pain at times of prolonged lifting, bending or crouching but I also do not consider that this pain has been disabling to any of the plaintiff’s activities at all…

[163] Although Dr. McGraw says that consideration could be given to a surgical fusion or arthrodesis of the left sacroiliac joint if the joint pain is not managed in the long-term by conservative treatments such as injections, or doing nothing and becoming fit, he does not recommend surgical intervention.

[164] With this opinion of Dr. McGraw that I accept I do not consider the chance of surgical intervention to be at any level sufficient for an award of compensation.

[165] I am satisfied from all the evidence that the plaintiff’s effort to become more fit through his own exercise routines is working sufficiently to resolve the strain in his left sacroiliac joint and any related low back soft tissue injury.

[166] I decline to apply any adverse inference against the plaintiff for failing to call Dr. Feldman, a physiatrist who attended on him. The plaintiff says he was simply told, as Dr. Parkin had told him, to rest. Even if I were to apply any adverse inference I would not know what that inference would be other than the opinion would be no different than all the evidence I have heard.

[167] I am prepared to accept that the plaintiff’s complaints have continued for over four years, but at a mild level, and I consider an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life should be in the amount of $40,000.

For other recent BC Caselaw dealing with non-pecuniary damages for sacroiliac joint injuries you can click here to access my archived posts.

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vernon Registry, assessing damages arising from injuries sustained a motor vehicle collision.

In last week’s case (Smith v. Williams) the Plaintiff was a young veterinarian.  She was involved in a 2009 collision.  The Defendant crossed the centre-line and caused a head-on collision.  The Plaintiff sustained chronic soft tissue injuries and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  The Plaintiff’s symptoms were on-going at the time of trial.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $75,000 Mr. Justice Betton provided the following reasons:

[33] The plaintiff indicated that the accident has left her with a feeling of vulnerability. She is very anxious in a motor vehicle, especially on highways, envisioning accidents unfolding. There are occasional panic attacks. She gets a tingling and pain down her right arm that is aggravated by repetitive motion and particular movements or positions. One of these, I note, was holding her child while breastfeeding. Others relate to her work as a vet.

[34] She spoke of how the physical and psychological injuries have adversely affected her enjoyment of her wedding and her regret for how she reacted to the stresses associated with the wedding toward her husband. For her part, the plaintiff indicates that she simply battles through her restrictions. She says that the more physically demanding her day, the greater the consequences in symptoms…

[43] This plaintiff is a young professional, early in her career. She has historically been a high-achiever, endowed with intelligence, motivation and physical ability. The motor vehicle collision came as she was planning her wedding and the purchase of a business. Her wedding, as described by her, was not the enjoyable experience that she, as a young woman, had dreamed of.

[44] The purchase of the business completed, and she has been able to live up to the work demands of that practice, facilitated in part by the fact that it is less demanding than work she did prior to acquiring the practice. In addition, her absence for maternity leave coincided with her rehabilitation. She has actively engaged in rehabilitation during all of the significant developments in her life, including being a new mother. The Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms linger and also influence the enjoyment of an activity which is part of everyday life, that is, driving…

[53] Taking what one can from those authorities and applying the general principles, as referenced in Stapley, it is my conclusion that an appropriate award for general damages is $75,000.