ICBC Law

BC Injury Law and ICBC Claims Blog

Erik MagrakenThis Blog is authored by British Columbia ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken. Erik is a partner with the British Columbia personal injury law-firm MacIsaac & Company. He restricts his practice exclusively to plaintiff-only personal injury claims with a particular emphasis on ICBC injury claims involving orthopaedic injuries and complex soft tissue injuries. Please visit often for the latest developments in matters concerning BC personal injury claims and ICBC claims

Erik Magraken does not work for and is not affiliated in any way with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC). Please note that this blog is for information only and is not claim-specific legal advice.  Erik can only provide legal advice to clients. Please click here to arrange a free consultation.

Archive for January, 2017

Court – Consent to Defendant Medical Exam Terms Or Risk Claim Dismissal

January 30th, 2017

Forced consent is a strange concept and one that has found its way into injury litigation yet again.

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering a plaintiff to attend a Defence medical exam and to sign a consent form or risk claim dismissal.

In today’s case (Gill v. Wal-Mart Corporation) the Plaintiff alleged injury following a slip and fall.  The Plaintiff agreed to attend an independent medical assessment requested by the Defendant but refused to sign the doctor’s ‘consent’ form.  In ordering the Plaintiff to sign or risk claim dismissal Mr. Justice Funt provided the following reasons:

[39]         With respect to the Master’s second reason that the plaintiff would not be signing the form of consent voluntarily, I respectfully disagree. The plaintiff may choose not to sign the consent form in which case the IME will not be conducted. The defendant may, however, bring an application to strike the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant.

[40]         Although not necessary having regard to the binding authority of Kalaora, I note that the case at bar is readily distinguishable from Peel where our Court of Appeal set aside an order requiring particular parties to endorse a “consent order”. Ordering endorsement of a “consent” court order is not consent. In the case at bar, in context, the court is not forcing the plaintiff to sign the form of consent. If the plaintiff chooses not to sign the form of consent, the plaintiff’s claim may be struck. It is the plaintiff’s choice…

[52]         The plaintiff is ordered to sign the subject form of consent used by Dr. Travlos. If the plaintiff refuses to sign the form of consent, the defendant, Mr. Pandher, is at liberty to apply to have the plaintiff’s claim struck.


Supreme Court of Canada – CPP Payments Non Deductible From Excess Insurance Policy

January 27th, 2017

Reasons for judgement were released today by the Supreme Court of Canada rejecting an insurer’s attempt to restrict the amounts payable under a policy of excess insurance.

In today’s case (Sabean v. Portage La Prarie Mutual Insurance Co.) the Plaintiff was injured in a Nova Scotia motor vehicle accident and was awarded $465,400 by a jury.  The at fault motorist had insufficient insurance to pay and the Plaintiff was only able to collect $382,000.  The Plaintiff had under-insured motorist protection with the Defendant insurance company and applied to recover the shortfall.  The Defendant sought to deduct any Canada Pension Plan disability benefits from their obligation.

The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with the Defendant and found that CPP benefits could not be deducted from the insurer’s obligation to pay.  In reaching this decision the Court provided the following reasons:

[2]                              The Endorsement stipulates that future benefits from a “policy of insurance providing disability benefits” are deducted from the shortfall in determining the amount payable by the insurer (cl. 4(b)(vii)). The issue in this appeal is whether the Canada Pension Plan  (CPP ) is a “policy of insurance” for that purpose.

[3]                              The trial judge in this case found that CPP  benefits were not benefits from a “policy of insurance” under the Endorsement and thus would not be deducted from the amount payable by the insurer. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the CPP  was a “policy of insurance” under the Endorsement.[1]

[4]                              I agree with the trial judge. The ordinary meaning of the words at issue is clear, reading this Endorsement as a whole. An insurer cannot rely on its specialized knowledge of the jurisprudence to advance an interpretation that goes beyond the clear words of the policy. An average person applying for this additional insurance coverage would understand a “policy of insurance” to mean an optional, private insurance contract and not a mandatory statutory scheme such as the CPP . Thus, future CPP  disability benefits do not reduce the amount payable by the insurer under the Endorsement.

[41]                          In sum, with respect to amounts that the eligible claimant is “entitled to recover”, cl. 4 (b) specifies nine sources that give rise to deductions from the amount payable by the insurer, none of which include the CPP . The ordinary meaning of a “policy of insurance” in cl. 4(b)(vii) of the Endorsement is clear. It refers to a private insurance policy purchased by the insured. Portage has asked this Court to read into those clear words the jurisprudence related to the collateral benefits rule in tort so that a “policy of insurance” would also include the CPP  regime. As noted above, I cannot agree. Thus, the ordinary meaning of the words “policy of insurance” in cl. 4(b)(vii) does not include the CPP  regime.

[42]                          The clear language of the provision, reading the contract as a whole, is unambiguous. There are no “two reasonable but differing interpretations of the policy”: B. Billingsley, General Principles of Canadian Insurance Law (2nd ed. 2014), at p. 147; Chilton v. Co-operators General Insurance Co. (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 161, (C.A., at p. 169). The mere articulation of a differing interpretation does not always establish the reasonableness of that interpretation and does not necessarily create ambiguity.

In British Columbia, it is well understood that CPP benefits are deductible from ICBC’s obligation to provide UMP payments.  This decision likely does  not change this reality as payments “to which the insured is entitled under the Canada Pension Plan” are expressly defined as a “deductible amount” in the legislation defining payable UMP benefits.


Why Tostitos “Breathalyzer” Chip Bag Will Likely Get Them Sued

January 26th, 2017

(Image via adweek)

The Super Bowl is right around the corner and like many other company’s Tostitos is hoping to cash in.

Their angle?  A chip bag that doubles as a breathalyzer.  As reported by Time,

The limited-edition “Party Safe” bag is meant to discourage drinking and driving, and will even provide those with a trace of alcohol on their breath with a $10 Uber code on the day of the big game. The company promises it comes equipped with an alcohol sensor that, when breathed into, will turn red if alcohol is detected and green if it’s not.

Let me break down, as simply as possible, as to why a lawsuit is all but assured

  • They have created a gimmick intended to sell product
  • the gimmick is targeted to those who have been drinking and are considering driving
  • The gimmick will give a literal ‘green light’ to drive
  • The chip bag technology, I assume, will not be foolproof
  • A drunk will drive relying on the bag
  • Some misfortune will, in all likelihood, arise

This is a terrible idea.  To quote the the Lawrence Police on Twitter

Lawrence Police on Twitter


Court Orders Several Injury Claims Tried Together Due to Fraud Allegations

January 24th, 2017

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, ordering several lawsuits to be heard together due to allegations of fraud.

In today’s case (ICBC v. Singh) the court reviewed an application requesting that seven personal injury actions involving motor vehicle accident claims related to three separate collisions be tried together.

In addition to the injury claims ICBC sued the individuals alleging that they “knew each other and conspired to stage the accidents to make false personal injury claims.

ICBC applied to have all the lawsuits tried together. In granting the application Madam Justice Duncan provided the following reasons:

[34]        The authorities provide a non-exhaustive list of facts to consider when making a determination on consolidation or, as in this case, ordering that actions be heard together. The factors are derived from Merritt, as well as Shah v. Bakken, [1996] BCLR No. 2836, and Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Sam, [1998] BCJ No. 947:

1.       Will consolidation create a saving in pre-trial procedures?

2.      Will there be a real reduction in the number of trial days taken up by the actions heard together?

3.      What is the potential for a party to be seriously inconvenienced by being required to attend a trial in which they only have a marginal interest?

4.      Will there be a real saving in experts’ time and witness fees?

5.      Is there a common issue of fact or law that makes it desirable to dispose of both (all) actions at the same time?

6.      Will consolidation avoid a multiplicity of proceedings?

7.      What are the relative stages of the actions?

8.      Would consolidation delay the trial and prejudice one or some of the parties?

9.      Would there be a risk of inconsistent results?

[35]        In this case, an order that the actions be heard together should result in a saving in pre-trial procedures. There would be one discovery of ICBC representatives concerning the fraud allegations rather than separately scheduled days of discovery, one per defendant. There would likely be a real reduction in the number of days required for trial if the actions were heard together, rather than as seven tort actions and one fraud action, as a repetition of evidence could be avoided. Parties could be excused for the portions of the trial which do not relate to them, saving their time and expense in that regard.

[36]        Conversely, the actions could be heard in stages with the ICBC fraud action scheduled first as it might determine, in whole or in part, the viability of the individual tort actions. This, of course, would be dependent on the views of a judge at a case planning conference or a judicial management conference.

[37]        The common issues of fact or law as between these actions is manifest in the pleadings and in the documents placed before the court by ICBC. The question is whether these accidents were staged by the parties. The parties knew one another, or at least knew one person with connection to more than one of the collisions. Mr. Haghmohammadi has some involvement in Collision #1 as he gave Ms. Prakash the vehicle she was driving at the time. Mr. Inderjit Singh, who drove the vehicle which allegedly injured Ms. Prakash and Ms. Mehran in Collision #1, had business dealings with Mr. Haghmohammadi in the sale of rebuilt motor vehicles and was in fact involved in Collision #3 with him.

[38]        If individual trials were held, inconsistent results could ensue. It is no answer to say that Ms. Prakash’s trial would create res judicata in relation to issues of alleged fraud arising from Collision #1, as Ms. Mehran has a separate proceeding arising from the same accident and Mr. Inderjit Singh is also a litigant in relation to Collision #3. Determining what issues were adjudicated in the first trial would not be straightforward and might visit unfairness on others who were not parties at Ms. Prakash’s trial.

[39]        I acknowledge that Ms. Prakash’s action is set for hearing in February and an order that the matters be heard together will necessitate an adjournment of that trial; however, I am satisfied of a high degree of interconnectedness between the parties and that it is in the interests of justice that the matters be heard together, or as directed following the case planning process or by judicial management, if a judge is appointed to hear the matter.


Slip and Fall Lawsuit Dismissed Due to No Evidence of Moisture

January 24th, 2017

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Kelowna Registry, dismissing a slip and fall lawsuit after a plaintiff failed to prove the existence of any hazard.

In today’s case (Hanes v. Loblaws, Inc) the Plaintiff fell and injured her knee and back while shopping at the Defendant’s store in 2010.  She sued for damages alleging the fall was caused by moisture on the floor.  The Plaintiff ” did not see water on the floor” before or after the fall but assumed the floor was wet because “when she took off her jacket, the back of it was wet“.  The Court dismissed the claim finding this was insufficient to find liability.  In doing so Madam Justice Russell provided the following reasons:

[139]     There is simply no evidence that Ms. Hanes’ fall was caused by moisture on the floor, whether that was a pool of water, or just general moisture causing the surface to become unreasonably slippery.

[140]     The only indication of the presence of moisture at all comes from an assumption on Ms. Hanes’ part that the moisture she says she felt on the back of her jacket, a jacket that did not cover her buttocks, following her fall was caused by water on the floor.

[141]     This evidence is completely uncorroborated. The video disk shows many customers, employees, and managers walking back and forth across the area where she fell before and after the incident. None of them seems to have noticed anything wrong with the surface, and none appears to have lost traction as they traversed the area around the customer service desk.

[142]     Numerous employees inspected the floor and found neither pools of water nor a moist surface.

[143]     It is my view that Ms. Hanes’ shoes were already wet when she entered the store due both to her crossing the snowy church parking lot, and residual moisture on the concrete outside the store.

[144]     With the wet leather soles and high heels she was wearing, it would have been very easy for her to skid a little on her right high heel and to turn her ankle, causing her to fall. However, assigning any cause to her fall is itself speculative.

[145]     In my view, her fall was truly an accident and liability cannot be found against Superstore.

[146]     I also cannot find fault with the quality of the surface of the floor in the Superstore, and I find that the program in place to keep the floor as clean and dry as possible in the circumstances met a reasonable standard of safety.

[147]     It is clear from the witnesses’ evidence and from the video disks that the cleaning program was underway the morning of the fall right up to the time Ms. Hanes fell.

[148]     Ms. Hanes has not established that Loblaws is liable for her fall and injuries. Therefore, it is unnecessary for me to address the damages she alleges she has suffered.

[149]     The plaintiff’s action is dismissed with costs to the defendant.


Plaintiff Stripped of Costs For Failing to Beat Defence Offer

January 19th, 2017

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, stripping a Plaintiff of post offer costs after receiving a jury award less than a pre-trial defence settlement offer.

In today’s case (Rutter v. Vadnais) the Plaintiff was injured and sued for damages.  About 2 years prior to trial the Defendant offered to settle for $50,000.  The offer was rejected and at trial a jury awarded global damages of $20,000.

The Court stripped the Plaintiff of costs from the time of the offer forward which would significantly impact the award given the costs of running the trial.  In reaching this decision Madam Justice Brown provided the following reasons:

[12]         Turning to the effect of the offers exchanged in this matter, Rule 9-1(5) and (6) provides:

Cost options

(5) In a proceeding in which an offer to settle has been made, the court may do one or more of the following:

(a) deprive a party of any or all of the costs, including any or all of the disbursements, to which the party would otherwise be entitled in respect of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery or service of the offer to settle;

(b) award double costs of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery or service of the offer to settle;

(c) award to a party, in respect of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery or service of the offer to settle, costs to which the party would have been entitled had the offer not been made;

(d) if the offer was made by a defendant and the judgment awarded to the plaintiff was no greater than the amount of the offer to settle, award to the defendant the defendant’s costs in respect of all or some of the steps taken in the proceeding after the date of delivery or service of the offer to settle.

[am. B.C. Reg. 119/2010, Sch. A, s. 21.]

Considerations of court

(6) In making an order under subrule (5), the court may consider the following:

(a) whether the offer to settle was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted, either on the date that the offer to settle was delivered or served or on any later date;

(b) the relationship between the terms of settlement offered and the final judgment of the court;

(c) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;

(d) any other factor the court considers appropriate.

[13]         The plaintiff in this case had strong medical opinions to support her position. The defence position was contrary to the weight of the medical evidence. Although the jury award is less than that offered by the defendant, I am not persuaded that the offer made was one that ought reasonably to have been accepted either on the date that the offer was delivered or any later date. As Madam Justice Adair said in Currie v. McKinnon, 2012 BCSC 1165 at para. 20: “While the purpose of the Rule is to encourage reasonable settlements, parties should not be unduly deterred from bringing meritorious, but uncertain, claims because of the fear of a punishing costs order.”

[14]         Second, while the amount recovered is less than the settlement offer, that is rarely a determinative factor, particularly as jury awards are more difficult to predict than judge assessments (Smagh v. Bumbrah, 2009 BCSC 623 at para. 13).

[15]         The relative financial circumstances are also a neutral factor in this case. Although Ms. Rutter does have some assets, I am not able to say that losing her costs or paying Ms. Vadnais her costs would not have a dramatic financial effect on Ms. Rutter.

[16]         Finally, although the defendant suggests that the history of negotiations between the parties is such that the offer of $50,000 was reasonable in response to the plaintiffs immediately preceding offer of $61,000, I am persuaded by the plaintiff’s response submissions that there were good reasons for her increasing her offer beyond $61,000 “as her retraining exposed her to physical demands of what she could expect to encounter ‘on the ward’ this showed her that her loss was likely to be more than she had previously thought.” The offer of $61,000 was made at the start of her retraining.

[17]         In conclusion, having considered the submissions of the parties and the factors set out in Rule 9-1, the plaintiff will have her costs of the action at Scale B until March 15, 2014, a reasonable time in which to consider the defendant’s offer. The parties will bear their own costs thereafter.


$4.5 Million Cost of Care Assessment in Paraplegia Injury Case

January 18th, 2017

Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing future care damages in the case of paraplegia.

In today’s case (Warick v. Diwell) the Plaintiff was involved in an “extremely serious” collision in 2009 where an oncoming semi truck/trailer crossed into their lane.  The Plaintiff’s husband and two friends were killed as a result of the impact.  The Plaintiff suffered profound injuries and was left paraplegic.

The parties settled all aspects of their claim except the future care costs.  The Court provided the following summary of applicable legal principles in future care assessments prior to assessing the Plaintiff’s significant damages.

[201]     The essential principles that determine an award for the cost of future care are not really in issue in this case, with each party simply emphasizing different aspects of the same overall body of authority in their submissions.

[202]     With respect to the standard of proof to be met, “[a] plaintiff who seeks compensation for future pecuniary loss need not prove on a balance of probabilities … that she will require future care because of the wrong done to her. If the plaintiff establishes a real and substantial risk of future pecuniary loss, she is entitled to compensation…”:  Graham v. Rourke (1990), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).

[203]     Claims made for future care must be both medically justified and reasonable. An award “should reflect what the evidence establishes is reasonably necessary to preserve the plaintiff’s health”:  Milina v. Bartsch (1985), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33 (S.C.) at paras. 199 and 201; aff’d (1987), 49 B.C.L.R (2d) 99 (C.A.).

[204]     This requirement of medical justification, as opposed to medical necessity “requires only some evidence that the expense claimed is directly related to the disability arising out of the accident, and is incurred with a view toward ameliorating its impact”:  Harrington v. Sangha, 2011 BCSC 1035, at para. 151.

[205]     The question has often been framed as being whether a reasonably-minded person of ample means would be ready to incur a particular expense:  Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 at p. 245.

[206]     The evidence with respect to the specific care required does not need to be provided by a medical doctor:  Jacobsen v. Nike Canada Ltd. (1996), 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 63, (S.C.) at para. 182. However, there must be some evidentiary link drawn between the physician’s assessment of pain, disability, and recommended treatment and the care recommended by a qualified health care professional:  Gregory v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2011 BCCA 144 at para. 39.

[207]     Damages for the cost of future care are assessed, not mathematically calculated:  Uhrovic v. Masjhuri, 2008 BCCA 462 at paras. 28-31. There is an inherent degree of uncertainty and discretion in making such awards. Because awards are made “once and for all” at the time of trial, judges must “peer into the future” and fix the damages “as best they can”. This includes allowing contingencies for the possibility that the future may differ from what the evidence at trial indicates:  Krangle (Guardian ad litem of) v. Brisco, 2002 SCC 9, at para. 21.

[208]     While no award should be made in relation to an expense that the plaintiff will not actually incur (Izony v. Weidlich, 2006 BCSC 1315 at para. 74), the focus of inquiry when a justified item or service was previously unused, is whether it is “likely to be incurred on a going forward basis”:  Gilbert v. Bottle, 2011 BCSC 1389 at para. 251.

[209]     A plaintiff is not entitled to an award for that portion of their costs of future care that will be publicly funded. However, the risk that access to public funds may be lost in future is a proper basis to provide a contingency in the award:  Boren v. Vancouver Resource Society for the Physically Disabled, 2003 BCCA 388 at para. 25[6].)

 


BC Court of Appeal – No Reverse Onus in Bus Driver Liability Claims

January 10th, 2017

There are a line of cases suggesting that once a plaintiff passenger establishes that he or she was injured while riding on a public carrier, a prima facie case of negligence is made out.

Today reasons were released by the BC Court of Appeal finding this is not so.

In today’s case (Benavides v. ICBC) the Plaintiff was awarded damages after being injured on a bus.  At trial the Court found the driver was negligent.  On appeal the BC Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge was wrong in finding there is a reverse onus in such cases however upheld the result on the basis that there was sufficient evidence to establish driver negligence.

The BC Court of Appeal provided the following reasons setting out the principles of liability:

[17]         I draw from this review of the law the following principles:

·       The mere fact that a passenger is injured while riding on a public carrier does not establish a prima facie case of negligence.

·       The plaintiff bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the defendant breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff.

·       Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence, in practical terms the burden shifts to the defendant to answer the case against him and to show that he was not negligent.


$175,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Post Concussion Syndrome and Chronic Pain

January 5th, 2017

Reasons for judgement were published today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a “violent” collision resulting in a permanent brain injury and chronic pain.

In today’s case (Sundin v. Turnbull) the Plaintiff was rear-ended while riding his motorcycle in 2012.  The collision was severe with the motorcycle being embedded in the Defendant’s truck as a result of the forces involved.

The Plaintiff suffered a head injury and post concussive symptoms lingered.  The Plaintiff developed chronic pain and the prognosis for the conditions was poor with residual permanent disability.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $175,000 Madam Justice Gerow provided the following reasons:

[106]     As stated earlier, the accident involving Mr. Sundin and Mr. Turnbull was a violent one. Mr. Sundin’s motorcycle was embedded into Mr. Turnbull’s pickup truck and Mr. Sundin was thrown through the air landing on the pavement. Immediately after the accident Mr. Sundin was dazed and spitting out teeth.

[107]     As well, there is no issue regarding Mr. Sundin’s credibility. I found that Mr. Sundin provided evidence in a straight forward and reliable fashion. I accept his symptoms as he described them are genuine.

[108]     There is no question that Mr. Sundin’s life has changed profoundly as a result of the accident. Prior to the accident Mr. Sundin had a history of performing at a high level in both his work and personal life.

[109]     As set out earlier, all the experts agree that Mr. Sundin suffered a MTBI, as well as numerous soft tissue injuries and damage to his teeth in the accident. As Dr. Benavente, the defendant’s expert, acknowledged, Mr. Sundin continues to suffer from post-concussion syndrome as a direct result of the head injury he sustained in the accident. Mr. Sundin’s ongoing symptoms of chronic headaches, problems with concentration and memory, and mood problems are attributable to the post-concussion syndrome.

[110]     As well as his cognitive problems, the expert and lay evidence establishes that as a result of the accident, Mr. Sundin suffers from chronic pain in his neck, shoulders and back, problems with his teeth and jaw, and some ongoing pain in his hips and knees. The evidence is that it is unlikely Mr. Sundin will recover to his pre-accident condition, mentally or physically. Mr. Sundin is having a difficult time accepting that he cannot perform physically or mentally as he did before the accident, and as a result has developed an adjustment disorder. The ongoing symptoms Mr. Sundin is suffering from as a result of the accident impact every aspect of his life.

[111]     As noted in Stapley, the assessment of non-pecuniary damages depends on the particular circumstances of the plaintiff in each case. Having considered Mr. Sundin’s age, the nature of his injuries, the severity of his symptoms and the fact they have been ongoing for four years with little improvement, the ongoing treatments, the psychological, cognitive and memory problems, and the guarded prognosis for full recovery, as well as the authorities, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages is $175,000.


$65,000 Non-Pecuniary Assessment for Concussion with Lingering Headaches

January 3rd, 2017

Adding to this site’s archived cases addressing damages for traumatic brain injury, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a concussion with lingering headaches.

In today’s case (Barr v. Accurate Transmission and Driveline) the Plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while in a cross walk.  She sustained a concussion with various lingering post concussive symptoms.

In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $65,000 Mr. Justice Williams provided the following reasons:

[15]         Ms. Barr’s principal injury was diagnosed as a closed head injury. In the report of Dr. Tessler, the neurologist, it is reported that she “likely sustained a Mild Concussive Injury or Mild Traumatic Brain Injury at the lower end of the spectrum of such injuries.”

[16]         Following her release from the hospital, Ms. Barr saw her family doctor, Dr. McCarthy. I note that Ms. Barr had also been under Dr. McCarthy’s care with respect to the problems she had been experiencing as a result of the workplace difficulties.

[17]         In her report and her trial testimony, Dr. McCarthy described the plaintiff’s symptoms following the accident as well as her observations and recommendations over the ensuing months. These included soft tissue injuries entailing extensive bruising and tenderness and also a series of symptoms that are collectively characterized as post-concussion syndrome: complaint of headache, dizziness, nausea, as well as a heightened sensitivity to light and activity. The bruising and associated discomfort resolved in a fairly short time; the post-concussion symptoms continued for a longer time, but Ms. Barr was able to increase her activities, with her dizziness and nausea ultimately resolving. The only noted residual symptom was occasional headache, dealt with by rest and over-the-counter medication.

[18]         The plaintiff described the aftereffects of the motor vehicle accident, beyond the physical bruising. She said she had episodes of headache, that her memory was less reliable, and that her concentration abilities were diminished. She said as well that her mood was affected, in that she was less cheerful and patient, particularly with her husband.

36]         In my view, the injuries sustained in the accident had a reasonably serious impact on Ms. Barr, both in terms of the accident’s immediate aftermath, and its longer term effects. These lingering effects have impacted her self-confidence and the range of leisure activities she can pursue. Moreover, they have adversely affected her mood and outlook.

[37]         That, in turn, has impaired her relationship with her husband. In this context, I note that he is somewhat compromised, in that he has a significant short-term memory deficit. Consequently, he relies on the plaintiff to be the strong one in the family. I am satisfied that her competence and confidence to fulfill this role have been diminished.

[38]         There is as well the matter of the plaintiff’s headaches. Those have not resolved; they still occur from time to time. I am satisfied that that condition is in part attributable to the accident.

[39]         Finally, I note that, prior to the accident, Ms. Barr was what I would describe as an otherwise healthy person just embarking upon what should be a special time of her life, her retirement. These injuries will, to some degree, negatively affect this period of her life.

[43]         In the result, having taken into account the authorities to which I have been referred, and the circumstances as I find them to be, it is my conclusion that an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages is $65,000.