ICBC Law

BC Injury Law and ICBC Claims Blog

Erik MagrakenThis Blog is authored by British Columbia ICBC injury claims lawyer Erik Magraken. Erik is a partner with the British Columbia personal injury law-firm MacIsaac & Company. He restricts his practice exclusively to plaintiff-only personal injury claims with a particular emphasis on ICBC injury claims involving orthopaedic injuries and complex soft tissue injuries. Please visit often for the latest developments in matters concerning BC personal injury claims and ICBC claims

Erik Magraken does not work for and is not affiliated in any way with the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC). Please note that this blog is for information only and is not claim-specific legal advice.  Erik can only provide legal advice to clients. Please click here to arrange a free consultation.

Archive for July, 2011

The Deductibility of Part 7 Benefits in ICBC UMP Claims

July 29th, 2011

I’ve previously discussed the deductibility of Part 7 Benefits in Tort Claims.  These benefits are also deductible in ICBC UMP (Underinsured Motorist Protection) Claims.  This was demonstrated in CD v. ICBC which I summarize below in my effort to create a searchable UMP judgement database.

In CD v. ICBC the Claimant was injured in a 2003 Collision in California.  The at fault motorist only had $25,000 in Third Party Liability coverage.  The Claimant was insured with ICBC applied to ICBC pursuant to UMP.  The value of the Claimant’s claim was decided via arbitration.  Arbitrator Yule quantified the claim at $27,500 less the $25,000 USD payment that was made by the at fault party’s insurer.  When converted to Canadian funds the payment exceeded the value of the claim leaving ICBC with no responsibility to pay under UMP.

Prior to reaching this conclusion the Arbitrator addressed the deductibility of Part 7 Benefits.  The Claimant claimed special damages of $1,445.  ICBC argued that all of this could have been claimed as a Part 7 Benefit and ICBC was under no obligation to cover these expenses under the provisions of UMP.  Arbitrator Yule agreed and in doing so provided the following reasons:

[ICBC] takes the position that nothing is recoverable for physiotherapy or massage therapy because these expenses are payable as no-fault benefits under Part 7 and, as such, are a “deductible amount” from UMP compensation.  There is no evidence that ICBC refused to pay these expenses under Part 7…I agree that the physiotherapy and massage therapy expenses are not recoverable in these circumstances as part of UMP compensation.  The vehicle repair deductible is not compensible because it is a claim relating to property damage, and UMP compensation is restricted to damages for injury or death.


$30,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for "Moderate" Soft Tissue Injuries

July 28th, 2011

Adding to this site’s ICBC claims pain and suffering database, reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing damages for a moderate soft tissue injury.

In today’s case (Olianka v. Spagnol) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision.  Fault was admitted.   The evidence was not particularly contested and the trial proceeded summarily.  The Court found the Plaintiff suffered moderate soft tissue injuries that were temporarily disabling with symptoms that were expected to linger into the future.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $30,000 Mr. Justice Blair provided the following reasons:

[21] Mr. Olianka suffered what Dr. Neumann describes as a moderate soft tissue injury to the neck, a moderate soft tissue injury to the mid-back and a mild soft tissue injury to his lower back. I accept Mr. Olianka’s evidence with respect to his collision-related injuries and that these injuries precluded him from working for a four-month period. I also accept that Mr. Olianka continues to experience intermittent pain in his neck and upper back which is expected to last for some unknown period. Dr. Neumann opined that by January 14, 2011, Mr. Olianka had made a significant recovery from his injuries and concluded that his residual pain should gradually subside in intensity and frequency. He did not expect Mr. Olianka to suffer any permanent consequences from his collision-related injuries.

[22] Nevertheless, the optimism expressed by Dr. Neumann and reflected in Mr. Olianka’s increased activity level does not overshadow Mr. Olianka’s difficulties for the 27-month period between the collision and Dr. Neumann’s report dated January 14, 2011. In that period, Mr. Olianka, due to his injuries, was unable to work for four months and subsequently those injuries compromised his ability to fully perform his work as he had done prior to the collision. In addition, he was unable to enjoy the leisure activities in which he had participated prior to the collision. This 27-month recovery period must be considered when ascertaining the non-pecuniary damages award to which Mr. Olianka is entitled. I accept that he continues, to some lesser degree, to suffer intermittent pain from his collision-related injuries as described by both Mr. Olianka and Dr. Neumann…

[28] Based on the authorities and the unique evidence found in this case, I find that the appropriate award for Mr. Olianka’s non-pecuniary damages is $30,000, taking into account all contingencies, given the extent of the soft tissue injuries to his neck and back, the disability period of 27 months post-collision, as well as the lingering and ongoing aspect of his injuries, the limitations that the injuries imposed, not just on his ability to work, but also on his ability to partake in those physical activities which occupied his life prior to the collision and which he has only recently been able to resume albeit to a limited extent.


BC Supreme Court Declines Jurisdiction in Out of Province Sexual Abuse Action

July 28th, 2011

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing the jurisdiction of the BC Supreme Court to hear a claim involving alleged sexual abuse which took place out of  Province.

In this week’s case (TC v. AM) the Plaintiff sued her former father in law in the BC Supreme Court claiming he sexually abused her in Montreal.  The Defendant, at all material times, lived in Montreal and continued to reside there when the lawsuit started.  He did not respond to the lawsuit.  The Court ultimately found that no jurisdiction existed to hear this case pursuant to the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act.  In doing so the Mr. Justice Harvey provided the following reasons:

[8] None of the presumptive categories under s. 10 of the CJPTA apply in these circumstances; however, the language of s. 10 clearly indicates that those categories do not limit “the right of the plaintiff to prove other circumstances that constitute a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which a proceeding is based.”

[9] The common law threshold for a real and substantial connection is high. In Josephson v. Balfour Recreation Commission, 2010 BCSC 603, Loo J. stated:

[79] The real and substantial connection test requires that there be a significant or substantial connection: Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416; and UniNet Technologies Inc. v. Communication Services Inc., 2005 BCCA 114.

[10] The jurisprudence in British Columbia suggests that the mere residence of the plaintiff in British Columbia is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a defendant resident outside of the province. Something more is required. This was discussed in Dembroski v. Rhainds, 2011 BCCA 185, where Hall J. referred to the decision of Bruce J. in Roed v. Scheffler, 2009 BCSC 731…

[11] This case lacks the additional element, beyond the mere residence of the plaintiff in this jurisdiction, to support a finding that there is a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts on which a proceeding is based. The action concerns allegations of sexual assault in Quebec in relation to a defendant who continues to reside in Quebec. There is not a “significant connection” as required by the Supreme Court of Canada in Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416.

[12] That the plaintiff suffers damages here is, as was the case in Roed, purely as a result of her residence in British Columbia. As stated by Dickson J. in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393, and referred to in Dembroski, if the essence of a tort is injury, “a paramount factor in determining situs must be the place of the invasion of one’s right to bodily security.” That location in this case is Quebec. The motor vehicle scenarios in Roed and Dembroski are analogous for the purposes of determining territorial competence, as they concern tortious conduct in another jurisdiction. The presence of the plaintiff in British Columbia alone does not establish a real and substantial connection in relation to events that occurred in another jurisdiction where the defendant continues to reside.

[13] Accordingly, I dismiss the plaintiff’s application.


Gross Past Tort Payments Deductible in ICBC UMP Claims

July 27th, 2011

This is the second in my series of UMP Case Summaries.  In today’s case (LD v. ICBC) the arbitrator had to address whether legal fees can be taken into account when considering the deductibility of past tort payments.

In LD the Claimant was involved in as 2003 collision in California.  The Claimant was insured with ICBC and had UMP coverage.  The at fault motorist only had $25,000 in Third Party Liability coverage and ICBC agreed that the Claimant’s claim exceeded this amount.

The parties agreed to have the value of the claim determined via UMP Arbitration.  Total damages of $86,608.31 were assessed.  Prior to this the Claimant already settled with the Defendant’s insurer for the policy limits of $25,000.  She had to hire counsel to achieve this result and after legal fees she received $16,054.

The Claimant argued that only the $16,054 should be deducted from the UMP damage assessment.   The arbitrator (Donald Yule) disagreed and deducted the full $25,000.  In doing so he provided the following reasons:

ICBC, however, submits that the correct deductible amount is what the M’s liability insurer was obliged to pay, namely $25,000.   (This position) is supported by the decision of Arbitrator Paul Fraser, Q.C. in Cederberg v. ICBC (May 18, 1995)….As Mr. Fraser concluded, the obligation to pay attorney’s fees arose out of a separate and independent contract with the attorney which, in no way, reduce the amount paid by the tortfeasor or payable by the tortfeasor’s insurer.  I agree with his analysis.  The full amount of the settlemetn of the M’s liability insurer is therefore a deductible amount.

This decision is also worth reviewing for the non-pecuniary damage assessment.  The Plaintiff suffered various soft tissue injuries.  Non-pecuniary damages were assessed at $55,000.  In doing so Arbitrator Yule made the following findings:

I find that in the accident Mrs. D suffered a Grade III whiplash associated disorder injury, bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome and right ulnar neuropathy, a Grade II lumbosacral spinal strain injury and myofascial pain in her shoulder ridge areas, and bruising to the knee.  These injuries caused headaches, interference with sleep, fatigue, irritability and anxiety.  The bruising resolved in short order.  The low back symptoms resolved within 2 years.  Headaches, and neck pain extending into the shoulders, while significantly inmproved by September, 2005, have nevertheless persisted to the date of hearing…

…I assess Mrs. D’s non-pecuniary damages at $55,000.

I should note that, adjusting for inflation, this assessment is closer to $58,000 in today’s dollars.


Waiting For Police Report Held Insufficient to Postpone Limitation Period in ICBC Claim

July 26th, 2011

Section 6(4) of the BC Limitation Act states in part that a limitation period “does not begin to run against a plaintiff…..until the identity of the defendant…is known to the plaintiff“.  Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, considering this provision in the context of an ICBC Claim.

In this week’s case (Telus Corporation v. Araneda) equipment owned by Telus was struck by a motor vehicle causing $43,000 in damage.  They sued the party they alleged was responsible but did so nine days after the limitation period expired.

Telus argued that the running of the period should be postponed by several days under s. 6(4) of the Limitation Act because it took 18 days for them to receive the police report identifying the defendant.  Mr. Justice McEwan rejected this argument and dismissed the lawsuit.  In doing so the Court provided the following reasons:

[20]. On the day of the accident, Telus, through its employee Dale Summers, knew it had a claim for property damage and knew the name of the tortfeasor was immediately ascertainable from a reliable source, the RCMP.

[21] In saying so, I reject Telus’ argument that a large enterprise should be judged on its “ individual circumstances” and that its step-wise approach to the management of its legal claims is akin to the situation in Strata Plan LMS 2940 v. Quick as a Wink Courier, 2010 BCCA 74. There the Court of Appeal upheld a judge of this Court who had found that an action brought by a strata corporation against an individual one day outside the limitation period was not statute-barred because the strata corporation was obliged to pass a resolution before it could initiate the action, and doing so took some time.

[22] Telus was not impeded by a statutory prerequisite, and there is no reason in principle why a large organization should be judged by a more accommodating standard than would apply to any competent individual. As in Meeker, Telus knew on the first day of the accident that it had suffered actionable harm and that the name of the person involved was ascertainable.

[23] It is regrettable that the limitation period went by in this case. As some of the case law demonstrates Courts frequently go some distance to ensure that cases are tried on their merits. The policy inherent in limitation periods, however, must also be respected. Applying the relevant legal principles to the present case, Telus has not established that it is entitled to postponement, and the action must be dismissed.


UMP Arbitration Caselaw Summary: Non-Pecuniary Damages for Tibial Plateau Fracture

July 25th, 2011

As previously discussed, when catastrophic injuries are sustained through the fault of an under-insured motorist most British Columbians enjoy Underinsured Motorist Protection “UMP”.

Sections 148.1 – 148.4 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation deal with UMP Claims.  When disputes arise as to the availability or the amount of UMP coverage the matter needs to be resolved through private arbitration as opposed to a public lawsuit.   The law requires all UMP decisions from 2007 onward to be published on ICBC’s website.  These cases, unfortunately, are published in PDF Format and they are not search friendly.  To remedy this I’ve decided to include UMP case summaries on this blog.  With that in mind here is the first in a series of UMP cases summaries.

The first UMP judgement published was RAH v. ICBC.  In RAH the Claimant was injured in a 2002 motor vehicle collision.   Fault was admitted.  It was agreed that the value of the claim would exceed the Defendant’s insurance limits and the parties agreed to have the value of the claim adjudicated by way of UMP Arbitration.

The Claimant suffered a comminuted fracture of the left medial and tibial plateaus.  These required surgical correction.   Unfortunately, even with surgical correction, the injury was so severe that the Claimant was left with “a marked disruption of the articular surface which accounted for on-going pain and inability to regain full movement of the left knee“.   The prognosis was for gradual worsening with a likelihood of a total knee replacement.   It was accepted that this injury would seriously impede the Claimant’s ability to earn a living and total damages of $681,000 were awarded.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) at $95,000 the arbitrator (Donald Yule) provided the following reasons:

The Claimant sustained severely comminuted medial and lateral tibial plateau fractures of the left knee.  He has undergone two surgeries, one to reduce the fractures with two plates and 10 screws and a second procedure to remove the hardware.  He faces the prospect of further surgery for a total knee joint replacement with a possible further revision 15 years later.  He has permanent on-going pain which will inevitably worsen over time until the first knee joint replacement surgery is done.  He has permanent loss of flexion of the left knee and knee joint replacement surgery will likely increase the loss of flexion.   He cannot return to his former occupation as industrial nurse/medic.  He cannot walk or sit for prolonged periods of time without causing an increase in left knee pain.   He takes non-morphine analgesics on a daily basis and occasionally Percocet for break-through pain.   He continues to use a cane.  Prolonged standing, walking on uneven surfaces, and going up and down stairs all aggravate his symptoms and will hasten the time when knee joint replacement surgery is required.  The claimant was physically active outdoors, apart from his work, before the Accident, both in the Scouting and Fourth Ranger groups and for recreational hiking, hunting, fishing and camping.  These activities except in a most limited and superficial manner, are now foreclosed to him…

…I assess the non-pecuniary damages at $95,000.

I should point out that this case was decided in 2008 and adjusting for inflation the assessment would be approximately $100,000.


Plaintiff At Fault in Fatal Tractor Trailer Collision for Running Stop Sign

July 22nd, 2011

Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with the issue of fault following a two vehicle collision.

In last week’s case (Rackstraw v. Robertson) the Plaintiff was involved in a collision with a tractor trailer.  The tractor trailer was travelling Northbound on Mount Lehman Road.  The Plaintiff was travelling eastbound on Sunset Crescent which forms a T-intersection with Mount Lehman Road.

The Defendant “decided to pass a northbound vehicle ahead of him”.   To do so he accelerated above the speed limit and had to travel in the southbound lane.  As he did so he saw the Plaintiff approach the intersection and run the stop sign which was facing him on Sunset Crescent.  The vehicles collided and the Plaintiff died shortly after.

Ultimately the Plaintiff was found fully at fault for the collision.  In reaching this conclusion Madam Justice Fisher provided the following reasons:

[25] Mr. Rackstraw owed a duty of care to other drivers travelling on Mount Lehman Road, in particular Mr. Robertson.  He breached that duty by failing to stop at the stop sign, failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to yield to the Robertson vehicle when he entered the roadway on Mount Lehman Road.  Mr. Rackstraw was the servient driver at all times…

[32] …. the fact that Robertson was travelling over the speed limit will only constitute negligence if his speed is what prevented him from taking reasonable evasive action: see Cooper v. Garrett, 2009 BCSC 35 at para. 42.  In my view, there is no evidence which establishes that Robertson’s speed prevented him from doing so. His truck was just about at the intersection when he first saw Rackstraw’s vehicle, and only his trailer, or part of it, was still in the southbound lane when the impact occurred…

[37]it is my opinion that the accident in the case at bar was caused solely by the failure of Mr. Rackstraw to stop at the stop sign, to keep a proper lookout and to yield to the Robertson vehicle when he entered the roadway on Mount Lehman Road.  When Robertson started his pass, there was no reason for him to believe that he could not do so safely or that he would interfere with the travel of another vehicle.  As in Ferguson, he was engaged in a lawful manoeuvre.  He did not see, and could not reasonably have seen, the Rackstraw vehicle until he was just about at the intersection and he had no reasonable opportunity to avoid the collision.


More on Part 7 Medical Exams Barring Tort Exams

July 21st, 2011

As previously discussedICBC can typically arrange an ‘independent’ medical exam (IME) in one of two ways.  The first is when an insured applies for first party no-fault benefits.  Section 99 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Regulation gives ICBC the power to compel an IME in these circumstances.  The second is under Rule 7-6(1) of the BC Supreme Court rules which allows the court to order an independent exam to “level the playing field” in an injury lawsuit.

Two sets of reasons for judgement were recently brought to my attention from the BC Supreme Court, Campbell River Registry, discussing when a previous Part 7 Exam will prevent ICBC from obtaining a new expert under the Rules of Court.

In the first case (Robinson v. Zerr) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision.  In the course of dealing with ICBC for his Part 7 Benefits the Plaintiff attended a medical appointment arranged by ICBC with an orthopaedic surgeon.  In the course of the tort lawsuit ICBC attempted to get an opinion from a second orthopaedic surgeon.  The Plaintiff opposed this.  ICBC brought an application to compel the second exam but this was dismissed with the Court finding that the first report strayed beyond what was required for a Part 7 exam.  In dismissing the Application Master McCallum provided the following reasons:

[8]  The authorities are clear that the Part 7 report can be treated, as it was in Robertson v. Grist, as a report in the tort action if it is shown that it effectively covered all of that ground, as I understand it.  It is clear from Dr. Dommisse’s that it does cover all of what one may expect in a report.   Dr. Dommisse did not have access to the pre-accident clinical records.  However, it is clear he knew of the plaintiff’s history because he describes past treatments and past history…

[10]  Dr. Dommisse went through the examination and gave his opinion.  His opinion is not qualified in any way.  He does not suggest that there is more information he needs.  He makes no recommendaiton for treatment.  There is nothing to suggest that, if he had more information or that he wished more information before he could make the determinations he did.

[11]  The report, in my view, is the same of sufficiently similar to the report in Robertson v. Grist and obtained in circumstances that persuade me that this report is indeed the opportunity for the level playing field that the authorities call for.  The defendant has had the opportunity to have the plaintiff examined by an examiner of his choosing.  Although the adjuster references Part 7 claim and the disability benefits, Dr. Dommisse does not, in my view, treat the report as limited in any way and gives his opinion on every aspect of the claim…

[15]  In those circumstances the defendant’s application is dismissed.

In the second case (Lamontage v. Adams) a similar result was reached with a Court finding that a subsequent exam should be with the Part 7 physician as that examiner covered ground relevant in the tort claim.

The above cases are unreported but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy of the reasons to anyone who contacts me and requests these.


$140,000 Non-Pecuniary Damage Assessment for T-12 Burst Fracture

July 20th, 2011

Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages following a 2005 motor vehicle collision.

In this week’s case (X v. Y) the Plaintiff was an RCMP officer.  (Supplemental reasons were released permitting the Plaintiff to identify himself by initials and to seal the Court file given the Plaintiff’s undercover work).  He was responding to an emergency call.  He was travelling on his motorcycle when he was struck by a truck driven by the Defendant who was in the course of making a U-turn.  Although fault was put at issue the Court found the defendant fully liable for the collision.

The Plaintiff suffered a burst fracture at the T-12 level which required surgical intervention.  He suffered from chronic pain following this and although he was able to return to police work he could only do so in a more administrative (as opposed to front-line) capacity.  In assessing non-pecuniary damages at $140,000 Madam Justice Dardi provided the following reasons:

[101] The plaintiff underwent surgery on July 21, 2005, after which Dr. D. explained to the plaintiff that he had a burst fracture in his vertebrae in the thoracolumbar region, and that metal rods, clamps and screws had been placed in the area to fuse the spine together. The plaintiff was fitted with a clamshell brace in order to stabilize his fused spine and prevent him from moving. He was not allowed to sit or stand up unless he was wearing this brace. He used a walker to manoeuvre around the hospital. After physiotherapy treatments, he was able to walk short distances, go to the bathroom, and get in and out of his hospital bed. He was released from the hospital on July 27, 2005…

[147] It is uncontroversial that the plaintiff suffered a serious injury in the accident: a fractured spine which required surgical fusion with metal instrumentation. The medical evidence clearly establishes that he is permanently disabled insofar as repetitive heavy bending, lifting and high-impact activities. He has an increased risk for the development or acceleration of degenerative disc disease and is at an increased susceptibility for reinjuring his back…

[163] In summary on this issue, I find that the plaintiff’s symptoms are genuine. He regularly experiences varying degrees of pain and significant stiffness, tightness, and spasms in his back. The cold exacerbates his symptoms. He will continue to experience episodic aggravation of his symptoms. He is at an increased risk of developing degenerative arthritis and he has an increased susceptibility for further injury to his back. He also faces the possibility of another surgery to remove the hardware in his back. He has reduced stamina and tires much more easily than prior to the collision. I also conclude that as the plaintiff ages, there is a substantial likelihood that his pain and discomfort will increase because he will not be able to maintain the same level of conditioning in the muscles supporting the fused area of his back.

[164] In terms of his career, the preponderance of the evidence clearly supports a finding that the plaintiff is not fit to perform the full range of policing duties. He must avoid impact activities and any risk of physical altercations with suspects, which restricts him from participation in front-line policing duties. He can no longer perform the duties of a motorcycle officer, nor is he able to pursue his ambition to join the ERT as an operational member…

[179] While the authorities are instructive, I do not propose to review them in detail, as each case turns on its own unique facts. Having reviewed all of the authorities provided by both counsel, and in considering the plaintiff’s particular circumstances, I conclude a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages is $140,000.


Show Me The Money 5: 2010 ICBC Doctor and Lawyer Billings Released

July 19th, 2011

Its hard to believe this is my fifth installment of this series but its that time of year again.   ICBC has released their Statements and Schedules of Financial Information for 2010.  (You can click here, here, here, and here for my previous 4 discussions of this topic).

As discussed last year, this annual report contains a lot of interesting information.  None more so than the billings of “Suppliers of Goods and Services“.  Some of the Suppliers of Goods and Services are Lawyers and Doctors.  If you browse through this annual report you can see just how much any given lawfirm or doctor has been paid by ICBC in the 2010 Calendar Year.

ICBC routinely uses the services of a handful of doctors.  A quick look through this data reveals just how profitable the “Independent Medical Examination” business really can be.  Here are some highlighted reported ICBC doctor billings for 2010:

Dr. Paul B Bishop:  $366,226

Dr. Marc R. Boyle:  $122,207

Dr. K.M.W. Christian:  $95,752

Dr. I. G. Dommisse $236,550

Dr. Kenneth J Favero:  $304,731

Dr. Martin P. Grypma:  $304,375

Dr. H. E. Hawk:  $269,908

Dr. Duncan M. Laidlow: $104,082

Dr. Jordan M. Leith:  $198,058

Dr. Alexander Levin:  $426,744

Dr. Stephen Maloon:  $396,591

Dr. R. W. McGraw:  $387,600

Dr. Duncan McPherson:  $163,153

Dr. Alexander Moll:  $147,239

Dr. T. O`Farrell:  $113,595

Dr. N. K. Reebye:  $251,155

Dr. Peter M. Rees:  $232,338

Dr. J. F. Schweigel:  $324,271

Dr. O. M. Sovio:  $290,427

Another provider of ’services’ revealed in these financial statements are law firms who do ICBC defence work. I have previously posted that some lawfirms and lawyers work both sides of the fence, that is on some cases they work for ICBC and in other cases they work for injured plaintiff’s suing someone insured by ICBC. According to the BC Law Society there is nothing wrong with this but these lawyers need to let their clients know if they signed the ICBC defence contract (known as the SAA) which restricts the lawyers ability to make claims against ICBC.  This is required so clients can make an informed decision when choosing to hire their lawyer.

If you hired a lawyer to advance your ICBC injury claim and are curious if your lawyer also works for ICBC you can check these annual reports to see just how much money any given lawfirm is paid by ICBC in each calendar year.